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PREFACE 
This thesis is a study of the Soviet Navy since World 
War II. The fact that the Soviet Navy has, in the past thirty 
years, been transformed from a position of comparative naval 
insignificance to a naval power second only to that of the 
United States of ffinerica is, clearly, the most important naval 
development of the post war world and as such deserves 
description, explanation and evaluation. 
The account which follows seeks to describe this 
development. and to show to what extent it has -
(a) been brought about by changes in Soviet strategic 
assessments of the importance of sea power; 
(b) altered the role of the Navy in Soviet military 
doctrine as enunciated by Soviet political, 
military and naval leaders; 
(c) provided the Soviet Navy with the means to carry 
out the roles assigned to it at various periods 
in the post war era. 
It also indicates the extent to which the geographical position 
of the Fleet areas and the limitations imposed on any branch 
of the armed services by the priorities of the political 
leadership have influenced the Navy's development and its 
capabilities. 
Chapters 1 and 2 establish the significance of the 
geographic handicaps impose0. on the Soviet Navy and provide an 
appreciation of the role of the navy in Soviet military 
doctrine prior to and in the immediate post World War II 
period. This is essential background for what follows. No 
sensible evaluation of the strength of the Soviet Navy can be 
attempted without appreciating the fact that its total strength 
is allocated to four widely dispersed fleet areas each of 
which has its point of egress to the high seas flanked by 
foreign powers belonging to adverse alliance systems. Equally 
no account of the changing roles of the Soviet Navy or 
~xplanation of its growth in terms of numbers or types of 
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vessels available is complete v;ithout the realisation that, 
historically,primacy has been afforded the ground forces, 
-v;i th the navy playing the subordinate role of "loyal assistant". 
The extent to which this perception of the navy, as essentially 
a subordinate arm of service, has changed, both within the navy, 
within other branches of the armed services and within the 
political leadership of the Soviet Union, is a major concern 
of this thesis. 
The description of the growth of the Soviet Navy is most 
apparent in those chapters (3, 5 and 8) v1hich are primarily 
concerned with ship construction and those (6 and 10) where the 
forward deployment of Soviet naval vessels is discussed. The 
reasonably clear cut facts of actual construction,armament and 
deployment constitute the hard evidence of Soviet naval develop-
ment. These facts, which together with geography, provide the 
basis for evaluating the significance of naval development, 
require explanation. Here the explanation is offered in terms 
of a complex of inter-related factors: changing strategic 
assessments arising from the developing capabilities of the 
Soviet Union's adversaries, especially the United States, 
evolving military doctrine, changes in the broad national 
priorities of the political leadership, inter-and intra-service 
debate and industrial and technological capabilities. 
Unfortunately the information available about many of 
these factors is limited, especially in open sources. In some 
areas it is unavailable for significant periods of time and in 
all cases the amount of information has varied as political 
power has passed from Stalin - Khrushchev - Brezhnev and 
Kosygin. However there is sufficient information in the open 
sources to enable a researcher to speculate with a high degree 
of confidence. The variable amounts of information also impose 
a certain unevenness on the narrative. For example although 
one may suspect the irrunanence of intra-naval debate there is 
only one period, during the 1960's, 
into the pages of Morskoy Sbornik. 
when evidence of it spilt 
Similarly only fragmentary 
first hand accounts of t.he intervention of the political leader-
ship into the details of ship armament have been recorded; no 
leading political figure :1as been as open in his critical 
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comments on certain aspects of the navy as Khrushchev, and 
only Gorshkov has provided us with an insight into his broad 
understanding of the potential uses of sea power in war and 
peace. tihere these invaluable insights into the broad processes 
of decision making are of assistance in understanding the 
development of the Soviet Navy, and where they provide infor-
mation on the debate on the changing role of the navy and the 
force structures necessary to carry out that role, they have 
been incorporated into the discussion. 
Two distinct but complementary techniques have been 
employed in the course of the thesis: 
(1) Analysis of ship building progra~nes. 
Initial research established the broad patterns of Soviet 
ship construction since the war. Once the dates of entry into 
service for the various classes of vessels had been established, 
and their broad capabilities assessed, it was possible to 
determine the time of original decision to construct any 
particular class. This was done by assuming, on professional 
naval advice, a lead time of ten years. This means that a new 
class of ship appe.aring in 1974 is a response to a requirement 
which was identified some ten years previously, in roughly 
1963/1964. During this ten year period the hull, armament, 
machinery and electronic systems are designed and developed 
and brought together resulting in the new vessel. 
It was possible to group classes of vessels into broad 
construction programmes. The initial classification of building 
programmes >vas supported by the quite dramatic evidence of cut 
backs and cancellations of some classes, often resulting in 
programmes being dropped at a time when they had just entered 
full production or, in the case of the Sverdlov class cruiser, 
requiring the dismantling of vessels on the slipways. Moreover 
there was evidence of conversions which so altered the armament 
of some submarines and surface vessels as to change their 
primary roles. This suggests that the Soviets felt it necessary 
to have an interim capability for certain missions while 
specific purpose designed vessels were being constructed. 
I~ is possible to be quite confident about the primary 
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w·ar time role intended for a vessel, despite the fact that 
any particular v1arship may be utilised for other purposes in 
peace or even war. A vessel's mix of weapons systems, its 
eventual deployment patterns and the mix of units constructed 
under the same programme are all strongly suggestive of its 
primary role. 
Confirmation of the building programmes, the requirements 
which lead to their initiation, and the specific purpose of 
vessels constructed was provided by the other major source of 
evidence:-
(2) Analysis of public statements and written material. 
An analysis of the public statements and writings of 
Soviet political, military and naval spokesman, particularly 
in those periods which previous analysis of construction pro-
grammes suggested to be particularly important, established 
the major pre-occupations and concerns of those figures with 
respect to the Soviet Navy, and its major adversary, the 
United States Navy. They provide evidence of Soviet strategic 
assessments, military doctrine and naval requirements. On 
occasions, most noticeably during the Khrushchev period, they 
indicate wide and sometimes bitter debate. The location of 
original construction programmes within the context of these 
statements provides additional confirmation for the location 
of initial decisions for ship construction and for the estimate 
of the specific purpose of any class of vessel. 
The chapters which follow, while being broadly chrono-
logical, are s·tructured to lead the reader from an account of 
evolving Soviet military doctrine and naval requirement to the 
Soviet response as manifested in the construction of new 
vessels and their eventual deployment. There is also an 
attempt to analyse the actual capability of the Soviet Navy to 
fulfil its assigned role within military doctrine. So that 
specific responses to evolving requirements can be better 
understood the broad directions of total national resource 
allocation and the debate between various branches of the 
armed service and within the navy are also discussed. 
It is perhaps necc~sary to indicate why Soviet naval 
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deployment to the Indian Ocean has been singled out for more 
detailed examination. In part this is because the writer is 
located in Australia and is naturally concerned about develop-
ments in his own region. More important, however, there is a 
great deal of evidence concerning actual ship movements which 
facilitates discussion of the peace time uses to which the 
Soviets put their nev1ly acquired naval power. It is also a 
deployment which illustrates the difficulties faced by the 
Soviet Navy operating at a great distance from its home bases 
and suggests that in many important respects the Navy was 
unprepared for such an operation. 
The body of the thesis ends with an analysis of Admiral 
Gorshkov's series of articles "Navies in War and Peace". The 
series is seen as playing a dual role, education and advocacy, 
at a time when the Soviet Navy is deficient in the resources 
necessary to match Gorshkov's claims, and faces a serious 
problem of block obsolescence. The analysis highlights the 
Admiral's views on the changing role of the navy in the armed 
forces, the roles of the navy in war and peace, and his 
attitude towards arms control. These constitute broadly the 
educative aspects of the series and lead to the advocacy of 
a firm political decision to implement a naval policy which 
will enable the Soviet Union to reap the benefits which a 
strong navy can provide. 
CHAPTER I 
The Impact of Geography and Subordination on 
the Navy Prior to vlorld War II 
Introduction 
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Historically the Tsarist Empire and its Soviet successor 
have not been dependent on the maintenance of sea lines of 
communication for their trading relationships. Consequently 
sea power has developed in the context of defending the 
Russian/Soviet land mass from sea based attack and protecting 
the army's coastal flanks. This has meant that for much of its 
history Russian/soviet sea power was primarily a coastal 
defence force. Moreover, the development and subsequent use 
of sea power has been influenced by geographical factors, 
limited access to enclosed seas whose egress points were 
controlled by foreign powers, and the wide dispersion of the 
fleet areas themselves. 
The development of sea power has taken place within a 
context of naval subordination to the land forces. There have 
also been continuous disputes within the armed services as a 
whole and within the Navy over the actual role and importance 
of the Navy. 
The following discussion seeks to develop the implications 
of these facts. Further, it seeks to test the proposition that 
since 1917 the Soviet Government has attached very great 
importance to naval development. The concern is firstly, to 
indicate the impact of geography and subordination on the Navy 
and, secondly, to indicate the impact of the Soviet regime on 
the Navy prior to World lvar II. This will provide a starting 
point from which to assess the degree of continuity and change 
in the post 1var era. 
:>( >< X 
Four general points emerge from a reading of histories 
of the Russian/Soviet Navy from the time of Peter the Great 
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until 1945. 1 Briefly these are: 
A. The limitations which geographical factors have 
imposed on the navy. 
B. The basically continental nature of the wars 
involving the Russian and Soviet states. 
c. The dominant role of the army in the armed forces 
which resulted in an atmosphere of official indifference 
towards the navy relieved from time to time by the 
policy of individual autocrats. 
D. The capacity for innovation and improvisation. 
A. Geographical Limitations: 
The Soviet Union, like its predecessor the Russian Empire, 
is geographically a continental landmass, (approximately 8.65 
million square miles in 1956) with long coastlines but limited 
access to the high seas. (See map p. 7a) Historically its 
concerns have been continental. Hence Russia did not need to 
construct and maintain a naval fleet to develop and safeguard 
sea lines of communication. The Russian fleet was developed by 
1. The following works give an outline of the major events of 
the Russian/Soviet naval history. Confining themselves in 
the main to a chronology of events they do not offer many 
useful generalisations. 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'Navies in war and peace'. Morskoy 
Sbornik 1972, Nos. 2-6, 8-12; 19731 No. 2, translated in 
Selected Translations from Soviet Naval Digest: u.s. 
Department of the Navy. Hereafter U.S. Navy trans. followed 
by the page number of the translation. 
Hucul, Walter C. The Evolution of Russian and Soviet 
Sea Power, 1853-1953. Ph.D. Disser·tation, University of 
California, 1953. 
Mitchell, Mairin, The Maritime History of Russia, 
1848-1948, (London, 1949). 
Fairhall, David, Russia looks to the Sea. (London, 
1971) Chapter 1-4 (contains interesting and general inter-
pretations). 
Woodward, David, The Russians at Sea (London, 1965). 
Saunders, M.G. (ed) The Soviet Navy (New York, 1958) 
Part I. 
Since this chapter was completed an additional work has 
appeared: 
Mitchell, D.i'J. A History of Russian and Soviet Sea 
Pmver (New York, 197 4) • 
It has in no way altered the original draft. 
The USSR and its outlets to the open sea~ 
···:~:·;.;.~,:~;:.}·%·:· $.1Wk.'%t[t~ The area normally covered by winter pack ice. 
~&i!t-#iff: 
N North Pole 
1 Northern Fleet. 2 Baltic Fleet. 3 Black Sea Fleet. 4 Far Eastern (Pacific) Fleet. 
,_. 
jl> 
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those Tsars who recognised the importance of naval forces to 
defend the Russian Empire from sea based attacks or who sought 
to provide protection for the army's coastal flanks. It v;as 
a tool developed and used by those who understood the 
importance of sea power in defending and extending a continental 
empire but alloVIed to grow blunt and virtually useless by less 
perceptive or ambitious successors. 
Those seas to which the Russian Empire eventually gained 
access, the Baltic, the Arctic, the Black Sea and the Sea of 
Japan, are all to some extent restricted both by ice and by 
narrow egress points to the wider seas. Moreover, these seas 
are separated by considerable distances. Thus, because trade 
routes were concentrated upon the Eurasian land mass, and 
because the seas to which the Russians eventually gained access 
were icebound during the winter months, the Russians never 
developed specific maritime-related industries. There was no 
steady supply of sailors nor an indigenous shipbuilding 
industry. 1 In short, Russia lacked a maritime tradition. 
1) Egress Points 
The fact that the exits from the various seas to which 
the Russians had access were controlled by foreign powers had 
two important effects on the navy: it faced great difficulties 
in getting to the high seas and it was quite unable to control 
the access of non-riparian naval powers into those seas of 
major defensive concern to it, namely, the Baltic and Black 
Seas with their separate fleets and, to a lesser extent, the 
Pacific and Northern areas which drew on units from the 
established fleet areas. 
Under the terms of the Montreux Convention of 1936, vlhich 
governs use of the Black Sea Straits, warships of all powers 
are allowed transit rights in time of peace, provided they 
notify the Turkish authorities and accept restrictions on 
certain categories of vessel. During war-time the Straits are 
1. For a similar point see Gorshkov, S.G. 'Navies in war and 
peace', Morskoy Sbornik No. 2 (1972), U.S. Navy trans p.9. 
Gorshkov does not, however, draw the same conclusion. 
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to be closed unless Turkey herself is involved in the vmr or 
1 is in imminent danger of attack. The Soviet Union signed 
the Montreux Convention. Although they preferred their 
traditional position, transit righ·ts to be granted to littoral 
2 pow·ers only, the t.erms of the Convention did prohibit entrance 
of warships to the Black Sea during hostilities not involving 
Turkey. The question of exit from the Straits could scarcely 
have arisen at that time, given the weakness of the Black Sea 
Fleet and its role as assistant to the ground forces. 
2) Distance 
The problem of distance between the major areas of 
concentration of the Russian fleet is difficult to illustxate 
because history offers so few examples of major unit movement 
between one area and another. Gorshkov has noted that the 
factor of distance implied that each area ought to have 
sufficient naval force to carry out the missions assigned to 
it, or else forces would have to be concentrated before an 
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engagement. 
3) Internal Communications 
A final difficulty imposed by geography arose from the 
inadequacy of the internal communications system throughout 
the vast land mass; a deficiency v1hich sea links were unable 
to make good. 
During the period of the second Five Year Plan, the Soviet 
1. Vali, Feranc A., The Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford, 
California, 1972). Appendix 12, p. 200-233, has the full 
text of the agreement. Chapter 3 contains a detailed 
discussion of the Convention. 
2. The Soviet delegate at Montreux called for the prohibition 
of transit rights for all non-riparian powers. Vali, op. 
cit., p. 37-38. 
3. Gorshkov, S.G., 'Russia's difficult road to the sea', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 3, 1972. U.S. Navy trans, p. 11, and 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'Into the oceans on behalf of science', 
Horskoy Sbornik_, No. 4, 1972. U.S. Navy trans, p. 13. 
This is a clear case of Gorshkov using analysis of history 
to make a point of contemporary relevance. 
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governnent attempted to improve internal water transport by 
linking the major river systems with canals connecting the 
White Sea, the Caspian and the Baltic. The opening of the 
Volga-Don Canal in 1952 and the Volga-Baltic Canal in 1964 
completed the project. The design of the locks and waterways 
and the vulnerability of the system to air atta.ck suggest that 
naval requirements were not considered in the project. 1 
'rhe Soviet Union has made a considerable effort to open 
the Northern Sea Route, linking the Northern and Pacific Fleets 
during the period (July-September) in which navigation is 
possible. The route was developed primarily for the movement 
of domestic trade along stretches of the arctic coast, and 
although it has been 
only nuclear powered 
used for the transfer of surface warships 
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submarines can transit all year round. 
Vessels using this route have to pass close to Alaska and gain 
access to the Pacific Fleet area through the straits separating 
the Japanese islands from the mainland. 
B. Continental \\Tars 
Despite the important contribution of the navy in various 
wars against littoral powers which had access to the same seas 
as the Russian fleets the navy was strategically subordinate 
to the army, for the majority of wars fought by the Russian 
state were against other continental land powers. Japan was 
the only littoral power which was a sea power, dependent on 
the control of the sea to land and supply its forces on the 
Asian mainland. 3 The fact that the Russian military est.ablish-
ment was so unprepared in 1904 to deal with a situation which 
1. A discussion of the significance and limitations of the 
Soviet canal system can be found in: 
Shafter, R.A. 'A new Red naval doctrine in the 
making' USNIP, Vol. 78, No. 9, 1952. 
Hibbs, R.S. 'Significance of the Volga-Don Canal' 
USNIP, Vol. 82, No. 6, 1956. 
Pollard, F.C. 'Red Navy doctrine' USNIP, Vol. 79, 
No. 9, 1953. 
2. Fairhall, D. op.cit., pp. 34-50. 
3. Cotten, Lyman A. 'The naval strategy of the Russo-Japanese 
War' USNIP, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1910, pp. 47-50. 
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it belatedly realised required the navy to play a leading role 
indicates the impact of a primarily continent-orientated 
military tradition. 
Throughout its history the fleet has been used, with a 
greater or lesser degree of success, as 'the faithful assistant 
1 
of the ••. Army', a tradition it maintained until after World 
War II. This role was appropriate when the major threat.s arose 
from the continent and when non-continental powers had to enter 
the restricted seas to reach the Russian/Soviet navy. 
C. The Position of the Navy vis-a-vis the other Armed Forces 
The present Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, 
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, S.G. Gorshkov, 
has recently noted, 
The development and employment of the Russian 
Fleet undoubtedly was greatly determined by 
the fact that Hussia was the largest continental 
country in the world. The defence of its 
borders in wars with contiguous land enemies 
took place mainly with the aid of armies, 
which created the prerequisites for under-
estimates of the Fleet by Tsarist high 
officials. As a result of this and a series 
of other reasons (among these not the least of 
which was the economy) our country's fleet 
developed rather unevenly. 2 
1) The role of the Navy 
The strategic role of the Navy in wars primarily 
continental in character has already been indicated. The 
dominance of the Army, even in naval thinking, is reflected 
in the inability of the Tsarist Navy to perceive a clear 
strategic role for itself. In the aftermath of the Russo-
Japanese War N. Klado, then a Professor of the St. Petersburg 
Academy, claimed, 
During more than two centuries of the history 
1. Yumashev, Admiral, I.S., 'Navy Day Speech', Pravda 
July 27th, 1947, p. 2. 
2. Gorshkov, S.G., 'Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 3, 1972, u.s. Navy trans, p. 10. 
of our much suffering fleet we have not 
sho~~ ourselves capable of deciding ... 
what kind of fleet we need, or absolutely 
whether we need one or not.l 
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Kaldo's comments were echoed by Victor Novitskii, who in 1911 
lamented that five years after the Russo-Japanese War the 
debate on the Russian Navy had still not come to any 
1 . 2 cone us~on. 
Admiral Gorshkov in his reflections on the history of 
the Tsarist navy notes that War Minister Kuropatkin advised 
the Tsar 
the lessons of history have taught us to 
follow the same path which our forefat.hers 
took, and see Russia's main force to be its 
land army.3 
To the extent that Russia needed a navy it was to be one capable 
of 'handling modest coastal defence missions•. 4 The difficulty 
for the advocates of a large offensive navy was that history 
indicated that Russia's 'main force' was indeed its army. If 
the navy had performed a more vital than coastal defence it 
was as 'assistant to the army•. The only occasions on which 
this overall assessment proved disastrous was when Russia was 
attacked by strong naval powers. 
The initial Soviet view of the relative primacy of the 
Army ~las made apparent during the Civil War. Naval units 
played little or no role as such, and most of the Black Sea 
fleet was scuttled. Consideration was given to destroying 
the Baltic Fleet after the Kronstadt Mutiny. Lenin held that 
l. 
2. 
3. 
• 
-. 
.The sailors •.• were unreliable: the 
navy was useless, it consumed coal, food 
Klado, N. The Battle for the Sea of Japan, (London, 1906) 
'l'ranslated by J. H. Dickson and F. P. Marchant. p. 278. 
Novitskii, v., Pomni Voinu (Moscow, 1911), pp. 17-20 cited 
in R. Kerner, 'The Soviet Union as a Sea Power', in 
Weigert-Stefansson-Harrison, New Compass of the World (New 
York, 1949), p. 118. 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea', 
u.s. Navy Trans, p. 9. 
Ibid., p. 9 • 
and clothing, of vlhich the country was 
desperately short: and so its disbandment 
would be pure gain. 
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It was only due to Trotsky's intervention that the Navy was 
saved. 1 
Sokolovsky states, in a summary of Soviet naval activity 
during l'>/orld War II, 
In strategic operations, the Navy ordinarily 
did not operate independently, .•. The Navy's 
principal efforts were directed at cooperating 
with the Ground Forces ••. 2 
and Admiral Isakov claims that the Soviet Navy's 
most important task .•. in all Soviet waters 
has been to protect the strategic flanks of 
the Red Army, extending to the coasts, against 
enemy landing parties and naval operations, 
and to direct its own blows against the enemy's 
flanks and rear.3 
2) Lines of command 
Further evidence of the dominant position of the Army is 
to be seen in the lines of command established in actual combat 
situations. During the Crimean War, Menshikov, as co~~ander in 
chief of the Russian Army, had authority over the naval leaders, 
Admirals Nakhimov and Kornilov, in the Black Sea. 4 
During the Russo-Japanese War there was no formulation of 
a coordinated plan for activities at sea but rather a series of 
sporadic directives. The General Staff under Kuropatkin 
concentrated on winning a victory on the 11anchurian battlefield 
1. Deutscher, I. The Prophet Unarmed, (London, 1959), pp.55-56. 
2. Sokolovsky, Marshall V.D.,ed. Military Strategy, lst ed. 
Moscow, Feb. 1963, Translated Rand Corporation (Prentice-
Hall, 1963, p. 262. 
3. Isakov, Admiral I.S., The Red Fleet in the Second World War, 
translated J. Dural, (Hutchinson, 1944), p. 16. 
4. Mitchell, M. op.cit., p. 130, Hucul, op.cit., p. 134-5. 
Gorshkov, 'Into the Oceans on Behalf of Science', u.s. Navy 
Trans, pp. 4-5. 
14 
and treated the naval staff as a low level committee. 1 
During the two World Wars naval subordination to the 
Army continued. 
The Russian navy during the First vlorld War 
was not only under orders of the Supreme 
Command of the military forces and could 
not order the disposition of the naval units 
in the Baltic without. authority from army 
headquarters but the Baltic fleet v1as even 
subordinated to an intermediate army commander 
responsible for the defence of Petrograd.2 
The Revolution, the ensuing Civil War and the rising at 
Kronstadt were to diminish even further the significance of 
the navy. The navy presented t\vo difficulties: the absence 
of the technical and industrial prerequisites for a naval 
force, and the political unreliability of the sailors. The 
officers in the main were ex-Tsarist officers who had been 
kept on and protected by Trotsky because of their expertise, 
while the men had demonstrated their unreliability in the 
Kronstadt Mutiny. 
Despite the creation of an independent Navy Corrmissariat 
in late 1937 Admiral Kuznetsov, vlho was Commissar for the Navy 
from April 1939 to January 1947, found himself powerless to 
effect major decisions. During the Finnish Campaign decisions 
involving coordination of the Army and Navy were taken by 
Stalin and the two most senior soldiers, the People's Commissar 
for Defence and the Chief of the General Staff, and consequently 
'decisions concerning our fleet were adopted without (naval) 
participation•. 3 Stalin's dominance ensured that 
In practice the People's Commissar for 
Defence >vas not the Supreme Commander, nor 
was the People's Commissar for the Navy 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleets. Stalin 
took all the decisions and others had to act 
on them.4 
1. Hucul, op.cit., pp.223-224. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 181. 
2. Hucul, op.cit., p. 354 and alsop. 298. Hitchell, op. 
cit., pp. 323-324. 
3. Kuznetsov, N.G. 'Before the War', part 7, International 
Affairs, (Moscow, November 1966), p. 97. 
4. Kuznetsov, N.G. 'Before the War', part 9, International 
Affairs, (Moscmv, Jan. 1967), p. 103. 
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Kuznetsov realised that in any future wur the Navy 
would inevitably be subordinate to land forces, 'and we had 
no intention of isolating our problems from theirs• 1 yet 
'(B)ecause the organization at the centre was not clear, it 
was impossible to decide many questions in the field'. In 
particular, the question of which Front (Army Group) the 
Baltic Fleet should be subordinated to, and how ·the Fleet 
units and Front organizations were to coordinate their 
operations were major areas or uncertainty. 2 
Kutnetsov complains that he was denied access to the 
decision-making areas of greatest importance and also complains 
of the attitude of leading armed forces personalities. He 
states that Marshal Timoshenko, as People's Commissar for 
Defence, was too busy to inform the Navy of decisions which 
affected it, and the Chief of General Staff, Army General 
Zhukov, 'made no effort at all to go into naval matters•. 3 
4) Resource allocation to the fleet 
The Army had prior claim on the limited resources of an 
industrially backward state. 
Klado summarised the position of naval forces in the pre-
revolution period, 'All questions regarding the importance of 
naval forces •.• appear to revolve around the capabilities of 
the army'. 4 Klado charged that financial strictures on the 
1. Ibid., p. 101. 
3. Kuznetsov, N.G., 'Before the War' part 9, p.lOl. Zhukov, G., 
'£he Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, translated by A. P. N. (London, 
1971) pp. 204-205 replied to these charges. Given the 
urgency of matters to do with the Red Army, 'I could not 
familiarize myself thoroughly with the state of naval 
forces'. Zhukov dismissed the question of a personality 
clash thus 'I do not remember nmJ whether it was a case of 
two comrades (Kuznetsov and I.S. Isakov, Chief of the Main 
Naval Headquarters) not being able to get along with me or 
whether I was unable to work with them, but it makes 
absolutely no difference'. 
~. Kuznetsov op.cit. 
4. Klado, N., 'Znachenie Fleta v. Riadu Voennykh Stredstv 
Gosudarstva' Pomni Voinu (1911), pp. 26-27, cited in Hucul 
op.cit., p. 282. 
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navy hampered its training programme and made it unlikely that 
those forces which the state had provided would be used 
effectively. 1 
The Revolution of October 1917 and the period of the 
civil war did little to enhance the prospects of the Navy. 
Added to the problem of political unreliability already 
discussed was the fact that the destruction or internment of 
most of the major fleet units for the second time in under 
t\venty years deprived the Red Navy of a Tsarist legacy. 2 
Although the lOth Party Congress determined 'to take 
measures toward the revival and strengthening of the Red Navy' 
it notec that this could only be done 'in accordance with the 
general condition and material resources of the Soviet Union•, 3 
which 1vere severely limited at that time due to the destruction 
and decay of industry resulting from the World War and the 
Civil War. Meister notes that no work was undertaken to 
complete any partially constructed ex-Tsarist vessel until 
1923. 4 It was not until the third five year plan that the 
construction of major warships, including battleships and 
possibly aircraft carriers, was undertaken. 
An interesting insight into the views of the Red Army 
on naval expenditure is provided by Marshal Tukhachevsky's 
analysis of German military preparations prior to World War I. 
He claimed that while preparing for war to be fought initially 
with France the Germans had constructed a navy for the 
subsequent conflict with Britain. This diversion of resources 
to the navy left the German ground forces ill-equipped and 
hence unable to achieve success in the initial conflict with 
France. 
1. Klado, The Battle of the Sea of Japan, p. 280. 
2. See appendix 1 for the fate of vessels which had been 
completed or were under construction at the outbreak of 
World War 1. 
3. Cited in Gorshkov, 'The Soviet Navy' , Morskoy s• 'k . norn1. _, 
No. 6, 1972, u.s. Navy trans, p. 13. 
4. Meister, J. f The Soviet Navy, Vol. 1, (Garden City 1972) 
pp. 22, 49. 
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It is completely indisputable that the German 
ground army \vas not strong enough to accomplish 
the mission set it by strategy. But what was 
the navy, on which more than four billion marks 
had been spent in the period since the start of 
the century, doing during this time? If we 
exclude isolated conflicts and battles the 
German navy was in general idle through the 
course of the entire war. It did not exert even 
the shadow of a decisive influence on the 
outcome of the conflict.l 
Whatever doubts may be raised in relation to the Marshal's 
analysis it is not difficult to see the implications it 
contained for the Soviet fleet: money spent on the fleet was 
money wasted. In a final pre-war illustration of the necessary 
priority given to the Army, construction of naval vessels laid 
down in 1938-9 was halted in 1940 and the steel and manpower 
saved was diverted to the production of ground armament. 2 
D. Innovations 
Despite its low status in the armed forces the Russian 
navy and its Soviet successor achieved a number of notable 
firsts. Gorshk.ov cites the Mediterranean squadron under 
Admiral Spiridov as 'an outstanding example of autonomous 
operations by a large naval formation completely cut off from 
its home ports•. 3 Although he omits to mention the squadron's 
dependence on British facilities, the presence of a squadron 
1. Tukhachevsky's analysis is discussed in Solnyshkov, Yu. S. 
Economic Factors and Armament (Moscow, 1973) JPRS Trans-
lations in U.S.S.R. Military Affairs No. 931,-~20-21. 
2. Zhukov, G., op.cit., p. 205. Kuznetsov, N.G. 'Soviet Naval 
Development prior to vlorld War II, Oktyabr, No. 11, 1965, 
JPRS Soviet Military Translations No. 218, p. 15. 
3. Gorshkov, S.G. 'Russia's difficult road to the sea', U.S. 
Navy trans. p. 18. It should be noted that Gorshkov is 
probably making a great deal of this historical point in 
an effort to claim a historical precedent for present day 
operations by the Soviet Navy. Other navies had operated 
at greater distances yet perhaps for not so great a time. 
The Mediterranean squadron was cut off from the Baltic only 
in the sense that it. was a long way from its home ports but 
this was a unique experience only for the Russians. More-
over, the requirements of provisions, ammunition and sailors 
were much simpler to meet in the days of sail before fuels 
had to be bought and specialist sailors were required to 
maintain elaborate propulsion and electronic equipment. 
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operating at such a distance from its home port, in the Baltic, 
for a period of some five years/was undoubtedly a major 
achievement. 
Less controversial are the Russian fleet's innovations 
in the use of weapons. At Sinope the Turkish fleet was routed 
by the Russian use of artillery. The exploding shell had been 
known for some time but it had always been considered too 
dangerous for use at sea. 1 Moreover, during the Crimean l'lar 
the Russians were able to protect their Baltic Fleet against 
the superior British and French forces by mine-fields around 
the major naval bases of Kronstadt and Sveaborg. 2 This was 
the first major utilisation of the mine. 
It is one of the ironies of Russian naval history that 
their use of artillery at Sinope and mines in the Baltic were 
in no small measure responsible for the rapid adoption by the 
other major fleets of armour plating. Russian industrial 
backwardness precluded her from keeping pace with these 
developments in quantitative as well as qualitative terms. 
Moreover, the very success of the mining operations in the 
Baltic led to the acceptance of a defensive policy in this 
region which dominated Russian thinking to the outbreak of 
World War I. 3 
During the Russo-'l'urkish War of 1877-78 the Russian 
fleet used the torpedo weapon for the first time in a major 
naval combat and routed the superior Turkish fleet. 4 
The most spectacular of all the Russian navy's innovations 
was the use of mid-ocean replenishment by the Second Pacific 
1. Mitchell, M., op.cit., p. 319. Hucul, W.C., op.cit., 
p. 120. Gorshkov, S.G. 'Into the oceans on behalf of 
science', u.s. Navy trans. p. 18. 
2. Hucul, op.cit., p. 144. 
3. Ibid., p. 179 and 182. 
4. Woodward, D. op.cit., pp. 111-117. Woodward cites F.T.Jane, 
The Imperial Russian Navy (London, 1904), p. 200. 'The 
credit due to t.he Russians is immense. They had no fleet 
to start with, and they used an almost unknown weapon. We 
cannot judge Makarov's exploits by the light of present day 
knowledge. He had to invent his tactics'. 
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Squadron as it crossed the Indian Ocean en route to Tsushima. 
During the 3,500 mile passage from Madagascar to the Indonesian 
archipelago the squadron was entirely dependent on German 
colliers of the Hamburg-funerika line. 1 
During the First World War the Russians, like the British . 
and Americans, made considerable use of naval aviation, 
especially in the Black Sea area, where naval aviation helped 
offset enemy superiority. The Russians used aircraft transports 
fitted with cranes which could lift hydroplanes in and out of 
the water. 2 
Submarine construction was the most dramatic field of 
Soviet naval innovation. The Soviets built a larger submarine 
fleet than any other power and used these vessels primarily 
for defensive purposes. In undertaking this programme they 
made a series of innovations in construction techniques. The 
small 'M-VI' type coastal submarines were the first to have 
all-welded pressure hulls and to use prefabrication. 3 
Construction, Doctrinal Debates and the Development of the 
Navy from 1917 to 1941 
It was the lot of the Navy to sustain particularly 
severe blows in the overall course of the 
Revolution and in the events of the Civil War. 
As a result of them we lost the largest and best 
part of its material, lost a vast number of 
experienced and knowledgeable officers who 
played an even greater role in the life and work 
of the Navy than all the other forms of weapons; 
we lost a whole series of naval bases, and finally, 
we lost the main nucleus of the other ranl'.s of Red 
Navy personnel. In short, all this meant we had 
no fleet.<! 
1. Hough, R., The Fleet that had to Die, (London, 1961) p. 100 
& 108-9. 
2. Shuginin, A.M. (Lt. General of Aviation (ret'd). 'Naval 
Aviations Combat Road', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 8, 1966, ~PRS 
Soviet Hilitary Translations No. 345, p. 2, and Chapman, W.G. 
'The Soviet Air Force', Nava! Revie~, 1965, p. 170. 
3. Rudnitskiy, M.A. (Engineer Rear Admiral Reserve), 'Soviet 
submarines', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 7, 1967. U.S. Navy trans. 
p. 35. See also Breyer, S. Guide to the Soviet Navy, trans. 
M.W. Henley (Annapolis, 1970), p. 143. 
4. Frunze, M.V. 0 Molodezhe (My Youth) (Moscow, 1937) p. 81. 
Cited Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Navy', Morskoy Sbornik 
No. 6, 1972, U.S. Navy trans. p. 13. 
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The Black Sea Fleet had been scuttled, or removed to 
internment abroad by the White Russians, 1 and the fleet 
personnel were subject to considerable political suspicion. 
Not only was there an unavoidable dependence on ex-Tsarist 
naval officers who, because of the specialist expertise 
necessary to maintain the remnants of the fleet, were less 
easily replaced than Army officers, but the crews 'the shock 
troops of the revolution', had threatened the new regime during 
the Kronstadt uprising. 
To ensure the political reliability of the fleet, some 
8,000 Komsomols were recruited direct to the fleet while 
1,000 others went to the naval training institutes in 1922. 2 
The 5th Komsomol Congress on the 16th October, 1922, 
adopted a resolution to sponsor the navy and by 1923 70% of the 
sailors aboard ships and 50% of the cadets enrolled in schools 
training naval commanders were Komsomol members. In 1925-26 
the first of the Komsomol candidates graduated and joined the 
fleet. 3 Frunze visited the Baltic Fleet in 1925 and claimed, 
Thousands of Komsomol replacements, forming 
the nucleus of the new navy laid the foundation 
on which further creative activity becomes 
possible.4 
The early twenties were notable for the vast effort put 
1. On November 15 and 16, 1920, Wrangel took to Bizerta the 
following vessels! 
1 pre-1900 battleship 
1 (-2?) cruiser 
9 destroyers including 6 new vessels of 1912 program~e 
and 4 submarines 
Hucul,' op.cit., p. 321. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 
16th Feb. 1932, p. 185 R. cites a document lodged by the 
Soviet Government to the League of Nations giving the strength 
of Soviet naval forces which includes these vessels under a 
separate heading. The Soviets pl~essed their claim to these 
vessels at the Rome Naval Conference of 1924. 
2. Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Na~' u.s. trans. p. 14 for figures. 
3. Mikhaylin, V.V. Vice Admiral and Pochupaylo, Ya. G. Vice 
Admiral. 'Following the course of the Aurora' Mors~Sl~£!nik, 
No. 12, 1967, U.S. Navy trans. p. 19, and 'On Combat watch 
on seas and oceans', Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (KVS) No.l2, 
June 1972 JPR.S Translations in U.S.S.R. Hilitary Affairs No.837. 
4. Frunze quoted in 'On combat watch' p. 2. 
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into training officers and men. 'The Navy v1as actua.lly 
transformed int.o a vas·t training detachment.'. 1 According to 
Gorshkov, 20,000 qualified naval specialists were produced as 
a result of the training programme, and in the period 1923-28 
some 1,200 naval officers graduated from training institutes. 
In 1924 a political re-attestation of the naval command staff 
was carried out resulting in the dismissal of 750 officers, 
who could be replaced with recently qualified men. 2 
As a result of foreign interventions during the Civil 
War period the Soviet coastlines in the Baltic had been reduced 
to a bare 100 mile strip. 3 Bases in the now independent Baltic 
states were lost, depriving the new regime of facilities 
necessary for deployment in the Baltic. Confinement to the 
Gulf of Finland made it a relatively simple matter for a 
hostile force to blockade the Baltic Fleet. Even though Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet Union 
by 1940 efforts to re-est.ablish forward bases there were too 
late to alter the position. Fortification of the naval bases 
at Tallin, Riga and Porkkala in Finland was incomplete at the 
time of the German onslaught, which quickly overran them. 
The restoration of ports and the shipbuilding industry 
and the overhaul of vessels \·:as begun in the early 1920s. By 
1924, the Baltic Fleet had, in varying states of operational 
effectiveness, two battleships, one cruiser, eight destroyers 
and nine submarines as well as other smaller vessels, while the 
Black Sea Fleet, which had to be started anew, consisted of one 
cruiser, two destroyers, t1vo submarines and t\velve other 
vessels, all of v:hich had been the legacy of the Tsarist navy. 4 
The Soviet Navy at this time was involved in a major 
debate over the fundamentals of naval strategy. The instructors 
at the major naval academies were wedded to a belief in a navy 
capable of winning command of the sea. To men such as 
1. Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Navy', U.S. Navy trans. p. 14. 
2. Erickson, J. The Soviet High Command (London, 1962) p. 176. 
3. Hucul, op.cit., p. 336. 
4. Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Navy', U.S. Navy trans. p. 14. 
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Professors Gervais and Petrov the threat of further British 
intervention in the Baltic could be countered. 
Our position would not be so hopeless if 
the (Soviet) Navy were to have a correct 
composition, that is, were to have the 
right share of bat'cleships and cruisers, 
of destroyers and submarines. 1 
But Zof, who had been appointed senior commissar of the Soviet 
Navy in 1924, pointed out the irrelevance of such solutions to 
what was regarded as a pressing threat: 
You speak of aircraft carriers and of the 
construction of new types of ships •.. at 
the same time completely ignoring the 
economic situation of our country and 
corresponding conditions of our technical 
means, completely ignoring the fact that 
perhaps tomorrow or the day after we >vill 
be called on to fight. And with what shall 
we fight? We will fight with those ships 
and personnel that we have already.2 
The training of reliable naval cadres having been set in 
hand, the Soviet Union could now think of rebuilding its naval 
forces. Lacking in technical competence the Soviet Navy, like 
the Russian Navy before it, sought assistance from outside. 
Germany was the most obvious source of naval assistance during 
the mid-1920s because of the covert collaboration which existed 
between the armed forces of Germany and the Soviet Union. The 
Weimar Republic sought to evade the limitations imposed by the 
Versailles Treaty on weapons systems, their development., and 
troop training, and the Soviet Union to overcome its isolation 
from the world of military technology. 3 
1. u.s. Naval Attache, Berlin, Report No. 40, February 1923, 
U.S. Archives, Alexandria, Virginia, cited in Herrick, R.W. 
Soviet Naval Strategy. (Annapolis, 1968) p.lO. 
2. Zof, v. 'The international situation and the tasks of 
maritime defence', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1925, p. 16, 
cited Herrick, R.W. op.cit., p. 10. 
3. For a full account of Soviet collaboration with Germany at 
this time, see Erickson, op.cit., Chapters 6 and 11. 
Erickson points out in the naval field these exchanges were 
extremely onesided. Unlike the situation in the purely 
military field the Germans had little need of Soviet 
facilities, and of course it did not suit German interests 
to create a potentially powerful naval rival in the Baltic. 
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From Erickson's account it is clear that: first and fore-
most the Soviets were concerned \vith submarines - their 
construction, operation, a~~inistration and tactical use - and 
the training of their crews. They asked the Germans for 
submarine experts to instruct them on coimuand, construction, 
and engine development and maintenance. Germany supplied the 
Soviet Union with the plans and documents it had already ·turned 
over to the victors of i'Jorld War I and offered to help the 
Soviets interpret the designs. 
The Soviets, al·though dependent on German expertise in 
this field, preferred to build in the Soviet Union so that they 
could assimilate and develop the designs. 
These initial contacts with the Marineleitung heralded · 
the first stage of nev1 Soviet naval construction. The requests 
forwarded indicated the dominance of those who, like Zof, 
accepted the need to fit naval planning to ·the existing 
industrial and technical capabilities. 
In May 1928 the Revolutionary J-.1ilitary Council defined 
the missions and laid down guidelines which served as a basis 
for developing a naval ship construction programme under the 
first Five Year Plan. 
In developing the Navy we shall strive toward 
uniting the surface and submarine fleets, 
coastal and mined positional defences and 
naval aviation appropriate to the character of 
the combat operations to be conducted in our 
naval theatres in the situation of probable 
war.l 
R. A. Muklevich, who had been associated with the approach to 
the German Harineleitunq, was called in to replace Zof in 1926 
or 1927, 2 a signal that a naval construction programme was 
about to begin; a programme that was confined by the require-
ments of a defensive naval strategy. Gorshkov claims this 
period as one of creative military theoretical vmrk in which 
the technical and economic realities of the day 
1. Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Navy', u.s. Navy trans. p. 4. 
2. Erickson, J.E., op.cit., p.841 and 848, for brief 
biographies of Hukle·.-:.ch and Zof. 
demanded that ways be sought to carry out 
the tasks of defending our borders by 
forces of a 'small' Navy in concert with 
ground troops •.. (a) 'small war' theory 
was born which, proceeding from the actual 
conditions, singled out rational methods 
and forms of combating a stronger maritime 
enemy.l 
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The opinions of these theorists - Herrick's 'Young School' 2 
based on the 'material-technical base of the Fleet• 3 were re-
flected in the naval construction programmes which roughly span 
the period of the first and second five year plans. They vmre 
also reflected in approaches to the Germans at this time. 
Gorshkov dates the initial construction plan as 1926. 
The intention \¥as to build twelve submarines, eighteen escort 
ships and thirty six torpedo boats. 4 More significant than this 
hmvever was the fact that during the initial five year plan 
defence industries were created and nevJ 
1. Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Soviet Navy', U.S. Navy trans. p.l5. 
2. Herrick, R.W., op.cit., pp.9-27, groups the participants 
of the naval debates into two schools of thought. Petrov 
and Gervais belong to a stream of naval thinkers which in 
the West would be identified with Mahan. Their doctrine 
was one of taking the offensive against the strength of the 
enemy, his fleet. Zof and Muklevich however represent an 
innovation in naval thought. The new 'small war' or Young 
School doctrine cited above is a purely defensive strategy 
calling for the protection of the coastal borders by short 
ranged coordinated attacks within range of shore based 
aviation and artillery. 
My impression is that Herrick over-states the coherence 
of these schools of thought, and the coherence of the 'Young 
School' during the 1920s and early 1930s. Thus the modifi-
cations/conversions of the heavy units of the ex-Tsarist 
Fleet,, vlhich appear to be deviations from 'Young School' 
thinking, need an explanation which Herrick does not provide. 
If we accept Gorshkov at face value these developments would 
be expected to come about as 'economic capabilities' of the 
Soviet State improved. On this interpretation the 'small 
war' theory was a stop gap measure, born of economic and 
technical necessity, to provide a solution to the challenge 
clearly spelt out by Zof. 'Perhaps tomorrow or the day 
after we >vill be called on to fight. And with what shall we 
fight?' 
3. Gorshkov, s.G. 'The Building of the Soviet Navy' (1928-1941) 
u.s. Navy trans. p. 9. 
~ Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Navy', U.S. trans. p. 14. 
ship-building yards were redesigned and 
built, thereby providing the material 1 base for the construction of a new fleet. 
During the first two Five Year Plans 
Initial stress was put on P.'r. boats, escort 
ships and destroyers and later on light 
. 2 cru1sers ... 
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In 1936 Tukhachevsky announced to the Central Executive 
Committee 'We are creating a powerful navy. We are concen-
trating our forces primarily upon the development of a submarine 
fleet'. 3 By this time the Soviet.s had produced the Dekabrist, 
Leninets, Shchuka, Sand M class submarines. 4 
During this period two additional fleet. areas were created, 
one in the Far East, the other in the North. 1'he Far Eastern 
Fleet, created in 1932 in response to the Japanese occupation 
of the south bank of the Amur River, is an example of the 
'small war' theory in practice. Set up under the command of 
Viktorov, a submarine specialist and reputedly one of the most 
able of the senior Soviet Naval Staff, the fleet originally 
consisted of a handful of submarines and a mosquito fleet of 
torpedo boats. 5 The submarine force of the Far Eastern Fleet 
numbered at least sixty nine vessels by 1937. 6 This force of 
submarines and torpedo boats was intended to keep Japanese 
major surface vessels, including aircraft carriers, at a 
distance from the coast. 
Besides the new construction, which had been undertaken 
during the early five year plans, some ex-Tsarist ships were 
1. Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Building of the Soviet Navy (1928-1941) ', 
U.S. Navy trans. p. 5. 
2 • Ibid. , p • 6 . 
3. Trotsky, L; ~he R~volution Betrayed, translated by Max 
Eastman (New York, 1945), p. 207. 
4. For a reconstruction of the Soviet Navy's interwar building 
prograrmne see Appendices I I-V at the end of this chapter. 
5. Erickson, J., op.cit., p. 361. 
6. Ibid., Appendix 3, table 'Distribution of Soviet Submarine 
Force- 1937', p. 804. 
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restored. Three Gangut class battleships were modified1 and 
refitted and work on the Svetlana class cruisers, incomplete 
in 1917, recommenced in 1924. 2 Even if it was necessary to 
limit new construction to small vessels in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s the need for larger ships was appreciated. 
It is difficult to pin-point exactly v1hen the decision 
was taken to construct a navy which would be capable of 
operating beyond home '>'7aters. As early as 1934-1935 the Naval 
Staff noted that the capacity of Soviet heavy industry made it 
impossible to construct capital ships. 3 The Soviet Union made 
approaches to American firms to tender for the construction of 
a vessel of 62,000 tons during the mid 1930s and eventually 
conducted direct negotiations with the United States government. 4 
During May 1936 the Soviet Union engaged in bilateral 
discussions with Britain over the terms of the London Naval 
Treaty. The Soviet Union's naval interests were linked to 
developments in Japan and Germany, and she sought terms at 
London which would leave her free to take steps to offset 
Japanese expansion in the Pacific while remaining tied to German 
expansion in the Baltic. 5 This applied in particular to the 
1. Meister, Jurg, The Soviet Navy, Vol. 1 (New York, 1972) , 
p. 26-27. 
2. Savin, A.A. and Ozimov, LV., (Engineer Captains, 3rd Rank) 
From the history of Soviet Naval shipbuilding (cruisers), 
M.orskoy Sbornik No. 12, 196 6, U.S. Navy trans. pp. 14-15. 
3. Meister, J., op.cit., p. 34. Erickson, op.cit., p. 409, 
suggests Stalin had personally intervened in naval affairs 
in 1935 when the question of an ocean going navy was debated 
at a Moscov7 conference attended by officers of the Pacific 
Fleet, together with Molotov, Voroshilov and Ordzhonikidze. 
Kuznetsov's 'Before the War Part 8', International Affairs 
(Moscow) No. 12, 1966, p.94 mentions meetings in the mid 1930s 
on the role of the Navy and types of ships necessary for 
carrying out that role. 
4. Davies, J.E. Mission to Moscow (London, 1943), p.223-4 
records a conversation he had 1vith Stalin while U.S. 
Ambassador to Moscow on the question of purchasing a battle-
ship from the United States. In a letter to Stalin on 
September 10, 1938, Davies writes 'It was a mat·ter of much 
grat.ification to me that that battleship matter had been 
satisfactorily worked out', p.276. 
5. Davies, op. cit. , p. 81, records a conversation v1i th Li tvinov 
in March 1937 in which he \vas given details of the A.nglo-
Soviet agreement. See K~(OSin..sr_'~<;'_()ntemporary Archive_:o;_,p.2115E, 
2205C, 2472D, and 2675A for details of the negotiations. 
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increase in cruiser strength. The agreement reached was that 
the Soviet Union should have the right to increase to ten its 
A class cruisers (8,000 tons and with 7.1'' guns). 
During the Spanish Civil War, Kuznet.sov, who was the 
Soviet Naval Attache to Spain at the time and later became 
Commissar of the Navy, realised the weakness of a naval force 
based primarily on the submarine. Not only were Soviet merchant 
vessels subject to attacks in the Mediterranean, from which the 
Soviet Navy could offer no protection, 1 but the Soviet Union 
2 
was unable to participate in the non-intervention patrol. 
The strong navy which Kuznetsov advocated was to include 
a substantial increase in naval aviation for 
In that naval war (Spanish Civil War) , however 
small its scale, it became quite clear that 
the air force had a part to play in any naval 
operations and had to provide cover for naval 
forces at their bases. We were convinced that 
it was highly important that the naval air 
force operating with the navy should be an 
organic part of it, under a single command and 
trained to operate at sea.3 
At the meeting of the Central Executive Committee in 1936 .. 
where Tukhachevsky had announced the creation of a powerful 
navy based on the submarine fleet,he also mentioned the need to 
4 pay attention to the creation of a more powerful surface fleet. 
Orlov, Muklevich and Chief of Staff Ludri, had concentrated on 
raising the technical capacity and efficiency of a defensive 
force based on the submarine, the minefield, coastal batteries 
and shore based aviation. Although these measures were realistic 
given the material-technical realities more \'las to be required. 
Orlov, Chief of the Navy, claimed in 1936 
vie had to create, and we have created a 
powerful defensive navy ... the nlli-rber 
1. Keesing' s Contemporary l',rchi ves, p. 27 3 4E gives details of 
the sinking of two Soviet merchant vessels on August 30 & 
Sept. 1, 1937. 
2. Mitchell, M., op.cit., p. 378 and Kuznet.sov, N.G., 'Before 
the War', part 8, p. 94. 
3. Kuznetsov, N.G. op.cit., part 5, p. 112. 
4. Erickson, J.E., op.cit., p. 410. 
of small surface craft, the defence of 
the shores, has grown threefold in that 
period. 
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and announced a sevenfold increase in submarine strength since 
1933. He continued 'We must build and >ve are building a really 
big navy, which includes vessels of all classes of the highest 
technical standing•. 1 If this new fleet were to be built then 
the 1938-42 Five Year Pla.n period 1vould see its implementation. 
On December 31, 1937, the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R. ordered the creation of the commissariat of the 
Navy with M. Smirnov to be the First Naval Deputy Co~nissar. 
Created at the same time was the Commissariat of Shipbuilding. 2 
These steps permitted concentrating the 
leadership of all the measures connected 
with the construction of a large ocean 
going fleet in a few hands,3 
Orlov, who had been at the head of the Soviet Navy during its 
previous period of expansion, was replaced by Smirnov a 
civilian. 4 He, in turn, was replaced in November 1938 by 
Frinovski, a former high official in the G. P. u. It v;as not 
until April 1939 when Kuznetsov became Commissar that the 
leadership reverted to a naval officer. 5 
Meanwhile, Molotov announced to the Supreme Soviet that 
'the mighty Soviet Power must possess a sea and ocean navy 
adequate for its interests and worthy of our great cause• 6 
while Morskoy Sbornik claimed 
'l'he U.S.S.R., a mighty Socialist power, must 
have the strongest sea and ocean navy in the 
1. Dallin, D.J., The Big Three (New Haven, 1945), p. 88, and 
Erickson, J.E., op.cit., p. 445. 
2. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 2891G, and Hucul, w.c., 
op.cit., p. 390. 
3. Gorshkov, S.G., 'The building of the Soviet Navy (1928-1941)' 
u.s. Navy trans. p. 8. 
4. Keesing's Contempora:si Archives, p. 2891G. 
5. Ibid., p. 3579B. 
6. Pravda, 
p. 385. 
p. 91. 
January 16, 1938, p.2, cited in Hucul, W.C., op.cit., 
Mitchell, M., op.cit., p. 328. Dallin, op.cit., 
world; 
of the 
genius 
such is the Hill of the party and 
government, such is the will of the 
S'calin .1 
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In a clear repudiation of Orlov, Muklevich and Ludri, Parti_xnove 
Stroitel'stvo, the official party organ, claimed 
For our country it is not sufficient to have 
a navy which is able to beat the enemy near 
the Soviet: shores. Vie must possess enough 
big warships together with plentiful light 
craft to annihilate 1:he enemy, if he dares 
to attack us in any sea, and in any ocean.2 
The emphasis on sea and ocean capability in these state-
ments represented a turnabout in Soviet naval thinking. NO't 
since Zof had ridiculed the 'big navy' advocates in the early 
1920s had anything like it been mentioned. 
During the summer of 1938 the purge, which had already 
eliminated much of the Red Army Cowmand, fell on the Navy. 
The major victims of the purge included Orlov, formerly Naval 
Co!l'mander-in-Chief, Ludri, his assistant, Muklevich, the former 
Director of Naval Construction, Sivkov, Kozhenov and Viktorov, 
commanders of the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets respec-
tively and Stasevich, Director of the Naval Academy. 3 Of the 
Fleet Commanders only Kuznetsov survived to become Naval 
Commissar. 
At the 18th Party Congress Orlov and Muklevich were 
denounced as accomplices of the former Army Marshal Tukhachevsky. 
Unlike the Army victims the denunciation of the naval leaders 
contained a specific criticism of their policies. Tevosyan, 
Peoples Coll'Jnissar for Shipbt.ilding, announced to the 1939 Congress 
that Orlov and Muklevich had opposed the idea of a powerful 
1. Pukhov, A. • Partiino-poli ticheokaiia Rabota V. Voenno-HorskoJ~, 
Flote za zo Set', Morskoy Sborni~, February 1938, p. 54, 
cited Hucul, VJ.C., op.cit., p. 388. Da11in, D.J. op.cit., 
p. 92. 
2. Partiyn£Y?::. Stroit:el'stvo, February 1939, cited in Da1lin, 
D.J., op.cit., p. 92. 
3. For an account of the purges as they affected the Navy see 
Erickson, J.E., op.cit., p. 470, and Conquest, Robert The 
Great Terror (London, 1968), pp. 231-233. 
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surface fleet and their removal made possible the building 
of a 'mighty attacking force•. 1 
The purge extended into the construction units and to 
the personnel of the fleets. As a result Stalin eliminated 
the officers whose doctrine their successors vmuld have no 
opt.ion but to follow during World ~'lar II. 
The new construction programme mentioned by Tevosyan at 
the 18th Party Congress was to centre on 
battleships, heavy cruisers, and other 
classes of surface warships: that is, 
a big surface navy. A largP number of 
submarines was also to be built. Not 
excluded either was the construction of 
aircraft carriers: rather they were only 
postponed to last year of the third 
(1938-42) Five Year Plan. This was 
explained .•. by the complexities of con-
struction of warships of this class and 2 the aircraft designed especially for them. 
From Kuznetsov's account of the pre-vJar shipbuilding pro-
gramme the Navy was subject to considerable direction by Stalin. 
Whereas the Navy's spokesmen Admirals Isakov and Galler 
advocated plans including aircraft carriers, 
Stalin, >vho usually took into consideration 
the opinion of specialists, for some reason 3 
underestimated the role of aircraft carriers. 
A request to increase the means of anti-aircraft defence on 
ships met with Stalin's 'We will not be fighting near the shores 
f • 14 o Amerlca ••. 
1. Tevosyan, speech to the 18th Party Congress quoted in 
Conquest, op.cit., p. 231. 
2. Kuznetsov, N.G., Nakanune (On the Eve) cited in Herrick, 
op.cit., p. 31. This-rJassage does not occur in full in the 
extracts from Nakanune which were translated into English 
and published in International Affairs (Moscow). The 
English language version omits any reference to aircraft 
carriers. See Herrick, R.W., ibid., for an explanation of 
the varying versions. 
3. Kuznetsov, N.G., 'Soviet naval development prior to World 
War II', ,JPRS trans. p. 13. 
4. Ibid., p. 13. 
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Besides illustrating Stalin's deep involvement in 
questions of fleet development, Kuznetsov's comments offer an 
interesting insight into the way naval s·trategy for the ensuing 
conflict was determined. The naval leaders of the day were 
unaware of Stalin's thoughts on the role of the navy in the 
most probable future 'tlar. Strong anti-aircraft defence could 
be dispensed with, as Stalin suggested, only if the fleet was 
not expected to range outside the limits of ground based naval 
aviation. Kuznetsov therefore appears incorrect in suggesting 
that Stalin underestimated the role of aircraft carriers. It 
is far more lil-;:ely tha·t Stalin did not envisage an ocean going 
navy and that his object was to build a navy capable of 
dominating the Baltic Sea. 
Under the impact of a disastrous Finnish Campaign (in 
which the Red Army took 100 days to achieve what had been 
expected to take a few days) and the increasing fear of Germany, 
the construction of capital ships was slowed do\vn, and production 
priority was given instead to armaments for the ground forces. 
A radical reconsideration of the prograw~e 
took place in October 1940 after which only 
submarines and small surface ships -
destroyers, minesweepers, etc. - were 
constructed.l 
The large vessels remained on the slips, either to be 
cannibalised during the course of the war or destroyed by 
German forces. 
1. Kuznetsov, N.G. 'Soviet naval development prior to 
World War II' JPRS trans. p. 15. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to World War II the Soviet Union had found no 
answer to the problems of geography which had beset its 
Tsarist predecessor. Each flee·t area had to be relatively 
autonomous in the event of war although transit of vessels 
from one fleet area to another could be undertaken in peace 
time. It would require a considerable naval force to gain 
access to the high seas in time of war, given the nature of 
the egress points. To sustain a naval force at sea v10uld 
require aircraft carriers which, despite the arguments of the 
post purge naval leadership, Stalin was not willing to provide. 
The Navy received a great deal of attention from the ne\v 
regime after a period of enforced austerity i~nediately 
following the revolution, but it remained strategically 
subordinate to the ground forces and its command structure was 
virtually ignored by the leading military planners prior to 
World War II 1 reflecting its lmv strategic significance. 
During the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s the 
Soviet Navy adopted a 'small war' strategy which called for 
the protection of the coast by short ranged coordinated attacks 
undertaken by coastal range submarines and small surface 
vessels within range of shore based aviation and artillery. At 
the same time ex-•rsarist battleships and cruisers were refitted 
and during the latter half of the 1930s Soviet yards began 
construction of longer ranged submarines and large surface 
vessels. However, despite the proposed entry of these ships 
into the Soviet order of battle Stalin's rejection of the 
carrier programme and his views on anti-a.ircraft weaponry 
suggest that he did not envisage a high seas role for the fleet. 
The vessels of the inunediate pre-war cons-truction programme 
signified a change from a sea denial strategy \vithin the 
enclosed seas to a strategy of control to be exercised wi'chin 
these restricted waters. 
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Type 
Battleships 
Pre~di:eadnought 
Ga.ngut class 
Nikolai I 
Battle Cruisers 
Borodino class 
Light Cruisers 
Destroyers 
Torpedo Boats 
Submarines 
No. 
2 
7 
1 
4 
10 
36 
12 
+5? 
45 
f IWENTIE1'H CENTURY TSARIST NAVAL CONSTRUCTION AND ITS POST OCT.l917 FATE 
Place of Construction Plan Date Laid Launch 
Baltic 
St. Petersburg Baltic 1st July 19Jl 
Admiralty Yard (2) 1909 
Baltisky Zavod (2) 
Nikolayev Black Sea 1914 
Russud Yard (2} last 
State yard ( 1} ___ §_~pt .1912 
Nikolayev Black Sea 
St. Petersburg Baltic 
New Admiralty Yard 
2 in Danzig Germany 
St Petersburg (2) 
Baltic 
Reval (2} 
( 4) Black Sea 
Baltic 
Black Sea 
1914 
autho.rised 
1912 
1912 
1912 
post 1912 
Feb .1913 
oct.1913 
- 1915 
Qct.l916 
June 1915 
to Nov, 
1916 
April-Nov. 
1914, 6 of 
Russian 
const. Nov. 
1915-Dec. 
1916, z 
others 
never 
launched 
Complete 
1907 
Nov. 1914 
1917 
Dec .1914 
Sept .1915 
3 completed 
1927-32 as 
c.tuisers, 2 
as tankers 
in 1926 
Fate 
1 sunk during WWI Slava 
1 scrapped with air-other pre-dreadnought 
battleships after the Revvlution 
1 lost during WWI 
2 lost during Civil War 
1 irrepairably damaged during Civil War 
3 taken over by Soviet Navy in 
considerable disrepair. 
scrapped in !922 by soviet Navy 
never completed. 
3 scrapped in German ports 1923 
1 scrapped in Leningrad 1931 
2 requisitioned by Germans 
2 scrapped in slip by Soviet Navy 
1 used as breakwater by Soviet Navy 
2 completed as me[cantile tankers 1926 
3 completed as cruisers 1927, 1928, 
1932 
30 by Oct. Of the 30 completed by the Revolution: 
1917, 17 3 war losses, 12 lost, scuttled or 
Baltic, 13 captured 1918-20, 6 captured by White 
Black, 1 of Russians, 11 served in Soviet Navy post 
which the 1920, 9 cancelled incompleted during 
Novik proto- WWI, 14 incomp1eted in 1920 of which 
type finished 6 completed by soviet Navy, 1 in 1923, 
prior to war 2 in 1925, 2 in 1927, 1 in 1928. 
95 were believed to exist in 1914. 12 lost during wwrr, 47 lost during 
Civil war, 36 in service with soviet 
Navy or State security. 
18 12 in Baltic 
6 in Black Sea 
approx.70 subs believed 
1912 1917 
under construction in Black Sea at time of Revolution. 
"!'able compiled from information in: Meister, J., The soviet Navy, Vol 1, and Woodward, D. The Russians at Sea, 
pp. 160-64, and checked against Janes Fighting Ships. 
As of Augi.lSt .!914 only the Novik, prototype of the destroyer programme, had been fully completed and was ready 
for service. Apart from th~s the ships .ready for service at the outbreak of war consisted of obsolescent ships. 
The completion of the Dreadnought in 1907 and the development of similar vessels by other major naval powe.ts 
had outmoded even the best of the pre-1905 ships. ',)\ 
Sources/Class 
TSARIST NAVY 
Gangut class 
No. 
3 
Negoti}fations with 
other powers post 
1935. None 
successful. 
(1) u.s.A. 1 
1 
(2) Italy 1 
(3) Germany 1 
SOVIET NAVY 
11Sovietsky Soyuz"? 2 
Sources: 
Disp. 
Standard 
25,500 
tons 
62,000 
tons 
45,000 
tons 
47,000 
tons 
50,000 
tons 
59,000 
tons 
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!£ SOVIET BATTLESHIPS AND PLANS 1917-45 
Main A.:rm 
12 12" (4x3) 
16 4.7" (16xl) 
6 3 11 A.A. (6xl) 
4 17.711 to:rpedo tubes 
9 16" guns 
Co!lllllents 
All in need of repair and suffering from neglect in the period Oct. 
1917-1922. 
1923 - under repair 1928-31. 
yra Revolutsia 1925 - repaired 1931-34. 
;hara Kommuna 1925 - all vessels were 
for ol.l burning; anti-aircraft 
Naval Staff advised that construction of capital ships beyond 
capability of Soviet heavy industry. Tenders sought abroad for 
complete battleships, machinery, armour plate and heavy guns for 
hulls to be built in the soviet Union. 
American companies refused to accept tender. 
Negotiations with u.s. government direct, agreement June 1938, 
Soviet Union subsequently withdrew. Soviet union still keen to 
purchase 16" guns, turrets, fixe contr(pl. equipment and heavy 
shells for ships building in the Soviet Union. 
9 16" guns (3x3) Italy had rendered aid in construction of a vaxiety of other 
12 7.1" guns (4x3) classes. Soviet enqubies for battleships. 
24 3.9" A.A. {12x2) 1936 firm Ansa1do proposed vessel. 
9 16 11 guns (3x3) 
12 611 guns ( 6x2) 
24 3.9" A.A. (12X2} 
smaller A.A. 
72 guns in all 
4 aircraft and 1 
catapult 
Soviet-German treaty 1939. Germany asked to submit plans of 
1Bismaxk' class battleship - rejected. 1940 some information 
made available. Orders for 16 11 , 1511 , 1110 and 6.1 11 guns in 
turrets, manufacture of 16 15 11 guns in twin turrets undertaken 
but never delivered. 
Laid down in 1938. Design said to be influenced by Italian plans. 
Major difficulties in pxoducing 16" gun. work stopped on project 
as a result of: 
a} technical difficulties 
b) and more importantly the need to direct scarce steel to 
tank building, 
The vessels were laid at the Ordzhonikidze Yard Leningrad and the 
Marti south Yard Nikolaiev. The vessel at Leningrad was stripped 
and scrapped during the war while that at Nikolaiev was wrecked by 
the Germans as they evacuated the area in 1944. 
Meister, J., op.cit., pp.46-77. 
Savin, A.A. and Ozimov, r.v. 'Soviet naval shipbuilding (cruisers)' 
Kuznetsov, N.G. 'Soviet naval development prior to World war II' 
Gorshkov, S.G. 'The building o:f the navy 1928-41 1 and 'The Second world War' 
Janes Fighting Ships, 1918-1940 
Tne tab.l.e resu.l.ts rrom a composite averaging. Data from the first four sources has been given greater 
weight than that from Janes Fighting Ships. Meister's figures have been accepted except where soviet 
sources offer contradictory evidence. 
Class No. 
'l'SARIST NAVY 1 
1 
usvetlana" 3 
··~~~ 2 
Maksim Gorki 4 
Cbapayev 6 
Kronstadt 2 
ill SOVIET CRUISERS 1917-1945 
Disp. Main Arm Plan Construction Dates 
Standard Date 
7,000 15 5.1" guns (15xl) 1912 
1900~1905 
1896-1902 
1913-27 
1913-28 
1913-32 
tons 4 3" AA (4xl) 
8,800 
tons 
11,300 
tons 
35,240 
12 21" torpedo 
tubes (4x3) 
100 mines 
9 7 .1" (3:x3) 
6 3.9" AA (6:xl) 
6 45mm AA 
6 21" (2x3) 
torpedo tubes 
2 aircraft and 
l catapult 
90 mines 
60 depth charges 
12 5.9" guns (4x3) 
8 3.9" AA (4x2) 
24 37mm AA (12 x2) 
200 mines 
12" guns (3x3) 
8 5.9" guns 
8 3.9" AA 
24 371'111'11 AA. 
8 l2.7mm AA 
1 catapult 
4 aircraft 
1932 begun 
1935 
to 
1939 
1936(?)begun 
1939 
1936 1938 
complete 
late 39/40 
1944 in 
Pacific 
complete 
postwar 
47 
Comments 
Although repaired, naval developments had made vessel 
obsolete. 
Aurora preserved as training vessel because of its 
h1storical association with the OCtober Revolution. 
All vessels were begun under pre-WWI tsarist naval 
programme. Construction delayed from 1917-1924 because 
of Revolution and civil strife. Outdated by time of 
completion which had been further retarded by with-
drawal of British advisers in 1917. Chervona Ukraina-
commissioned 1927. Krasny Krim- commiss~oned 1928. 
Both completed more or less to original design, radius 
3,700 miles at 18 knots. Krasnt Kavkaz - commissioned 
1932 instead of guns being moun ed in centre line turrets, 
main battery four 7.1" guns, 9 more modern AA guns. 
Displacement increased to 8,000 tons, radius 7,300 miles 
at 18 knots. This vessel is considered 'the first born 
of the great Soviet naval shipbuilding (industry) 1 • 
A.M. Gushchin, Course Plotted far Firino (Voyenizdat, 
1964), p.23, cited sav~n, A.A. and Oz~mov, r.v., op.cit. 
p.l5. 
Italian technical assistance for Kirov a greater number 
of guns carried than for comparable cruisers of other 
Nations. Aircraft and catapult removed in 1941 and A~A. 
armament increased during the war. Thought to have 
exhibited poor sea keeping qualities. Radius 850/3,000 
miles at 34/18 knots. 
three vessels had been laid down in Nik~layev and all 
but one of these were towed incomplete to Poti· they 
were completed after the war. The 3 vessels laid in 
Leningrad yards were completed after the war. Compared 
to the Kirovs they had lighter armament but an additional 
tw:ret had been added. they were also better seakeeping 
vessels. Radius 7,000 miles at 20 knots. 
Probably laid down at Marti Yard Leningrad and Marti 
North Yard Nikola.yev. Const.ruction suspended in 1940 and 
both scrapped on the slip. 
Soviet-German 
collaboration 
As a result of the Soviet-German pact the Soviet Union 
requested: 
Sources: Meister, J., op.cit ., p.46-77; 
Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Building of 
Janes Fighting Ships 1918-1940. 
( 1) machinery and armour plate for the cons truc_tion of 
heavy cruisers. 
(2) plans and assistance to construct Admiral Hipper 
class cruisers. 
{3} pw:chase of two Admiral Hieper class cruisers. 
Ge.rman government suppl~ed one 1ncoaplete unit the 
cruiser Lutzow which was incomplete by time of attack 
in 1941.---
A.A. Savin and I.V. Ozimov, op.cit., Kuznetsov, N.G., ibid, 
the Navy 1928-41 1 and 1 the second World War 1 , 
the table results from a composite averaging. Data from the first four sources has been given greater 
weight than that from Janes Fighting Ships. Meister's figures have been accepted except where Soviet 
sources offer contradictory evidence. 
Class 
Ex-l'sari.st 
~ 
Leningrad 
~ 
Tashkent 
'O' Class 
~ 
No. 
17 
Disp. 
Standard 
1,300 tons 
IV DESTROYERS AND FLOTILLA LEADERS 1917-1945 
Main Arm 
5 4" guns {Sxl) 
1 75mm AA 
1 37mm AA 
9 17.7" torpedo tubes 
(3.><3) 
60 mines 
depth charges 
Plan Date 
probably decision 
to build a series 
from the original 
Novik prototype 
taken in 1912 
Const. Dates 
Novik 
laid 
prototype 
complete 
1913 1910 
class 
~1917 
1923 
1925 
1927 
1928 
Range 
470/1,800 
miles at 
30/16 knots 
48 
Col'llraents 
The Novik was at the 
beginning of WOXld War I the 
most powerful vessel of its 
class in the world. see 
Table Twentieth Centuxy 
Tsatist Naval Construction 
for further details. 
6 2,200 tons 5 5.1" guns (Sxl) 
2 3 11 AA (2.xl) 
probably 1928 
:for prototype 
Leningrad 873/2,100 
miles at 
36/20 knots 
Ele1nents of French and Italian 
design. Possibly an attempt 
to (:"reate a aodern 'Novik'. 
Initial design unsat~siactory 
poor seakeeping qualities, 
poor WWII record. 
2 45mm AA 
8 21" torpedo tubes 
84 or 68 mines 
depending on type, 
52 depth cA~ges 
lud complete 
1932 1936 
others 
1933 1937 
to to 
1937 1940 
54-60 1,700 
planned tons 
4 5.1" guns {4.xl) 
2 3" AA (2Xl) 
1932 laid 
1935 
complete 
1941 
800/2,600 
miles at 
38/19 knots 
Italian cooperation in early 
units. The design 1110di:fied to 
suit conditions in the Arctic 
and North Pacific as the 
original Italian influenced 
vessels displayed poor sea-
keeping qualities. Anti-
aircraf't armament inadequate, 
had 'to be augmented dur :[ng the 
war. Not all units completed 
due to war. 
l 
301 
16? 
4 37mm AA 
9 other light AA units 
6 21" torpedo tubes (2X3} 
60 mines, 10-15 depth 
charges 
2,900 tons 6 5.1" guns {3x2) 1936{?) 
6 45mm AA 
& smaller AA units 
6 21" torpedo tubes (2X3) 
60 mines 
1,800 tons 4 5.1" (2.x2) 1936 
2,200 tons 2 85mm AA {lx2} 
(a range 6 37mm AA 
of 8 21" 'tOrpedo tUbes ( 2X4) 
estiaates)80 mines & depth charges 
to 
1938 1941 
launched NOv. 4,000 miles 
1937, completed at 20 knots 
1939 
laid 
1939 
-41 
complete 
1943 & 
post war 
era 
not known 
Qrdered from the Italians in 
1937. Delivered early 1939 and 
armed by Soviets before being 
placed in commission in mid-
1939. 
Completion of this class 
considerably delayed by the war. 
AP?ro.x. 10 vessels completed in 
post war era. Torpedo tubes 
were increased from six in 
previous classes to eight. 
2,600 6 5.1" guns (3.x2) 1939-40 laid complete not known A replacement for· the Leningrad 
2 3" AA (2Xl} 1939 none class. Only four vessels under 
3 4Smm AA construction in 1941. 2 towed 
8 12. 7mm. to Poti and scrapped after war, 
8 torpedo tubes (2X4), others scrapped by German Army 
mines, depth charges duxing war. 
Sources: Meister, J., op.cit., p.46-77; A.A. Savin and I.V. OZimov, op.cit.; 
Kuznetsov, N.G., ibid.; Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Building of the Navy 
1928-41' and 'The Second World War•, Janes Fighting Ships 1918-1940; 
s. Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy. 
The table results from a composite averaging. Data from the first four sources 
has been given greater weight than that from Janes Fighting Ships. Meister's 
figures have been accepted except where Soviet sources offer contradictory 
evidence. 
Class No. 
Dekabrist 6 
Leninets 25 
Pravda 3 
~ 
M 100? 
(several 
variants of 
which the 
most important 
were 
1 M-VI 1 , 
1 M-VI 1 mod. 1935 
'M-XII 1 ) 
s 50? 
K 10+ 
Disp. Armament 
Surf/Sub 
920/1,000 1 4" gun 
tons 1 45mm AA 
8 21" torpedo tubes 
900/1,300 1 4 11 AA gun 
tons 1 37m:n AA 
6 21" torpedo tubes 
12 torpedoes 
carried mine laying 
capability, 20 mines 
1,200/1,800 
tons 
650;750 6 Torpedo tubes 
tons 1 45mm AA gun 
150 tons 2 torpedo tubes 
later later 
variants 4 21 11 
250 tons 1 45mm AA 
780 tons 6 torpedo tubes 
2111 
1 3.8" gun 
1 4Smm AA 
1,500/2,000 10 torpedo tubes 
tons 21 11 
20 torpedoes carried 
2 3.9" guns 
2 45mm guns 
20 mines 
y SUBMARINES 1927-1945 
Plan 
Date 
1926 
(Dec} 
1928 
1932 
1932 
1932 
1936 
1936 
Const. dates 
1927 1929 
1929 1934 
1935 
1935-40 
1933 
1937 
to 
1940 
1939 
to 
1943 
Radius/Speed 
medium ocean going range 
15 knots surface speed 
7,000 miles at 9 knots 
surface, speed 16 knots 
surface, 9 knots sub-
merged. 
medium ocean going range 
surface 14 knots 
submerged 8 knots 
3,400 miles 8 knots 
surface, 90 miles 3 knots 
submerged max speeds 
13 knots surface 
8 knots submerged. 
surface speed 17 knots 
submerged speed 8.5 
knots 
surface 29 knots 
submerged 10 knots 
Sources: Breyer, S., op.cit.; Rudnitskiy, M.A., 1Soviet Submarines'; 
Janes F1ght1ng ShiPs, 1927-1953; Gorshkov, S.G. 1 The Building 
of the Navy', 1 The Second World War 1 • 
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Comments 
Based on contemporary Italian 
design. 
Thought to be based on the British 
L class submarine which was raised 
by the soviets in 1928 off 
Kronstadt. A successful class. 
Two torpedo tubes removed and 
replaced with installation for 
mine laying. 
A failure as a class. Boats 
spent most of their time as 
transports. 
A successful class perhaps 100 
boats of this type and its 
modifications built. 
several variants on design built. 
Limited endurance and habitability. 
Prefabricated and shipped to the 
yards on the seas. Intended for 
coastal usage. The lat~r models 
were successful during WWil 
operating against enemy's close in 
lines of communication. It is 
possible that this class did not 
reach the numbers planned for it 
due to priority claims on steel. 
Range and seakeeping qualities made 
it possible to operate in the open 
sea at much greater distance from 
base than for the Shch types. 
Design probably German in origin. 
Hulls electric welded. 
Although the only truly long range 
submarine the Soviet Navy built 
few in the pre-war era. Those 
that were built were not used to 
their fullest capabilities. Diving 
time of 50 seconds a tremendous 
advance on other boats. 
CHAPTER II INTRODUCTION 
Despite the increased security of the Soviet fleet areas 
following the Second World War the gains were not such as to 
deny non-littoral naval powers access to the enclosed seas. 
The Soviet Union embarked on a diplomatic campaign which sought 
to keep the islands and states flanking the egress points out 
of the alliance systems being constructed by its major post-war 
rival, the United States. There was a degree of urgency in 
these diplomatic attempts brought about by the weakened state 
of the navy. 
The immediate post-war period was also a time for assess-
ment of the recent experience of the various arms of service. 
Soviet naval planners, and others ~Jj. th an interest in post- war 
naval development, had before them their own experience, which 
had been limited to coastal operations, and the experience of 
their war time allies and opponents, who had fought on the 
high seas. The assessment noted the role of the various navies 
in the recent war, the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
types of vessels, and provided a basis from which to draw 
conclusions relevant to the future development of the Soviet 
Navy in the post war period. 
The concern for the security of the fleet areas and the 
enclosed seas, and the assessment of the navy's role in the 
recent war indicate continuity in Soviet thought about the navy. 
Moreover they are essential factors in an appreciation of the 
immediate post-war construction programme. 
THE STALIN POST WAR ERA 
CHAPTER II 
Soviet Doctrine and the Security of the 
Fleet Area in the Post War Period 
A. Post War Military Doctrine 
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In 1945 the Soviet Union possessed a number of 
military assets, the main one being its very large army, 
which, as a result of its major role in eliminating 
Germany from the strategic balance had secured commanding 
positions in central, eastern and south east Europe. 
The size of the army was reduced significantly from 
11,365,000 in 1945 to 2,865,000 men in 1948, 1 but the 
decrease in numbers was to some extent offset by the 
re-equipment of the armed forces. The ground forces 
were motorised and the fire power of rifle divisions 
increased significantly. 2 
The Soviet Union by late 1948 had established a 
buffer zone of •socialist states• several hundred miles 
wide and its armed forces in East Germany occupied 
advanced positions at considerable distance from the 
Soviet borders. This was a considerable advantage not 
only in the context of a land war. It was relevant in 
a situation where the United States and Britain 
possessed long range bomber forces, an as yet under-
developed branch of the Soviet Air Force which had 
placed emphasis on ground-attack aircraft and light 
bombers for tactical support for the army. 3 
1 Men'shov, M. 'The U.S.S.R. Armed Forces in the Post War 
Period', K.V.S., No. 14, July 1972. JPRS Translations in 
U.S.S.R. Military Affairs No. 852, p.31-32. 
2 Ibid, p.33-34, for technical details. See also 
T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore 
and London, 1970), and Mackintosh, M. Juggernaut (London, 
1967)' p.271-2. 
3 Yakovlev, A.S., Fifty Years of Soviet Aircraft 
Construction (Moscow, 1968), translated Israel Program 
for Scientific Translations, Jerusalem, 1970, p.95. 
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Offsetting these advantages was the fact of American 
possession of a small, but growing, stockpile of atomic 
bombs, a developing system of air force bases in 
continental Europe and a strategic bomber force capable 
of delivering these weapons. Stalin, while encouraging 
the development of nuclear weapons1 and delivery vehicles, 
long ranged bombers and rockets, 2stated that in his view 
the impact of the atomic bomb had been overrated: 
Atomic bombs are intended for intimidating 
the weak-nerved, but they cannot decide the 
outcome of war, since they are by no means 
sufficient for this purpose.3 
Soviet military doctrine in the post-war period was 
subordinated to the requirements of Stalin's autocracy and 
the need to attribute its fundamental soundness to his 
overriding genius, 4despite the setbacks of the early 
phases of the 'Great Patriotic War'. Thus the wartime 
distinction between the decisive permanently operating 
factors and the transitory factors, for example, surprise, 
1 The Soviet nuclear fission research had been halted due 
to the outbreak of war in 1941 but research was resumed in 
June 1942 probably under the spur of reports reaching 
Moscow that America and Germany were working 'urgently' on 
the creation of a 'new and.super powerful weapon'. From 
1944 at the latest the programme was receiving the support 
of the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Golovin, Isor, Dr. 
'The man behind the Soviet A-Bomb'. Soviet Weekly, 
24 Sept., 1 Oct. and 8 Oct. 1966, and 'Igor Kurichatov 
1903-1960: An Introduction', Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientist(Dec. 1967), p.8-18. 
2 Yakovlev, op.cit., p.l04-5, for post-war aircraft 
production, which included the Il-28 tactical jet bomber 
and the Tu-16 with ra~ges of 2,400 km (1,500 miles) and 
5,760 km (3,600 miles) respectively. Neither could reach 
the United States from Soviet territory. 
Men'shov, 'Armed Forces', p.34 for details of early 
short ranged missile launchings in October 1947 and in 
1950. 
3 Stalin's comment was made during an interview with 
Alexander Werth in September 1946 and was reported in 
the Sunday Times, 17 September, 1946. 
4 Gallagher, M.P. The Soviet History of World War II, 
(New York, Lond, 1963) chapter 2. 
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was maintained in the post-war period, 1and discussion of 
the impact of the atomic bomb was conducted within its 
terms of reference. 
Stalin may have been correct in minimising the impact 
of the atomic bomb in 1946 given the size of the American 
stockpile. What he apparently ignored, even in the early 
1950s when the stockpile had grown in significance, was 
the lower level questions relating to the impact of the 
new weapon on actual combat conditions. These questions 
were not raised during Stalin's lifetime and no ground 
force exercises under conditions simulating an atomic 
battlefield occurred until September 1954. 2 
The doctrine of the permanently operating factors 
assumed a war of attrition. While appropriate for 
continental Europe such a war would have little impact 
on the United States, for the Atlantic Ocean was 
dominated by the major sea-powers of the Second World 
War, the United States and Great Britain. Moreover, the 
United States remained inaccessible to Soviet air power. 
In any major war in the immediate future the Soviet 
Union could attempt to overrun continental Europe as 
quickly as possible, in the process capturing United 
States strategic bomber bases. What could not be 
achieved was any direct damage to the United States. 
The assigned role of the Soviet Navy in such a war 
appears obvious. In the enclosed waters of the Baltic 
1 Stalin, J.V. 'On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet 
Union' (Moscow 1946) p.45, for the permanently operating 
factors. The permanently operating factors did not 
constitute the basis of a strategy because they said 
nothing about how the desireable ends, stability of the 
rear, quality of leadership, number of troops and 
efficient supply were to be attained. 
2 Men'shov, op.cit., p.71. Men'shov claims that the army 
and navy already possessed nuclear weapons and scientific 
data on their effects prior to this date. 
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and Black Sea it could provide sea-based flank-
protection and artillery support, it could overcome enemy 
coastal strongholds by offshore artillery fire, and assist 
by providing cover for short ranged amphibious landings. 
Enemy attacks from aircraft carriers could be held at bay 
by the submarine and surface forces, The role of the army 
was still 'decisive': the Navy and Air Force were required 
for support operations. 
B. Post-War Naval Doctrine. 
The details of the Soviet Navy's combat achievements 
during the war need not concern us here. 1 What is of 
interest is the impact of the conflict on Soviet naval 
leaders and others who thought about the role of the 
navy in the future. 
On Navy Day, 22 July 1945, Stalin's 'Order to the Red 
Army and Navy' praised the Soviet Navy as 'the loyal help-
2 
mate of the Red Army in the war against Germany'. Soviet 
naval leaders reaffirmed Stalin's assessment in Navy Day 
3 
speeches throughout the 1940s. Given the continental 
nature of the war as experienced by the Soviet Union 
such an assessment was perfectly sensible. However as 
Gorshkov was later to point out, the utility of this 
1 Soviet accounts may be found in Isakov, I.S. (Admiral), 
The Red Fleet in the Second World War, translated by J. 
Hural (London,l944); Golovko, A. (Admiral) With the Red 
Fleet, translated by P. Broomfield (London 1 1965); Gorshkov, S.G. (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union) 
'The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War', Morskoy 
Sbornik, No. 10, 1972, U.S. Navy trans. 
2 Stalin, J.V., 'Order to the Red Army and Navy', 22 July 
1945, quoted in Kerner, R.J. 'Russian Naval Aims' 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1946, p.296. 
3For example, Yumashev, I.S. (Admiral, Commander in Chief 
of the Navy 1947-1951) 'During the course of the war, the 
fleet was the faithful assistant of the Red Army', Pravda, 
27 July, 1947, cited in Hucul, op.cit.; and Yumashev again 
on Navy Day 1949 'Lenin and Stalin have considered the 
Navy an important branch of the armed forces always 
stressing the need for the closest unity of action between 
the Army and the Navy ... The Navy, like the Air Force, 
plays its role in war, not in isolation from the Army, but 
in a single purposeful unit with it, the role of the Army 
being the decisive one'. Pravda, July 1949. 
assessment for the emerging international situation was 
negligible. 1 
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Immediate post-war writings reaffirmed the doctrine 
of 'combined action' which it was claimed had been 
confirmed by the experience of all the Powers involved in 
the recent war. 
War on the sea has historically never been an 
independent phenomenon, but always a part of 
a war as a whole. 
From the experience of the Soviet and foreign 
armed forces in the recent war it is necessary 
to consider it completely confirmed that the 
combined action of land troops with air and 
sea forces is a foundation of the contemporary 
conduct of war.2 
In the Soviet context the dominant role of the Army 
in the armed forces, {brought about by the fact that ~n 
the past wars had been fought primarily on land), 
suggested that the doctrine of 'combined action' would 
reinforce the notion of naval subordination. To the 
extent that the experience and contributions of the 
wartime allies, the major naval powers, was ignored and 
denigrated by the officially inspired historiography of 
3 the war, there was no corrective to this bias borne of 
Soviet and Russian experience. 
Admiral Alafuzov, reflecting on the experience of 
the Great Patriotic War, compiled an eight point summary 
of the missions of the Navy: 
1 Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Development of Soviet Naval Science' 
Morskoy Sbornik No.2 1967, U.S. Navy trans. p.l0-14. 
See pp. 136/7 below for an extended discussion. 
2 Belli (Rear Admiral) Voennaia Mysl' No. 9.1946, p.32 & 
37 quoted in Garthoff, R.L. How Russia Makes War (London, 
1954) p.362. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G., op.cit., trans. p.ll. See also 
Gallagher, M.P., The Soviet History of World War II 
(New York, London, 1963) for an account of the 'officially 
inspired historiography' esp. chapters 1 and 2. 
The Fleet is called upon to fulfil the 
following basic missions: 
( 1) defence of our own sea communications. 
(The Soviet Navy had performed this 
task in the Black Sea during the s~ge 
of Odessa and Sevastopol, in the Baltic 
during the withdrawal from naval bases 
in Finland and the Baltic States, across 
Lake Ladoga during the seige of Leningrad 
and in the North helping to keep open the 
supply links to the allied forces. In 
this latter case however their assistance 
was limited to the last hundred miles or 
so of the convoy route). 
(2) interruption of the enemy's sea 
communications. (As had occurred in the 
Southern Baltic after the break out of 
Soviet submarines from the Gulf of 
Finland, in the Western part of the 
Black Sea and in the waters surrounding 
the Crimean Peninsula after it had been 
cut off by land in 1944 and in the waters 
north of Scandinavia.) 
(3) defence of our territory against enemy 
invasion from the sea. (The Germans 
only attempted two unsuccessful landings 
in the Baltic.) 
(4) invasion of the enemy's territory from 
the sea. (The Soviet naval infantry 
spearheaded a number of small landings 
in all the naval theatres. These were 
mainly of a diversionary nature although 
there were large amphibious assaults at 
Kerch, into the Kurile Islands and 
Sakhalin as well as along the Korean 
coastline.) 
(5) defence of our shore installations. 
(During the opening years of the war 
this was the major task of the Soviet 
fleet in the Baltic, at Leningrad 
and Kronstadt, in the Black Sea, at 
Odessa and Sevastopol, until these 
centres fell, and in the North, where 
sailors joined ground forces in 
protecting the Murmansk base.) 
(6) the destruction of the enemy's shore 
installations. (Naval aviation and 
landing parties of naval infantry 
accomplished this task in all the 
nav~l theatres.) 
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(7) support of the Army's sea flanks 
and some pages later: 
(8) evacuation of an isolated sector. 
(This had occurred at Hango and 
Tallin in the Baltic Sea and at 
Odessa and Sevastopol in the 
Black Sea. ) 1 
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While Alafuzov•s listing of missions would be 
familiar to an American or British naval audience 
reviewing World War II, the essential difference arises 
from the fact that the Soviet Navy was limited to coastal 
operations, carried out in restricted waters under the 
protection of land based aircraft and shore artillery. 
In cases where missions called for operations outside 
these limits, most obviously in keeping open the supply 
links with the allies in the North, the Soviet Navy was 
unable to meet the requirement. 
The naval power allies conducted operations on the 
high seas. As a preliminary condition for their success 
the naval powers sought to gain control of the sea by 
either destroying enemy fleet concentrations, blockading 
the enemy fleets in base or by establishing a local 
preponderance of seapower estimated to be sufficient to 
carry out an operation with success. The Soviet Navy 
would not achieve this control except in its own 
1 For the listing of missions see Alafuzov, V. (Admiral) 
'On the nature of naval operations•, Voennaia Mysl, No. 8 1 
1946, p.l7 and 18, as cited in Garthoff, op.cit., p.363. 
The illustrative examples are drawn from Isakov, op.cit., 
passim, Gorshkov, op.cit., passim, and Gorshkov 'The 
Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War•, Eassim. 
For a recent and almost identical listing to that of 
Alafuzov see Ivanov, S.G. (Rear Admiral Reserves) 
'Supporting the coastal flanks of the Army', Morskoy 
Sbornik, No. 1, 1971, U.S. Navy trans. p.46-52. 
coastal waters. 1 
In Gorshkov 1 s assessment World War II had a 
significant, if stultifying, impact on Soviet Naval 
thought and doctrine. It 'strengthened the dominant 
position of the defensive tendencies in views on the 
strategic use of the fleet• which 
during the first post war years ..• to an 
even greater extent than before, bound it 
(the fleet) to the coastal zone controlled 
by the ground forces ... (T)he fleet's 
role of simply being an assistant to the 
ground forces was strengthened. 
This view did not take into account 'the changes which 
have occurred in the arrangement of forces in the 
international arena•, in particular the formation and 
consolidation of the 'great camp of socialism• and the 
emergence of 'aggressive military blocs, headed by the 
traditional naval powers'. 
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This oversight is attributed by Gorshkov to the 
military historical research which sought to 'generalise 
the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces ln the Great 
1 The Soviets were not unaware of the concept 'command 
of the sea'. During a pre-war lecture course at the Naval 
Academy attended by Gorshkov, it was stated: 'To achieve 
superiority of forces over the enemy in the main sector 
and to pin him down in the secondary sectors at the time 
of operation means ~o achieve control of the sea in a 
theatre or a sector of a theatre, i.e., to create such a 
situation that the enemy will be paralyzed or constrained 
in his operations, or weakened and thereby hampered from 
interfering with our execution of a given operation or in 
our execution of our own operations mission. 
Belli, V.A. (Captain 2nd Rank) 'Theoretical Principles 
of Conducting Operations. Synopses-Theses'. Naval Academy 
1938. Cited Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Building of the Navy 
(1928-41) 1 Morsko~ Sbornik, U.S. Navy trans. p.9. 
The definition lS remarkable for its breadth; the 
control of coastal waters exercised by submarines, land 
based aviation and small surface vessels is subsumed 1 as 
well as control of the high seas being exercised by the 
projected battleships, cruisers and aircraft carriers of 
the 1938 Soviet building programme. 
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Patriotic War•. 1 Primary attention was focused on the 
great land battles where the fleet played at the most a 
minimal role. Moreover, the combat experience of the 
fleets of the great naval powers was considered to be of 
minor importance in determining the outcome of the war, 
so it received scant attention. 
The upshot of the post war discussion was a 
2 
•stagnation and formalism in naval theory• based not 
only on the immediate past, but on the continental 
tradition of Tsarist and Soviet military experience. 
In the three articles of the series 'Navies in War 
and Peace' dealing with naval activities during the 
Second World War, 3 Gorshkov does not repeat this 
aggressive and partially undeserved attack on the post 
war naval theorists. The period 'stagnation and 
formalism' did not set in immediately after the war. 
Alafuzov, Isakov, Schner and others4 had contributed 
books and articles analysing the World War II experience 
which contained elements far from stagnant, formal or 
defensive in implication. 'Stagnation and formalism• 
probably did not dominate Soviet writings on the war 
until early 1947, by which time the main post war 
1 Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Development of Soviet Naval Science', 
U.S. Navy trans. p.ll. 
2 Ibid., p.l5. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Second World War•, Morskoy Sbornik, 
No. 9, 1972, p.l4-24, U.S. Navy trans. p.l-17. 
'The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War•, Morskoy 
Sbornik, No. 10, 1972, p.l3-21, U.S. Navy trans. p.2-14. 
'The basic missions executed by navies in the course 
of the Second World War', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11, 1972, 
p.24-34, U.S. Navy trans. p.l-19. 
4 Alafuzov, 'Nature of Naval Operations•. 
Isakov, The Red Fleet. 
Schner, I., •Aircraft Carriers and their role in the 
operation of a navy', Veonnaia Mysl, June, 1946. 
See also Garthoff, R.L., How Russia Makes War, Chapter 
21 for a discussion of the Soviet Navy's World War II 
operations based on Soviet post-war articles. 
propaganda line had been established. 1 
As the uneasy alliance of conven~ence between the 
United Nations gave way to the tensions of the Cold War, 
the Soviet High Command found itself faced with the task 
of preparing for a possible future war against a new 
antagonist, the United States. Unlike the historical 
continental antagonists, Sweden, Turkey and Germany, the 
United States was not accessible by land. 
After World War II the socialist camp was 
faced by the armed forces of the aggressive 
military blocs, headed by the traditional 
naval powers, special importance in the 
armed forces of which had, for a long time 
attached to the Navy. 2 
Moreover, the •traditional naval powers•, the United 
States and Great Britain, had, during the course of the 
war, given a vivid illustration in the Atlantic of the 
ability of seapower to project force over seas and oceans 
onto the continental land mass of Europe. In the Pacific 
U.S. seapower had destroyed the Japanese fleet, rolled 
back the Japanese from their island conquests, cut 
Japanese sea lines of communication and finally brought 
the American forces to a position from which they could 
destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs. 
The naval powers, Britain and the United States, had 
shown an ability to contain the submarine threat by the 
use of surface forces, and shore and later carrier-based 
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1 Gallagher, P., op.cit., Chapter 1-3 described the process 
by which this propaganda line was established. 
Gorshkov himself, in his 1972 articles, gives undue 
credit to the Army for he not only asserts that the war 
was won on the Eastern Front, a standard Soviet claim 
since 1946-1947, but lends his name to the highly dubious 
assertion that the Soviet success at Stalingrad was the 
turning point in the Pacific War. See Gorshkov 'The 
Second World War', U.S. Navy trans. p.9-ll. 
2 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Soviet Naval Science', U.S. Navy trans. 
p.ll. 
naval aviation equipped with radar. Radar was extremely 
effective in operations against diesel electric 
submarines, which spent only a small part of their total 
time at sea submerged. Attacks on enemy submarine bases 
further disrupted their operations. 
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The appearance of the snorkel submarine had come too 
late to upset the predominance that allied anti-submarine 
warfare techniques had gradually established over the 
German U-boats. With the refinement of radar systems, 
the initial advantage which the introduction of the 
snorkel had conferred on the submarine was lost. 
The Germans had been unable to interrupt the flow of 
food and raw materials by dislocating the sea lines of 
communication, the maintenance of which had enabled 
Britain to continue the war. Later these sea lanes 
brought the men and material which were essential for 
the amphibious invasion of Europe. 
When the invasion came German coastal defences had 
not been sufficiently strong to hold back the invasion 
fleet or the troops which successfully landed. 
Finally, the United States had demonstrated, ln the 
final stages of the war, that it had mastered the 
technology of the atomic bomb and had provided an 
illustration of the devastation it could cause. 
Soviet military planners, ordered by 1947 at the 
latest, to prepare for a possible future war, with the 
United States as principal antagonist, could not have 
overlooked any of these factors. While they could 
suggest plausible plans for the removal of hostile 
American forces from Europe there remained no way in 
which the Soviet Union could inflict direct damage on the 
continental United States. Nor could the Soviet Union 
prevent the United States from utilising its sea power 
to intervene in the affairs of Europe, except, possibly, 
by taking up where the Germans had left off, and attempting 
to sever the Atlantic lines of communication by the use 
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of submarines, and reinforcing coastal defence systems 
around its own shores. The alternative solution, to set 
about the construction of a masslve surface fleet, capable 
of wresting control of the sea from the major naval powers, 
would have required a major economic and technological 
investment in the immediate postwar period and even then 
would take several decades to produce. 
If the war had shown the importance of sea power it 
had also confirmed the United States as the primary power 
in this field. Whereas the industrial base of the United 
States shipbuilding industry had been untouched by the 
war enabling it to turn out huge numbers of all classes 
of vessel incorporating the new technologies of radar and 
sonar, that of the Soviet Union had been overrun and 
destroyed. Unlike the United States the Soviet Union had 
been virtually incapable of launching any warships of 
size or significance during the course of the war. 
The replacement of losses in ship inventory was 
very difficult because we had lost a number of 
shipyards and had changed over much of the 
capacity of the shipbuilding industry to 
construction of tanks and other weapons for the 
Army. Therefore in the course of the war we 
built mostly small warships and patrol boats. 
Despite these difficulties the Navy received 
from industry two light cruisers, 25 destroyers, 
escort ships and minesweepers, 52 submarines 
15 large submarine chasers and 873 patrol 
boats of various types during the Great 
Patriotic War.l 
The ships laid down prior to the war, under the 
1938-42 programme were, in the main, left uncompleted. 
They either fell into German hands, were wrecked on the 
slipways, or if near completion, were transferred to 
safer ports in the Black Sea, to await completion 
following the end of the war. 
1 Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic 
War', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 10, 1972, U.S. Navy trans. 
p.ll. 
The course of the war had an impact on naval 
assessments of the utility of certain weapons systems. 
The experience of the Fatherland War ... 
shows that submarines can be extremely 
effectively used in the struggle against 
sea communications, and under certain 
conditions and relations of forces ~n the 
theatre, is the type of naval force 
fulfilling the main role in the mission 
of interdicti-ng enemy supply by sea .1 
Naval aviation emerged in Soviet thinking as 1 the 
most universal type of force of the fleet•, 2and Admiral 
Isakov noted that 
successful naval operations can be conducted 
close to the shore or in narrow areas only 
if air supremacy has been secured over the 
zone of operations.3 
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Whereas prior to the war •aviation was relegated to 
the role of one of the main means of reconnaissance and 
support• 4 the experience of the war extended this range 
of missions to include not only reconnaissance but also 
anti-submarine warfare, convoy protection, destruction 
of the enemy's air and surface forces, aerial mining, 
1 Shergin, Captain 1st Rank 'Submarine warfare against 
enemy communications during World War II', Morskoy Sbornik 
No. 7, July 1946, p.ll cited in R.L. Garthoff How Russia 
Makes War, p.367. My emphasis. 
There is a degree of subt~'y here that was to disappear 
from Soviet assessments of the utility of the submarine, 
especially the nuclear powered submarine, during the 
Khrushchev era. Gorshkov has recently seen fit to remind 
his Soviet audience that submarines, although they can be 
extremely effective, need the support of other types of 
naval forces, to carry out their assigned missions. 
Gorshkov, S.G. 'Some problems in mastering the world 
ocean', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1973, JPRS, Translation 
of U.S.S.R. Military Affairs, No. 905, p.l9. 
2 Alafuzov, V., op.cit., p.28, cited Garthoff, op.cit, 
p.368. 
3 Isakov, The Red Fleet, p.26-27. 
4 Gorshkov, S.G. 
U.S. Navy trans. 
U.S. Navy trans. 
1 The building of the Navy 
p.lO. See also Shuginin, 
p.l5. 
(1928-41) 1 ' 
'Air Strikes' 
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attacks on enemy naval bases and support of ground forces. 1 
The war indicated the inadequacy of the prewar 
doctrine 'Bomber aircraft are the basic offensive nucleus 
of the air forces of the RKVMF (Soviet Navy)•. 2 During 
the war specialised torpedo planes were added to the 
fleets. The disadvantages of low speed, short flight 
range and small load capacity., which had limited the 
employment of naval aviation at a time when it was 
equipped with aircraft designed for other branches of 
the armed services was thus to some extent overcome. 
The war also indicated that aircraft carriers had 
displaced the battleship from its position of primacy. 
Kuznetsov claims 
1 
in 1942, after the battle for Midway Island in 
the Pacific Ocean, it became clear to all how 
much the character of naval battles had changed 
and what striking force had appeared at sea in 
the form of aircraft ..• , This only only decided 
the outcome of the fighting, but also became 
the turning point in the Japanese-American war. 
The Japanese Admiral Yamamoto was forced to 
retreat although his battleships had not lost 
their ability to fight. Thus history executed 
its sentence on the battleships. 3 
In an article published in June 1946 I. Schner wrote 
The condiUions of modern war at sea made it 
mandatory for powerful carrier forces to take 
part in naval warfare, using them to strike 
devastating blows against the enemy naval 
forces and to battle with his air force. Both 
at sea and near one's bases these tasks can only 
be carried out by carrier aviation. 4 
Isakov, op.cit., passim and Shuginin, op.cit., passim. 
2 Provisional Manual of the Combat Em loyment of Bomber 
Aircraft of the Soviet Navy Moscow-Leningrad,l940}, p.l, 
cited Garthoff, op'.cit;, p.368 .. See also, 
Gorshkov'The building of the navy', U.S. Navy trans. p.lO. 
3 Kuznetsov, N .G. 1 Soviet Naval Developments Prior to World 
War II', JPRS Soviet Military Translations No. 218, p.l2. 
4 Schner, I. 'Aircraft carriers and their role in the 
operation of a navy' Voennaia Mysl June 11946, p.82., cited in Herrick, R.W. Soviet Naval Strategy, p.58. 
64 
The war also had an impact on tactical doctrine. 
As a result of combat experience a major reassessment of 
The use of submarines in groups, combined action 
by aircraft and submarines, use of torpedo boats 
and aircraft in mass against lines of communication. 
was undertaken. Soviet authors claim that such problems 
were 1 d . 1 1 •reso ve creatlve y'. 
c. The Fleet Areas in the Post War Period. 
By the late 1940s the Soviet Union had under its 
control, or the control of its satellites, the southern 
coast of the Baltic to the border of what has now become 
the German Federal Republic. The Finnish-Soviet border 
had been pushed back from Leningrad across the Karelian 
Peninsula and the important base of Porkkala, inside the 
mouth of the Gulf of Finland, had been leased to the 
Soviet Union for a period of fifty years. 2 Soviet 
influence was established along the western coast of the 
Black Sea. 
These changes undeniably strengthened the Soviet 
Union's position within these historically important 
seas, but they did nothing to improve the fleet's 
strategic offensive capabilities against the non-
. . 3 
rlparlan powers. 
In the Arctic region the Soviet Union gained the 
Petsamo region of Finland. This denied Finland a northern 
coastline and gave the Soviet Union control of an important 
nickel mining area. As the acquisition of the Karelian 
1 Sidorov, P. (Colonel) 'The creative character of Soviet 
military science' Sovetskii Flot 11 December, 1958, 
translated in Garthoff, R.L. The Soviet Image of Future 
War (Washington,l959) Appendix C., p.l24 
2 For details see Jakobson, Max Finnish Neutrality 
(London, 1968) p.22-24 passim. 
3 
. k . f Herrle , R.W. Sovlet Naval Strategy, p.55-56, or the 
same point. 
Peninsula added to the post war 
so the territorial gains in the 
between the Northern Fleet base 
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security of Leningrad 
north provided a buffer 
1 
of Murmansk and foreign 
controlled territory. The Sea of Okhotsk in the east became 
a virtual Soviet lake following the acquisition of Southern 
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. But the major access 
points from all the Soviet Navy's fleet areas were still 
dominated by foreign powers. As in the past this 
presented the post war Soviet Union with a dual problem. 
Not only was the Soviet Navy unlikely to ga~n access to 
the high seas in any future conflict but more importantly, 
given its post war force strength, it was unable to 
prevent the intrusion of hostile naval forces. 
1) The Baltic Fleet Area 
Despite its strategic vulnerability the Baltic fleet 
area was, and is, a vital centre for the Soviet Navy. Not 
only are the Soviet Union's biggest and most efficient 
dockyards for the construction of merchant and naval 
vessels situated at Leningrad and Kronstadt but so too 
are major administrative, logistic and training 
. 11 0 2 ~nsta at~ons. 
It is not surprising therefore that the status of the 
Baltic Sea was a matter of concern to the Soviet Union, 
during and in the period immediately after the war. 
1 The warm Gulf Stream waters which flow to the Arctic 
keeps the ice at its maximum extension on average distance 
of 180 miles from the coast until Mys Syvatoy Nos. Thus 
the northern port of Murmansk remains ice free throughout 
the year while Archangel, the longer established northern 
port, is frozen for approximately half the year. 
2 Siegfried Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, translated 
by Lt. Commander M.W. Henley, R.N. Retired, (Annapolis, 
Maryland, 1970), p.204-208 and 227-232 give details of 
ports and ship building industry. 
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In 1943, at Tehran, Stalin associated himself with 
the views expressed by Roosevelt on the post war 
partition of Germany, in which was included the proposal 
that the Kiel Canal be placed under international 
authority. It was also agreed that there be free 
navigation of the Baltic. 1 Churchill gave Stalin 
assurances that he accepted Soviet claims to ice free 
ports, and felt that the Soviet Union was destined to 
have a large merchant and naval fleet, which he, at any 
rate was willing to accept as a feature of the post war 
maritime scene. 2 
During December 1944 V.I. Semenov of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry told Th.D¢ssing, the Danish Ambassador 
to Moscow, that Denmark was a Soviet sphere of interest 
and a post war Danish foreign policy independent of the 
Soviet Union would be considered an unfriendly stance. 3 
However, apart from this expression of concern, it appears 
as though the Soviet Union made no attempt to initiate 
actions to alter the status of the Danish Straits. 
The Soviet forces which had landed on the Danish 
island of Bornholm, situated inside the mouth of the 
Baltic Sea, in May 1945, completed their 
April 1946 and were replaced by a Danish 
evacuation by 
. 4 
garr~son. 
Following Danish adherence to the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 
there was some dispute over the actual conditions of 
Danish return to the island. The Soviet Union insisted 
that the Danish government had agreed to re-establish 
1 McNeill, W.H. America, Britain and Russia: Their 
Cooperation and Conflict 1941-1946 (London, 1953) p.354. 
2 Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War, Vol. 5, 
The Closing Ring, (London, 1952) p.336-7. 
3 Erling Bjol 'U.S.S.R., Detente and the Future of NATO', 
Orbis, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 1969, p.224. 
4 . I Kees~ng s Contemporary Archives, p.7791A and 7823D. 
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i tse1f on Bornho1m with Danish forces only and hence any 
attempt to establish NATO bases there was a violation of 
1 
the agreement. 
Soviet jurists were at pains to establish the 
legitimacy of the Soviet claim to a twelve 
territorial waters limit within the Baltic 
mile 
2 Sea. Soviet 
patrol vessels seized a number of Swedish and Danish 
fishing vessels for alleged violations of Soviet waters 
or for infringing on coastal defence zones. 3 In the case 
of American reconnaissance aircraft which were shot down 
over the Baltic the Soviet government alleged violations 
f . t . 4 o Sov~e a~r space. 
Of greater significance was the Soviet attempt to 
have the Baltic declared a 'closed sea•. This legalistic 
argument was combined with a political/propaganda campaign 
5 in support of the notion of a 'sea of peace'. In this 
vein the Soviet press and government protested against 
intrusion into the Baltic by warships of the NATO powers 
"1 . 6 wh~ eon exerc~ses. 
1 0 . d d" . rv~k, N. an Haagerup, N.J. 'The Scan ~nav~an members 
of NATO' Adelphi Paper No. 23, December,l965, p.3. 
2 Butler, W.E. The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, 
p.38-39. 
3 "'K::::e'-!e;;s"-~:!:.· ;;n~g!..'...:s"-C~o:,cn..,t:..:e"'m"'p""""o"'r~a'"r'-y"'-£:.A~r_,c"'h=i::t.v.:.e'-'s~, p . 107 6 8 D and p . 109 13 E . 
4 Butler, W.E., op.cit., p.39. 
5 Ibid, p.l24. 
6 Petukhov, S. 'Mainbrace' Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
September 20, 1952, p.4. translation Current D~gest of 
the Soviet Press (C.D.S.P.) Vol. 4, No. 38, p.l3. 
'Exercise provocation' New Times, No. 39, September 24, 
1952, p.20. 
'Mariner' New Times, No. 41, October 10, 1953, p.l8. 
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2) The Northern Fleet Area. 
The Soviet forces which had occupied northern Norway 
l 
withdrew to Soviet territory at the end of the war. If 
Soviet withdrawal from Bornholm removed the possibility 
of controlling the mouth of the Baltic the withdrawal from 
Norway similarly removed the possibility of controlling 
one side of the North Cape - Bear Island- Spitzbergen 
channels between the White Sea and the Norwegian Sea. 
Soviet naval officers and politicians were aware of 
the importance of the Northern Fleet 
convincingly demonstrated during the 
area which had been 
2 
war. The major 
disadvantage of the area from a Soviet perspective was 
the fact of foreign possession of the islands to the 
north of Norway which could be used to mount operations 
cutting the lines of communication between the Northern 
Fleet area and the seas beyond. 
During 1944 the Soviet Union requested that the 
Norwegian Government in exile cede Bear Island in the 
Norwegian Arctic to the U.S.S.R. and agree to a 
condominium arrangement for the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) 
island group. 3 The Norwegian Government postponed 
discussion of the issue which Molotov sought to revive 
again in 1946 although this time discussion was limited 
1 It should be noted that in the immediate post war period, 
prior to the onset of the cold war, when it appeared as 
though the United States would withdraw its troops from 
Europe by 1947, the Soviet Union did differentiate between 
wartime allies and enemies. Soviet forces were removed 
from northern Norway, Bornholm (Denmark), Yugoslavia, 
Poland, (except for those required to maintain lines of 
commu~cation to Soviet forces in Germany), Czechoslovakia 
and Iran by late 1946. Soviet forces of occupation 
remained in former enemy Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
East Germany and Finland. 
2 The wartime commander of the Northern Fleet was of the 
opinion 'Without the Kola inlet the Northern Fleet cannot 
exist ... the Kola inlet is necessary to the state'. 
Golovko, A. (Admiral) With the Red Fleet, p.40. 
3 0rvik, Nils. 'Scand~navian security in transition: the 
two dimensional threat• Orbis, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1973, p.721. 
to the Spitzbergen guestion. 1 While these measures 
provide 
careful 
an indication of Soviet concern the Soviets were 
not to alarm Norwegians or their wartime allies 
by . h . h 2 press~ng t e~r approac es. 
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The Soviet Union continued to make its concern felt, 
hoping to appeal to Norwegian restraint in the area while 
warning the Norwegians of the Soviet attitude. 
Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told his 
Norwegian counterpart Trygve Lie: 
the Dardanelles ... here we are locked in ... 
Oresund ... here we are locked in. Only in 
the North is there an opening, but this war 
has shown that the supply line to Northern 
Russia can be cut or interfered with. This 
shall not be repeated in the future. We have 
invested much in this part of the Soviet Union, 
and it is so important for the entire Union's 
existence that we shall in future ensure that 
Northern Russia is permitted to live in 
security and peace.3 
Subsequent statements by the Soviet Government and 
reports in the Soviet press in 1947 indicated that in 
the developing Cold War climate the Soviet Government 
was particularly concerned with the strategic importance 
of the Spitzbergen Islands. 4 Although concern about 
rapid American expansion in the Arctic region was 
directed primarily at the maintenance of air bases in 
Greenland, Iceland and Britain and the establishment of 
l Ibid, p.721. 
2 For an account of the delicacy of the Soviet's moves 
in this region see Riste, 0. 'The Great Powers and the 
Northern Gap 1940-45' Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 7 
especially p.ll-12. 
3 Molotov quoted by Trygve Lie Hjemover (Homeward} 
(Oslo, 1958), quoted Jacobsen Soviet Strategy -Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Glasgow, 1972} p.l51. 
4 Mathisen, T. Svalbard in the Changing Arctic (Oslo, 
1954) p.51-55 for a summary analysis of this development. 
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additional facilities in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, 
it did have a naval dimension. 1 
Soviet efforts to raise the issue of Spitzbergen 
bilaterally in 1947 were rejected by the Norwegian 
Starting on 15 February, 1947. 2 The Soviet Union 
apparently continued its basic approach of cautiously 
reminding the Norwegian government of its concern and 
the matter was not formally raised again until 1949, in 
the context of Norway's decision to enter the North 
Atlantic Alliance. 
On 9 January, 1949, the Soviet Ambassador handed 
the Norwegian Government a note which drew attention to 
the Soviet Union's views on the proposed alliance; 
'a group of Powers pursuing aggressive aims' seeking to 
establish 'air and naval bases ... particularly on the 
territory of Powers situated close to the frontiers of 
the Soviet Union• 3 and requested that the Soviet Union 
be informed of Norway's intentions especially with 
establishment of bases in Norwegian respect to 
territory. In a subsequent note of 6 February, 1949, the 
Soviet Union rejected any suggestion that the Soviet Union 
posed a threat to Norway. After reminding the Norwegians 
that 'Soviet troops were withdrawn from Norwegian 
territory voluntarily and even earlier than the Norwegian 
Government itself desired' the note proposed 'a pact of 
non-aggression, and thus put an end to all doubts•. 4 
1 Galant, V. 'Polar fever in America' Zvezda, No. 11, 
1947 in Soviet Press Translations, February 1948, p.l02. 
2 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p.8529D. The Norwegian 
rejection reaffirmed Article 9 of a treaty of neutralisation 
which in 1920 had neutralised the Spitzbergen Islands. 
As the treaty was an international one the Norwegians 
opposed the Soviet approach on the grounds that it could 
not be altered by a bilateral act. 
3 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p.9794A contains the 
text of the Soviet Note. 
4 Ibid, for the text of the note of 6 February, 1949. 
The Norwegian Government rejected the offer of a 
non-aggression pact1and stated its intention to join the 
Atlantic Alliance but in its reply to the first of the 
Soviet notes it undertook 
not (to) join in any agreement with other 
States involving obligations to open bases 
for the military forces of foreign Powers 
on Norwegian territory as long as Norway 
is not attacked or exposed to threats of 
attack.2 
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This undertaking was reaffirmed in the note rejecting the 
proposed non-aggression pact. 
The Soviet government did not raise the Spitzbergen 
issue again until 1951. Some idea of Soviet thinking 
can be gleaned from a Pravda article published on 30 
August, 1951, which attacked the 'polar strategy' of the 
United States. Spitzbergen and northern Norway was 
specifically mentioned as part of the NATO alliance's 
•eastern flank'. The article objected to the establish-
ment of air and naval bases in the region and drew 
attention to the establishment of communications centres 
which could serve American surface vessels and submarine 
forces. 3 
The immediate cause of Soviet concern was the 
establishment of the North Atlantic Command which 
inter alia assumed responsibility for the defence of 
the Svalbard group of islands, Jan Mayen Island and 
Bear Island. This was seen by the Soviet Union as 
contravening Article 9 of the 1920 Treaty on Svalbard, 
which prohibited the establishment of military bases there, 
1 
2 
1 
3 
Keesing's 
Keesing's 
February, 
Contemporary Archives, p.9842. 
p.9794 for the text of Norwegian reply of 
1949, to the initial Soviet note. 
Kuranen, I. 'Under cover of "defence" talks' Pravda 
30 August, 1951, p.3. 
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and the assurances which Norway had given ln 1949 on the 
question of foreign military bases. 
In a note to the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow of 
15 October, 1951, the Soviet Government pointed out: 
the Soviet Union has special interests in 
this area {Spitzbergen). The U.S.S.R. owns 
part of the coal deposits on Spitzbergen 
and is the only country, besides Norway, 
carrying on industrial mining of coal on 
Spitzbergen, which supplies the northern 
areas of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet 
northern fleet ... The outlet to the ocean 
in the west beyond Spitzbergen and Bear 
Islands also has exceptional significance 
for the Soviet Union and its security in 
the north.l 
The importance of the ocean outlet for Soviet security 
was further elaborated in a Pravda article on 28 October, 
1951. 
By their geographical location the 
Spitzbergen islands are, so to say, one 
of the banks of the canal which links 
the Soviet Union with the ocean in the 
North. With the development of aviation 
Spitzbergen's importance to Soviet 
security has increased still further.2 
The Soviet Government and press strongly condemned 
the manoeuvres conducted by the Alliance powers in the 
North, Norwegian and Baltic Seas. The part played in 
the operations by aircraft carriers, whose aircraft 
were reported to be carrying bombs and ammunition, was 
noted as was the fact that the opposition's naval forces 
consisted of submarines, cruisers and aircraft, ~ 
1 The text of the note to the Norwegian Ambassador appeared 
in Izvestia and Pravda 16 October, 1951, p.2. 
2 Rassadin, G. Pravda 280ctober, p.4. See also 
Mikhailov, S. 'Spitzbergen and Medvezhi Island' 
New Times No. 44, 31 October 1951, p.28-3l for a more 
explicit charge of American attempts to integrate the 
islands as well as the northern regions of Norway into 
a system of Arctic military bases stretching from 
Alaska through Greenland and Iceland. 
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the precise items which the Soviet Navy had been acquiring 
in its post war completion and construction programmes. 
The fact that these exercises involved countering a 
hypothetical invasion of Norway from the east was also 
criticised .cl 
3) The Black Sea Fleet Area 
Soviet efforts to alter the Montreux Conventions on 
tche Turkish Straits before 1941 have already been 
discussed. In responding to Ribbentrop 1 s original Axis 
proposals the Soviet Union had asked for a base for its 
land and naval forces within range of but not on the 
Bosporus. The Soviet's major pre-war concern was to 
prevent the entrance of hostile naval forces to the Black 
Sea. 
As a result of a war time agreement between Stalin 
and Churchill, on which the United States reserved its 
position, the Soviet Union was assured of preponderance 
in the Black Sea while Britain obtained predominance in 
Greece. 2 This ensured that the British could dominate 
the Aegean Sea while the Turkish Straits remained in 
Turkish hands under the terms of the Montreux Convention. 
At Yalta Stalin stated that the Convention was out of 
date and that 'it was impossible to accept a situation 
in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat•. 3 In June 
1 Petukhov, s. 'Mainbrace' Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
20 September, 1952, p.4. 
'Exercise "provocation'", International Notes, New Times 
No. 39, 24 September, 1952, p.20. 
'Mariner' International Notes, New Times, No. 41, 
10 October, 1953, p.l8. 
2 This agreement was reached on 9 October, 1944, and 
resulted in the Soviet Union being given 90% predominance 
in Roumania,a 75% predominance in Bulgaria, a 50-50 share 
with Britain and others in Yugoslavia and Hungary while 
Britain retained a 90% predominance in Greece. Winston 
S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI (Boston, 1950) 
p.227. 
3 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Washington (The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945) 
p.328, 903 quoted in Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War 
(London, 1969) p.366. 
1945 the Soviet Government made it known that if the 
Turco-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression 
were to be renewed, certain conditions would have to 
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be met. The Soviet Union demanded firstly the granting 
of a base on the Dardanelles, secondly, a return of the 
Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan and, thirdly, that 
the Turkish Straits be closed to warships of all countries 
except Turkey and the Soviet Union. 1 
It is of interest in this connection that the first 
post war Soviet ambassador to Greece was an Admiral, 2 
indicating the Soviet interest in Greece as a Mediterranean 
power. The Soviet Union also showed interest in some of 
the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Some control over 
these islands was essential for Soviet attempts to control 
communications between the Mediterranean and Black Seas 
should negotiations with the Turks succeed. These claims 
were advanced by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria o.n the Soviet 
Union's behalf. 3 
The problem of the Turkish Straits was brought into 
the open ln August 1946 when the Soviet Government 
presented a note on the Montreux Convention to the Turkish 
Government. The note protested against Turkish violations 
of the Conventions during the war 4and set out the basic 
revisions that the Soviets wished to see. The most 
contentious of these were points 4 and 5 of a five point 
plan. 
1 Sadah, Necmeddin (Turkish Foreign Minister 1947-50) 
'Turkey faces the Soviets' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27, 
April 1949, p.458, and George Kirk The Middle East 1945-50, 
Survey of International Affairs (London, 1954), p.21. 
2 The Soviet Ambassador was Admiral Rodionov. See Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, p.8114B for his appointment. 
3 Xydis, G.S. American Naval Visits to Greece and the 
Eastern Mediterranean in 1946, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
Columbia University 1956, p.S0-81 
4 Chief among these violations was the allowance of Axis 
powers' vessels to pass through the Straits in contra-
vention of the provisions of the Convention. See Kirk, 
op.cit., p.31 for protest and details of the Soviet 
publication of captured wartime documents dealing with 
Turco-German relations. 
4. The establishment of a regime for the 
Straits as the sole sea passage leading 
from the Black Sea should come under the 
competence of Turkey and other Black Sea 
Powers 
and 
5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers 
most interested and capable of guaranteeing 
freedom to commercial navigation and 
security in the Straits should organise 
joint means of defense of the Straits for 
the prevention of the utilisation of the 
Straits by other countries for aims 
hostile to the Black Sea Powers.l 
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In a New Times article Vice Admiral Belli indicated 
Soviet concern in his rhetorical question. 
Can a situation on which there is no 
protection for the legitimate interests of 
the Black Sea powers for their rights to 
refuse uninvited visitors to enter their 
homes be tolerated anymore? Yet the 
Soviet Government's proposals for a 
revision of the terms of the Montreux 
Convention has met with fierce opposition. 2 
In a note to Turkey dated 24 September, 1946, the 
Soviet Union clarified the intentions of its fourth 
point. It saw the Black Sea as a closed sea and 
provided a Soviet definition of the term. 
The Soviet Government desires before all to 
invite the attention of the Turkish Government 
to the special situation of the Black Sea as 
a closed sea. Such a situation means that 
the Straits of the Black Sea represent a 
seaway leading only to the shores of a 
limited number of powers, namely the shores 
of the several Black Sea powers. Therefore 
it is entirely natural that the Soviet Union 
and the other Black Sea powers are the most 
interested in the regulation of the regime 
of the Straits of the Black Sea and 
accordingly their situation in this matter 
1 Howard, Harry N. The Problem of the Turkish Straits, 
Department of State Publication No. 2752, Near Eastern 
Series, No.5, 1947, p.47-49. 
2 Belli, V. (Vice Admiral) 'The situation in the 
Mediterranean' New Times, No. 17, 1946, p.l2. 
cannot be compared with that of other 
powers .... With regard to the Straits 
of the Black Sea leading into the Black 
Sea, which is a closed sea, it seems 
proper in this case to establish such a 
regime of the Straits which above all 
would meet the special situation and the 
security of Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and 
the other Black Sea Powers.l 
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A Soviet success on these points would firstly deny 
the United States and Great Britain, among others, the 
right to take part in the revision of the treaty which 
was scheduled to take place before 9 August 1946. 2 
Secondly, acceptance of the doctrine of the closed sea 
which justified excluding non-riparian powers from the 
revision of the Convention would also exclude the 
warships of non-riparian powers from the Black Sea. 
Finally acceptance of point 5 of the Soviet proposals 
with or without success over the Greek Aegean Islands 
would deny Black Sea access to hostile naval powers. 
The American, British and Turkish position prevailed 
and Soviet moves for a renegotiation of the Conventions 
3 lapsed. 
1 Howard, op.cit., p.56-57. 
2 In the event the treaty was automatically renewed 
9 November, 1946, without revision. 
3 On 30 May, 1953, the Soviet Government issued the 
following declaration - 'In the name of preserving 
good neighbourly relations and strengthening peace 
and security the Governments of Georgia and Armenia 
have found it possible to renounce their territorial 
claims on Turkey. As for the Straits question the 
Soviet Government has revised its opinion on this 
issue and considers it possible to protect the 
U.S.S.R.'s security in connection with the Straits 
on terms equally acceptable to both the U.S.S.R. and 
Turkey'. 
on 
Documents on International Affairs, 1953, (London, 
1956) p.277-78. This formal withdrawal from the posture 
of a dissatisfied power vis a vis Tur.key came almost 
seven years after the November 1946 renewal of the 
Conventions. 
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Soviet reactions to United States naval visits to the 
Mediterranean in 1946, 1 were similar to those expressed on 
United States activity in the north. In the case of the 
visit of the battleship Missouri Soviet reactions had 
been aimed primarily at the Turkish state and the Turkish 
media. The visit of the aircraft carrier Roosevelt 
brought a much stronger reaction. It was seen as part 
of an attempt to form an anti-Soviet Mediterranean bloc 
extending from Spain to Turkey. 2 This visit was linked 
with 'various Arctic expeditions of the United States 
3 Navy' as demonstrating United States desire to decide 
international questions by displays of armed might. 4 
The pre-war situation 'when the United States never had 
any hold in the Mediterranean' was contrasted to the 
present state of affairs. 5 
A letter by the Soviet historian Eugene Tarle published 
in the New York Herald Tribune attacked a statement by 
Admiral Halsey in which the United States Admiral had 
asserted the principle of 'freedom of the seas • . 'We 
demand the right to go anywhere at any time. It's nobody's 
damn business where we go'. Tarle interpreted the above 
as a 'demand for unhampered movement of American vessels 
in alien waters•. 6 
1 Xydis. American Naval Visits gives an extensive account 
of the naval visits to Greek and Turkish waters of the 
battleship Missouri and the aircraft carriers Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Randolph. Particular attention is paid to 
the international background of these visits, press 
speculation as to their intentions,and the reaction of the 
Greek, Turkish and Soviet mass media coverage of them. 
2 Belli, op.cit., p.S-12. 
3 This was clearly a reference to the cruise ~n Arctic 
waters by the aircraft carrier Midway. The U.S. Navy 
maintained that this exercise -Frostbite - was an attempt 
to assess carrier operations in Arctic conditions. 
4 E.g. the Greek elections as an immediate issue and more 
generally a compelling of a solution to the general war 
settlement. 
5 Belli, op.cit., p.8-l2. 
6 New York Herald Tribune, 19 September, 1946, and New 
Times, 1946, p.l. 
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In November 1946 the American press announced details 
of a cruise to 'Russia's backyard• 1 by the USS Randolph 
and escorting vessels. Prior to this Stalin in an 
interview with Hugh Baillie had expressed indifference to 
United States naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean. 2 
This attitude was reversed on the day the text of the 
interview was published in the American press in a speech 
by Molotov at the United Nations General Assembly, which 
complained of the pressure stronger powers were bringing 
to bear on other states. 
We know that squadrons of naval vessels and 
military aeroplanes sometimes appear in seas 
and regions where they have not been before, 
when this is considered necessary in order 
to promote the success of diplomatic 
negotiations.3 
The Soviet Union continued to express concern over 
the rapidly expanding presence of American naval forces 
in the Mediterranean and the establishment of air and 
naval bases on either shore of that sea, and the proposed 
entry of Greece and Turkey into the NATO alliance brought 
sharp reaction. 
(I)t is evidence that the invitation extended 
to Turkey to join the Atlantic bloc means 
nothing other than an attempt by the 
imperialist States to use Turkish territory 
for the purpose of setting up bases on the 
Soviet frontiers, with aggressive aims.4 
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a note to 
the Turkish Ambassador in July 1953 expressed concern 
l New York Times, 9 November, 1946, p.5. 
2 Ibid, 29 October, 1946, p.l. 
3 
'The Soviet Union and international cooperation' 
Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 
29 October, 1946, delivered by M.V. Molotov in Molotov 
Problems of Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1949), p.256. 
4 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p.ll853A.$0r a 
similar charge attacking both Greece and Turkey see 
'New candidates for the Atlantic bloc' New Times, No. 21, 
1951, p.l7. 
79 
about the number of foreign naval formations visiting 
. l . l ports ~n the B ack Sea Stra~ts. 
The Soviet Ministry responded to the formal Turkish 
reply, which expressed surprise at the Soviet Union 1 s 
concern, by publishing a list of foreign naval vessels 
which had visited the Black Sea Straits. 
The Black Sea Straits have been visited by:-
In 1950 - 33 foreign vessels with 
a displacement of 197,000 tons 
In 1951 - 49 tl tl 378,000 tons 
In 1952 
-
69 tl tl 587,727 tons 
In first 
seven 
months more than 
of 1953 - 60 tl tl 300,000 
when the visits to the Black Sea Straits 
by foreign naval vessels have reached the 
above-mentioned large dimenions, the 
request by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry 
for additional information from the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry concerning the 
increasing frequency of visits to the 
Black Sea Straits by large foreign naval 
formations could not come as a surprise.2 
4) The Far East 
tons 
In the Far East the Soviet Union gained control of 
the whole of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands by taking 
part in the final stages of the war against Japan under 
the terms of agreement worked out at Yalta. Although 
these gains virtually made the Sea of Okhotsk a Soviet 
lake they did little to improve the Far Eastern fleet's 
prospects of unimpended access to the Pacific. 
Under the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1945 the Soviet 
Union regained Port Arthur which had been lost in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. 3 Although Port Arthur was 
1 Pravda and Izvestia, 21 July, 1953, p.2 for complete 
text of Note. 
2 Pravda and Izvestia, l August, 1953, p.2. 
3 Mitchell, M. The Maritime History of Russia (London,l949) 
p.l82. 
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ice free and gave direct access to the Pacific the 
problems of operating it as a joint naval base with 
Vladivostok had not changed since the conflict with 
Japan some forty years earlier. Because Port Arthur and 
Vladivostok are separated by 1,200 miles of sea, 
including the relatively narrow Korean Straits, any 
attempt to link the forces at the two ports would be 
vulnerable to an enemy blockade of the Straits, and 
relatively large forces would be required simply to 
give the attempt a minimal chance of success. 
Following the success of the Chinese Communist 
revolution the Soviet Union agreed to the retrocession 
of Port Arthur as part of the package of agreements 
which followed Mao's visit to Moscow in December 1949 -
January 1950. This retrocession, due to be effected 
'immediately upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Japan but not later than the end of 1952 11 was delayed. 
In an exchange of notes dated 15 September, 1952, the 
Chinese •requested' the Soviet Union to prolong the 
deadline for the withdrawal of its forces 
pending the conclusion of peace treaties 
between the Chinese Peoples Republic and 
Japan and the Soviet Union and Japan.2 
that is indefinitely. 
The situation remained unchanged during Stalin's 
lifetime but during their visit to China in October 1954, 
Bulganin and Khrushchev agreed to return Port Arthur to 
1 For the text of Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the 
Peoples Republic of China on the Chinese Changchun 
Railway, Port Arthur and Dalny see Beloit, Max Soviet 
Policy in the Far East,l944-195l (London, 1953), p.262-
264. 
2 Exchange of notes of 15 September, 1952, Amending 
Article II of the Sino-Soviet Treaty 14 February, 1950. 
Beloff, op.cit., p.265-6. This request came while 
China was embroiled in the Korean War. 
81 
Chinese control, a policy that was effected in May 1955. 1 
Soviet diplomatic activity towards the states which 
dominate the access points to the seas most vital to 
Soviet defence followed a discernible pattern in the post 
war period. First the Soviet Union indicated the 
importance of the states in question to its own security 
and suggested that existing arrangements be revised. 
Following rejection of the suggested revisions the Soviet 
Union then, where appropriate, either insisted on the 
scrupulous observation of the conditions pertaining to 
the establishment of foreign bases or else sought 
regional agreement on its version of the closed sea 
doctrine. As Butler has pointed out 
The doctrine (of the closed sea) purported to 
secure the Baltic and Black Sea flanks from 
Western military influence by excluding, in 
cooperation with other littoral states, the 
warships of non-littoral powers, it would 
establish a line over which a non-littoral 
power could not send its warships without 
subjecting itself to the charge that it had 
committed a violation of international law. 
The stipulation of regional regulation of 
the regime of a closed sea is an important 
qualification, for the Soviet Union has been 
careful not to assume the transparently 
unlawful right to determine or police such 
a regime unilaterally. 2 
The Soviets were extremely cautious in their initial 
suggestions that existing treaties be revised. When 
rebuffed they sought to avoid a situation whereby the 
states in question would turn to the other Great Powers 
for security, and thus bring Britain and/or the United 
States directly into areas essential to Soviet security. 
Although in the case of the Spitzbergen islands and the 
Black Sea Straits the Soviet Union sought the right to 
establish military bases it seems certain from the wording 
1 Gittings, John, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 
(London, 1968), p.56. 
2 Butler, op.cit., p.l3l. 
of the request, which drew attention to the use the 
Germans had made of these areas during the war, and from 
the state of the Soviet Navy, that these naval and air 
bases were intended, at least initially, to be primarily 
defensive in purpose. 
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The inclusion of Norway and Denmark (1949) and 
Turkey and Greece (1951) in the NATO alliance was a 
reverse for Soviet policy although both Norway and 
Denmark refused to allow foreign military bases to be 
established on their territory. The Soviet press and 
government denounced naval exercises and port visits by 
foreign naval vessels in these regions. As George Kennan 
noted 
' 
It seems preposterous to the Russians that 
foreign planes and naval vessels should be 
able to approach with impunity within a 
few miles of their coastal installations. 
For these reasons they have shown and will 
continue to show an extreme and almost 
pathological degree of sensitivity about 
their maritime frontier.l 
The diplomatic activity of the post war period did 
not result in any improvement so far as the Soviet Navy's 
access to the high seas was concerned. Access points 
from the fleet areas were still dominated by foreign 
powers which, by 1953, had all entered alliances involving 
the United States. To repeat: By 1945 the Soviet Union 
had undeniably strengthened its position in the 
historically important seas but this strengthening of 
position did nothing to improve the fleet's strategic 
offensive capabilities against a trans-oceanic sea power 
such as the United States. 
l Kennan, G.F., quoted Saunders, M.G. (ed) The Soviet 
Navy, p.l2. 
CF..APTER II CONCLUSION 
Soviet diplomacy failed to improve the security of the 
European fleet areas beyond that which had resulted from 
territorial acquisitions and the installation of friendly 
regimes in the post-war era. Access to the virtually land 
enclosed seas was under foreign control and by the early 1950s 
those countries v1hich flanked the points of entry v1ere part of 
the United States post-war alliance system. Hostile naval 
forces could gain relatively unimpeded access to the seas 
which abutted the Soviet Union from which sea based attacks 
could be launched on the Soviet landmass or on Soviet 
the coastal region. The security 
ground 
of the forces operating in 
fleet areas and the seas on 
therefore to remain a major 
which they were located was 
preoccupation of the Soviet Navy 
and the Soviet armed forces as a whole. 
Soviet post-war military thought was dominated by Stalin's 
doctrine of the permanently operating factors, a doctrine 
singularly inappropriate as a basis for evolving a strategy 
against a power \vhose territory was beyond the reach of Soviet 
armed forces. 
The assessment of the Soviet Navy's role during the war 
strengthened the traditional view that its task '"as to provide 
assistance to the ground forces. Moreover Soviet accounts of 
the war suggested that the major achievements of the allied 
naval powers in the A·tlantic and Pacific, while important, were 
secondary to the decisive role of Soviet ground forces in 
defeating Germany and Japan. 
Soviet naval commentators noted the major trends in the 
war on the high seas, the new and important roles of aircraft 
carriers, the necessity of reliable air support for naval 
operations and the effectiveness of submarines against sea 
communications. Hovmver, much of this appears to have been 
regarded as irrelevant for a navy concerned to maintain the 
security of enclosed seas. There is nothing to suggest that 
the historic role of the navy was to be changed, nor that any 
broader task, beyond the attempt to dominate the seas of 
historic importance, was envisaged. 
However, the new adversary, the United States, was not 
a European pm•1er and the fleets of the United States and her 
allies, which controlled the high seas, were capably of 
launching sea based strikes against the Soviet Union. The 
political-military leadership's assessment of the role of 
Sovie·t sea power, on which the immediate post war construction 
programme would be based, while not irrelevant to Soviet 
security requirements, was too limited to be of lasting utility 
in the emerging post war naval situation. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Post War Reconstruction of the Soviet Navy 
The devastation inflicted on the Soviet Union during 
the course of the Second World War was immense. War 
losses were estimated at twenty million people, and a 
recent Soviet source states that 'the riches of the land 
h . 1 were reduced by t lrty percent•. 
It was within this context that the Navy had to 
reconstruct. In doing so it competed for scarce 
resources with the other traditionally favoured branches 
of the armed forces, and with the full range of civilian 
demands. 
There can be no doubt that the Soviet Navy was 
seriously weakened during the war, despite the restrictions 
placed on the use of the Baltic Fleet in 1945. 2 Not only 
were ships destroyed during the course of the war, but 
naval construction yards were devastated and few of the 
1 Men 1 shov, M. Col. 'The USSR Armed Forces in the post war 
era•. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 14, July 1972. 
JPRS No. 57223. Translations in USSR Military Affairs 
No. 852, p.30. 
Men'shov's detailed figures indicate that the destruction 
included: 
and 
1,710 
70,000 
32,000 
93,000 
65,000 
16,000 
428,000 
towns and urban settlements 
villages and hamlets 
industrial enterprises 
kolhkozes and 1,876 sovkhozes 
kilometres of railway line torn up 
locomotives destroyed or removed 
railway carriages destroyed or 
removed. 
2 The Main Naval Staff, the Stavka and Kuznetsov himself 
had opposed the Baltic Fleet's use of its major surface 
ships in the Southern Baltic in 1945. •Losses of ships, 
especially big ones, would be hard for the personnel of 
the fleets and for the people to bear, which is explained 
not by high cost so much as by the impossibility of 
replacing them quickly with new ones ... The fleet had 
to be preserved, used carefully, and exposed only to 
justified risk when the situation demanded it.• 
Kuznetsov, N.G., Admiral 'Memorable days of Forty-Five•, 
Part I, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 8, 1972, p.64, 
translated by G. Jukes, A.N.U. 
ships laid down in the 1938 building programme survived 
1 the war. 
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It is difficult to be certain of the composition of 
the Soviet Navy at the end of hostilities in 1945. The 
following table serves only to indicate the approximate 
size and distribution of major units by fleet area. 
DISTRIBUTION OF SUviET NAVAL FORCES 1945 
~ Baltic 1 Northern 1 Far East 2 Black Sea 
Battleship 4 l l l 
Cruisers 5 2 l 2 4 
Destroyers 6 12 18 ll 10 
Small Surface 627 146 204 
Submarines 28 22 78 
Naval Aviation 787 721 l, 500 
Sources: 
History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Vol. 5, 
p.227 (Baltic), p.237 (Northern), and p.226 (Far Eastern). 
Kuznetsov, 'Forty-Five' Part 2, Voenno-Istoricheskii 
Zhurnal, No. 9, 1972, p.55. 
Meister, J., The Soviet Navy, Vol. l (New York, 1972), 
p.lO. 
Janes Fighting Ships, 1945-46. 
Notes: 
l. The History of the Great Patriotic War gives figures 
for the Baltic, Northern and Far Eastern Fleets as of 
l June, 1945. 
l See Chapter I, Appendices 2-5, p.46-49 above for 
details. 
3 
Notes (Cont) 
2. These figures are from 
do not differ substantially 
Kuznetsov 'Forty-Five• and 
from those provided in 
The History except for naval aviation which is listed 
as approximately 750. 
3. The Black Sea figures which I have been unable to 
trace from any primary source are based on Meister and 
Janes Fighting Ships 1945-46. I have taken the total 
given in Janes for any one type and subtracted the units 
from the other Fleet areas and compared this with 
Meister's estimated. 
4. These were three Gangut class battleships built for 
the Tsarist Navy and recommissioned, after refits and 
repairs, into the Soviet Navy. 
5. Among the cruisers listed are: 
(a) the Lutzow, an incomplete heavy cruiser from 
Germany. During the war it served as a floating 
battery. It was left unfinished in the post war 
era. 
(b) two medium cruisers from the Tsarist Navy's 
building programme of 1912. Other medium cruisers 
were from the Kirov programme of 1932. 
(c) the light cruiser Aurora, a relic of the 
October Revolution, is also listed. 
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6. Among the destroyers listed were possibly as many as 
seven of the Novik class which originated with the 1912 
Tsarist programme and were completed after the Revolution. 
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The Soviets also took over warships and auxiliaries 
from the German and Japanese fleets. According to 
Kuznetsov: 
The ships received did not have great fighting 
significance. But all the same they gave us a 
certain help in training personnel and re-
inforcing our rear organisations with auxiliary 
ships. Several of them sailed for some time as 
part of our fleets, reminding us of a hard war 
and a difficult victory.l 
Among the submarines available to the Soviet Navy in 
1945 were units from the following classes: 
SUBMARINE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY 1945 
Class No. Built DisElacement Range 
K 11 1936-41 1,390 tons oceangoing 
D 3 1929- 1,000 tons limited 
oceangoing 
s 16 1935-41 780 tons medium 
p 2 1928 1,200/1,800 
tons 
L 17 1929-35 900/1,300 medium 
tons 
M 46+ 1935-41 250 tons coastal 
ShCh 21+ 1935-41 650/750 medium 
tons 
Sources: 
The numbers are from Janes Fighting ShiEs 1945-46. 
All other data from Janes Fighting ShiEs 1945-46/ 
1953-4; Breyer, S. Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.29-30 and 
143-3; Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Building of the Soviet Navy', 
Eassim, Rudnitskiy, M.S.,'Soviet Submarines•, p.33-39. 
1 Kuznetsov, 'Forty-Five•, part 2, p.53-4. Kuznetsov 
also gives details of the bargaining over the division 
of the German Fleet at the Potsdam conference. 
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As well as these boats the Soviet Union had three 
ex-Royal Navy V-class submarines, six Italian submarines 
of mid-l930s construction, and a variety of recent German 
submarines which incorporated the snorkel device. 1 Of 
greatest interest were the XXI, XXIII and XXVI types 
which had demonstrated the potential, in the closing 
stages of the war, to revolutionise submarine operations. 
As well as the snorkel device the Soviets also captured 
the design of the Walther propulsion system which promised 
greatly increased subme.r ged speeds for submarines. 2 It ~ s 
possible that the advancing Soviet Army found plans for a 
V-2 type rocket capable of being launched from a submarine 
or from containers towed by submarines. 3 As well as the 
plans and examples of German submarines the Soviets 
captured a number of scientists and technicians at various 
construction sites. They transferred the men, documents 
and equipment to the Soviet Union. 
The war disrupted the Soviet shipbuilding plans of 
the immediate prewar years. Meister claims that during 
the course of the war some ninety eight Soviet shipyards 
of varying sizes were destroyed and that it was some five 
years before the major Black Sea yards returned to full 
. 4 operat~on. 
The ports of the Black Sea, Baltic Sea 
and the Sea of Azov, as well as basins of 
rivers and lakes to the west of the Volga, 
had been reduced to such ruin and 
destruction by the enemy as history has 
never known in any previous war. In the 
process of falling back, the enemy blew 
up berths, moles and lighthouses, scuttled 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1945-46. 
2 Bar-Zohar, M., The Hunt for the German Scientists 
1944-1960, translated by Len Ortzen (New York, 1967), 
p.l49. 
3 Ibid, p.l48-49, also Breyer, s., op.cit., p.52-54. 
4 Meister, J. 1 The Soviet shipbuilding industry 1 , 
Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union Bulletin, 
Vol. 5, No.9, September 1958, p.25. 
vessels in harbours and roadsteads, mined 
entrances to channels and port structures, 
dumped steam locomotives, cars, cranes and 
hoist lifts into the water and blasted 
multi-span bridges.l 
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Stalin was fully aware of the weakness of the Soviet 
Navy and the implications of this weakness for Soviet 
actions abroad. In a conversation held in April-May 1944 
with the Yugoslav Communist Djilas about the feasibility 
of supplying arms to the Yugoslav liberation forces Stalin 
is quoted as saying: 'Ships are needed for this. And we 
have no ships. Our Black Sea fleet is destroyed.• 2 
In January 1947 during a discussion of the first 
post-war five year plan Stalin again revealed his anxiety 
about the weakness of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. He was 
concerned to find a way to build the Volga-Don Canal 
which he characterised as 
A terribly important job from the military 
point of view as well; in case of war they 
might drive us out of the Black Sea - our 
fleet is weak and will go on being weak for 
a long time. What would we do with our 
ships in that case?3 
Besides appreciating the weakness of the Soviet Navy, 
Stalin was keenly aware of the naval power of the United 
States. Djilas reports Stalin as saying: 
The uprising in Greece will have to fold 
up (because) they have no prospect of 
success at all. What, do you think that 
Great Britain and the United States -
the United States the most powerful state 
in the world - will permit you to break 
1 The Hydronauts (Moscow, 1964} cited Polm~, N. 'Soviet 
shipbuilding and shipyards', USNIP, Vol. 98, No.5, p.275. 
2 Djilas, M. Conversations with Stalin, translated 
Petrovich, M.B. (Harmondsworth, 1963}, p.54. 
3 Ibid, p. 121. In the event the Volga-Don canal was of 
limited use for the transfer of naval vessels. See 
Chapter 1 p.l2 for comment. 
their line of communication in the 
Mediterranean? Nonsense. ~we have 
no navy.l 
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This, then,was the position which faced Soviet naval 
planners in the immediate post war period: a badly damaged, 
old fleet, a crippled shipbuilding industry, a series of 
geographic obstacles to the high seas, the naval forces of 
potentially hostile powers flaunting superiority in their 
'backyard', a war record which underscored their role as 
'faithful helper of the Army', and a naval doctrine based 
on the wartime role. The only immediate way in which the 
Soviet Union was capable of reacting to United States 
naval movements was on a verbal diplomatic level. 
In addition to these naval problems the fact of an 
American atomic monopoly had to be faced. 2 
The development of a nuclear capability and a 
suitable delivery system were clearly high order priorities 
for the Soviet Union in the post war period. 3 It was also 
necessary to •provide for the defence of the Soviet people• 
while reducing the manpower in the Army and Navy, thus 
enabling the discharged servicemen to contribute to the 
. 4 reconstruct~on of the shattered country.~ During the 
period of A~erican atomic monopoly 
1 Ibid, p.l40-l. This incident probably occurred in 
September 1947 when Djilas and Kardelj were in Moscow 
to discuss the establishment of the Cominform. 
2 Molotov, in his speech to the United Nations General 
Assembly on 29 October 1946, had spoken at length on the 
subject of control of atomic weapons and raised the issue 
of 'atomic diplomacy' being applied to influence small 
countries. Problems of Foreign Policy, p.257-267. 
3 The key dates for Soviet nuclear development are: 
November 1947 - M.V. Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union 
had the secret of the atomic bomb. 
August 1949 - experimental testing of a nuclear device. 
August 1953 - a thermonuclear device successfully tested. 
Men'shov, 'Armed Forces in the postwar period', trans. 
p.32. 
4 Ibid, p.32, gives the following figures for the reduction 
in armed forces personnel: May 1945, 11,365,000 reduced 
by 8.5 million to give 2,874,000 by 1948. 
These are the figures supplied by Khrushchev in January 1960. 
we could resist the imperialists only by 
a large army equipped with the finest tanks, 
as well as a strong air force and navy.l 
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The post war naval building progr2mme concentrated 
on the large scale production of medium range submarines, 
a cruiser programme, with attendant destroyers, and a 
considerable increase in the number of land based aircraft 
capable of providing air protection for surface units in 
restricted waters. 
It is impossible to be certain of the details of 
the process which produced the final construction plan. 
However, it is clear that post war planning for the navy 
began in September 1945 at the latest. Kuznetsov recalls 
that shortly after the conclusion of the Japanese 
operations while he was in the Far East 
.... I was rung up on the high-frequency 
(i.e. the secure) telephone. The supreme 
Commander (Stalin) asked when I would be 
flying out to Moscow. 'The question of 
what to do about a new shipbuilding 
programme has to be decided• said stalin, 
and hung up. In the government they were 
already deciding the future of the Navy, 
and hurrying us sailors on to work out 
the new programme. Peacetime had begun, 
new tasks had arisen.2 
As in the prewar period Stalin himself exerted a 
great deal of influence not only on the major outline of 
the post war shipbuilding programme but also on more 
detailed decisions concerning armament. No doubt there 
is a deal of exaggeration in Admiral Golovko's claim: 
1 
2 
3 
Comrade Stalin shows constant concern for 
the construction of the best types of 
warships and armaments, points out ways of 
further develo?ing and perfecting Soviet 
Naval science, and defines the direction 
and content of Party-political education 
for Soviet servicemen.3 
Ibid, p.32. 
Kuznetsov, 'Forty-Five•, part 2, p.56. 
Golovko, A. (Admiral), Navy Day Speech Izvestia 
29 July, 1951, p.2. 
but 
the 
scepticism should not obscure 
wartime leaders of the United 
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the fact that many of 
Nations 
political and military, were astounded by 
alliance, 
Stalin's grasp 
of the broad strategic implications of operations and the 
technical details of military equipment. 1 
Soviet naval analysts appear to have had definite 
ideas as to the structure of the post war fleet. Admiral 
Alafuzov wrote: 
The surface forces have always been, and still 
are, the basic and most universal element of 
the navy .... They can operate on the near and 
far approaches to our shore, and therefore 
they are capable of defending against enemy 
efforts to invade from the sea, or against 
separate strikes at our coasts.2 
The views of Captain Shner and Kuznetsov on the necessity 
of aircraft carriers in a modern fleet have already been 
mentioned. 
Apparently Stalin was not convinced by these claims. 
According to Kuznetsov some small and large aircraft 
carriers had been proposed, and apparently accepted by 
Stalin, in the post war building programme 'but by Stalin's 
personal instruction they excluded from it at first the 
big and then even the smaller ships•. 3 
1 See, for example, Churchill, W.S. The Second World War: 
Vol. 4. The Hinge of Fate (London, 1951), p.434, for 
Stalin's reaction to 'Operation Torch', the North African 
invasion. 
Deane, J. (Major-General, USA) The Strange Alliance (New 
York, 1947), p.l08, describes Stalin's grasp of weapons, 
aircraft and aviation tactics. 
Djilas, M. Conversations, p.55, describes Stalin's 
reaction on belng presented with a rifle used by the 
Yugoslav partisans: 'He opened and shut it, hefted it, and 
remarked: 'Ours is lighter•. 
2Alafuzov, V.A. 'On the fundamentals of naval operations•, 
p.26 quoted in Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, p.58 
3 Kuznetsov, N.G. 'Soviet naval development prior to World 
War II' Oktyabr No. 11, Nov. 1965, trans. JPRS No. 33,537 
in Soviet Military Translation No. 218, 30 December 1965, 
p.l3. See Herrick Soviet Naval Strategy p. 64, f.n. 15 for 
the further evidence of a 'Former Soviet Naval Officer• on 
the carrier question. 
Kuznetsov also records that Stalin's views on anti-
aircraft defence for the surface units had remained 
unchanged since the prewar period. 1 When, in the post 
war period 
we suggested replacing one large calibre turret 
on certain cruisers with an anti-aircraft 
installation which would have considerably 
strengthened the ship's anti aircraft capability 
... this proposal was decisively rejected.2 
Stalin also held strong views on the calibre of the 
ma~n batteries for the cruisers 
(W)e sailors insisted that cruisers be built 
with guns not larger than 22.5 ems. Such 
cruisers could successfully smash all ships 
of their class and would be relatively small 
and inexpensive.3 
Although Stalin accepted the sailors' view after some 
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vacillation he apparently insisted in 1949 that 
4 programme. 
a cruiser 
I 
with 30 em guns be included in the 
These disputes between Stalin and his Admirals are 
of interest not only for what they tell us about the 
formulation of the building programme: they also reveal 
a lack of coordination between high ranking naval 
officers and Stalin on the role of the navy in a future 
war. The dispute over anti-aircraft armament and the 
fate of the carrier programme suggest that the political 
authorities responsible for deciding major military issues) 
and the Army officers who dominated the Ministry of the 
Armed Forces,saw the post war navy as carrying out 
similar tasks to those which it had performed during the 
war. Carrier aviation and heavy anti-aircraft capability 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See p. 42 above. 
Kuznetsov •Soviet Naval Development', trans. p.l3. 
Ibid, p.l3. 
Kuznetsov, 'Before the War•, International Affairs, 
December 1966, p.96. 
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could be dispensed with but only if shore based aviation 
were able to cover the fleet units in their areas of 
operation. To dispense with the carrier programme was to 
commit the navy to a defensive strategy and to restrict 
its operations to the coastal zones. The naval officers, 
on the other hand, suggested a building programme which 
would have given the Soviet Navy a capability for an 
offensive strategy involving wartime operations on the 
high seas. 
Kuznetsov does not specify the dates on which the 
major decisions relevant to the post war naval programme 
were taken. It is likely that the navy's programme for 
a high seas fleet was presented in late 1945 and early 
1946, possibly before the February 1946 reorganisation 
of the separate Commissariats of Defence and Naval Affairs 
whichamalgamated to form the Ministry of the Armed Forces, 
and almost certainly before Kuznetsov, 1a strong advocate 
of the high seas fleet, was replaced by Yumashev in 1947. 
Kuznetsov's endorsement of the reorganisation, 2despite 
the fact of his replacement,suggests that it was not until 
after the February 1950 decision to establish separate 
Ministries of War and of the Navy (a move Kuznetsov 
described as incomprehensible) 3 that the naval cut backs 
occurred. 
Prior to the war Kuznetsov had complained that the 
navy, despite its post-December 1937 status as a separate 
commissariat, had no real control over naval policy 'all 
we in the navy could do was observe what the People's 
Commissariat for Defence was doing•. 4 It is tempting to 
speculate that this situation recurred between February 
1950 and March 1953. 
1 Kuznetsov became a First Deputy Minister for Defence 
under the new Ministry. 
2 Kuznetsov, •Before the War•, 
(Moscow, January 1967), p.l02. 
3 Ibid, 
4 Ibid, 
p.l02. 
p .101. 
International Affairs, 
94 
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES 
The following table indicates the scope of the post 
war building programme. It is based on an examination of 
the ships which actually resulted from that programme 
although where there is evidence that classes of vessels 
were to be part of the programme and were subsequently 
cancelled these have been included. Moreover, where there 
is evidence that a class such as the Sverdlov light 
cruisers or the Skory destroyers were originally planned 
to build to a certain number these figures have been 
indicated. 
It has proved impossible to indicate precisely how 
long it took to get individual shipyards into operation 
after the war or to gain accurate figures for the 
numbers of pre-war vessels which were completed after the 
war. Programmes on which construction work did not begin 
but which must have reached the status of a firm design 
and building commitment have been included although in 
some cases only tentatively. The time span indicates the 
construction time for the class as a whole, from commence-
ment of the first vessel to the completion of the last 
vessel. 
l) Cruisers 
The vessels of the Chapayev class which had been 
laid down in the pre-war years were completed by 1950. 
The work had been carried out at the Ordzhonikidze Yard 
in Leningrad and at the Marty Yards, Nikolayev, following 
the extensive repairs necessitated by war time destruction. 
By 1953 it is probable that six of a projected class 
of twenty four Sverdlov class light cruisers had been 
completed and that an equal number were building at yards 
TABLE I 
PATTERN OF THE POST WAR SOVIET SHIP BUILDING PROGRAMME (MAJOR UNITS ONLY) 
' 
. . . . • • • • • • 
Type ~ B I~ 1::6 "' .-< Or~g~nal plan made 
CRUISERS Complete - 5 Chapayevs Sverdlov - 24 planned provision for heavy 
cruisers and aircraft 
I carriers Nikolayev & Leningrad yar~ I Talhn I Complete some Skory l only Kotlin 
DESTROYERS 'O' class 85 planned 12 planned 30+ planned 
I 
Kola (12 planned) _I Riga 
FRIGATES Complete - some Albatross 
I ( 48 planned) 
Complete 
SUB CHASERS some 
Artilerist Kronstadt 200+ 
OCEAN-GOING Possible completion 
SUBMARINES of some K-class units Z (36 planned) 
MEDIUM RANGE Possible com?letion 
SUBMARINES of some SHCH class w 240 
COASTAL RANGE 
SUBMARINES Possible completion of some M class Q (39 planned) 
Sources: 
Note: 
------------------
Janes Fighting Ships, 1945/6 - 1973/4. 
Breyer, S., Gu~de to the Soviet Navy, esp. Chapter 9 and Appendix I. 
Meister, J., The Sov~et Navy, Vols. 1 & 2. 
Hadeler, W., 'The Sh~ps of the Soviet Navy', in Saunders, M.G., ed. The Soviet Navy, 
(New York, 1958}, p.l4U-H>~ 
McGwire, M., •soviet Naval Procurement'. 
A bracket indicates tha1 the figure _; s the best available and presents an order of 
magn-i. tude ra the c than ~- confirmed number 
"' 
"' 
Class 
Chapayev 
Sve.rdlov 
Heavy 
Cruiser 
Carrie.rs 
No. 
5 
24 
plan 
(4) 
Displacement 
(in tons) 
11,500 
lS,CX>O 
deep load 
15,500 
19,000 
deep load 
2 large 
2 small 
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TABLE II 
CARRIER AND CRUISER CONSTRUCTION POST WAR STALIN PROGRAMME 
Armament 
(in mm} 
main 
12-l52mm (4x3} 
dual purpose 
8-lOOmm (4x2} 
anti aircraft 
24-37mm ( 12x2) 
100-200 mines 
main 
12-l52mm { 4x3) 
dual purpose 
12-lOOmm (6x2) 
anti aircraft 
32-37mm {16x2) 
mines 
140-250 
torpedoes 
10-533m (2x5) 
Construction 
Data 
Laid 1938-40 
Launch 1941 
Work resumed 1946-7 
Completed 1948-50 
at Marty Yards 
Nikolayev and 
Ordzhonikidze Yard 
Leningrad 
Laid 1948-53 
20 only of the av 
rate of 4/yeai 
Launch 1951-54, 
17 only. 
Complete 1952-58 
14 only 
At Marty Yard 
Nikolayev 
Ordzhonikidze Yard 
Leningrad (possibly 
1 or 2 at Syerodvinsk) 
7 
~ 
C A N C E L L E D 
C A N C E L L E D 
Sources: As for Table I, p.95. 
Range/Radius 
and Speed 
Range 
5,400 miles 
at 15 knots 
Max speed 
34 knots 
Range 
a, 700 miles 
at 18 knots 
Speed 
34 knots 
Comments 
This class was a replacement for the Kirov 
vessels and planned in the pre war construction 
programme. Six vessels had originally been 
intended but one was scrapped at Nikolayev by 
the Germans in the course of the war. Two 
others which were building at Nikolayev were 
removed to Poti by the Soviets during the war. 
Apparently a post war development based on the 
Chapayev class incorporating some of the results 
of wa.r time expe.rience and developments into 
the design. Programme cancelled before 
completion (see p.l44-147 below for an account). 
There is evidence cited p.lO above that a class 
cruiser was planned. Such a class would have 
been logical enabling the incorporation 
of wartime experience and developments at a 
higher level of soohistication. Construction 
would have been unde.rtaken in the mid to late 
50s when the Sverdlov programme was complete. 
·ghting sh~ps 1957-8 reports two large 
isers 6ri the stoCks 
There is evidence (p.9 above) that Stalin 
himself ordered the cancellation of this aspect 
o£ the programme despite its suppo.rt by naval 
officers. 
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recently vacated by the pre-war cruisers. 1 The Soviet 
concentrating on the Navy was at this time the only navy 
development of this type of vessel. 
completed two Tiger class cruisers in 
the United States Navy completed some 
in wartime and in the mid 1950s began 
cruise~ to guided missile armament. 2 
The Royal 
1959 and 
Navy 
1960 while 
cruisers laid down 
to convert gun 
Janes Fighting Ships 1953-4 suggests that the 
Chapayev and Kirov class cruisers were primarily 
concentrated in the Baltic and Black Seas although both 
the Northern fleet and the Pacific fleet probably had 
3 two. Moreover, when the Sverdlov cruisers appeared in 
greater numbers they were not concentrated in the Northern 
fleet area. Had it been intended to use these vessels 
for commerce disruption, as was frequently suggested at 
the time, 4 they were at a tremendous disadvantage. Being 
concentrated in the Baltic and Black Sea areas they would 
find access to the Atlantic routes extremely difficult, 
and moreover, the absence of any sea based air power 
would have left them extremely vulnerable to air attack. 
As Stalin himself had cancelled the carrier programme 
it seems safe to conclude that this was not the role 
intended for these new vessels. The armament character-
istics of the cruisers, in conjunction with the absence of 
aircraft carriers, supports the conclusion that they were 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1953-54 suggests that only one 
Sverdlov had been completed (p.30l), with a further seven 
to nine others at varying stages of completion. Figures 
from the 1954-55 and 1955-56 editions, however, suggest 
that this is low. The figures used in the text are taken 
from R.W. Herrick Soviet Naval Strategy, p.65, and agree 
with MccGwire•s projections on page 77 of his article 
'Soviet Naval Procurement', in The Soviet Union in Europe 
and the Near East (London, 1970 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1953-54, 1956-57 and 1973-74 under 
cruisers for R.N. and U.S.N. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1953-54, p.30l-302. 
4 See for example 'The Strength of the Soviet Fleet', 
Naval Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, p.l87; and 'Spindrift', 
'Foreign Navies' Brassey's Annual 1953, p.l47. 
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to be used in the familiar Soviet naval role of providing 
flank support for military operations in coastal areas. 1 
If, as has been suggested, Stalin intended a further 
class of heavy cruisers then this addition would have done 
nothing to alter the role of the cruiser component of the 
fleet. 2 Without carrier based air power these vessels 
were limited to areas of operation capable of being 
covered by land based aviation. 
Although there is little information available on the 
range of Soviet military aircraft it appears that in the 
early 1950s the Soviet Air Force had nothing more advanced 
than the Tu-4, a Soviet version of the B-29 Super Fortress, 
or the Tu-6,a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft with a 
maximum range of 1,550 miles. 3 While both these aircraft 
may have been of some use against submarines they would 
not have been capable of surviving at their maximum range 
against aircraft from a carrier because no fighters could 
escort them to this distance. The maximum radius of 
Soviet fighters appears to have been little more than 600 
miles. The early MIG-15 had an airborne endurance of two 
hours. 4 This suggests that the naval fighters • role was 
to be that of the previous war - defending ports and naval 
1 See the earlier account of the Soviet Navy's roles in 
World War II, p.55/7 above. W. Hadeler, 'Ships of the Soviet 
Navy', in M.G. Saunders, ed., The Soviet Navy (New York, 
1958, p.l50, reached a similar conclusion. 
The land operations covered could be envisaged as either 
a Soviet attempt to seize control of the coasts of the 
Baltic and Black Seas in the context of the seizure of 
continental Europe or else the repulse of 'imperialist' 
invasion forces. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1957-58, p.318 reports the sighting 
of two large cruiser hulls on the stocks of Nikolayev. 
3 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 1953;1954, p.l80-81. 
4 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft, 1953-1954, p.l77-8 
and Armour, R.D.S. (Capt. R.N.) 'The Soviet Naval Air Arm' 
in Saunders, The Soviet Navy, p.l91, for technical 
descriptions of the MIG-15. 
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bases and, if required, assisting the Soviet Air Force 
in its ground support role. In addition these aircraft 
could carry out coastal convoy escort duties, and air 
patrols above Soviet surface forces provided these surface 
units remained within 100 miles of the coast. The fighters 
could provide an escort for the bombers and torpedo 
bombers of the Naval Air Force for operations extending 
to a maximum of 400 miles from the coast. 1 
2) Destroyers 
Following the war a number of '0' class destroyers 
were completed. The number in commission in 1953 was 
2 probably ten. This class was followed by the Skory 
class destroyers of 'Which, it has been estimated, some 
3 
eighty five vessels were to have been produced. The 
large numbers projected for this class and the number 
of yards involved, Zhdanov in Leningrad, Marty at 
Nikolayev, and yards at Komsomolsk and Severodvinsk 
suggest that this was to be the post war generation 
destroyer. 
During the Stalin era design decisions must have been 
made for at least two other classes of destroyer type 
vessel. The destroyer leader Tallin was laid down in 1953 
and completed in 1955, and the Kotlin class began building 
in 1954. 
1 Escorting a bomber to a distance of 400 miles would give 
the MIG-15 a maximum over target duration of 40 minutes. 
This does not allow for bomber protection to and from the 
target area and is therefore subject to great reduction. 
Escorting surface ships was essential if they were to be 
protected against carrier aircraft attacks. If a constant 
combat air patrol was to be maintained over the surface 
vessels these probably could not operate at distances of 
even 100 miles from shore given the two hour endurance 
of the aircraft available. 
These figures are supported by the evidence of a 
'Former Soviet Naval Officer• cited in Herrick Soviet 
Naval Strategy, p.l37-139. The Soviet Naval Air Force 
is treated at greater length at p.ll5-ll7 below. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships provides figures which vary from 18 
in 1951-2 and 1952-3 to 10 in 1953-4 and 15 in 1955-6. 
As the Skory class destroyer was being brought into service 
at this time the estimate of 10 appears to be reliable -
a run down from some higher number of previous years. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, p.562. 
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These vessels are more appropriately discussed in a 
subsequent chapter. Here it is enough to note their 
existence in the plan, and the more important advances 
over the earlier Skory's, as indicated in Table III. 
3) Frigates 
The following table indicates the characteristics 
of the frigates or destroyer escort classes laid down in 
the Stalin era. 
4) Submarine chasers 
The characteristics of the prewar Artilerist and the 
post war Kronstadt class of submarine chasers is indicated 
below in Table V. 
The armament mix and range characteristics of the 
vessels produced in the immediate post war building 
programme, together with the absence of any major 
programme for building a fleet of auxiliary vessels, 
supports the contention that the post war fleet was 
designed for a coastal role, to operate within the range 
of shore based aircraft. 
The mining capability of the major surface warships 
and the long and medium range submarines is indicated in 
the tables. This, together with the absence of a long 
range offensive aerial mine laying capability, (due to a 
lack of fighter support for long range aircraft) and the 
absence of effective offensive use of the K class 
submarine during the previous war 1 suggests a continuation 
of the Tsarist practice, established during the Baltic 
phase of the Crimean War, and practised by the Soviets 
in World War II, of laying protective mine fields in 
coastal waters and particularly in defence of naval base 
areas. 
The range and armament of the Sverdlov cruiser are 
l Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Building of the Navy', U.S. Navy 
trans. p.ll. 
Class 
0 
Skory 
!ill.!.!! 
~ 
No. 
? 
at least 
10 
85 
Plan 
l 
30+ 
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TABLE III 
DESTROYER CONSTRUCTION - POST WAR (STALIN) PROGRAMME 
Displacement Armament Construction Range and 
{tons} (in mm) Data Speed 
1,800 std. 
2,650 deep 
load 
2,600 std. 
3,500 deep 
load 
3,200 std. 
4,300 deep 
load 
2,850 std. 
3, 900 full 
load 
main 4-l30mm 
(2x2) 
anti aircraft 
2-SSmm (lx2) 
6-37mm 
mines 80 
torpedo tubes 
B-.533mm (2x4) 
depth charges 
main 4-130mm 
(2x2) 
anti aircraft 
2-8.5mm ( lx2) 
7-37mm 
Mines 80 
torpedo tubes 
10-533mm ( zxs) 
4 depth charge 
throwers 
dual purpose 
4-l30mm (2x2) 
anti aircraft 
16-45mm (4x4) 
mines 70-90 
torpedo tubes 
l0-533mm (2x5) 
2-16 barrelled 
ASW rocket launch 
dual purpose 
4-l30mm (2x2) 
anti aircraft 
16-47mm ( 4x4) 
mines 80 
torpedo tubes 
10-533mm (2x5} 
6 depth charge 
t.hrowe:ts 
Laid 1937-41 
Launch 1941-43 
Work delayed due to 
war. 
Completed 1943-47 at 
Zhdanov Leningrad 
Marty Nikolayev 
Navy Yard, 
Sevastopol 
Kpmsomolsk (F.E.) 
b'Verodvinsk (Arctic} 
Laid 1949-53 
Completed 1952-56 
at Zhdanov 
Leningrad and 
Yards at Nikolayev, 
~msomolsk, 
5\iexodvinsk. 
Laid 1952 or 53 
Completed 1954 or 5 
Baltic 
Laid 1954-
Last completed 1958 
at various yards in 
Leningrad and 
Nikolayev. 
Source!'i: As in Table 1, p 95 
Max Speed 
36 knots 
3,900 miles 
at 13 knots 
Max speed 
33 knots 
2,500 miles 
at 18 knots 
Max. speed 
38 knots 
5,500 miles 
at 16 knots 
Max. speed 
36 knots 
Comments 
Perhaps as many as 30 of these units originally 
planned - work had not begun on all of them 
when the war broke out. Following the war some 
10 units were completed - for training purposes. 
Armament - out dated by 1945. l30mm guns hand 
operated - a low rate of fire - the twin mounts 
could not fire independently. 
A post war development of the 10 1 class. Breyer 
p.266 claims the class represented a stage of 
development that had been reached in 1939-40 
poor seakeeping qualities 
limited amount of electronic 
equipment in original design 
but additional gear was added. 
Main 130mm guns have low angle of elevation. 
Anti ail' craft 7-37mm replaced in 1953 with 
8-37mm in 4 x 2. 
Only one vessel of this type was constructed 1 
probably because of poor stability. It was 
the first large Soviet vessel to be built with 
a flush deck. As a flotilla leader it is 
significantly larger than the Skorys. 
Improvements over Skoras: 
1. turrets and fir~ng ~rectors fully stabilised 
2. ASW rocket launchers 
3. improved electronic gear fitted 
4. gunnery armament improved 
5. significantly faster 
Flush deck. Greater stability than Tallin 
because of lower free board. Intended for large 
series production probably as a replacement for 
the Skory but programme cancelled 1 see p.l47/8. 
below. ASW depth charge throwers originally 
mounted had only a transverse throw capability. 
Have been significantly modified and converted 
during the Khrushchev era. See p.l64 below. 
Class 
Albatross 
Kola 
Riga 
TABLE IV 
FRIGATE CONSTRUCTION - POST WAR (STALIN) PROGRAMME 
No. ~Displacement~ Armament Construction -~Range and Commerits 
3 
12 
54 
(tons} (in mm} Data Speed 
920 
1,500 std. 
1,900 full 
load 
1' 200--Sta. 
1,600 
full load 
anti aircraft Laid 1939 (?) 25 knots Only the three vessels building 
3-lOOmm (3xl) Completed postwar in the Far East survived the war 
6-37mm Far East (and of which one was completed in 
mines 20 Marty Yard 1944. 
torpedo tubes Nikolayev) The five at Nikolayev were 
3-533mm ( lx3) ___ scr<>.pped l:>y the Germans. 
dual purpose Laid 1950-51 31 knots There may have been 24 of these 
4-lOOmm (4xl) First seen 1954 vessels planned as a successor 
anti aircraft Last completed to pre war frigates. The lack 
4-37mm (2x2) 1957 of radar and contemporary fire 
mines 30? Baltic yards. control equipment made them weak 
torpedo tubes in anti aircraft defence. 
3-533mm The lOOmm guns hand operated for 
4 depth charge a rate of fire of 15-20 rounds/ 
throwers minute. Breyer p.276 suggests 
vessels designed for duty in 
coastal areas subjected to rough 
seas, Arctic and North Pacific. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1963/4, 
p.423 suggests Balt1c and Far 
East duties. 
duaT purpose 
4-lOOmm (4xl) 
anti aircraft 
4-37mm (2x2) 
mines 60? 
torpedo tubes 
3-533mm 
4 depth charge 
throwers 
Laid 1952or 53 
First completed 
1955. Last 
completed 1959 
at yards in 
Baltic, Black 
Sea and Far 
East. 
Sources: As in Table I, p.95. 
2,SOOm1les 
at 15 knots 
Max. speed 
28 knots 
Lighter hull buCbetter sea-
keeping qualities reported than 
for Kola. 
Adherence to torpedo armament on 
this type of vessel explained by 
fact that Soviet Navy at least 
in this period did not have to 
reckon with a powerful submarine 
threat as did the frigates of 
the USN and RN - rather the 
threat was surface vessels. 
However modernised units have 
been fitted with 16 barrelled 
rocket launchers for ASW. 
1-' 
0 
N 
Class 
Artillerist 
Kronstadt 
No. 
200 
+ 
TABLE V 
SUBMARINE CHASERS - POST WAR (STALIN) PROGRAMME 
Displacement 
(tons) 
240 
300 std. 
350 full 
load 
Armament 
(in mm) 
l-76mm 
anti aircraft 
2-37mm 
(2xl) 
3-l3mm 
(3xl) 
depth 
charges 
1-lOOmm 
anti aircraft 
2-37mm 
(2xl) 
mine rails 
and depth 
charges 
later units 
incorporated 
depth charge 
throwers 
Construction 
Data 
Laid 1940 
Completion 
2 by 1941 
+4 by 1942 
Range and 
Speed 
25 knots 
+ll subsequently 
Boat yards along 
Volga 
Built between 
1948 and 1956 
1,500 miles 
at 12 knots 
Max speed 
24 knots 
Sources: As in Table I, p. 95. 
Comments 
Originally 40 units planned and 
laid of which only 17 were 
completed. Possibly some 
units were finished in the 
post war period. 
A development of the pre war 
designed Artillerist. 
Two versions the major 
difference being that early 
units carried mines while 
later units had depth charge 
throwers. 
.... 
0 
w 
broadly comparable with light cruisers of 
the RN which were completed following the 
104 
the USN and 
1 
war. But 
where the USN and RN cruisers were designed to give 
close cover and anti aircraft support for convoys and 
aircraft carrier groups, and to provide support for 
assault landings, 2 only the latter role could have been 
intended for the Soviet cruiser following Stalin's 
intervention to cancel the aircraft carrier programme. 
~t is unlikely that Soviet cruisers could have played 
the role of commerce raiders as the Germans had attempted 
in World War II as they had neither the tankers nor the 
overseas support facilities necessary for replenishment 
of the raiders operating on the high seas. Air protection 
was not sufficient to safeguard vessels operating in this 
wartime role even in the Southern Baltic, where the 
cruisers could expect considerable air harrassment when 
returning to ports to refuel and resupply.) 
The light anti-aircraft armament suggests that the 
Sverdlovs were intended to operate within the range of 
shore based fighter aircraft. Hence it can be assumed 
that these vessels were intended primarily to cover 
landing operations and to provide flank protection for 
military operations in coastal areas. 
The anti-submarine warfare developments of the Soviet 
Navy in this period also suggest that operations were to 
be confined to coastal areas. The low priority afforded 
a large anti-submarine capability stemmed from the 
elimination of German naval power in the post war period. 
Soviet merchant shipping in the early 1950s was neither 
large nor vital enough to attract a major allied submarine 
effort and there was consequently no need for an anti-
submarine specialisation in either destroyers or destroyer 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1956-7 for Tiger class cruisers RN 
and for Cleveland class cruisers USN. 
2 See the general notes under cruisers, Janes Fighting 
Ships, 1964-65, p.269. 
escorts. What was required was an anti-submarine 
capability for the protection of vessels engaged in 
ground support functions in the Baltic and Black Seas 
and in Soviet coastal waters. Hence the large number 
of small Kronstadt submarine chasers. 
lOS 
Kuznetsov's complaints that Soviet surface vessels 
did not have sufficient anti-aircraft weapons have been 
mentioned above. Protection against air attack could 
only be guaranteed within the range of shore based 
fighters, and it appears that Stalin,for one,was of the 
opinion that within this protected area shipboard 
anti-aircraft weapons would be used only in an auxiliary 
role,and did not require the emphasis his Admirals 
apparently urged. 
5) Submarines 
As with the surface vessels the Soviet Navy found 
itself in possession of a number of uncompleted pre-war 
classes of submarines following the war. The most 
successful of these, the Shch medium range class and the 
MV coastal class were probably continued in production. 
The larger Shch types incorporated an important feature 
Snorkel. Pre-war of the captured German units; the 
boats were gradually phased out1 and replaced gradually 
with new units. Some of the earlier boats were kept but 
as training rather than operational units. 
The new post-war medium range submarine was the NATO 
designated 'W' class, a modification of the German XXI type. 
Hadeler points out that the Soviet modifications involved 
a reduction in size because the German submarine, a vessel 
of some 1,600 tons on the surface, was too large for 
l Janes Fighting Ships 1953-4, p.3l4. 
Class 
K 
z 
TABLE VI 
OCEANIC RANGE SUBMARINES - POST WAR (STALIN) PROGRAMME 
No. Displacement 
Surface/ 
Submerged 
1,500/2000 
tons 
36? 1,900/2,200 
tons 
Armament 
l0-533mm tubes 
20 torpedoes 
carried 
2-lOOmm guns 
2-45mm guns 
20 Mines 
10-533mm tubes 
6 bow, 4 stern 
24 torpedoes 
carried 
(or 40 mines) 
early versions 
armed with 
guns. 
Construction 
data 
1939-43 
post-war 
period? 
Laid 1949? 
Completed 
1951-55 at 
Sudomech 
Yard, 
Leningrad 18 
and Navy 
Yard 
Severodvinsk 
( ll ?) 
Sources: As in Table I, p.95. 
Radius/Speed 
Surface 29 
knots 
Submerged 10 
knots 
20,000 -
26,000 miles 
(surface 
cruising) 
18 knots 
surface 
15 knots 
submerged 
Comments 
It is possible that some of these 
boats remained to be completed 
following the war and that they 
were finished in the post war 
period. Janes Fighting Ships 
1945 through to 1953 reports 
an increase in the size of this 
class. However it is equally 
possible 1 and not necessarily 
contradictory to the above, 
that the Soviet submarine design 
teams concentrated on incorpora-
ting the advances of German 
submarine technology into Soviet 
construction6 
First of the post war long range 
cruising submarines built by 
USSR. Adopted many features of 
the German XXI Type Boat in 
particular the snorkel. Earlier 
versions were equipped with 
guns 
z I had 2-25mm A.A. 
Z II had 1-lOOmm gun. 
which were subsequently removed. 
There may have been some delay in 
deliveries as different types of 
propulsion system were experi-
mented with - notably the Walthar 
hydrogen peroxide system-and/or 
because of difficulties in 
incorp_o~:ating the snorkel system . 
.... 
0 
a> 
Class 
ShCh 
w 
No. nfsj)Tacement 
surface 
Submerged 
650/750 
240 1,030/1,180 
TABLE VII 
MEDIUM RANGE SUBMARINES-POST WAR (STALIN) PROGRAMME 
Armament ConstruCtion Radius/Speed 
6 torpedo 
tubes 
l-45mm gun 
6-533mm 
torpedo tubes 
4 bow 2 stem 
18 torpedoes 
carried (or 
40 mines) 
Data 
1935-40 
1951 - 1957 
at yards 
throughout 
the 
u.s.s.R. 
Sources: As in Table I, p.95. 
Surface 
14 knots 
Submerged 
8 knots 
13,000 -
16,500 
surface 
cruising. 
sur :face 
17 knots 
submerged 
15 knots 
Comments 
It is possible that some of 
these vessels were completed 
following the war. 
The design is thought to have 
been influenced by the German 
XXI type which may explain the 
delay in laying this class 
until the early 1950s. 
Early versions had A.A. guns 
or lOOmm gun. 
Not until the IV model was the 
snorkel attachment a permanent 
feature and this became the 
standard version of the boat. 
The delay in fitting the 
snorkel suggests difficulties 
in application. 
..... 
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Class No. 
M 
Q 22+ 
TABLE VIII 
COASTAL RANGE SUBMARINES - POST WAR (STALIN) PROGRAMME 
Displacement 
Surface/ 
Submerged 
650/740 
Armament 
4-533mm tubes 
in bow. 8 or 
10 torpedoes 
carried 
ConstructiOn- Rad~us/Speed 
Data 
1954-1957 3,500 miles 
at surface 
cruising 
speed 
surface 
18 knots 
submerged 
16 knots 
Sources: As in Table I, p.95. 
comments 
A pre-war design which had 
several variants (see tableV 
Submarines 1927-45 in 
Appendices, Chapter I for 
details). Due to its satis-
factory performance in 
restricted and shallow waters 
during WWII it may have had 
some post-war carry over. 
Although construction did not 
begin until 1954/5 firm design 
decisions must have been taken 
in the Stalin era. 
The boats may have been 
originally fitted with the 
Walther propulsion system which 
offered the possibility of high 
submerged speeds of limited 
duration. The removal of this 
system or its rejection probably 
accounts for the delay in 
construction and may have been 
reflected in the small numbers 
produced compared with the 
pre-war Ms. 
..... 
0 
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for operations in the Baltic and Black Sea. 1 This suggests 
that Stalin had not built a submarine force suitable for 
closing the Atlantic seaway between the United States and 
her NATO allies. Even if the Soviet Navy had had the six 
1 2 1 class ocean going submarines which MccGwire estimates 
were available in 19532 these boats together with the 
available 'W' class vessels3 would not be sufficient to 
pose a major threat to the NATO lines of communication. 
In February 1953 it was reported that the Soviet Navy 
had stationed thirty submarines with the Northern Fleet. 4 
For the same year Janes Fighting Ships records a Soviet 
submarine total of some 5 370 boats. 
of the Soviet submarine force in the 
The stationing of 8% 
North at this time is 
comparable with the distribution of Soviet submarines 
immediately prior to the 'Great Patriotic War'. In June 
1941 the Soviets had 15 submarines with the Northern Fleet6 
at a time when the total submarine fleet was estimated to 
be 245. The Northern Fleet was reinforced in 1942 to a 
1 Hadeler, W. 1 Ships . . . ', p .157. Janes Fighting Ships 
1973-4 gives the surface displacement of a W class 
submarine as 1,030 tons with a range of 13,000 to 16,500 
miles at 17 knots surfaced. The editions of Janes in the 
1950s give a higher displacement. Whether this was due 
to confusion with other classes or based on misinformation 
is not clear but it is important that for a considerable 
time the Soviet Union was credited by the West with a 
vastly greater capability for a forward naval posture 
than in fact it had. 
2 MccGwire, M. •soviet Naval Procurement', p.78. 
3 MccGwire, M., ibid, suggests a figure of 12 available 
in 1953 with 36 building. 
4 ~N~e~w~~Y~o~r_k __ W~o~r~l_d~-T~e_l_e~g~r~a=m, 28 February 1953, p.9. 
5 Janes Fighting Ships 1953-4, p.312. 
6 Kozlov, I. Capt. 1st Rank (Reserves), 'Defence of 
internal communications by the Northern Fleet 1941-1945', 
Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No.4, 1972, translated by 
G. Jukes, A.N.U. 
7 The total number of Soviet submarines is given in Hadeler 
'Ships ...... •, p.l58, Table VI, Distribution of Russian 
Submarines. 
109 
llO 
total of 23 submarines. 1 In January 1945, 22 submarines 
were reported in the Northern Fleet. 2 This suggests that 
in 1953 as in the period 1941-1945 these boats were 
intended primarily for defensive operations in the fleet 
areas and not for ranging into the Atlantic Ocean to 
effect a guerre de course strategy. 
If all the submarines capable of operating in the 
Atlantic had been posted to the Northern Fleet area in 
1953 this would have amounted to little more than twenty 
eight such craft. 3 Of these the Soviets might have been 
able to maintain an average of seven boats on station in 
the Atlantic over an extended period4 and these boats 
would have to pass the anti-submarine barriers the NATO 
allies would presumably establish across the North Cape-
Spitzbergen and the United Kingdom-Iceland-Greenland 
passages. 
1 Kozlov, I., op.cit. 
2 See p.84 above. 
3 The twenty eight submarines would include 10 Ks, a 
prewar long range submarine and 6 Zs and 12 Ws which 
according to MccGwire•s estimates were available in 1953. 
4 The calculation that one quarter of Soviet submarines 
could be maintained on station at any one time has been 
adopted from German operational experience where one third 
on station was the average ratio maintained. The Germans 
for a considerable part of the war had a more direct 
access to the Atlantic than is available to the Soviet 
Union and allowance for this fact has been made and the 
ratio adjusted accordingly. 
For a full discussion of the German experience see 
R.E. Kuenne, The Attack Submarine: A Study in Strategy, 
(New Haven and London, 1965}, Chapter 2. 
An article 'The Russian Submarine Fleet', Naval Review, 
Vol. 42, No. 1, 1954, p.57-58 approaches this problem 
from a different perspective. The author discounts all 
boats of coastal range, and boats stationed in the Pacific 
and Black Sea. He also subtracts a proportion of boats 
because of factors such as age, operational efficiency, 
and the requirements of submarine training. The remainder 
of the boats is then divided by three to give a number of 
vessels available on station. On this basis he arrives 
at a figure of twenty five boats on station in mid-
Atlantic. 
Either of the calculations produces a figure which is 
a far cry from the total of 370 submarines in the Soviet 
fleet. 
lll 
The Z class long range submarine, like the prewar 
K class, deserves attention because its range gives it 
an operational capability at a considerable distance 
from the Soviet base areas. If the estimated building 
plan projection of 36 Z class submarines presented in 
Table VI above is accepted (in fact only 29 were built) 
then providing all these vessels were established in the 
Northern Fleet Area, which is unlikely, this would have 
enabled a theoretical mid-Atlantic on station presence, 
sustained over time, of no more than 9 vessels. It is 
unlikely that Soviet naval planning envisaged the z class 
as disrupting the Atlantic sea lines of communication. 
The number of submarines is too small, given the amount of 
enemy shipping, on World War II experience, they could 
expect to be involved. 
It is much more likely that the Zs were to be used 
against high value targets such as aircraft carriers. 1 
Their long range would afford them a considerable time on 
station2 especially if they were to be deployed in the 
Spitzbergen-Northern Cape gap or, further afield, in the 
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. 
1 See p.ll3 below for a discussion of aircraft carrier 
developments; and p.71-72 above for Soviet concern over 
naval exercises in the North Atlantic region. 
2 It is difficult to give an approximation for the time 
on station because we have no clear indication of what 
Soviet wartime practice might be. During the war an 
attempt was made to send a K class submarine on an 
extended operation to the Southern Baltic from mid 
December 1941 until May 1942. Although the attempt was 
called off, because of damage to the submarine's super-
structure, its being mooted at all suggests that the 
necessities of wartime may call for operational times 
beyond the two month patrol limit which is accepted by 
the U.S. Navy for the deterrent force of Polaris/Poseidon 
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines. 
See Achkasov, v., Capt. lst Rank, 'Submarines of the Red 
Banner Baltic Fleet on enemy lines of communication in 
1941-1942 1 , Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 12, 1972. 
p.66, translation by G. Jukes, A.N.U. for the planned 
development of the K class. It is unlikely however that 
the Z class would remain on station for longer than 9 
weeks, if operating in the G-I-U.K. area, given that the 
Z is capable of independent operations for a period of 
12 weeks and allowing for a transit time of l~ weeks 
each way. 
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It ~s possible that the Northern Fleet did not 
enlarge its operational area beyond that of World War 
II, which extended from Spitzbergen in the West to Tiksi 
in the East until the late 1950s or early l960s. 1 If this 
were the case, then the Northern Fleet could rely on 
maintaining a high state of readiness and deploying its 
submarines in surges as the occasion warranted. 
If the Zs were to be sent further afield then war 
time experience suggests they would have been capable 
of maintaining a front line of defence against the entry 
of carrier task forces to the Norwegian Sea. A secondary 
line of defence against the carriers,across the Spitzbergen-
Bear Island-North Gap channels>maintained by W class 
submarines and possibly surface vessels under an uncertain 
umbrella of air power 2could have prevented the carriers 
penetrating the Barents Sea. 
the 
Sea 
main defensive 
itself. 3 
zone until 
Carriers would not penetrate 
they came within the Barents 
It is possible that while the Z class was being 
developed some thought was given to its eventual use as 
a vector for a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. 
German designs existed for ballistic missiles to be fired 
1 Golovko, A. With the Red Fleet, p. l for Northern Fleets 
operational area during the war. See p.380-382 below for an 
account of Soviet naval activities in the North sea during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
2 An uncertain umbrella because of the distance between 
Soviet territory and the Spitzbergen Islands, some 500 
miles, exceeded the radius within which constant air 
cover could be provided (100 miles). 
3 This suggested deployment pattern is drawn by inference 
from its possible counterpart in Soviet Army doctrine. 
'An army in defence was organised in severalzones: an 
advanced outpost zone, a main defensive zone, and one or 
more secondary defensive zones•, R.L. Garthoff, How Russia 
Makes War, p.76. 
Thus the Z class submarine barrier at the G-I-U.K. gap 
formed the advanced outpost, the Spitzbergen-North Gap 
the main defensive zone, and the waters of the Barents 
Sea the secondary defensive zones. 
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from submarines, 1and Soviet rocket development and research 
relied heavily on German science and technology. Work on 
a nuclear weapon proceeded throughout the period. 
Certainly the conversion of some of the Z class which 
occurred in 1955-57 must have been planned in the late 
forties or early l950s. 2 
Carrier Capability 1946-1953 
Developments in aircraft carrier capabilities did not 
escape the attention of Soviet commentators nor,we may be 
sure,did they pass unnoticed by Soviet military planners. 
From March 1946 onwards the USN had been car~ying out a 
series of carrier operations in the Arctic. 3 Such 
operations must have indicated the possibility of the 
deployment of carrier task forces in the Norwegian and 
4 Barents Sea. 
Throughout the remainder of the 1940s the USN 
conducted a series of exercises designed to illustrate 
that aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons for 
considerable distances could be flown from the decks of 
aircraft carriers. 5 These flights while impressive in 
l See p. 87 above . 
2 See p.l74 below. 
3 Operation Frostbite was the first of a series of 
exercises designed to develop a capability for carrier 
operations in areas above the Arctic Circle. Flight 
operations were conducten from the USS Midway which with 
three destroyers cruised in the Davis Strait. The 
aircraft involved were mainly of W.W.II origin but 
included the newer F8F Bearcat and the FR-1 Fireball. 
United States Naval Aviation 1910-1970. NAVAIR 00-SOP-l 
(washington D.C., 1970), p.l59. 
4 For a Soviet reaction to these operations ln Arctic 
regions see B.B.C. Foreign Radio Broadcasts No. 164, 
19 August 1946, p. Pl & 2. 
For subsequent Soviet reactions to USN exercises in the 
Arctic, see p.71-72 above. 
5 These tests culminated in the flight of a Neptune P2V-3C 
aircraft from the decks of the carrier Coral Sea carrying 
a 10,000 pound load. The aircraft took off from the 
carrier in the Atlantic, flew to the West Coast of the 
U.S.A., dropped its load and returned to land in Maryland. 
U.S. Naval Aviation, p.l69. 
themselves, were designed to demonstrate the potential 
of carrier based aviation ln the event of a nuclear 
war. Once that potential had been demonstrated it was 
possible to initiate the design and construction of 
carrier based aircraft capable of delivering nuclear 
1 
weapons over long ranges. 
Wartime Essex and Midway class carriers underwent 
conversions designed to strengthen their elevators and 
flight decks and increase their fuel storage. 2 
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On 31st August 1950 the AJ-1 'Savage' had completed 
carrier qualification tests on board the USS 'Coral Sea', 
marking the introduction of nuclear armed attack bombers 
to carrier operations. 
Throughout the early 1950s, carriers from the USN 
and RN increased their operational efficiency by 
incorporating two British innovations, the angled deck 
and the steam catapult. The angled deck provided a 
greater safety margin in handling aircraft by creating 
a longer clear deck for take off and landing while the 
steam catapult provided an external power source, 
essential to enable the aircraft carrying heavier loads 
to take off from relatively restricted areas. 
The new Forrestal class carriers incorporated these 
innovations and were built to operate the larger, heavier 
naval aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. 
The AJ-1 'Savage' after a brief period of service 
was withdrawn in 1954 and replaced as the attack bomber 
of the carrier fleet by later versions of the AD 'Skyraider' 
1 The first such contract was issued to North American 
Aviation In. in June 1946. Ibid, p.l60. 
2 Ibid, p.l63 Janes Fighting Ships 1953-5 reports 
fourteen of these conversions eventually took place. 
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which had a combat radius o£ about 500 miles. 1 
The following map indicates the area o£ the Soviet 
Union which could be subject to attack by carrier launched 
aircraft operating in the Barents Sea. Clearly there was 
no threat to the major population area o£ Leningrad or 
Moscow but the Northern Fleet Area itself was vulnerable, 
as was any 
. 2 
reg~ons. 
force attempting to operate in the northern 
The problem o£ carrier based aviation would 
emerge more markedly as aircraft ranges increased. 
Soviet Naval Aviation 
The major fleet units, both surface vessels and 
submarines, required protective cover which could only 
be provided by land based aircraft. Moreover coastal 
air defence for some 50 miles inland was the responsibility 
of naval aviation units attached to the various fleet 
3 
areas. 
Writing in 1950 a western commentator on Soviet 
aviation, Asher Lee, pointed out that naval aviation 
units attached to the fleet areas 'have not yet the 
assistance o£ either the latest jet planes or a radar 
screen to help the early warning system' and he assessed 
the ability of naval aviation to defend target areas 
such as Leningrad, Baku and Vladivostok against daylight 
attack as low. 4 Night attacks would find the Soviet Air 
1 See H. Gann, 'Douglas Skyraider• in Aircraft in Profile 
Vol. III, (Windsor, Berks., 1966), p.l44, where the AD-4 
is credited with a combat range o£ 1,110 miles and the 
AD-6 with a combat range o£ 1,143 miles. Gann actually 
£lew the aircraft and I have accepted his figures £or 
range as a better guide than .figures in Janes All the 
Worlds Aircraft, 1953-4 to 1956-7. 
2 See p.72 above for a specific protest relating to 
NATO naval exercises designed to attack enemy forces 
advancing into Norway. 
3 Isakov, 'The Red Fleet ... ', p.35, for an example o£ 
naval aviation being used £or support o£ land operations 
in the Baltic. For the general point see R.L. Gartho££ 
How Russia Makes War, p.361. 
4 Lee, A.,'The Soviet Air Force• (London, 1950), p.l98-9. 
See also Stockwell, R.E. Soviet Air Power (New York, 1954), 
p.54. 
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Force almost totally powerless, until radar control of 
anti aircraft fire and all weather night fighters were 
1 
available on a much greater scale. 
Following the war the decision was made to equip the 
air force and naval aviation with jet aircraft in three 
stages. During the initial stage developmental work was 
undertaken on German engines. This was followed by the 
introduction to Soviet plants of British engines built 
under license. During this period the MIG-15, LA-15 and 
YAK 23 single engined fighters were produced together with 
the IL-28 twin engined bomber and the three engined TU-14 
bomber. Finally Soviet jet engines from Soviet design 
offices were produced and incorporated in the MIG-19 
fighters, the YAK-25 fighter interceptor and the TU-16 
long range bomber (3,600 miles). 2 
Aircraft from the secondary stage of development 
must have been part of the naval aviation units which 
3 took place in the fly past on Soviet Air Force Day 1951. 
The MIG-15, which entered service with the Soviet Air 
Force in 1948, did not enter Soviet Naval Aviation until 
1951, 4 and it was replaced in 1953-4 by the MIG-17, a 
follow-on aircraft. 5 Whether or not the MIG-19 and 21 
were intended to enter naval service is difficult to 
determine. The important point is that all these fighters, 
despite variations in armament and speed, were 
characterised by low combat radius estimated at between 
1 Yakovlev, A.S., Aircraft Construction reports that it was 
only 'In the early fifties (that) the design offices of 
Mikoyan Lavochkin and Yakovlev were given the task of 
designing the first Russian all weather night interceptor•, 
p.l04. 
2 Ibid, p.l03-5. 
3 Armour, R.D .. S., Capt., 'The Soviet Naval Air Arm• in 
Saunders, ed., The Soviet Navy, p.l90. 
4 Taylor, J.W.R., ed., Combat Aircraft of the World 
(London, 1969) p.585-6. 
5 Taylor, op.cit., p.587. 
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210 and 300 miles, with the exception of the MIG-19, 
which was credited by some observers with a radius of 
600 miles. Moreover these fighters were stated to have 
1 
an in flight endurance of only two hours. 
The short range and flight time suggests that these 
fighters would be virtually useless as escorts for the 
slower naval aviation bombers or as a combat air patrol 
for surface naval forces except within very narrow 
operational areas. 
In 1951 the Navy received the first of perhaps as 
many as seven hundred tactical jet bombers 1 the IL-28, 
which had entered the Air Force in 1949. Its combat radius 
of some 750 miles can be extended by the use of wing tip 
tanks and it has a maximum speed of about 550 miles per 
hour. 2 A companion bomber the Tu-14 has a similar speed 
but a radius of 1,125 miles. It was apparently not as 
successful as the IL-28 and enjoyed only small scale 
production, running to perhaps 300 units, which were 
incorporated into the Naval Air Forces. 3 
Soviet Naval Aviation by 1953 was clearly increasing 
in size,as aircraft designed for the Air Force were 
subsequently allocated to Naval Aviation,but whereas the 
bombers clearly had the operational range to attack 
aircraft carriers their armament, free fall bombs, and 
the lack of fighter escorts, seriously limited their 
capability to do so. 
The aircraft of the Naval Aviation units do however 
appear ideally suited to the role of Soviet naval aviation 
in World War II; the support of ground troops in coastal 
regions and the protection of naval bases. 
1 . 8 . Taylor, op.c~t., p.S 5-7; Armour, op.c~t., p.l91; and 
Munro, op.cit., p.80-86. 
2 . 6 Taylor, op.c~t., p.57 ; Armour, op.cit., p.l9l, and 
Munro, op.cit., p.76, and Yakovlev, op.cit., p.l04. 
3 . . Taylor, op.c~t., p.621; Armour, op.c~t., p.l91. 
CHAPTER IV 
IN'rRODUCT I ON 
The immediate post war naval construction programme, 
significantly influenced by Stalin's interventions, was to 
produce a large number of heavy, artillery firing cruisers, 
medium range t.orpedo armed submarines and an array of coastal 
vessels. Such a programme, and the initial research and 
development of sea-based missile systems and nuclear propulsion 
units for subsequent use in submarines, involved considerable 
outlays and the use of scarce resources. It was designed to 
enable the Soviet Union to dominate the enclosed seas. 
Following Stalin's death significant changes occurred in 
Soviet society. For our purposes the most important of these 
were the increased emphasis given to consumer goods at the 
expense of heavy industry and the critical reappraisal which 
occurred throughout the armed forces necessitated by the intro-
duction of nuclear vJeapons and developing missile technology. 
The approach of the new leadership to domestic, economic, foreign 
and defence policy questions resulted in large scale reductions 
in manpower and the re-equipment and re-organisation of the armed 
forces which set the context for the major changes which 
occurred in the Navy. 
The new political leadership pressed the Soviet Navy to 
undertake a reassessment of its force requirements appropriate 
to an age of sea based strikes launched from points well beyond 
the areas of traditional concern to Soviet sea power. The 
leadership of the navy changed hands because of political dis-
satisfaction with the continued emphasis on large expensive 
surface vessels and the apparent inability of the Soviet Navy 
to adjust to the rapidly changing naval environment. Khrushchev 
in particular viaS concerned at the potential threat from sea 
based strike forces and saw the solution t.o this problem, so far 
as the Navy was concerned, in the relatively less expensive and 
more effective field of missiles launched from submarines, small 
surface vessels and aircraft. 
Some attention must be given to the claim that the 
period of the mid-1950s saw the beginnings of a balanced 
fleet development. It is clear from the evidence presented 
in this and the subsequent chapter (on the ship building 
programme) that this was not the case. Although the Soviet's 
continued the submarine launched ballistic missile programme, 
giving them a direct strike capability against the United 
States, the navy as a whole was unable to operate in a hostile 
environment beyond the range of assured cover provided by land 
based aircraft. 
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CHAPTER IV 
From Stalin to Khrushchev: From Kuznetsov to Gorshkov 
Background Factors 
The period following Stalin's death in March 1953 
was characterised by change in almost every aspect of 
Soviet affairs. Commentators noted a relaxation of the 
intense drive to reconstruct after the ravages of war, 
a concern to redirect the economy toward a greater 
satisfaction of consumer demands, and new approaches in 
foreign policy. That the changes themselves were subject 
to open debate involving the political ~~d military 
leadership was in itself a significant change. 
During the post-Stalin power struggle Malenkov had 
proposed the reorientation of the production potential 
of the country towards consumer based industry. 1 
Moreover, Malenkov and Mikoyan appear to have been 
groping towards a defence doctrine of 'mutual deterrence' 
and a policy line that a future war was unwinnable in any 
meaningful sense. Malenkov spoke of the possibility of 
'a new world holocaust which, with the present means of 
warfare, means the destruction of world civilisation• 2 
while Mikoyan claimed that 
the danger of war has receded to a large extent 
... because we now have not only the atomic 
bomb but also the hydbgen bomb which in the 
hands of the Soviet Union are a means of 
checking the aggressors and for waging peace. 
1 Malenkov announced in August 1953 that the 'main task' 
of the Party and Government was to ensure further 
improvement in the material well being of the Soviet 
people. Heavy industry had developed to the point where 
•we have all the necessary conditions for bringing about 
a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods'. 
Malenkov, 'Speech to the Supreme Soviet•, Pravda, 
9 August, 1953. 
2 
'Speech by Comrade G.M. Malenkov, 12 March, 1954 1 , 
Pravda, 13 March, 1954. 
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Whereas previously the United States had escaped the full 
impact of the war 'now the situation would seem to be 
different 1 • 1 
These proposals, to increase consumer production at 
the expense of heavy industry and to alter fundamentally 
the Party doctrines on war, aroused the antagonism of 
the military because they implied cuts in defence 
expenditure. 2 Moreover the Soviet military could argue 
that at present their thermo-nuclear strength was not 
sufficient to sustain a concept of 'mutual destruction•. 3 
The United States could escape the full consequences of 
war because at the time the Soviet Union had no viable 
1 
'Speech of A.J. Mikoyan' Kommunist (Erevan) 12 March, 
1954, quoted in Dinerstein, H.S. War and the Soviet Union 
(London, 1959), p.7l-2. 
2 Garthoff, R.L. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age 
(New York, 1958) p. 23, indicates that military budget 
allocations declined in 1953 and 1954. The meeting of 
the Supreme Soviet which accepted Malenkov•s resignation 
increased the military budget by over twelve per cent. 
Marshals G .. K. Zhukov and V.D. Sokolovsky supported an 
emphasis on heavy industry in their Armed Forces Day 
speeches, 23 February 1955. Zhukov 'Order of the Day' 
Pravda, 23 February 1955, Sokolovsky, Izvestia, 23 
February 1955. 
3 Marshal Zhukov, when asked how he had estimated that 
the United States had only five or six atomic bombs in 
its stockpile at the end of the 1940s, admitted that it 
was based on Soviet experience. 'We know from our own 
experience how difficult that is'. 
Zhukov, G.K. (Marshal), interview with W.R. Heartst 
el al, 7 February 1955, Pravda, 13 February 1955, and 
New Times No. 8, 1955 Supplement p.l3-l6. 
For an attack on the Malenkov-Mikoyan position see 
'Speech of Comrade Bulganin at a meeting of the electors 
of the Moscow City electoral district 10 March 1954 1 • 
Izvestia, ll March 1954. Bulganin, then the Minister of 
Defence, argued that it was reckless to think that the 
United States spent enormous sums of money only to 
frighten the Soviet Union. 'We cannot depend on the 
humanitarianism of the imperialists, who, as life has 
shown, are capable of using any weapon of mass 
destruction'. 
delivery system capable of reaching the American land 
1 
mass. 
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Malenkov's v1ews were disputed by his direct political 
opponents. Khrushchev maintained that capitalism was 
facing a period of crisis from which it might seek to 
2 
escape by launching a new war. He also claimed that the 
Soviet Union had and would continue to stress the 
3 development of the heavy industrial sector of the economy. 
In the period following Malenkov's resignation from 
the Premiership Khrushchev was to adopt his policies, 
albeit in modified form. He told the Twentieth Party 
Congress that war was not fatalistically inevitable, a 
significant modification of the 'Leninist' doctrine of 
inevitable conflict between social systems previously 
in vogue, but at the same time spoke of the need for 
'vigilance', and maintaining •the means to give a smashing 
rebuff to aggressors should war occur•. 4 While such a 
war, should it occur, would lead to 'incredible destruction 
and loss' and be a 'disaster to all mankind', the result 
1 Not until the conversion of the Z-class submarines to 
carry two 350 mile range SARK ballistic missiles in 1955-57 
did the Soviet Navy acquire a delivery system capable of 
inflicting damage on the United States. By this time, 
1957, the ICBM programme had shown its potential but there 
were insufficient missiles to make this a credible 
deterrent once reliable surveillance techniques became 
available in the 1960s. 
2 
'Speech of N.S. Khrushchev at the meeting of electors 
of the Kalinin electoral district of the City of Moscow 
6 March 1954', Pravda, 7 March 1954. Bulganin, whose 
views were cited in p.2, f.n. 3, was speaking as a 
political opponent of Malenkov as well as Minister of 
Defence. 
3 Khrushchev interview with W .. R. Hearst, Jna. et al 
5 February 1955, Pravda, 11 February 1955, and New Times, 
No. 8, 1955, Supplement p.6-l2. 
4 Khrushchev, Report of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. to the 
Twentieth Party Congress, New Times, No.8, 1956. 
Documents 'Some Fundamental Questions of Present Day 
International Development'. 
would be 1 the inevitable destruction' of the capitalist 
1 
system. 
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Khrushchev subsequently became so clearly identified 
with 'goulash communism•, virgin lands campaigns and the 
desire to provide a greater measure of consumer 
satisfaction that substantive documentation is scarcely 
2 
necessary. 
The political struggle which resulted in Malenkov's 
resignation closely involved the leading figures of the 
military establishment, who were concerned to maintain 
what they saw as a necessary level of preparedness. 
Khrushchev was able to maintain the support of significant 
members of the military during his later struggle with the 
. t 3 ant~-par y group 
4 Marshal Zhukov. 
and in his subsequent moves against 
The military was also involved in a debate over 
fundamental doctrinal ~ssues which had been held in check 
by Stalin's dominance of the field of military doctrine. 
The necessity for debate had been occ.asioned by the 
development of nuclear weapons, and centred on the 
continued relevance of Stalin's permanently operating 
1 Khrushchev, Report to the Anniversary Session of the 
USSR Supreme Soviet: Forty Years of the Great October 
Socialist Revolution. Pravda and Izvestia 7 November 
1957, p.2-6. 
2 One example only. 
Khrushchev, 'Speech to the Plenary Meeting of the C.C. 
of the C.P.S.U., 6 May, 1958. New Times, No. 19, May 
1958. Documents p.2-23, especially the section 'Accelerate 
development - of the chemical industry, especially 
production of synthetic materials and products, to meet 
consumer and other economic requirements•, p.l3. 
3 For the role of the military and especially Marshal 
Zhukov, in Khrushchev's struggle for supremacy in both 
the Government and Party see Conquest, Robert Power and 
Policy in the USSR (New York, 1961), p.320-345. 
4 See Kolkowicz, R. The Soviet Military and the Communist 
Party, (Princeton, 1967), p.l34-l35, and p.247-253. 
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factors and the role of surprise ln contemporary warfare. 1 
The appearance of new weapons, development of which 
had been initiated under Stalin, continued throughout the 
period. In 1953 the Soviet Union successfully developed 
and tested a thermonuclear bomb while in 1954 and 1955 
the long range bombers, the MYA-4 Bison and the Tu-95 
Bear, were publicly displayed for the first time. 2 These, 
with the Tu-16 Badger bomber, 3 were to form the basis of 
the Soviet strategic delivery system until such time as 
they could be replaced by missiles. 4 
1 stalin's post-war military doctrine has been outlined, 
p.50j3 above. For a discussion of the debate on fundamental 
doctrine, see R.L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, p.61-91, and 
The Soviet Image of Future War (Washlngton, 1959), p.23-85. 
Also H.S. Dinerstein, op.cit., p.28-63. 
2 The MYA-4 'Bison•, a four-engined jet with a range of 
6-7,000 miles, was allegedly withdrawn from service as a 
long range bomber in 1961. Khrushchev scornfully 
commented 'It could reach the United States, but it 
couldn't come back'. Khrushchev, The Last Testament. 
None the less the authoritative Milltary Balance 1974-5 
continues to list 40 MYA-4s in the Long Range Air Force 
inventory. The Tu-95 'Bear•, a turbo-prop bomber, has 
a range of 7,800 miles with a 25,000 lb. bomb at an 
over target speed of 500 m.p.h. 
Wolfe, T.W., Soviet Power and Europe, p.l78-l81. 
Janes All the World's Aircraft 1973-4, p.489-490. 
3 TU-16 'Badger', a twin-engine turbo jet, has a 4,000 
mile range with a 6,600 lb. bomb load at 480 m.p.h. 
Janes - Aircraft 1973-4, p.488-9. 
4 Wolfe, T.W., op.cit., p.l79, notes that by the late 
1950s, 150 to 200 heavy bombers of the 'Bison• and 'Bear• 
types had been incorporated into the Soviet Long Range 
Air Force while possibly 1,000 'Badgers• were added to 
the operational inventory. 
It is doubtful that this was seen by Soviet leaders as 
giving an intercontinental capability although it did of 
course provide a considerable capability against America's 
European allies and American bases in Europe. Khrushchev 
claims that Tupolev, a major Soviet aircraft designer, had 
told Stalin that contemporary technology made impossible 
the task of constructing an intercontinental strategic 
bomber. Khrushchev dismissed the MYA-4 'Bison'. Not 
only was its range too limited- 'It could reach the 
United States, but it couldn't come back', but •we 
weren't sure it could fly through dense anti-aircraft 
fire. Nor did it perform very well in its test flights•. 
Similarly the Tu-95 'couldn't be used as a strategic 
bomber' because of its vulnerability to anti-aircraft 
defence. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 
(London, 1974) p.39-40. 
Continued experimentation with rockets resulted in the 
first instance in the development of medium and inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles1 and finally, in 1957, 
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in the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile and the launchings of the first Sputniks. 2 
By 1955 the Soviet force level had grown to 5,763,000 
from its 1948 low of 2,874,000: a growth attributed to 
Western 'provocations', the most important of which were 
undoubtedly the formation of the NATO alliance and the 
Korean War. In August 1955 Khrushchev initiated a series 
1 These missiles, as with the long range bomber fleet, 
could not reach the United States but were capable of 
reaching targets in Europe. First shown during the 
7 November celebrations in 1957 they were the products 
of a programme which had been initiated in the immediate 
post war period. 
Zhukov in his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in 
February 1956 claimed possession of 'diverse atomic and 
nuclear weapons, mighty guided missiles, among them long 
range missiles', Pravda, February 1956. 
2 The Tass Communique Pravda and Izvestia 27 August 1957, 
p.2, which announced the successful launching of 'An ulta-
long-range intercontinental multiple-stage ballistic 
rocket' continued: 'The results obtained show that it is 
possible to direct rockets to any part of the globe. The 
solution of the problem of developing of intercontinental 
ballistic rockets will make it possible to reach remote 
areas without resorting to a strategic air force, which 
at present is vulnerable to up-to-date methods of anti-
aircraft defence.' 
In the spate of articles which followed,the speed, 
destructiveness, accuracy and invulnerability of the 
ICBM were stressed, as was the fact that 'No aggressor 
on earth can now evade retaliation', and that American 
overseas bases had now lost their significance. 
For example, Maj.-Gen. G.J. Pokrovsky, 'Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles', Izvestia, 31 August 1957, p.3., and 
V. Kruchinin, 'Test of Ultra-Long Range Ballistic Missile 
is New Success of Soviet Science and Technology', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 September 1957, p.3. 
Sputnik I was launched on 4 October 1957, and Sputnik II 
on 3 November 1957. The latter carried a 1,100 lb. pay 
load which indicated a substantial thrust capacity. 
Bloomfield, L.P., et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race, 
(Cambridge and London, 1966), p.4l. 
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of troop cuts which continued until 1957. 1 
These reductions, made primarily because of the 
economies involved, coincided with a major reorganisation 
andre-equipment of the ground forces. 2 The reorganisation, 
carried out under Marshal Zhukov, who had been appointed 
Minister of Defence in February 1955, 3 resulted in an 
increase in firepower per division deployed, although the 
number of divisions had been reduced as a result of the 
troop cuts. Unlike subsequent troop cuts announced Ln 
1960 these moves do not appear to have been opposed by 
the military. 
In 1955 PVO (Anti-Air Defence) was established as a 
separate service of the armed forces under Marshal S.S. 
Biryuzov. The new branch was equipped with new and more 
advanced interceptor aircraft and surface to air missile 
4 
systems. 
These changes Ln the armed forces as a whole, together 
with the increased priority given to consumer industry, 
established a climate in which the Navy, still regarded as 
the seaward flank of the Army, would find it difficult to 
argue for and justify new and expensive programmes. 
1 In August 1955 the Soviet armed forces were reduced by 
640,000 men and in May 1956 a reduction of 1,200,000 men 
was announced. A smaller reduction of 300,000 men occurred 
in late 1957. 
'On a new reduction in the USSR Armed Forces•, Pravda 
and Izvestia, 7 January, 1958, p.2. 
2 This primarily involved the motorisation of all rifle 
divisions and an increased emphasis on tank armies. With 
the advent of tactical missiles,artillery was reorganised 
and the heavier armour replaced. See Mackintosh, M. 
Juggernaut, (London, 1967), p.292-3. 
Among the tactical missiles in service by 1957 were 
'Frog I & II', a mobile ground-to-ground missile with a 
range of 15-40 miles according to varying estimates, 
'SCUD', with a range of 50-100 miles, 'SHADDOCK', range 
of approximately 300 miles. Wolfe, T.W., Soviet Power, 
p.l73-l77, and Janes Weapons Systems 1973-4, p.38-40. 
3 Zhukov moved into the position of Minister of Defence, 
replacing Bulganin whom Khrushchev nominated as Premier 
following the fall of Malenkov in February 1955. 
4 See Wolfe, Soviet Power, p.l84-188. 
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The cuts ~n military manpower were claimed as 
e'tidence of the Soviet Union's good intentions and desire 
to reduce international tension. 1 The Soviet Union also 
proposed a series of zones of peace and nuclear free 
zones in the Baltic, Central Europe, the Far East and 
in the Mediterranean area. 2 The call for peace zones 
and nuclear free zones, specifically called for the 
removal of United States naval forces. 
The nuclear arming of the U.S. Sixth 
(Mediterranean) Fleet and attached Air 
Force began three or four years ago . 
. .. . this process has been completed, and 
the Fleet has a nuclear striking potential 
This force numbers up to 250 combat planes 
armed with atomic bombs and based on 
aircraft carriers.3 
1 
'Letter from President N.A. Bulganin to President 
Eisenhower 1 February 1956', New Times, No.7, February 
1956, Documents. 
Bulganin suggested a proposed 'Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation' between the US and the USSR. He cited 
as evidence of Soviet intentions the 1955 reduction in 
manpower; the reduction of appropriations for military 
expenditure in 1956 by 9,600 million rubles compared 
with 1955; the relinquishing of the last of the Soviet 
Union's military bases at Porkkala, and the Soviet 
initiative in concluding the State Treaty with Austria 
in 1955. 
See also 1 A Real Contribution to Peace', International 
Affairs, (Moscow), No. 10, October, 1955, p.l37-8. 
2 See, for example. v. Jordansky, 'The Baltic Peace 
Cruise', New Times, No. 37, 11 September 1954, p.22-25. 
Mikoyan's visit to the German Democratic Republic in 
August 1957 in which he called for peace in the Baltic 
region, reported in I. Chelnokov, 'The Baltic Must Become 
a Sea of Peace', International Affairs (Moscow) No. 12, 
December 1957, p.l35-6, and the celebration of Baltic 
Peace Week sponsored by the German Democratic Republic in 
1958 and 1959. Reported in New Times, No. 28, July 1958, 
p.2, and International Affairs, (Moscow) August 1959, p.83-4. 
Khrushchev, N.S., Speech to the 21st Party Congress, 
Pravda, 28 January, p.2-l0, spoke in support of the 
Rapacki plan for an atom free zone in Central Europe, and 
also called for 'A zone of peace, above all an atom free 
zone' to be •created in the Far East and the entire 
Pacific basin 1 • 
3 M. Lvov, 'NATO's Mediterranean Nuclear-Rocket Axis•, 
International Affairs (Moscow), October 1959, p.5l. 
The American Seventh Fleet (in the Pacific) 
is equipped with atomic weapons (atomic 
fighter bombers and Regulus guided missiles) . 1 
The establishment of a NATO Baltic command and NATO 
exercises involving Baltic states were condemned. 2 
126 
These appeals for peace zones were the verbal carrot 
in Soviet attempts to extricate itself from encirclement 
by military bases,under the auspices of various Western 
inspired regional defence pacts such as NATO, the Baghdad 
Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO. The verbal stick was 
contained in dire predictions about the fate of countries 
which played host to foreign military bases in the event 
of a future war. 3 The Soviet Union's leaders paid visits 
to Afghanistan, India and Burma which in itself consti-
tuted a significant departure from former practice. 
During these visits economic assistance programmes were 
initiated, a post-Stalin view of the Third World was 
developed, and less successfully, the Soviet visitors 
attempted to denigrate Britain, the former colonial 
4 power. In 1955 an agreement to supply arms to Egypt was 
concluded. 5 
1 Vladimirov, K., Yefremo~, A., 'Peace Zone in the Far 
East' International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6, June 1959, 
p.2l. 
2 Chelnokov, I., 'The Baltic', p.l35-6. 
3 
'In the event of attack on the USSR crushing retaliatory 
blows will be struck at these bases, first of all by rocket 
blows'. Maj-Gen. N. Talensky 'Military Strategy and 
Foreign Policy', International Affairs (Moscow), No.3, 
March 1958, p.28, and 'The Countries that will suffer most 
will be those in which the Americans have established 
their missile bases•, 'West German Socialist Editors 
Interview Khrushchev', 5 May 1959, Pravda, May 9, p.l-2. 
4 Mackintosh, J.M. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign 
Policy (London, 1962), p. 128-140. See also New Times, 
No. 52 1955 and No. l, 1956, for the text of the major 
speeches made by Bulganin and Khrushchev while in India 
and Burma. 
5 Mackintosh, J.M. Strategy and Tactics, p.ll7-l27, and 
Ra'anan, U., The USSR Arms the Third World, (Cambridge, 
Mass, and London, 1969), esp. p.lJ-34. 
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These visits and the arms agreement marked the final 
repudiation of the Stalinist policy1of hostility towards 
the newly independent countries-which had been based on 
a belief that the ex-colonies were still subservient to 
the ~ormer colonial powers especially in matters of 
economic and foreign policy. These acts established 
Soviet influence in countries bordering southern USSR 
thereby breaking the chain of hostile alliance systems 
which had threatened to encircle the Soviet Union and 
its socialist camp. 
In Europe besides settling the Austrian question on 
terms acceptable to the Western powers)and relinquishing 
claims to the Porkkala base in Finland, the Soviet Union 
attended a Heads of Government Conference at Geneva in 
July 1955. Disarmament, European security, Germany and 
cultural-economic exchange programmes were discussed. 
Perhaps the main achievement of the Geneva Conference was 
that it had been held at all. The style of negotiation 
indicated a relaxation of tension in international affairs, 
but the relaxed 'Spirit of Geneva•, while applicable to 
the manner of negotiation, 'was rarely applied by the 
Soviet Government to the actual solution of the problems 
'2 themselves. 
In 1956 Premier Bulganin and Secretary Khrushchev 
visited Britain and in 1959 Khrushchev visited the United 
States and by all accounts established friendly working 
relationships with President Eisenhower. 
1 For an account of an emerging new line in Soviet policy 
prior to Stalin's death and continued under Malenkov, see 
Mackintosh Strategy and Tactics, p.57-58 and 72-87. 
However, as Mackintosh notes 'It was left to those who 
overthrew Mr. Malenkov in 1955 to make a major break with 
Stalin's legacy in strategy and tactics in the field of 
foreign affairs•., p.87. 
2 Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics, p.l05-ll6. The 
quotation is from p.ll2-ll3. 
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Despite the Soviet Union's difficulties with its 
satellites, the Suez crisis of 1956, the friction in the 
Middle East in 1957-8 and the offshore islands dispute 
in the Far East 
replaced by one 
the atmosphere 
1 
of thaw. 
The Navy in the Post-Stalin Era 
of cold war had been 
As early as Navy Day 1953 Kuznetsov suggested that 
Stalin's views on the relevance of the experience of 
World War II and the subordinate role of the Navy were 
not regarded by the Navy as eternal verities. 
The single experience of the great patriotic 
war is now already inadequate. In order not 
to lag behind life Soviet naval science must 
be constantly and creatively elaborated and 
the achievements of naval theory persistently 
and stubbornly inculcated in the exercise of 
combat readiness. 
Moreover, Kuznetsov made the point that as well as being 
a continental power 
Our country's sea coasts are washed by the 
waters of fourteen seas and her maritime 
borders are more than 47,000 kilometers long 
- more than two thirds the national borders 
of our home land. This is why we need for 
the defence of our state interests at sea a 
strong and powerful fleet which, together 
with the Soviet Army, is fully capable of 
solving successfull~ the tasks of our 
country's defense'. 
The suggestion that the Soviet Navy should be 
elevated to a position of equality with the Army and that 
the Soviet Union needed a strong fleet for 'the defence 
of state interests at sea' in all probability took the 
remainder of the military establishment by surprise. 
What these 'state interests' might be, apart from providing 
1 For a more extended discussion of the Soviet posture 
during the last three of these crises see p.219-215 below. 
2 Kuznetsov, N.G .. Navy Day Speech,Pravda, 26 July, 1953, 
p.2. 
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an active defence in time of war, is unclear. Possibly 
the phrase, and the speech as a whole, was a product of 
Kuznetsov's euphoric assessment of future naval 
developments. If he thought that he might retrieve the 
aircraft carriers from the oblivion to which Stalin had 
consigned them, and hence develop a high seas fleet 
capable of contesting and assuming control of the sea, 
he was soon to learn otherwise. 
Following Stalin's death in March 1953 the separate 
Ministries for War and for the Navy were merged to form 
a Single Ministry of Defence under Marshal Bulganin as 
Minister. 1 Admiral Kuznetsov, the ex-Navy Minister 
became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and a First Deputy 
Minister. Bulganin, although a Marshal, gained his rank 
through political work rather than as a military 
professional. As such he was the Party's 'Man at the 
Ministry' rather than the Military's 'Man in Cabinet•. 
The hard questions involving the adaptation of the 
military forces for nuclear war, their re-equipment and 
re-organisation, were raised and solved by professional 
soldiers of whom the most prominent was G.K.Zhukov now 
a First Deputy Minister following Stalin's death. 
There is little direct evidence of naval reaction to 
this re-organisation. However in his memoirs Kuznetsov 
does discuss in some detail naval reaction to the 1946 
abolition of the People's Commissariat 
to the 1950 decision to re-establish a 
for the Navy and 
Ministry of the 
2 Navy. Kuznetsov recalls that during discussion of 
1946 merger in the Central Naval Staff and proposed 
People's Commissariat four major points were made. 
1 
l. 'We started from the conviction that modern 
operations demanded centralised control and 
joint operations of the various arms of the 
services.' 
Malenkov, G.M., Chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers in a speech to Session of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, Pravda, 16 March 1953, p.l. 
the 
the 
2 Kuznetsov, N. 'Before the War', Part 9, International 
Affairs (Moscow) January 1967, esp. p.l02. 
2. •sufficient independence should be given 
to each arm. 1 
hence 3. •it would be right to preserve for the 
successor to the People's Commissar for 
the Navy, whatever his future designation, 
the powers of a People's Commissar, 
including the right of going straight to 
the government and maintaining contact 
with other People's Commissars.• 
4. 'all operational problems, planning 
development of combat forces and material 
in the event of war should be concentrated 
in the General Staff, as the one supreme 
operational agency. 
The Navy, whether opposed to the reunification or 
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not, was concerned that its point of view could be put 
directly to Government should the need arise 'Unity of 
control of all the armed forces had to be combined with 
sufficient independence for the Navy•. 1 Undoubtedly 
this was intended to provide the Navy with a sanctioned 
court of appeal should its needs be ignored in a unified 
defence establishment dominated by ground forces personnel. 
There can be no doubt that the appointment of Zhukov 
as Minister of Defence in February 1955 was regarded by 
Kuznetsov, and possibly also by his successor Gorshkov, 2 
as a severe blow to naval development. 
Kuznetsov had not been on good terms with Zhukov 
when the latter had been Chief of the General Staff 
before the war, as he made abundantly clear in his 
memoirs written in the mid l960s. 3 In their pre-war 
encounters Kuznetsov complains that he found Zhukov•s 
demeanour •rather haughty' and that Zhukov 'made no 
effort at all to go into naval matters•. Apparently 
Isakov, then Chief of the Naval Staff, also failed in 
an attempt to get Zhukov to decide on issues that he 
raised with him. 
l Ibid, p.l02. 
2 See p.l38-9 below for Gorshkov 1 s at.tack on •leftist'. 
views of some influential •authorities•. 
3 See p.20 above. Kuznetsov 'Before the War•, 
International Affairs (Moscow), January 1967, p.lOl. 
131 
Zhukov, First Deputy Minister since 1953, evidently 
felt little need to improve his acquaintance with even 
the broadest issues of naval development for in an 
interview in February 1955 he confessed, 'I cannot tell 
you whether the USSR is building aircraft carriers, because 
I have had nothing to do with naval matters for some time' .1 
Kuznetsov, a relic of the post-war Stalin naval era, 
was eventually dismissed from his formal position of 
Commander-in-Chief in January 1956. In fact it appears 
as though he lost his position de facto in mid 1955 for 
the Moscow ceremonial meeting for Navy Day 24 July 1955 
was addressed by Vice Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, First Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The Pravda report of the 
2 
meeting does not even mention Kuznetsov as being present. 
From what has been said of relations with Zhukov 
it may well be that Kuznetsov's decline in influence 
stems from early 1955. 
Khrushchev claims that Kuznetsov's dismissal was 
the result of growing disillusion with his performance 
as Commander-in-Chief. 3 Khrushchev's own assessment of 
the Soviet Navy,and Kuznetsov as Commander-in-Chief, was 
influenced by direct contact with the Far Eastern Fleet 
following his visit to China in October 1954. He was 
unimpressed by the coastal defences around Vladivostok, 
claimed that Port Arthur, which he had just relinquished 
to the Chinese, was 'defenseless against air attacks' 
and noted that its entrances were 'easily guarded against 
enemy submarines and battleships approaching from the sea' 
but that it was, in the aircraft age, 'a completely 
unacceptable place in which to keep our Pacific Fleet ... 
even in peacetime'. Moreover the naval exercises 
1 Zhukov, 'Interview with W.R. Hearst, Jnr' New Times, 
No. 8, February 1955, p.l6. 
2 Pravda 24 July 1955, translated in Moscow Daily Press 
Review, Joint Press Reading Service No. 205, p.2. 
3 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.l9-29 covers 'The 
Fall of Admiral Kuznetsov'. 
Kuznetsov staged for his visitors struck Khrushchev as 
~ather depressing'. 'He (Kuznetsov) seemed to be 
1 looking at the present through the eyes of the past•. 
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Khrushchev has also revealed the following discussion 
which occurred at a Presidium meeting 
'Tell us, Comrade Kuznetsov, if we had all the 
ships you've proposed we build, how would that 
affect our position vis a vis our enemies? 
Would we be able to withstand the full force of 
a sea attack by the British and American navies?' 
'No 1 , he replied 'We'd still be far inferior to 
the British and Americans'. 
'Even if we had all the ships you're asking for?' 
'Yes', he said (At least he was being honest). 
'Then what sense does it make to invest these 
colossal sums of money? Even if we approved 
your recommendations, it would take. ten years 
for us to build all the ships you want, and 
by then the United States would probably be 
even further ahead of us because the Americans 
have much greater material capabilities. I 
don't see how this money you're asking us to 
spend would contribute to the security of our 
country'. 
Everyone around the table exchanged views and 
came to the same conclusion. I went on to say= 
'Let's put off indefinitely the question of 
building up our navy and concentrate instead on 
the development of our airforce and missiles. 
Any future war will be won in the air, not on 
the sea; and our potential adversaries are 
equipped to attack us from the air. Therefore 
we should think first about improving our 
airborne defenses and our means of counter-
attack.' 
1 Ibid, p.2l-25 for Khrushchev's account of his 
inspection of the Far Eastern Fleet. 
2 Ibid, p.26 emphasis added. 
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Even if we discount the authenticity of Krushchev•s 
Last Testament, 1 it would seem as though this account 
squares with the independently accepted facts. Kuznet sov 1 s 
•neo-Stalinist' navy would remain inferior to the RN and 
USN, it would cost a colossal sum but add little to the 
security of the country, and the Americans did have 
greater material capabilities. Moreover, Soviet defence 
planning did concentrate on the air force and missile 
forces even though no satisfactory intercontinental 
bomber was developed. 
Kuznetsov's eventual fall was attributed by Khrushchev 
to his campaign on behalf of the surface fleet, which was 
rejected by the Army, (Khrushchev mentions Bulganin and 
Malinovsky as principal opponents, omitting reference to 
Zhukov), and by the Government. 
Khrushchev's account of the Soviet Navy and its 
leadership in the mid 1950s is of interest because it 
contains an explicit rejection of Stalin's views 
As I see it, one of his (Stalin's) biggest 
errors was his decision to concentrate our 
resources in the development of the navy, 
particularly our surface fleet ..... 2 
(Stalin) failed to realise the crucial role 
which aircraft carriers and submarines had 
played in World War II ... he refused to 
recognise that a surface navy wouldn't be 
decisive in any future war ..... 
1 There is in fact an apparent consensus that this,the 
second volume of Khrushchev 1 s memoirs, is in fact what 
it purports to be, Khrushchev's own recollections of 
his period in power. The translator's introduction 
describes in some detail the voice print methods used 
to verify the authenticity of the tapes from which the 
translation was made. What is in doubt is the truth 
or otherwise of Khrushchev's account. In my opinion 
the general thrust of his chapter 'The Navy' is 
supported by the direct evidence of appointments, 
building programmes and Khrushchev's own speeches 
reported at the time. 
2 Ibid, p.l9. 
Granted, American naval superiority was 
undeniable. But, if Stalin could recognise 
that fact, he should have seen that we must 
concentrate on developing our defensive 
weapons, our means of sinking enemy surface 
ships, rather than on building up an 
offensive surface fleet of our own .... l 
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Clearly Khrushchev did not follow the steps of his 
predecessor. 
Khrushchev confessed to an early enthusiasm for 
missiles. He was impressed by their accuracy and power, 2 
and regarded surface ships armed with artillery as 
outmoded. 3 Moreover Khrushchev became convinced of the 
advantages of submarines in the contemporary situation. 
Submarines were 'much cheaper to build and operate -
(they) were also a much more formidable and effective 
4 
weapon' because they could operate alone or in small 
packs and easily escape detection. 
Evidently the First Secretary's assessment of the 
submarine was not shared by some 'high ranking naval 
commanders' who favoured keeping a strong surface fleet. 
They could not stop thinking of submarines 
as auxiliary vessels rather than as the 
most important element in a modern navy. 
They refused to see that, while cruisers 
are cumbersome floating artillery batteries 
submarines are mobile, underwater missile-
launching pads.5 
Kuznetsov's replacement, Admiral Gorshkov, delivered 
a broad attack on Stalin's building programme 6and post-
war naval strategy, which has recently been described as 
1 Ibid, p.20. 
2 Ibid, p.22 and 29. 
3 Ibid, p.28 and 30. 
4 Ibid, p.30. 
5 Ibid, p.30. 
6 Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Development of Soviet Naval 
Science', Morskoy Sbornik, No.2, February 1967, p.9-2l, 
U.S. Navy trans. p.l-21, especially p.l0-15. 
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amounting to a doctrine of 'command of the coast•. 1 
The claim that Stalin's post war programme stemmed 
directly from the Soviet experience of the war has already 
been examined and, once allowance has been made for the 
individual assessments of Shner, Alafuzov and Kuznetsov, 
found to be substantially correct. 2 Gorshkov points to 
the impact of Soviet military historical research on 
naval science. Because primary attention was given to 
Soviet op.erations and land battles the combat experience 
of the great naval powers was not considered very 
instructive. This research served to strengthen the idea 
that the fleet's role was •simply being an assistant to 
the ground forces• and led to a 'stagnation' and 
'formalism' in naval theory. 3 
Gorshkov notes that this transfer of experience did 
not take into account •the changes which have occurred in 
the arrangement of forces in the international arena•. 4 
He singles out two significant developments: the 
development of the socialist camp and the emergence of 
aggressive military blocs 
headed by traditional naval powers .... 
During the first post war decade the fleets 
of this coalition were built up with great 
intensity, far and away surpassing in their 
striking power the other branches of the 
armed forces. The tendency to assign to 
the Navy the role of one of the primary 
strategic weapons in a future war was 
becoming increasingly clear. 5 
1 This appropriate phrase occurs in J. Erickson, 'The 
Soviet Naval High Command', USNIP, May 1973, Naval 
Review Issue, p.68. 
2 see p.53-64 above. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Naval Science', p.ll and 15. 
4 Ibid, p.ll. 
5 Ibid, p.ll. 
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The 'command of the coast• doctrine reduced the art 
of naval warfare to 'the organisation and coordination of 
various types of forces ... with the ability to act only ln 
our own coastal areas.' Surface ships were given the role 
of primary force but were capable of repulsing enemy 
attacks 'when at sea adjacent to own coasts•. 1 Only here 
could they be covered against air attack. 
Naval training gave an important place to the 
organisation of the battle in a mine - artillery position. 
This required enemy warships to enter prepared minefields 
thereby committing themselves to an unfavourable position 
from which they could be attacked by torpedo boats, 
aircraft, shipboard and shore artillery - the full weight 
of the Soviet Navy. 2 
Gorshkov was extremely critical of this 'undeviating 
attempt to c.onduct every engagement with surface ships by 
launching the main strike in own coastal waters'. He 
acknowledged that 
operations such as these could take place 
when repulsing strikes by the enemy's fleet 
at shore objectives, as well as in the course 
of anti-landing operations. 
However the constant repetition of a standard exercise 
procedure engendered sketchiness and stifled initiative. 3 
Moreover it failed to test the Navy's capacities in 
different but emerging circumstances, i.e., in combat 
against aircraft carrier task forces standing clear of 
coastal waters but operating within range of carrier 
based aircraft. 
Both Khrushchev and Gorshkov were critical of the Navy 
as they found it in 1954-1955. In some respects their 
l Ibid, p.l4. 
2 Ibid, p.l4. See Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.22 
for an account of a naval exercise in late 1954. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Naval Science', p.l5. 
137 
criticisms were similar. Both considered that the Navy 
was too wedded to the past, both decried the sterility 
of naval exercises: both were concerned that not 
sufficient attention was being paid to naval innovations. 
Khrushchev looked to missiles, aviation and submarines as 
the wave of the naval future. 1 He was concerned to cut 
the 'absolutely staggering' naval expenditure and to 
redirect the military as a whole towards a greater concern 
for defence against airborne attack and the development of 
a missile capability. 2 As part of his concern to slash 
naval expenditure he advocated the development of a 
missile armed submarine navy and claimed that the surface 
navy was obsolete, 3 except for coastal operations, and 
suitable only for ceremonial occasions. In this he was, 
on his own admission, opposed by the navy and forced to 
. 4 
make concess~ons. 
For Gorshkov,Khrushchev•s plans for the navy were 
partially acceptable. He too noted the growing role of 
the submarine and missile armed aircraft in naval warfare 
and accepted the demise of the artillery firing heavy 
surface ship. 5 What he could not accept was the view of 
'some extremely influential authorities' who felt that 
'with the appearance of atomic weapons the Navy had 
completely lost its importance.• 6 
1 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.22 and 29 for his 
evaluation of the ~mpact of m~ssile carrying aviation 
on the navy, p.29-30 for his evaluation of submarines. 
2 Ibid, p.26. 
3 
'The thick iron plating on surface ships had been 
rendered helpless against armour-piercing shells, to 
say nothing of nuclear weapons. The heavier the armour, 
the heavier the ship, the faster it will sink•. 
Ibid, p.30. 
4 Ibid, p.32. 
5 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Naval Science', p.lS-17. 
6 Ibid, p.l8. 
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These authorities are never identified nor is there 
any evidence to confirm that the most likely candidates 
for the title, Zhukov and Khrushchev, advocated the 
extreme views cited by Gorshkov. Khrushchev's derogatory 
comments were reserved for the cruisers and destroyers of 
Stalin's construction programme', a programme for which 
Gorshkov himself had little respect. 1 
What undoubtedly happened in the mid 1950s was that 
the Soviet Navy was posed a series of searching questions 
about possible missions in a future war,and the role of 
the various units which comprised its fighting strength. 
In a period of review and reassessment of previous dogma 
in the armed forces as a whole it is unlikely that the 
Navy 
this 
escaped the process. The construction programme of 
period, to be reviewed in the following chapter, 
indicates quite clearly that some fundamental reassess-
ment was undertaken. 
Khrushchev's contribution to this process has 
already been reviewed: Zhukov for all his professed 
ignorance and lack of concerm about naval matters could 
scarcely maintain this attitude in his new role of 
Defence Minister. The Navy, a vast consumer of capital 
and resources, must have been carefully examined, given 
the search for across the board military economies, in 
a period characterised by a shift towards a greater 
satisfaction of consumer demands. 
It may be that some missile enthusiast asserted that 
missiles fired from land launchers could destroy enemy 
fleet formations on the seas and oceans. 2 Others may have 
l Ibid, p.l4. 
2 See Gorshkov, 'Naval Science', p.l8 for this and other 
charges against the 'influential authorities'. Khrushchev, 
The Last Testament, p.29, mentions the use of shore based 
missiles against enemy formations. 
negated the importance of fleet support for the ground 
forces and discounted the possibility of amphibious 
landings in the nuclear age. 
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was 
During the period 1954-1959 coastal defence artillery 
replaced with cruise missiles. 1 Shorter range 
missiles were fitted to small torpedo boats to produce 
50 Komar class missile boats. 2 There is no evidence of 
any cut back in the production of patrol boats, submarine 
chasers and other small surface vessels, which formed the 
backbone of close in-shore coastal defence. 3 
The overall picture reveals a drastic cut back in 
the cruiser and destroyer programmes coupled with the 
construction of small, relatively inexpensive, more 
powerfully armed vessels to undertake the tasks which 
4 had previously been alloted to larger vessels. It ~s 
true that these small surface craft had neither the 
range nor the sea keeping ability to operate far from 
the coast. But the cruisers had also been restricted 
in their range of operation by the absence of protective 
air cover and adequate anti-aircraft weapons. 
1 The fi:JCst of these cruise missiles,the Salish and 
Samlet, were derivatives of the Kennel air to surface 
jet powered missiles and are credited with a range of 
approximately 60 miles and 120 miles respectively. 
The Shaddock cruise missile may not have come into 
service with the coastal defence forces until the early 
1960s. It is credited with a range of 300 miles. Both 
Samlet and Shaddock would require mid course guidance 
if used at their maximum range. Janes Weapon Systems 
1973-4, p.4l-42. Janes Ships 1973-4, p.534-634 
2 The Komar is a conversion of the P-6 torpedo boat 
fitted with 2 SS-N-2 missiles which have a range of 
23 miles. Janes Ships 1973-4, p.566. 
3 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.3l. 'We relegated 
our surface fleet to an auxiliary function, primarily 
for coastal defence. We built P.T. boats, coastguard 
cutters and sub-chasers armed with depth charges'. 
4 See next chapter for a detailed discussion of the 
cut backs in the Stalin programme and for new 
construction initiated under the Khrushchev programme. 
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The planned increase in mechanisation and fire power 
of the ground forces undoubtedly increased their mobility 
and ability to by-pass or eliminate defensive cores of 
resistance to their advance. The role of the expensive 
and vulnerable cruisers in shelling these pockets of 
resistance from offshore could reasonably be expected to 
be accomplished>if not by the land forces themselves, then~ 
at least by those cruisers which were completed,together 
with small missile armed coastal defence boats operating 
as ground support for them. 
The questioning of the continued feasibility of 
amphibious landing operations under nuclear war conditions 
was not limited to influential authorities in the Soviet 
Union. 1 This was an obvious mission for hard and 
penetrating reassessment in a situation where officials 
were anxious to prune overall defence spending hopefully 
in branches of service other than their own. 
While the questioning and probing of the navy's 
missions and force structure was underway, Gorshkov claims 
the Central Committee of our Party defined the 
path of fleet development, as well as the fleet•s 
role and place in the system of Armed Forces in 
the country. The course taken was one which 
required the construction of an ocean-going 
fleet, capable of carrying out offensive 
strategic missions. Submarines and naval 
aviation, equipped with nuclear weapons, had 
a leading place in the programme. 
This was the authorised source for the creation 
of a balanced Navy, capable of successfully 
conducting combat operations under differing 
circumstances.2 
We must discount Gorshkov•s attempts to write his own 
place in Soviet naval history. He was not a saviour who 
rescued his fleet from the 'influential authorities• short-
sighted enthusiasm for missile forces~and in its hour of 
1 For a fuller discussion of the Soviet debate 
amphibious landings, see p.377 below. 
2 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Naval Science•, p.l9. 
over 
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darkest crisis presided over its development towards a 
balanced fleet. 
Firstly,it was not the Navy as such which had lost 
its importance, but rather Stalin's Navy, based on 
artillery firing cruisers and capable of effecting the 
'command of the coast• strategy on which Gorshkov himself 
poured such scorn. Naval construction turned to smaller 
units and.missile armament. At the heart of the new 
construction programme stood the missile firing submarine 
and shore-based medium and long range missile firing 
aviation. The new strategy from which this construction 
programme stemmed was one of ocean denial. 
Secondly the claim that the Soviet Navy began to 
develop into a balanced navy in the mid 1950s - coinciding 
with Gorshkov's promotion to Commander-in-Chief - is 
subject to challenge. Gorshkov offers an entirely vacuous 
definition of a balanced fleet. 1 We are told that a 
balanced fleet is •ocean-going', that it is composed of 
•submarine forces, aviation, surface warships and other 
types of force developed harmoniously', moreover, 
In composition and armament it is capable 
of carrying out missions assigned it not 
only in a nuclear war, but in a war which 
does not make use of nuclear weapons 
and finally it must be able •to support state interests 
at sea in peacetime•. There is no indication of what 
missions were in fact assigned 
unclear whether the underlying 
to the Navy. It is left 
naval strategy is offensive 
or defensive because there is no indication whether the 
mission of destroying the enemy's naval forces and 
contesting for control of the high seas is included in 
the missions assigned. Gorshkov does claim that as a 
result of decisions taken in the mid 1950s the Navy was 
converted to 'an offensive type of long-range armed 
force'. 2 
1 Ibid, p.l9 including footnote. 
2 Ibid, p.l9. 
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This however is a clear reference to a submarine launched 
ballistic missile capability and does little to clarify 
the issue of offensive or defensive naval strategy. The 
claim to protect state interests at sea in peacetime is 
vague. There is no indication of what these •state 
interests at sea' are, although clearly the protection 
of the merchant, fishing and research fleets are included. 1 
Nor is there any indication as to how these undefined 
state interests were to be protected by the Navy. Indeed 
there is no sustained use of the phrase •protection of 
state interests' in Soviet naval writings until the late 
1960s and even now its precise meaning and implications 
. 1 2 remaJ.n unc ear. 
The claim that submarine forces, aviation, surface 
warships and other types of forces developed 'harmoniously• 
is belied by the ship construction programme of the mid 
1950s. Khrushchev may have been enthusiastic about 
missile firing submarines and naval aviation but he 
certainly resisted any naval proposals for the construction 
of aircraft carriers which may have arisen, 3 cut back 
surface fleet construction and transferred ship yards 
from naval construction to merchant ship building. 4 
Moreover Gorshkov himself admitted that 'submarines and 
naval aviation ... had a leading place in the programme•. 
1 The Soviet Navy's inability to provide a secure surface 
escort for the cargo ships carrying missiles to Cuba in 
1962 suggests that this objective had yet to be attained 
by that date. 
It may have been this episode which was foremost in 
Gorshkov•s mind when he wrote of the protection of state 
interest at sea. 
2 See McConnell, J.M., 'The Soviet Navy in the Indian 
Ocean', Professional Paper No. 77, Center for Naval 
Analyses;Washington for an interpretation. 
3 I do not believe that suggestions for carrier 
construction were pressed by the Navy during Khrushchev 1 s 
period of office. There is no evidence of conflict over 
this question in Soviet material published following 
Khrushchev's fall and Khrushchev himself admits to a 
•nagging desire' to have acquired carriers 'but we could 
not afford to build them•. Khrushchev, The Last Testament, 
p. 31. 
4 See p. 194-5 below for evidence. 
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The leading role given to submarines and shore based 
aircraft implied a defensive strategy of ocean denial. 
Admittedly this required a different naval force structure 
to that needed for a 'defence of the coast• strategy but 
the new requirements did not produce a balanced fleet in 
the sense appropriate for an offensive strategy aimed at 
winning and holding command of the sea. 
It is difficult to understand what Gorshkov had in 
mind when he spoke of an ocean-going fleet. There was 
no attempt in the latter half of the 1950s to exercise 
the Soviet fleets outside the major fleet areas, 1whereas 
one might expect an attempt at area familiarisation, if 
not full scale exercises, in more distant waters if only 
to accumulate operating experience on the high seas Ln 
preparation for a more rigorous oceanic role. Moreover 
if it were intended to have an ocean-going fleet by the 
late 1960s it would be reasonable to expect the 
construction of an adequate support fleet during the 
1950s. However when the Soviet Union did begin to 
deploy vessels outside its fleet areas in the mid 1960s 
it found itself initially handicapped by the lack of an 
afloat support capability. The absence of an auxiliary 
fleet-suggests that no oceanic role was intended for the 
Soviet Navy by the decision-makers who had the final 
word on naval construction during the period of the mid 
1950s. 
1 Holmes, E.P. (Admiral USN) 'The Soviet Presence in 
the Atlantic', NATO Letter, Vol. 18, September 1970, 
p.6-ll. 
CHAPTER TV 
CONCLUSIONS 
There were major changes in the Soviet naval construction 
programmes associated with the rise of the new political and 
naval leadership. The period from the mid-1950s saw the demise 
of large artillery armed surface ships and a significant cut 
back in the nu:rnbers of medium range diesel-electric submarines. 
An increased emphasis on missiles launched from submarines, 
aircraft and smaller surface ships, and the development of 
nuclear powered submarines, characterised pronouncements on the 
future of the navy. 
There is little evidence that Stalin envisaged or sought 
to construct a 
coastal region. 
was too limited 
naval force capable of operating beyond the 
Both Khrushchev and Gorshkov saw that this 
a role for the navy at a time \vhen direct 
threats were being posed to Soviet territory by sea based strike 
forces increasingly capably of launching attacks from beyond 
the coastal seas. HovJever if both Khrushchev and Gorshkov 
could agree that "Stalin's navy" was fundamentally inappropriate 
in the changing circumstances there is little evidence that they 
agreed on what ought to replace it. Khrushchev, vJith his broad 
social and economic concerns, wanted to cut back on military 
expenditure: Gorshkov wanted the best navy he could have. 
vfuereas he did not necessarily object to cancellations in the 
Stalin type surface fleet there is no reason to suppose that 
he was satisfied with the limited numbers of surface vessels 
delivered to the fleet under the new construction programme. 
The navy was subject to close scrutiny. It was a capital 
intensive service requiring allocations from a wide range of 
industry and it was particularly vulnerable to pressures from 
other competing claims because it was the junior service in 
the Soviet military hierarchy and had traditionally played a 
subordinate role in Soviet strategy. Kuznetsov, who \vas replaced 
as the Commander in Chief of the Soviet. Navy, appears to have 
been identified as an advocate of a large ocean going navy 
consistent with his stress on the importance of aircraft carriers. 
Whatever the merits of such a case it was inappropriate at 
a time when the political leadership was determined to 
institute economies in all branches of the armed forces. 
What emerged from the process of discussion and decision 
was the need for a navy which, while capable of carrying out 
the functions which had emerged from the analysis of the >vorld 
War II experience, would be capable of denying an even wider 
area of sea to hostile naval forces. Such a navy vms to be 
based on the new technology of nuclear power and missiles. 
There is no indication- despite Gorshkov's claims to 
the contrary - of any attempt to develop a balanced fleet 
capable of carrying out offensive strategic missions on the 
high seas. There is no evidence publicly available that such 
an offensive role was even considered. However, during this 
period the navy developed a submarine launched ballistic 
missile capability, which at the time constituted the most 
reliable means available to the Soviet Union for launching a 
direct attack on the United States. The development was of 
great significance for it created a highly task specific arm 
within the Navy which in later public pronouncements \vas placed 
second only to the Strategic Rachet Troops in the Soviet force 
structure. 
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THE KHRUSHCHEV NAVY 
CHAPTER V 
Ship Planning and Construction 1953/4 - 1959/60 
The analysis of Soviet naval planning and construction 
can be dealt with most conveniently in four separate 
sections. 
l. The cancellation of the surface fleet programmes 
from the Stalin plan; 
2. The conversions and construction plans for 
surface vessels agreed to and undertaken in the 
period 1953/4 to 1959/60; 
3. The submarine programme; 
4. The naval aviation programme. 
The cancellation of the surface fleet programme. 
(a) Cruisers 
The strength of the Soviet surface navy was to have 
lain in the twenty four Sverdlov class cruisers and a 
possible follow on class of heavy cruisers. The Sverdlovs 
were under construction at the Ordzhonikidze Yard at 
Leningrad and at the Marty Yard in Nikolayev. Reports 1n 
Janes Fighting Ships circa 1958 suggest that at least two 
hulls of the heavy cruiser programme may have been laid 
at Nikolayev. 1 
Reconstruction of the curtailed cruiser programme 
suggests the following pattern: 
Stalin's Cruiser Programme (notional 
1954 
reconstruction) 
1948 1950 1952 1956 1958 
laid 24 Sverdlovs I Heavy Cruisers 
launched Pre-War I 20 Sverdlovs 
complete Chapayev 1 14 Sver dlovs 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1957-8, p.318. Reference to these 
hulls continued in Janes until the 1961-2 edition. 
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Only twenty Sverdlov hulls were laid to 1953,and of 
these only seventeen were launched from 1951 onwards. 
1 By 1956 fourteen vessels of the class had been completed. 
At least six of the hulls, some st.ill on the slip ways, 
were apparently broken up between 1953 and the late 
1950s. 2 There is no indication that the heavy cruisers, 
if in fact they existed, advanced beyond the keel laying. 
The fate of the cruiser programme, which slowed 
down perceptibly following Stalin's death, and eventually 
was abandoned completely;suggests a radical rethinking of 
fundamental naval missions and doctrine. Khrushchev 
indicates that the cruiser programme was scrapped because 
the surface artillery fleet was regarded as obsolete in 
the age of missiles and nuclear weapons. 3 What was the 
use of an essentially 1930s-type large cruiser, equipped 
with small guns, in the 1960s? The surface vessels 
which appeared in the 1960s~and hence must have been 
agreed to by the mid 1950s; were much smaller with a 
long range main missile armament. The next vesse~; 
comparable in size to the Sverdlovs, the Moskva and 
Leningrad helicopter cruisers, were specialised, purpose 
built, anti-submarine vessels. 
Khrushchev was also concerned by the expense.in 
' terms of manpower and operating costs.,involved in 
maintaining the surface navy,but this must have been a 
'd . 5 secondary consl eratlon. 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, p.546. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, p.546. 
3 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.30. 
4 This agreement may only haveb~~ affirmation to continue 
with a programme initiated in the late 1940s under Stalin. 
This conclusion is based on an assumption that it would 
require a period of at least 10 years to move from an 
initial firm decision to construct vessels to their 
actual entry into service with the fleet. 
5 Ibid, p.31. 
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The decision to scrap the cruiser and destroyer 
programmes was formally taken by the Ministry of Defence, 
with the backing of the General Staff, which drew up a 
formal proposal subsequently approved by the government. 1 
It is difficult to gauge naval reaction to the decision. 
Khrushchev reports that 'some men in our navy ... couldn't 
get over being completely deprived of cruisers•. 2 
Kuznetsov obviously resisted the scrapping of the surface 
navy and was replaced by Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief. 
Gorshkov's attitude is difficult to assess. In particular 
it is difficult to tell whether he launched a successful 
campaign to maintain the completed Sverdlovs,which it had 
been intended to scrap. 3 Khrushchev did speak in terms 
of scrapping ninety percent of the Soviet Navy's cruisers4 
but, as he himself 
partially designed 
admits,his public utterances were 
5 for propaganda effect. It is one 
thing to dismantle a vessel before completion, and quite 
another to contemplate breaking up new, already completed, 
vessels,no matter how unsuitable they may have appeared 
in a combat role, for naval vessels can be used for 
purposes other than those originally intended. Following 
the cancellation of the programme one cruiser was 
modified, albeit unsuccessfully, in 1961-2,to take a 
surface to air missile and another was transferred to 
the Indonesian Navy in October 1962. 6 Sverdlovs have 
also served as command centres for forces on distant 
deployment since the mid 1960s, a role for which their 
1 Ibid, p.32. 
2 Ibid, p.32. 
3 See Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, p.71-74, for the 
view that Gorshkov preva~led on Khrushchev not to scrap 
90% of the cruisers as he had threatened. 
4 New York Times, 22 September 1959, p.22. 
5 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, provides the following 
example: 1 It always sounded good to say in public 
speeches that we could hit a fly at any distance with 
our missiles', p.47. 
6Janes Fighting Ships, 1973-4, p.546. 
size and subsequently added electronic equipment 
particularly equips them. During 1972 two further 
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conversions were 
. '1 1 SA-N-4 mlSSl e. 
carried out introducing the modern 
Moreover even Khrushchev conceded a role 
for the artillery cruiser in •softening up shore defences 
in preparation for a landing assault•. 2 Doubts on whether 
Khrushchev intended to get rid of the already completed 
Sverdlovs should not, however, obscure the fundamental 
point that the former Stalin era navy, based on artillery 
firing surface ships, had to all intents been discarded. 
The transfer of former cruiser ways in the Baltic to 
tanker building underlined the decision to move away from 
3 large surface vessels. 
(b) Destroyers 
Because the precise numbers of the three classes of 
destroyers initiated in the post war building programme 
~ 4 are~known and the information on keel laying, launching 
and completion is unavailable, tabulation would only create 
a false sense of precision. 
The Skory programme, initiated in the late 1940s, 
resulted in some 75 vessels being completed by 1956. It 
is possible that this programme was abandoned, before the 
completion of the final units, in favour of later types 
of destroyers. 5 The poor stability of the Tallin class 
vessel undoubtedly led to the termination of the programme 
after the initial prototype had undergone sea trials. 6 
1 Ibid, p.546, and see p.293 below. 
2 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.30. 
3 Times, 25 September 1959, p.3., see p.l93-4 below for 
discussion. 
4 MccGwire, 'Soviet Naval Procurement• suggests that there 
were to have been 80 Skorys, 12 Tallin and 36 Kotlin class 
destroyers, p.77. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, p.562 suggests that 85 
Skorys were originally planned. 
5 Janes 1973-4, p.562. 
6 Breyer, S., Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.268. 
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The fate of the Kotlin class is a little easier to 
determine. We do know that more keels were laid than 
appeared as conventionally armed Kotlin class destroyers, 
for in 1957 four hulls of this class were used to build 
the Kildin class missile destroyer. 1 All told some 26 
Kotlins were completed. 
Undoubtedly destroyer programmes were terminated, but, 
as the case of the Kotlin/Kildin transformation suggests, 
this had more to do with questions of armament, the change 
from guns to missiles, than with the, belief that vessels 
of this range and size were outmoded or too expensive, 
though Khrushchev in a clear reference to the Kotlin/ 
Kildin transformation claims that the resulting vessels 
. ff" . t 2 were ~ne ~c~en . 
Two Skory class destroyers were transferred to 
Egypt in 1956, two went to the Polish Navy in 1957-8 and 
four to Indonesia in 1959. 3 These vessels were 
apparently no longer regarded as essential Soviet naval 
requirements in the dawning missile age.and hence could 
• 
be used as goods in the Soviet arms trade. No new 
destroyer emerged from the Soviet shipyards between 1958 
and 1961, when the first Krupny class missile destroyer 
was sighted. 4 The apparent hiatus in construction of 
destroyer type vessels is obscured to some extent by the 
Kildin vessels which, although unsatisfactory in them-
selves, did provide apparent continuity in production and, 
more importantly, enabled the Soviet Navy to gain 
experience in designing and handling missile armed vessels. 
1 See below p.l65-6. 
2 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.32. 
3 Ibid, p.29 for the decision to sell surface warships. 
Janes 1973-4, p.562 for transfers. 
4 Breyer, Guide, p.272. 
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(c) Frigates 
Frigates of the Kola and Riga class began building 
in the early 1950s and were completed by 1958/9. This 
was followed by a two year hiatus until 1960/61 when the 
Petya class was laid and completed. 
Although no figures exist for the actual numbers of 
Kola and Riga class frigates originally planned1 it appears 
as though 10 or 12 Kolas were built and up to 64 Rigas 
were completed. The Kola class may well have been cut 
short; a run of l0-12 units seem remarkably few for this 
type of vessel. Indications that the time required for 
the completion of launched hulls spread over three years 
suggest that the class was judged to be unsatisfactory. 2 
The completion of 64 Rigas, the successor class, indicates 
that this was a more successful 
despite some reduction in size, 
design than the Kolas, 
3 
speed and armament. 
During the late 1960s the original depth charge projectors 
were replaced by two 16 barrelled anti-submarine rocket 
launchers. 4 The fact that no such modification was 
carried out on the Kolas suggests that the Rigas, unlike 
the preceding class, were considered to be capable of 
using the new weapons system effectively in a greater 
variety of sea conditions. 
{d) Sub Chasers 
It is difficult to detect any major changes in the 
construction plans of this type of vessel. The major post 
war class, the Kronstadt, appears to have had a production 
1 MccGwire, •Procurement• suggests that 24 Kolas were to 
be constructed at a rate of 12/year and 72 Rigas were to 
follow on at 12/year. He suggests a class of frigates-
designated the Ritya - was intended for building in the 
late 50s and early 60s. The deletion of the class under 
Khrushchev was responsible for the two year gap in frigate 
construction. 
2 Breyer, S., Guide, p.276. 
3 . f . For a comparLson o the Kola and R~ga classes see Table 
p.l02 above. 
4 First reported in Janes Ships 1969-70, p.552. 
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run of over 200 units. It was followed by the SO-I class 
which began production in 1957. Khrushchev indicates in 
his memoirs that no major changes were made in respect of 
this type of vessel. 1 
The conversion and construction plans for surface vessels 
1953/4 - 1959/60 
(a) Cruisers 
It is probable that the requirement for helicopter or 
anti-submarine cruisers was recognised in this period. If 
we allow a minimum ten year period between a design 
decision being taken and the entrance of a completed vessel 
into active service then the decision to build the Moskva 
class can have been taken no later than 1957/1958. Yet 
this is precisely the period when Khrushchev and possibly 
other influential authorities were deriding the surface 
navy. It was a period of military cost consciousness, 
troop cuts and heavy expenditure on missile development 
but also a period of establishing new defensive forces and 
eguipment. 2 It is unlikely that the regime, which had 
given ample evidence of its willingness to intervene in 
naval affairs, would have approved the construction of 
such a task-specific vessel without the demonstration of 
an urgent clear cut need. The one such need which could 
win approval was the requirement to counter submarine 
launched missile systems. 
Soviet naval planners must have been aware of the 
United States Regulus programme. The Regulus I, a 
subsonic cruise missile with a range of 500+ miles had 
been deployed aboard conventional submarines since 1953 
1 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.3l. 
2 This requirement may well have been appreciated by 
Khrushchev himself. He had evidently approved the 
establishment of the air defence forces as an autonomous 
branch of service. During his term of office the 
establishment of surface to air missile systems was 
boosted. The Moskva programme was likewise a defensive 
system. 
TABLE II 
Class No. 
Moskva 2 
HeLICOPTER OR ANTI SUBMARINE CRUISER KHRUSHCHEV PROGRAMME 
Displacement 
(in tons) 
15,000 
18,000 
stand. 
full 
load 
Aircraft 
18 'Hormone• A 
Ka-25 
ASW helicopters 
search radar 
under the nose 
dipping sonar 
carries anti/ 
sub torpedoes 
and other 
stores. 
Max. range 
351 n.miles. 
Armament 
(in mm.) 
ASW 
18 Ka-25 
helicopters 
1 twin A/S 
missile 
launcher. 
2-12 tube 
MBUs. 
AA 
2twin 
SA-N-3 
Goblet. 
2 x 2 dual 
purpose 57mm. 
Other 
2 qUJ.ntuple 
torpedoes 
533 mm. 
Construction 
Data 
Laid 1962-3 
Sea trials 
Moskva mid 
1967. 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974-5, p.533-534. 
Breyer Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.256-7 .. 
Range and 
Speed 
30 knots 
max. speed 
Comments. 
This vessel marks a 
radical departure 
from former Soviet 
naval cons true t ion 
(see text). It 
includes a number 
of recent genera-
tion weapons and 
electronic systems 
A/S missile 
launcher SA-N-3 
Goblet 
Variable depth 
sonar . Three D 
radar. Probably 
intended for a 
longer construction 
run than in fact 
eventuated (see 
text). 
,_. 
"' ,_. 
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and by 1958 a 1,000 mile range supersonic Regulus II 
missile had been developed. Moreover during the 1950s 
the U.S. Navy had authorisation for purpose built SSGs 
and SSGNs. 1 The planners must have also been aware of 
the Polaris project~ however1 it is possible that in the 
mid to late 1950s, they did not expect the SLBM to become 
operational until the late 1960s. 
It is unlikely that the Moskva class was intended for 
use in countering enemy attack submarines~or as a V/STOL 
platform providing air cover for the surface fleet or 
amphibious operations,as is sometimes suggested. 3 Despite 
the growth of the Soviet merchant fleet 4 , which began under 
Khrushchev's administration, the fact remains that this 
fleet has limited strategic importance in war. At most 
it would be used along coastal lines of communication5 
where it could be efficiently protected from enemy 
submarines by the vast array of coastal defence vessels 
operating under the cover of land-based naval aviation. 
Moreover there is no evidence that in 1957/8 the Soviet 
was preparing for an eventual forward deployment. Major 
out of area exercises involving surface ships did not 
1For details of Regulus Project see United States 
Department of the Navy. United States Naval Aviation 
1910-1970. NAVAIR-00-80P-l pass~m. 
2 Janes Firhting Ships 1974-5 suggests 'the design (for 
the Moskva must have been completed while the "November" 
class submarines were building' implying 1 an awareness of 
the problem of dealing with nuclear submarines•. The 'N' 
class is the first of the Soviet Navy's nuclear powered 
attack submarines. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1968-9, forewo~d. 
Breyer, S. Guide, p.256 both suggest the use of V/STOL 
aircraft from Moskva. 
4 See Athay, R.E. The Economics of Soviet Merchant-
Shipping Policy (Chapel Hill, 1971), esp. p.l0-14. 
Harbron, J.D. Communist Shi sand Shi ing (London, 1962) 
p.l25-l77. Sov~et Merchant Ships Havant Hampshire, 1969). 
For discussion of the impact of merchant fleet policy on 
the Soviet Navy see p. 193-4 below. 
5For a Soviet discussion on the importance of coastal 
communications see Filinov, S.I. Capt. lst Rank, 'Armed 
conflict and communications by sea' Morskoy Sbornik No. 3 
1964 p.33-4l. U.S. Navy trans. esp. p.33-34. 
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being until 19631 nor is there evidence.in the late 1950s 
of a build up of the supply fleet to sustain a forward 
2 deployment. The anti-carrier operation, although 
conducted at growing distances from the shore, as longer 
range U.S. carrier based aircraft came into service, was 
assigned to missile armed submarines and naval aviation. 
It did not at that stage call for surface vessels on 
distant deployment. There was, therefore, no apparent 
need at this time, nor in the foreseeable future, for a 
special purpose vessel designed to protect an out of 
fleet area naval force from submarine attack. 3 
The fact that Moskva was designed with its super-
structure traversing the width of the ship suggests that 
it was never intended to handle the V/STOL aircraft which 
first appeared in the Soviet Union in 1967. 4 V/STOL jet 
aircraft are operated most efficiently in the STOL mode. 5 
1 See Holmes, E.P. Admiral, 'The Soviet presence in the 
Atlantic', p.6-ll, and Gorshkov, S.G., 'The great tasks of 
the Soviet Navy', Red Star, 5 February 1963, translated 
F.R.B. 14 February 1963, USSR National Affairs p.CCl-CC6. 
This article, written after the Cuban fias~o, was primarily 
a call to the Navy to get to sea and train. 
2 The problems this caused for the Soviet fleet once it 
moved to forward deployment will be discussed below. 
3 Enemy attack submarines could be used in two other roles; 
as a protection force accompanying enemy SLBM submarines 
intended to attack defensive ASW forces or to disrupt 
amphibious operations. The use of Moskva as an anti SLBM 
system is not incompatable with the first of these tasks. 
As there is no evidence of an intention to conduct blue 
water amphibious operations it is unlikely that Moskva 
was designed to protect amphibious forces. Short ranged 
coastal amphibious attacks could be adequately protected 
from enemy interference by the vast array of small coastal 
ranged sub-chasers and destroyers operating under the 
protection of land-based aircraft. 
d 
· The first public appearance of a Soviet $"/STOL jet 
occurred at the Domededovo air display 9 July 1967. 
Yakovlev, Soviet Aircraft Construction, p.l07-8. 
5 The saving in fuel consumption brought about by a rolling 
take off is the main advantage. 
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One only needs to consider the Moskva steaming backwards 
into the wind at 20 knots during aircraft take off, or the 
plight of a pilot, returning from his mission,being waved 
off to repeat his landing attempt, to dismiss this 
possibility, Moreover the width of the deck elevators, 
approximately 13 feet 1 is too narrow for modern fixed wing 
aircraft. Recently the Moskva has been modified by addition 
of a landing pad to the flight deck, presumably to allow 
V/STOL aircraft tests2before the aircraft go into service 
with the Kuril class carriers, and to train pilots in take 
off and landing techniques under test conditions, where 
fuel consumption is not an important factor. Further the 
addition of a landing pad suggests that the original flight 
deck is unable to handle either the weight of the aircraft 
or the thrust of its engines, or both, in take off or 
landing. 
It has been suggested that Soviet naval planners 
could have argued the case for the Moskva class in 
1957/8 firstly on the basis of the U.S. Navy's already 
existing Regulus cruise missile programme and secondly 
on the basis of their projection that the U.S. Navy would 
achieve an operational SLBM system in the mid to late 
1960s. They could have cited the fact that the U.S. Navy 
was not ordered to proceed with the development of Polaris 
until December 1956 and the apparent caution of the 
Eisenhower administration in providing funds for the SLBM 
programme3as evidence that a counter to Polaris would be 
required in the late 1960s. More likely they used the 
evidence of their own SLBM programme projections to suggest 
1 See scale drawings and photos in Janes Fighting Ships 
1972-3, p.602-606. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1974-5, p.533. 
3 See Ball, D.J. 'The Strategic Missile Programme of the 
Kennedy Adminstration 1961-1963' unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
A.N.U. June 1972, p.66-71 for an account of the 
administration~ attempts to restrain Navy and Congressional 
demands for additional Polaris funding, at least until the 
initial units had demonstrated that the system worked. 
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that an American equivalent would take approximately ten 
years to develop. Either way, on this account, it must 
have come as a considerable shock to the Soviet leaders 
when the Polaris programme in fact delivered its first 
operational submarine in late 1960, some three years 
earlier than the Americans originally intended. 1 The 
original Polaris A-1 missile, like the Soviet SS-N-6 
Sawfly, had a relatively short range of 1,200 nautical 
miles, 2 suggesting that it would operate in the Barents Sea 
area, which was also the most likely operational zone for 
the SSG and SSGNs carrying Regulus missiles. By the early 
1960s however the USN was producing the Polaris A-2 and 
A-3 missile, and the cruise missile programme had been 
cancelled. The significantly longer range of the A-2 
and A-3 enabled total coverage of the Soviet Union from 
3 
an enormous area of sea space. 
It was possible to estimate the relatively small 
number of vessels required to hunt cruise missile firing 
submarines in the Barents Sea - western commentators have 
suggested that perhaps 6-8 Moskva class vessels were 
originally intended. 4 However the numbers required to 
cover the enormous areas of distant sea space, far removed 
from land based air cover, 5 must have appeared quite beyond 
1 See Baar, James and Howard, William, Polaris (New York, 
1960) Polaris and Poseidon Chronology (Wash~ngton, D.C., 
1970) and espec~ally Sapolsky The Polaris System 
Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). 
2 Polaris and Poseidon: F.B.M. Facts (Washington, D.C., 
1970) p.2. - i.e. 1,380 statute miles. 
3 The Polaris A-2 has a range of 1,500 nautical miles 
(1,725 statute miles) and A-3 2,500 nautical miles (2,880 
statute miles). See Maps p.284a below for sea space from 
which these vessels can operate. 
4 MccGwire, M. 'Current soviet Warship Construction•, in 
MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments: Content and 
Capability (Halifax, 1973), p.l2l. 
5 The anti-aircraft armament of the Moskva, two twin 
SA-N-3 Goblet launchers and two twin 57 min dual purpose 
guns, suggests that it was to operate under at least 
partial air cover. 
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the means of the Soviet Navy. Moreover,unlike the Regulus, 
the Polaris missile was an underwater launch missile.and 
' . 
hence its vector the SSBN did not have to surface. It was 
therefore less vulnerable to Soviet ASW forces. The Moskva 
programme was cut,but not in time to cancel the first two 
vessels,for which long lead time items must have been in 
hand. The American decision to refit the George Washington 
class SSBNs, which originally had carried Polaris A-1, with 
Polaris A-3 missiles; removed from the USN the last of the 
SSBNs forced to use the Barents Sea as a launch area. 
The American decision to cancel the Regulus programme 
and to develop the longer range Polaris A-3 and A-3, 2 
suggests that the task-specific Moskva class must have 
appeared as a vessel without a viable role in the early 
1960s. At this time the programme was cut. 
(b) Guided Missile Cruisers 
It is guite probable that approval for the Kynda 
class guided missile cruisers, the first of which was 
laid down in mid 1960 was given in 1953/4. 3 The Kynda's 
probably stemmed from the same round of discussions which 
led to the cancellation of the majority of surface unit 
programmes of the Stalin era. The course and exact timing 
of these discussions must remain a matter of conjecture, 
yet it is clear that the Navy, perhaps reluctantly, 
accepted, as an alternative to the high cost surface 
units, smaller surface vessels equipped with long range 
missiles. 
1 Polaris A-1 was officially retired from active duty when 
the USS Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) ... returned to the 
United States on 14 October 1965 for her initial overhaul 
and refit to A-3. F.B.M. Facts, p.2. 
2Polaris and Poseidon Chronology, p.ll. 
3 No Soviet source credits Stalin with initiating the 
development of a missile armed navy although Khrushchev 
draws our attention to the fact thai under Stalin there 
was almost total ignorance, outside the design teams 
immediately involved and members of the Politbureau, as 
to the latest technical developments. Khrushchev mentions 
in particular the officers serving with fleet who were 
ignorant of missile carrying aircraft. Khrushchev, 
The Last Testament, p.29. 
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The Kynda and Kxesta I classes axe examples of this 
new type of vessel. Both axe modest in size and axe 
fitted with gxound foxce suxface to suxface missiles 
1 (SSM), and (SAM) adapted fox naval use. The adaptation 
of gxound foxce missiles to naval sexvice had the 
advantage of being xelatively inexpensive, because thexe 
wexe no majox development costs, and enabled pxoved 
missiles to be bxought into fleet sexvice xapidly. As we 
shall see, in the case of the single Svexdlov convexsion 
dating fxom this pexiod, the adaptation was not always 
successful. None the less the SS-N-3 (Shaddock) and 
SA-N-1 (Goa) missiles pxovided the Soviet Navy with a 
long xange missile and aix defence missile fox immediate 
use, while woxk was continuing on the development of naval 
. "l 2 mlSSl es. 
The majox disadvantage of the long xange missile was 
the need fox a foxm of mid couxse guidance when operated at 
ovex-the-horizon range. This guidance is provided by 
aircxaft as a xule, but this raised pxoblems of co-
oxdination, as all operational Soviet aixcxaft axe at 
present land based. Guidance may also be pxovided by 
ship boxne helicoptexs, as with the Kresta I and latex 
vessels (with attendant problems of helicopter 
vulnexability to attack by aircxaft), by satellites (whexe 
cooxdination is a majox difficulty) ox submaxines, such 
as theW 'canvas bag' convexsions. If the submarines axe 
not in sight of theix target howevex they cannot pexfoxm 
theix function, and if in sight of it may well be fully 
occupied in surviving attacks by enemy ASW ships, 
aircxaft and helicopters. 
1 Details of the missiles used by the Soviet Navy will be 
found in Appendix I, p.l95-6 below. 
2 Although the SS-N-3 Shaddock has an equivalent in the 
land foxces (Janes Weapon Systems 1973/4, p.42) and the 
SA-N-1 Goa is used by both the Navy and Axmy (Janes Weapon 
Systems 1973/4, p.SS-89) it is by no means cleax that the 
SS-N-1 Strela/Scrubber and SS-N-2 Styx have gxound foxce 
equivalents. The SS-N-1 and 2 are pxobably fixst and 
second genexation naval missiles which in the case of the 
foxmer were found to be unsatisfactoxy. The Navy adapted 
the longex xange gxound foxce Shaddock until such time as 
a later genexation naval cxuise missile was developed. 
TABLE III 
class No. 
Kynda 4 
Kresta I 4 
GUIDED MISSILE CRUISERS - KHRUSHOIEV 1953/4 - 1959/68 PROGRA!'IiME 
constr-uc-tron-- ------Range ana 
Displacement Aimament Data Speed Ma<:;ll.;!,_r:t(2ry 
4,500 
standard 
6,000 full 
load 
5,140 
standard 
6,500 full 
load 
SSM 
'2'quad:ruple 
mounts for 
SS-N-3 Shaddock 
(probable 
reload 16 
missiles). 
SAM 
Ttwin launch 
for SA-N-1 Goa 
30 reloads guns 
4-76mm dual 
purpose guns 
ASW 
2-T2 barrelled 
MBUS 6-533mm 
torpedo tubes 
(2x3) 
SSM 
2twin fo.r 
SS-N-3 
SAM 
2twin for 
SA-N-1 guns 
4-57mm {2x2) 
ASW 
2'!2-bar.relled 
MBUs fwd. ( 60 
reloads), 
2 6-barrelled 
MBUs aft. 
Tor~edoes 
10- 33mm ( 2x5) 
1 ship laid 
June 1960 
launched April 
1961 completed 
June 1962. 
2nd ship 
launched Nov. 
1962, remainder 
not completed 
until 1965 at 
Zhdanov yard 
Leningrad 
lst laid Sept. 
1964, launched 
1965 sea trials 
in Baltic Feb. 
1967, 2nd 
launched 1966 • 
rest launched 
1967-8 at 
Zhdanov yard, 
Leningrad. 
Sow:ces: Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.522-3. 
35 knots 
4,500 miles 
at 18 knots 
top speed 
34 knots 
Geared 
Steam 
turbines 
Geared 
steam 
turbine 
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Comments 
Although a helicopter pad is 
p:rovided there is no helicopter 
embarked. Hence the Kynda must 
rely on external ta.rget location 
and mid course guidance if its 
SS-N-3 missiles are to be used 
at full range. Missile launchers 
can be elevated and trained through 
250°. 
On board helicopter enhances A/S 
capability as well as providing on 
board target location facilities. 
Kxesta I the first of the Soviet 
ships :f.ree to operate alone and 
distant from land based aircraft. 
Breyer, p.l06 suggests extensive 
magaz1nes for missile launchers 
SSM & SAM. 
Janes 1974-5 however reports no SAM 
reloads but this is probably a-
misprint. 
Janes Weapon Systems 1973-4 suggests 
tbat the SSM launchers cannot be 
reloaded, p.53, and this would seem 
reasonable given launcher positions. 
Missile launchers can be elevated but 
not trained. 
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A comparison of the armaments of Kynda and Kresta I 
reveals an increase in the number of SAM launchers and a 
reduction in SSM launchers. The increase in SAM 
obviously provides for a greater capability against air 
attacks while the decrease in SSM launchers may be offset 
by the large number of SSM missiles carried by Kresta I. 1 
However the Soviet designation of these vessels as large 
anti-submarine ships2suggests that the SSMs were not 
intended to be the main armament but rather existed to 
provide an anti-surface ship capability to an ASW vessel~ 
the primary function of which, like the Moskvas, was to 
counter the already existing cruise missile threat and the 
SLMB threat expected to emerge during the mid-to-late 
1960s in the Barents Sea area. Of equal significance is 
the inclusion of a helicopter and hangar aboard the 
Krestas and the increase in ASW armament. The helicopter 
not only provides organic target location and mid course 
guidance, enabling the 300 mile range Shaddock to be used 
at maximum range, but it also can be used to detect 
submarines. 
The Kresta was the first surface vessel, equipped 
for possible independent action at some distance from the 
shore. Its SAM armament provided it with a reasonable 
degree of protection from air attack, its SSM could be 
used against hostile surface vessels,including carriers~ 
while its helicopter freed it from the need to rely on 
land based aircraft for SSM mid-course guidance and 
provided an on board submarine detection capability 
greater than that provided by hull mounted sonars. 
Kresta I may therefore be considered a vessel designed to 
meet a new task; that of countering missile firing 
submarines within a relatively restricted sea area. 
1 Breyer, Guide, p.l06 suggests that Kresta has larger 
magazines than Kynda for both SSM and SAM whereas Janes 
1974/5, suggests that there is no reload. capacity for 
SAM launchers, but this seems to be the result of a 
typographical error and may have been meant to apply to 
SSM system. 
2 . h . . Janes F~g t~ng Sh~ps, p.553. 
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It is obvious that the Kynda programme faced 
difficulties. The first two units of the class were 
completed by August 1962 whereas the last two took until 
1965 to complete, by which time work had begun on the 
lead ship of the Kresta Is. 1 Khrushchev offers an 
explanation of this slow down. 
We decided to build four cruisers ... They were 
good solely as show pieces, and very expensive 
show pieces at that. After the first one was 
finished - and the second one was almost 
finished - we had second thoughts about whether 
to build the other two at all. We exchanged 
op~n~ons in the leadership and decided to go 
ahead as a concession to the military, which was 
in favour of these ships.2 
While Khrushchev may have been concerned at the 
expense of the Kynda's, it is likely that he was also 
annoyed that his naval advisers were urging on him more 
and more expensive vessels made necessary in part by the 
changing naval environment: ~n particular the emerging 
need for a system to counter the threat from aircraft 
carriers and cruise missile armed submarines capable of 
3 
attacking the Soviet Union from greater distances and the 
l',M 
emergence in the mid 1960s of an AmericanS~ threat. 
Undoubtedly he was under pressure to complete the Kynda 
class, a decision he may well have concurred in because 
the long-lead-time components must have been to hand. 
Kresta I, with its ability to conduct operations 
independent of land based aircraft, probably stems from 
the reassessment of naval needs which occurred in 1957/8 
when the possibility of a major missile threat from the 
Barents Sea area emerged. 
1 Ibid., p.553. 
2 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.33. 
3 
e.g., the Douglas Skywarrior and Skyhawks and the North 
American Vigilante with ranges of 2,500, 1,700+ miles and 
2,650 miles respectively. 
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In 1961-1962 one of the Sverdlov cruisers, the 
Dzerzhinski, had its number 3 turret removed and replaced 
with a surface-to-air missile the SA-N-2 (Guideline), 
which had first been reported in use ashore in 1957. 1 
Its adaptation to the Navy was not a success. Weapon 
system experts claim the difficulties are a result of the 
fire control and guidance system of the missile which must 
be gathered to the radar beam early in flight (within 6 
2 
seconds) or will not be acquired at all. The decision 
to carry out the modification was probably taken in the 
late 1950s. 
(c) Destroyers 
The Skory and Kotlin destroyer programmes were cut 
short. Six or so of the Skorys, and an unknown number of 
Kotlins,, were modernised,initially to improve their anti-
submarine potential. The Skory modification dates from 
19583and that for the Kotlins presumably occurred at the 
same time. 
In the case of the Skorys the major changes affected 
the anti-aircraft (from 8-37mm in twin turrets to 5-57mm 
single) and the anti-submarine armament: the depth charge 
throwers were replaced by 2 16-barrelled anti-submarine 
rocket launchers. The number of torpedo tubes was reduced 
from 10 to 5. 
The Kotlin modification was similar " The number of 
torpedo tubes was reduced to 5 and 2 16-barrelled A/S 
rocket launchers replaced the original depth charge 
projectors. There was apparently some modification in 
anti aircraft armament, and a few Kotlins incorporated 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.640. 
2 Janes Weapon Systems, 1973/4, p.l08. 
3 Breyer, Guide, p.266-8 and Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, 
p.561-2. The 1962-3 edition of Janes is the first to 
report the Kotlin modification, p.405. 
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a helicopter pad. Both sets of modification must have 
involved alterations to the electronic equipment for the 
new anti-aircraft and anti-submarine systems. 
The modernisation programme undoubtedly grew out of 
a reassessment of the future potential submarine threat 
to the surface navy. The A/S rocket launchers were first 
seen on the 'Tallin' class destroyer and therefore were 
presumably available in relatively large numbers, as only 
one unit of this class was completed. 
The reassessment of the submarine threat would have 
been prompted by a number of considerations. By 1957/8 it 
must have been apparent that the post war developments in 
submarine technology were rapidly making the slow sinking 
side and stern projected depth charges obsolete. 1 The 
modern submarine could dive deeper, because of improvements 
in hull design, while the nuclear powered boats could remain 
submerged for the duration of their patrol, and travel 
submerged at relatively high speeds when necessary. 
Whether the Soviets foresaw an increase in NATO 
submarine activity in waters close to the Soviet Fleet 
areas, or whether they had decided that anti-carrier 
operations would of necessity bring them out onto the high 
seas, must remaln a matter of conjecture. What is clear is 
that by moving from simple depth charge to A/S rocket 
launcher the Soviet Navy by-passed one stage in Western ASW 
development, the streamlined depth charge requiring mortar 
launch, and moved direct to a multiple rocket launcher 
system,which had originally been developed for short range 
rockets (350- 200 metres), by the United States during 
World War rr. 2 
The first of the Kotlin SAM conversions also dates 
from this period. The prototype conversion, which occurred 
1 The simple depth charge and mine appear to have been the 
principle Soviet A/S weapons in the post war period. The 
Tallin is the only pre-1955 vessel to be equipped with any 
other A/S system. 
2 Janes Weapon Systems 1973/4, p.487 and 489. 
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in 1961-2, involved the removal of the main aft twin gun 
turret and its replacement with a SA-N-1 twin missile 
launcher. Unlike the Sverdlov conversion this was 
obviously successful. Not only did the SA-N-1 become the 
main surface-to-air missile of the navy but in the mid 60s 
a further six Kotlins were converted to Kotlin SAM. 
Three major construction programmes date from this 
period. The first involved the construction of a small 
number of Kildin class missile destroyers, which were based 
on the Kotlin hulls and began rebuilding in 1957-8 at 
Nikolayev. Basically the Kildin was a Kotlin with a rear 
gun turret replaced by a single SS-N-1 missile launcher. 
At the same time work began on the Krupny class of missile 
destroyers. Powered by steam turbines these vessels 
carried two SS-N-1 missile launchers, one forward, the 
other aft. The third of the series, the Kashin class 
destroyer armed with two twin SA-N-1 systems, and powered 
by a gas turbine system, commenced delivery in 1962. 
Although the Krupny and Kashin class vessels may have 
stemmed from design decisions taken in the Stalin era 
they must have been reaffirmed by the new leadership, 
probably in the 1953/4 round of decisions which also 
ordered the building of Kildin on Kotlin hulls. 
The Krupny and Kildin are both armed with SS-N-1 
missile about which there is a great deal of confusion in 
1 the open Western sources. As the fullest commentary, 
that in Janes Weapon Systems, points out the Strela or 
Scrubber SS-N-1 and the SS-N-2 Styx missiles are both 
commanded by radio and dependent on ship board radar for 
target information. The variation - clearly recognised 
between Strela/Scrubber and Styx - is in size and range, 
and hence in the systems platform. Styx is launched from 
small patrol boats, the Komar and Osa classes, while 
1 Janes Weapon Systems 1973-4, p.52 and 54. Hewish, Mark 
'World Missile Yearbook', Flight International, 14 March 
1974, p.A7. Subsequent discussion is based on these 
sources. 
Class No. 
~ 4 
KrupnY :£ 
l2 
(plann-
ed) 
Kotlin 
@! 
~ 
8 
(2 
+ 
6) 
19 
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TABLE. IV: GUID~D MISSILE DESTROYER CONS!RUCXION - KHRUSHCHEV 1953/54 ~ 1959 PROGRAMME 
Construct1on Range and 
Dis_pl~~E!!llcm! __ JU1Jlalllfi!!I\.L -~t~_ SP~!e-d Machinery 
3,000 SSM Began rebuild- Cruising geared 
standard TS'ingle launehu ing on Kotlin range. 5,500 turbines. 
4,000 :tor SS-N-1 Strela, hulls 1957~8. miles at 16 
:full load Guns Completed knots. 
~-A.A. (4x4) 1959-60 at 36 knots 
3,650 
standard 
4,650 
:full load 
2,850 
standard 
3;900 
:fUll load 
4,300 
standaxd 
5,200 :full 
load 
ASW Zhdanov Yard, IDAXilD\.Uil 
~6-barrelled Leningrad and speed. 
A/S rocket launchus Marty Yard, 
~edoes Nikolayev. 
- 3mm (2X2) 
SSM 
~ingle launchers 
:tor ss-N-1 
Guns 
lS=37mm A.A. (4x4) 
ASW 
2'""!6-barrelled 
rocket launchel:s 
6 A/S-533mm torpedo 
tubes (2X3) 
SAM 
T"'l'win launcher 
£-or SA-N-1 
Guns vary according 
lOkind of conversion 
some have 2-130mm 
(lx2) d.p. and 4~67ma 
(lx4) or 8-30mm (2x4} 
A.A. while others 
have 2-lOOmm (lx2} 
d.p. and 4-57mm plus 
4-30mm in later ships. 
ASW later units had 
2'""!2-barrelled rocket 
launchers. 
Tor~edoes 
5-59lltlll in (lxS} 
J!!l!:! 
2 twin la~mehers 
fat: SA-N-1 
Guns 4-76mm guns 
Jmr 
1r'Y2-barrelled rocket 
launchers, fwd. 
2 6-barrelled rocket 
launchers, aft. 
5-533mm AlA torpedo 
tubes. 
Laid :from 1958 
on. COIIIPleted 
1961-1963. 
Initial 
construction 
Zbdanov Yard 
Leningrad, 
also at 
Nik.olayev, 
possibly 
Komsomolsk ? 
2 prototype 
conversion 
1961-62 
6 later 
conversions 
1966-67. 
Dates :for laying 
down not known 
but probably 
1959-60. 1st 
units delivered 
1962 .:fr0111 
Zhdanov Yard, 
Leningrad and 
Nosenko Yard l 
Nikolayev. 
34 knots 
s,_soo miles 
at 16 knots. 
36 knots 
maxi..,. 
speed. 
.35 knots 
geared 
steam 
tw::bines 
geared 
ti.U'bines 
... 
turbine 
sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5 0 p.SSS-559. 
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy. p.270-274. 
com:m.ents 
Tbe single SS-N-1 launcher replaced the after 
gun taountings of the Kotlin class,.A.A .. 
Ar!llalllent improved by replacing the 45mm guns 
on Kotlin with 57mm units in at least the 
last 3 units of the class. SS-N-1 missile-
range of over 100 n.miles. Kildin reported 
in Breyer, p.272 as carrying 6 SS-N-1 in 
magazines. See p.294 below fat details o£ 
latest modification. 
The first ships built from the keel up as 
missile ships. The missile armament is 
double that of the Kildin - launchers 
:forward and aft. MaxiiiiWII nwabe.t of missiles 
16, 8 in each magazine. Breye:r, p.272. 
A helicopter pad at the stern but no hanger. 
Possibly realised to be unsatisfactory while 
building and tbe:z:efore only 8 completed. 
6 o:f the units later converted to Kanin, 
see p.293 below. 
An attempt to make up 'the shortfall in SAM 
a.raam.ent to provide soae protection for 
Kildin and~ class SSM destroyers. 
The first class of warships in the world to 
rely on gas turbines :for propulsion. Ships 
have a quick get away time and fast 
acceleration. lst series produced class 
to have SAM system as main armament, 
A/S armam.ent strong 6-barrelled launcher 
range o£ some 4,500 metres but no major 
new ASW device, e.g. variable dept'h sonar 
or helicopters. Soviet designation - large 
anti sub~~~arine ship therefcre seems lllis-
placed at least in the 1970s. Breyer, 
p.274 suggests a magazine capacity o:f 
60 SA~N~l missiles. 
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Strela/Scrubber, with a 17 metre launch rail, is carried by 
larger vessels, which can provide greater on-board aerial 
heights for guidance. 
There is no evidence that this family of missiles is 
directly derived from missiles developed for other branches 
of the armed forces as was the case with SA-N-3. The Kotlin 
SAM and Kashin class destroyer are both armed with SA-N-1 
missiles, which provided a much needed improvement in anti-
aircraft capability for the Soviet fleet. It has been 
frequently observed that these vessels were probably 
intended to provide support for the SSM destroyers against 
air attack. There is a great 
suggest that this is indeed a 
deal of empirical evidence 
prime function for these 
to 
units, especially when Soviet surface vessels are on forward 
deployment. However, the Soviets describe the Kashin class 
as a Large Anti-Submarine Ship. 1 While there is a 
relatively heavy A/S armament aboard the Kashin there are 
no modern detection aids, helicopters with dunking sonar, 
or variable depth sonar, incorporated. This suggests that 
whatever the original intention the Kashin was soon 
outmoded, at least as an anti-submarine vessel, and reverted 
to the role ascribed to it by Western commentators. 
(d) Frigates 
There seems to have been a complete hiatus in the 
construction of these vessels. Following the winding down 
of the Riga programme in 1958 no new vessel of this type 
began building until 1960/61. 2 The planning decisions for 
the successor classes, the Petyas and Mirkas must have been 
taken earlier as these vessels incorporated a new propulsion 
system and were armed with the new 12-barrelled A/S rocket 
launchers. The Mirkas may well have been designed during 
the early 1960s with some alterations to the hull to 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.555. 
2 Breyer, Guide, p.276-8. 
Class 
Petya 
I & II 
Mirka 
I & II 
No. 
20 I 
25 II 
20 
total 
TABLE V FRIGATE CONSTRUCTION - KHRUSHCHEV 1953/4 - 1959/60 PROGRAMME 
Di sp laceme nt-- -- Armariieii :r --------- -CO-ns t iUC:ti-on ~--R3.rig-e and--Mc\Chlner y 
(in tons)_ -~ Data __ ~-_~ Speed 
950 standard Guns lst ship built 34 knots 
1,150 full load 4-76mm (2x2) 1960-61 at 
950 standard 
1,100 full 
load 
d.p. Kaliningrad 
A/S continued in 
4 16-barrelled production 
rocket launchers until 1964 
in I's 
2 12-barre1led 
rocket launchers 
in Il's. 
Torpedoes 
5-406mm I (1x5) 
10-406mm II (2x5) 
Guns 
4-76mm (2x2) 
d.p. in I only 
A/S 
4 12-barrelled 
rocket launchers 
2 forward 2 aft. 
in I's. 
2 16-barrelled 
rocket launchers 
in Us. 
Torpedoes 
5-406mm (lx5) 
in r. 
10-406mm ( 2x5) 
in II. 
also at 
Nikolayev 
Began building 33 knots 
in 1964 and 
continued in 
prorluction until 
1969, at 
Leningrad and 
Nikolayev 
Source: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.562-3. 
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.278-9. 
gas turbine 
and 
diesels 
gas turbine 
and 
diesels 
Comments 
Breyer suggests-t-here 
may have been problems 
with this class' sea 
keeping qualities, 
p.278. At least 2 of 
the Petya IIs have 
lost the rear gun 
turret and had V.D.S. 
installed (post 1972 
alteration). Intended 
for A/S operations in 
restricted waters. 
Mixed propulsion system 
enables fast departures 
and acceleration and 
economic fuel con-
sumption_ while cr~-~--~~ng. 
Presumably built to 
correct the poor sea 
keeping qualities 
exhibited by Petyas. 
At least one of this 
class mounts a V.D.S. 
(post 1971 alteration) 
see above comments on 
Petya. 
,_. 
"' 
"' 
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overcome Petya's poor sea~keeping qualities. 1 
The major innovation in the Petyas and Mirkas was ln 
their machinery which combined gas turbines,enabling them 
to get underway quickly, and accelerate rapidly, with 
diesel engines for economical cruising. The A/S weapons 
systems were updated and consisted entirely of rocket 
launchers and torpedoes. Some of each class carry variable 
depth sonar systems (V.D.S.). 2 There is no apparent 
difference in weapons systems between the two classes. 
(e) Sub-Chasers 
There does not appear to have been any dramatic cut 
ln production of this type of vessel but rather a 
progression in design from the Kronstadt and SO-I to Poti 
and finally the recent impressively armed Grisha, 
Khrushchev specifically mentions this type of vessel among 
the coastal defence forces, which continued building during 
his term of office, apparently with his approva1. 3 
The continued support of the sub-chaser programme, 
taken together with the steps to improve the ASW 
capabilities of the Stalin era destroyers, clearly 
indicates a growing anxiety about enemy submarine 
penetration into coastal waters, threatening coastal 
communications and possible shortranged amphibious 
operations. 
(f) . 4 Llght Forces 
Amongst the vast array of light forces to be found 
in the Soviet Navy the most impressive to emerge from this 
l Ibid, p.278. 
2 The V.D.S. system is first reported on this class of 
vessel in Janes Fighting Ships 1971-2, p.631. 
3 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.31. 
4 It is not intended to examine the development of the 
Soviet Navy's light coastal defence forces in detail. It 
is sufficient to note that over 375 of these vessels in 
various classes exist and to highlight the most important 
of these vessels. I have also omitted a detailed account 
of the development of mine-sweeping forces - in 1974/5 it 
is reported that 180+ ocean mine-sweepers are in operation 
with a further 120+ coastal and 48 inshore craft. 
Class- No. 
~ 100 
Poti 70 
TABLE VI SUB-CHASERS CONSTRUCTION - KHRUSHCHEV 1953/1954 - 1959/1960 PROGRAMME 
Displacement Armament Construction Range and-
Data S eed 
215 standard Guns Built from 1,100 miles 
250 full load 4-25mm (2x2) 1957 to at 13 knots 
A.A. 1960 29 knots 
ASW max. 
45-barrelled 
rocket launchers 
possibly 
2 depth charge 
racks with 
24 charges 
550 standard Guns Built from 28 knots 
650 full load 2-57m;n (lx2) 1961 to 
A.A. 1968 
ASW 
21'2-barrelled 
rocket launchers 
4-406mm 
torpedo tubes 
Source: Ja~es Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.564. 
Breyer Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.298. 
Machinery 
Diesel 
Gas 
turbine 
and 
diesel 
Comments 
A successor to the 
Kronstadt class intended 
for use ~n coastal waters. 
Hull made of steel. 
Some units modernised in 
1965 lo¢sing aft. A.A. 
gun and incorporating 
4 single torpedo tubes. 
5-barrelled rocket 
launcher range of 
1,800 metres. 
A heavier unit carrying 
a heavier AsAa armament 
and a more efficient 
rocket launchers for ASW. 
12-barrelled rocket 
launchers range of 2,500 
metres. Gas turbine 
enables fast get away 
and acceleration: diesels 
for economic cruising. 
..... 
"' co
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era were the Komar and Osa missile boats. The Komar was 
a modification of the light P-6 torpedo boat, armed with 
two single launchers for a SS-N-2 missile, while the Osa 
was designed as a missile boat with four launchers for 
the SS-N-2. Boats of both classes have subsequently been 
transferred to other navies. 
These vessels are yet another component of the strong 
mobile coastal defence forces. Because of their size they 
have a restricted range and are probably unable to survive 
in heavy seas. Most certainly they are not high seas 
vessels. However this should not detract from their 
importance. They are relatively inexpensive vessels and 
they, and their equivalent, have enabled many of the 
smaller naval powers, to whom they have been transferred, 
to increase their coastal defence capacity dramatically. 
The effectiveness of these vessels and their missiles 
has twice been demonstrated. On 21 October 1967 the 
Israeli destroyer Eilat was hit and sunk by missiles from 
Egyptian Komars, and India made use of the Osas in the 
December 1971 war against Pakistan, primarily against 
Pakistani merchant vessels. 
The submarine programme 
The submarine construction programme in the period 
1953/4 to 1959/60 saw the appearance of four major 
submarine types: ballistic missile firing submarines, 
cruise missile firers, ocean-going attack submarines and 
medium and coastal range boats. During the course of this 
period nuclear propulsion was successfully incorporated in 
the first three of these types although units with 
conventional propulsion systems were still produced. 
Soviet spokesmen claim that the building of nuclear 
submarines began in the mid 1950s as a result of a 
re-examination of naval developments carried out by the 
Class 
Komar 
Osa I 
&II 
TABLE VII FAST ATTACK MISSILE BOATS CONSTRUCTION - KHRUSHCHEV 1953/4 - 1959/60 PROGRAMMES 
No. Displacement ArmameD.t __________ COilStructfOil Range and Machinery 
(in tons) -~~-- ___ j)ata Speed 
80+ 70 standard 
80 full load 
200+ 165 standard 
200 full load 
Source: 
2-25mm 
A.A. (lx2) 
2 single 
launchers 
for SS-N-2 
4-30mm 
A.A. (2x2) 
4 launchers 
for SS-N-2 
1959-61 from 
P-6 torpedo 
boats 
Built since 
1960 
400 miles diesels 
at 30 knots 
max. speed 
40 knots 
800 miles 
at 25 knots 
max. speed 
32 knots 
diesels 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.565. 
Breyer Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.296. 
Comments 
Because of their size 
vessels of this class are 
only suitable for use in 
coastal waters and calm 
seas. SS-N-2 missile range 
23 miles approx. 
Missile launchers are 
relatively exposed to sea. 
The major difference between 
Osa I & II is in the missile 
housing, the latter having 
a cylindrical mount. Both 
types however afford 
greater protection for the 
missiles than on Komar 
because the launchers can 
be sealed. 
~ 
-.J 
0 
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1 Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. There is no need to 
doubt this claim because it ties in with the completion of 
the early units of the H class SSBN (Ballistic Missile 
Nuclear Powered Submarine) in 1958. However considerable 
work on nuclear reactor development must have occurred 
under Stalin,to enable the propulsion units to be completed 
and ready for assembly by the mid 1950s. The actual 
decision to build a series of nuclear reactors for SSBNs 
and other nuclear powered submarines must have been taken 
in the mid to late l940s. 2 
(a) Ballistic Missile Submarines 
It seems likely that the Soviet Navy gave considerable 
thought to the potential of ballistic missile firing 
submarines during the post-war Stalin era, an idea they 
may well have adopted from the Germans. 3 However in the 
reassessments of the mid 1950s this project was given even 
greater priority,,as can be seen by the conversion of the 
last seven of the Z class ocean-going attack submarines 
into missile firers. The conversion appears to have been 
relatively straightforward, requiring the extension of the 
fin so that two vertical launch tubes could be fitted to 
carry the 350 mile SS-N-4 missile. These were followed by 
the G class SSB and the H class SSBN which were originally 
designed to take 3 SS-N-4 missiles in the fin. 
This programme provided the Soviet Union with an SLBM 
(submarine launched ballistic missile) capability by 1958. 
However the submarines were inferior in many important 
respects to the eventual product of the US Navy's Polaris 
programme. In particular they carried fewer missiles of 
1 Gorshkov's views have been examined on p.l40 above see 
also Sorokin, A.I. We are from the Nuclear Submarines 
(Moscow, 1972) extracts translated by JPRS. Translations 
in USSR Military Affairs No. 861, p.34 of translation. 
2 Soviet scientists led by Kurchatov had recommended 
working on the development of a nuclear reactor in early 
1943. The first experimental uranium-graphite reactor 
was successfully tested on 25 December 1946. 
Golovin, I. 'Father of the Soviet Bomb', p.l7: 
3 See p. 87 above. 
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shorter range, and the missiles had to be fired from the 
surface. It may well be the case that development of 
the Y class submarine and its missiles did not begin until 
details of the American programme had filtered through to 
the Soviet Union, for the Y class lS ln many respects 
equivalent to the American SSBN boats. 
The fact that major American cities are, in the main, 
within a hundred miles or so of the coast meant that the 
comparatively short range of the missile did not present 
a major targetting problem for the Soviets. On the other 
hand the requirement for surface launch within such a 
short distance of the American coast made the submarines 
extremely vulnerable to anti-submarine air patrols. In 
addition the conventionally powered Z conversions and the 
G units transitted most quickly and economically on the 
surface. When submerged they needed to use the snorkel. 
In either case the risk of detection while in transit 
was high. Finally the Soviet Union had no forward bases 
near the United States, therefore each patrol would need 
to spend at least 1/3 of its total patrol time in transit. 
It is significant that the Soviet Union continued to 
build ballistic missile submarines with conventional 
propulsion units along with nuclear reactor powered 
vessels. There may well have been a financial constraint 
on the Navy's building programme, forcing them to continue 
with the less expensive but 'less satisfactory• 
conventionally powered G class, which in fact outnumbered 
the H class. But the G class would only be considered 
•less satisfactory• if it were designed to carry SLBMs 
for attacks on the United States. If it were intended 
to provide an SLBM capability for the Baltic and Black 
Sea fleets, areas where there were no naval powers capable 
of mounting a major ASW operation against the Soviet fleet, 
and where the Soviet Union controlled a significant section 
of the coast, then it might be reasonable to use the less 
expensive, but perfectly adequate G class SSB. Such an 
SLBM capability would enable a sea-based nuclear attack 
TABLE VIII TRANSIT TIME FROM KOLA TO A POINT 400 MILES OFF NEW YORK 
FOR SOVIET F.B.M.S. 
Speed 
made good 
15 knots 
{Z V submerged) 
17 knots 
{G submerged) 
17.6 knots 
{G surfaced) 
18 knots 
(Z V surfaced) 
20 knots 
(H class SSBN 
submerged) 
Distance 
3,900 nautical 
miles 
* to nearest day. 
. . * Days ~n trans~t 
{there and back) 
22 
19 
18 
18 
16 
* Days on station 
(assuming a 60 day 
patrol) 
38 
41 
42 
42 
44 
.... 
.... 
w 
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~s~,~.~.--------- Co.nstJru~: t~on ·~Sp~?~r an""c'l~------------------------------
Class No. Oisp!·'@,~~~!).t U-.Mnt Dates & Places _ R.~dius Macllin-exy Comments 
2 - v 7 
G 22 
t.ot<s 
su<jc~oo 
·-
2,3:50 tuns 
sm:·:f.aced 
tens 
l.auxvtb11.'r':t s 
1;u~s, 
ID.'issi:li.e· 
lmiles: ~ 10"533-. 
l:A\t%'pe1&' 1!AilJ';:iw;S iU:;r'W'~ 
%i:<ebui 1 t t>etween 
193,5 ;;u:v:t: 195.7 at 
and 
d. 
.\'I;WI'!NH~]$k 
16 ?Jg:;:t.s di ~s\t':l/ 
su.t£'3\ce, eh1:ct:r:±:.c 
15 Wx!.ol\s 
c:~::\lcisin.~<g 
. 1-l "6 Jir,.n;a:'trS> 
$%Pl::li&C'ed 
17 il;;n"Cd;e. 
$"1',i<ftW'ie:t'·]*'i:' 
The first Soviet SSB. In conversion 
these submarines were fitted with 
an enlarged conning tower in which 
two vertical launching tubes were 
housed. The missiles had to be 
launched from the surface. Maximum 
submerged depth 460 feet • 
They were imtended from the outset 
to carry ballistic missiles. 
.Surface launch. With a maximum 
4iving depth of 750 feet they had 
~ greater chance of escaping 
detection and destruction than the 
z-v class. 
~--·-------------------------------------------------~-------------------
H 12 3,700 tons 
£:1\I!Jt'f.a.ced 
1aM..'l\Clttte:x$ "?'"?''•'"" wn.ween 
and I~oz 
!im.Ot$: OO<ehlAA.X 
:r&.a,ctox 
Nuclear power meant that this boat 
«::auld proceed to its launch point 
ttJubmerged. It also enabled a 
higher submerged speed to be 
maintained :for a virtually unlimited 
range. Use of N reactors also 
improves the habitability of the 
submarine. Boats of this class are 
of similar hull and reactor design 
to the E class cruise missile 
m·ubmar ine. 
----·------------·---------~·---------------------------------
$o<Ji:tCf1:} di!!!!!l!!...E:!l:<J!!!l!J:W!l!i:.i!i' 19'7 4/5 • V •. s 3"1-5 3EL 
fh::illi)N:<T, ~:iol!.i!! to t~,Sov:i<e:t ~ll• p.21J:t. 
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on targets within Europe. However this would presuppose 
the basing of the G class submarine in the Baltic and 
Black Sea area, whereas recent research by R. Berman 
suggests that the G class SSBs are situated with the 
Northern and Pacific Fleet. 1 If this were the case in 
the mid 1960s - and there appears to be no way of telling 
from open sources - then this hypothesis must be rejected. 
The Soviet naval planners may have decided to use 
long-lead-time items, such as the propulsion units, which 
had been provided in earlier programmes. 2 If this had 
been the intention it is difficult to see why the units 
were completed as SSBs instead of attack submarines. 
Attack submarines do not necessarily require the 
relatively high subsurface speeds and long underwater 
endurance which are highly desirable characteristics for 
an SLBM system, possibly having to deploy four thousand 
miles from base. 
Again the decision to continue building SSBs may have 
been taken because of the lack of facilities for building 
nuclear submarines and their reactors. In the period 
1958 to 1963 some 30 nuclear powered submarines of all 
types came into service at an average rate of about six 
a year. 3 This rate of building was slightly increased 
in the next four years to produce the 27 E-II cruise 
1 Berman, R. 'Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment', in 
MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments, p.ll3-117. 
2 This argument accounts for the construction of 16 J class 
cruise missile submarines and the 56 F class attack 
submarines as well as the 22 Gs. What it does not do is 
explain the fact that between 1963 and 1967/8 the Eli 
cruise missile submarine was the only nuclear powered 
submarine class to enter service. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, gives the following numbers 
for nuclear powered submarines delivered between 1958 and 
1963. 
H class SSBN 12,N class SSN 13, EI class SSGN 5. 
These 30 boats were of similar hull design and have first 
generation nuclear reactor plants. See pp.537, 540 and 
543. 
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missile submarines. 1 Evidently a decision was taken to 
defer building all other units and to concentrate on the 
E-II, which used all available yards capable of building 
nuclear powered submarines. This decision could have 
arisen out of a positive assessment of the E-ll as an 
anti-carrier weapon, to which other nuclear submarine 
programmes should defer, but this is unlikely. 2 More 
plausible is the possibility that the nuclear reactors 
for the H class SSBNs were unsatisfactory and that it 
was decided to await the development of a new generation 
of reactors before proceeding. Moreover the SLBMs 
available at the time were the short range, first and 
3 
second generation SS-N-4 and SS-N-5. By 1962/3 the 
SS-N-6, submerged launch, 1,250 nautical mile missile, 
must have been under development. It may have been 
decided to wait the development of the third generation 
reactors and the new missiles before proceeding further 
with the SSBNs. 
In this respect it is interesting to note that the 
nuclear reactors and hull design of the H class SSBN have 
been equated with that of the E-I cruise missile 
submarine (SSGN) and the N class attack submarine (SSN) 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.540. Although Janes 
comments on the commonality of the reactors in E-I, N 
and H class submarines it does not include the E-II in 
this list. MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy' 
in MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments, February 
1973, states that the E-ll has a second generation 
nuclear hull/reactor unit, p.l34. 
2 Besides the objection that this involved putting all 
the nuclear reactor eggs in one SSGN basket it is unlikely 
that the Soviet Navy would have evaluated the E-ll so 
highly. The E-II is a surface launch cruise missile 
submarine and the long range of its missile required 
mid course guidance. These issues are taken up below on 
p.350-352. The SLBM system has the advantage of being 
able to deter an attack or attack ground targets if the 
need arises. The missiles of the E-II are primarily an 
anti-ship weapon. 
3 See Appendix at end of chapter for details. 
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none of which enjoyed long production runs. 1 In all three 
cases there was a parallel construction programme of 
conventionally powered equivalents, the G SSE, the Wand 
J SSG, and the F SS, all of which delivered significantly 
more units than their nuclear counterparts. Moreover, 
the SSBN and SSN programmes stopped in 1962 and 1963 
respectively and no follow-on classes appeared until 
1967/8. 2 The SSGN programme continued and delivered 
the E-II with the second generation hull/propulsion 
unit. 3 
The second generation hull/propulsion units may 
still have been thought unsatisfactory for SSBN use, 
hence only the SSGN received them. Moreover, or possibly 
alternatively, there was the promise of the long-range 
submerged launch missile under development which could 
be coupled with the third generation hull/propulsion 
units to provide a more sophisticated SI.BM system in 
1967/8: the Y class. In this case it may have 
appeared pointless to develop an inferior SSBN based 
on second generation equipment. The hull/propulsion 
unit for the SSGN E-II was not used on a second 
generation SSN. This decision may have resulted from a 
cost-benefit analysis. In an attack submarine, dependent 
on close approach to target, a quiet conventional 
submarine has obvious advantages over a noisier and more 
expensive nuclear powered boat, and the long production 
run of F class vessels suggests that this was a 
successful submarine. 
1 The N completed 13 units compared with its convention-
ally powered contemporary the F which ran to some 56 
units. The E-I completed 5 units while the J class 
went to 16 units. 
2 The first Y class SSBNsentered fleet service in late 
1967 and early 1968 and the first V class SSN was 
delivered in 1967. Both have third generation hull/ 
nuclear propulsion units. 
3 MccGwire, 1 Structure' , p. 134. 
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(b) Cruise Missile Submarines 
Until recently the Soviet Navy has been the only navy 
to maintain a large number of cruise missile submarines. 1 
Like the Kynda and Kresta I cruisers, submarines have been 
fitted with a variant of the Shaddock missile. Thus 
considerable economies have been made while increasing the 
combat potential of the submarines. These vessels could 
have a limited use against ground targets as well as 
against enemy surface ships. 2 
The early conventionally powered cruise missile 
submarines (SSG) were conversions of the W class medium-
range submarine. These early conversions showed a 
considerable amount of experimentation in the missile 
installations. The first units to appear, theW Twin 
Cylinder class, housed its missiles in containers attached 
to the hull. 3 
1 The French have a project under way to adapt the existing 
Exocet surface to surface missile (range 20 n.miles) for 
submarine launch and the US Navy Harpoon missile (range 
30 n.miles) will come into service aboard surf,ace ships, 
submarines and aircraft in 1975. Janes Fighting Ships 
1974/5, p.626 and 635. 
During the 1950s the US Navy producedthe Regulus 
subsonic cruise missile which was first launched from a 
submarine on 6 March 1953. The Regulus I had a range of 
500+ miles and had to be launched from a surfaced 
submarine. A follow on cruise missile, Regulus II was 
subsonic and had a range of 1,000 miles. It was fired 
from a submarine in September 1958. However on 12 
December 1958 the programme was terminated, in favour 
of the Polaris underwater launched SLBM, bringing to a 
close the US Navy's initial cruise missile programme. 
For details see - Paolucci, D.A. 'The development of 
Navy strategic offensive and defensive systems'. USNIP 
May 1970, p.210-2l3. United States Department of the 
Navy United States Naval Aviation 1910-1970, NAVAIR 
00-SOP-l (Washington, D.C., 1970) passim. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1961/2, p.30l. 
2 The SS-N-3 is believed to have an infra-red terminal 
guidance system which as Herrick has observed offers a 
greater accuracy against sharply defined targets such as 
ships. Janes Weapon Systems, 1973/4, p.52. Herrick, 
Soviet Naval Strategy, p.l23. 
3 These containers appear similar to those used for the 
Shaddock missile in its ground forces role as a mobile 
cruise missile. 
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This created a tremendous amount of noise and drag from 
the hydrodynamically monstrous shape that resulted. In 
the subsequent W Long Bin class, the missiles were housed 
in a streamlined conning tower constructed on an extended 
hull. 1 Not until the J SSG and E SSGN class boats were 
the containers actually let into a smooth hull to be 
elevated for firing. Clearly the Soviet Navy was 
experimenting with cruise missiles and submarines and, 
having proved the utility of the basic concept, an improved 
hull design was developed. 
All these vessels suffer two major disadvantages. 
Not only do they have to surface in order to launch their 
missiles, but because the missiles are housed in containers 
outside the pressurised hull, missile maintenance must be 
carried out on the surface. Thus even the E class SSGNs 
will find it necessary to surface from time to time, or 
else risk a reduced level of successful launchings. 
The E class SSGN submarine occurs in two distinct 
classes, the E-I armed with 6 SS-N-3 missile launchers 
and the E-II which has 8 launchers for the same missile. 
As has been pointed out the significant difference between 
the two classes is that E-II was built with a second 
generation hull/propulsion unit and was the only 
submarine built on this equipment. 
The conventionally powered J class, built at the same 
time as the E-I and E-II provided a relatively inexpensive 
class of SSGs and may have absorbed long-lead-time items 
at hand. 2 The long range of the SS-N-3 enabled the J 
class to fire its weapons outside a possible ASW perimeter 
provided reliable mid-course guidance was available. It 
is unlikely that conventional power was a disadvantage in 
this respect. The major problem with the Js, as with the 
1 Janes Weapon Systems, 1973/4, p.52-3 
2 It would seem that 16 units is in fact too small a 
number to suggest a complete programme and too large to 
be explained away as an experimental class. MccGwire 
suggests that 72 units of this class may have been 
originally planned. MccGwire, 'Procurement•, p.79. 
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TABLE X: CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION - KHRUSHCHEV PROGRAMMES 1953/54 - 1959/60 
NAto--desig. 
class. No. Displacement Armament Construction Speed/Radius Machinery Comments 
W Twin 
Cylinder 
W Long 
Bin 
J 
E 
E-II 
6 
7 
16 
5 
27 
1,000 tons 
surfaced, 
1,600 tons 
submerged. 
1,300 tons 
surfaced, 
1,800 tons 
submerged. 
2,200 tons 
surfaced, 
2,500 tons 
submerged. 
4,600 tons 
surface, 
s,ooo tons 
submerged. 
5,000 
surface, 
5,600 
submerged 
2 cylinders for SS-N-3 
Shaddock Missile range 
approx. 300 miles. 
6 21" torpedo tubes, 
4 bow, 2 stern. 
4 single launchers 
for SS-N-3. Shaddock 
Missile range approx. 
300 miles. 
4 21" torpedo tubes. 
A single cylinder 
prototype began 
conversion in 1956 
and the remainder 
were modified from 
1958 to 1959. 
Conversions 
occurred between 
1960 and 1963 
17 knots 
surface 
considerably 
slower than 
w class 
submerged. 
17 knots 
surfaced 
slower than 
original 
when 
submerged. 
diesel 
electric 
diesel 
electric 
This conversion, purely experimental, 
never entered series production. It 
was designed to test the SS-N-3 at 
sea and served its purpose. It was 
a thoroughly messy conversion. The 
containers reduced submerged speed 
and increased noise. 
A more efficient and substantial 
conversion than twin cylinder. The 
four SS-N-3 launchers were built into 
a remodelled fin and hull lengthened 
by 26 feet. There is no organic 
guidance and so the missile relies on 
aircraft or surface ship cooperation 
to reach target. Resistance and hull 
noise problems much less than for the 
former twin cylinders and with four 
missiles an operationally effective 
unit. 
2 twin launchers Began construction 16 knots diesel This was a logical continuation of 
2 fwd and 2 aft fin 1960. 1st vessel surface, electric W class conversions but the long 
for 55-N-3. Shaddock launched 1962, 16 knots gap between completion of the lst 
missile range approx. completed 1963, submerged. and 2nd of the class suggests that 
300 miles. second completed Radius 15,000 it was overtaken by the nuclear 
6 21" torpedo tubes 1966. miles at powered E class. 
bow; 2 or 4 16 11 surface 
a/s to aft. cruising speed. 
3 twin launchers for Completed 1960-62 20 knots Nuclear The nuclear reactor/hull thought to be 
SS-N-3. Shaddock Navy yard maximum reactor similar to that in H and N classes. 
Missile range 300 Komsomolsk steam A nuclear prototype. The SS-N-3 
miles. 6 21 11 torpedo turbines missile with which all the cruise 
tubes bow, 4 1611 missile submarines were fitted. 
a/s torpedo tube§_a_f~--·- Required external guidance. 
4 twin launchers for 
SS-N-3. 6 21" torpedo 
tube s bow, 4 16 11 
torpedo tubes aft. 
built between 
1963 and 1967 
20 knots 
Source: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.540-541. 
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.288-291. 
nuclear 
reactor 
steam 
turbines 
A second generation hull/nuclear 
reactor system. The hull is slightly 
longer than for the E-I and an 
additional pair of missile launchers 
has been added. 
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Z-V and G SSBs, is that these vessels transit more quickly 
and economically on the surface, where they are vulnerable 
to detection and attack particularly by ASW aircraft. 
Breyer reports a delay of three years between the 
completion of the first J class submarine in 1963 and the 
second in 1966. 1 This delay can be accounted for if we 
assume that the E-Is under construction between 1960 and 
1962 were curtailed not only in favour of the E-lls with 
their more advanced propulsion system but also in favour 
of the Js which might have been produced only in very 
limited numbers but for dissatisfaction with the E-I. 
The Js were not only cheaper but, subject to the constraints 
of surface transit, capable of carrying out similar tasks, 
especially if some form of protection against air attack 
could be provided by SAM armed surface vessels. 
(c) Attack Submarines 
Z class submarime construction was halted after the 
29th vessel had been completed in 1955. 2 Seven of the 
class were subsequently converted to SSBs in the period 
1955-1957. 
The follow on F class began building in 1958 at the 
Sudomekh and Leningrad yards where the Zs had been laid. 
It would appear that the Fs began delivery on schedule, 
for they are powered by a similar propulsion unit to that 
used in the G class SSB3which also appeared in 1958. 
The F was the Soviet Navy's second generation post war 
patrol SS (attack submarine). Construction of the F class 
ran from 1958-1967 and produced 56 units. Obviously it 
was seen as a useful boat, hence the long construction 
run, but equally apparent is the fact that submarine 
construction facilities had to be shared with other units 
so this run of some 56 units spread over a decade. 
1 Breyer, Guide, p.290. 
2 M . ccGw~re, 'Procurement' suggests 36 
intended under the original programme, 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.544. 
is probably that in the J SSG. 
Zs were originally 
p.78. 
The propulsion unit 
lBZ 
TABLE XI: ATTACK PATROL SI.BMARINE CONSTRUCTION - KHRUSHCHEV PROGRAMMES 1953/54 - 1959/60 
NATO desig. 
Class No. 
F 56 
N 13 
Displacement 
2,000 tons 
surface 
2,300 tons 
submerged 
3,500 tons 
su:rface 
4,0CX> tons 
subm.e:rged 
Armament 
10 21" torpedo 
tubes 
6 bow, 4 aft. 
20 torpedoes 
carried. 
6 21 11 torpedo 
tubes bow. 
Construction 
Built between 1958 
and 1967, 
Sudomekh Yard, 
Leningrad. 
{Breyer p. 284 -
dates for beginning 
of construction as 
1956) 
1st boat completed 
in 1958 - yearly 
output 6-8 boats. 
entered service 
1958-63. 
Speed/Range 
20 knots 
surfaced 
15 knots 
submerged. 
Range 20,000 
miles surface 
cruising 
20 knots 
surface, 
25 knots 
submerged. 
Source: Janes Fighting Ships, 1974/5, p.543-4. 
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.284-7. 
Machinery 
diesel 
electric 
nuclear 
reactor 
steam 
turbines 
Comments 
Maximum depth 750 feet. cf, Z 460 
feet. A follow-on to the z class 
with a new propulsion unit common 
to the G class SSB. Intended for 
long range operations. A most 
successful class - still widely 
deployed. 
The number of free flood holes in 
the casing suggests a noisy boat. 
The hull design indicates· a high 
speed capability when submerged 
a hunter-killer submarine? 
183 
TheN class SSN also entered service in 1958. As has 
been noted above there was possibly some difficulty with 
the first generation nuclear reactor system which limited 
the production of these vessels compared with their 
conventional counterparts. However it should be noted 
that the attack submarine like the cruise missile submarine, 
is primarily an anti-surface ship weapon. In this respect 
the F class could well have been considered a more cost-
effective means of carrying out the same task as the more 
expensive and perhaps unsatisfactory nuclear powered units. 
Moreover, theN is a noisy boat because of the number of 
free flood holes in its hull. 1 This, together with a 
noisy reactor, may well have made the class less viable 
in combat conditions than the quieter running Fs. 
(d) Medium and Coastal Range Submarines 
TheW class medium range submarine may have built to 
240 units but some authorities claim that even so it fell 
short of the numbers originally planned. 2 The R class, 
the second post-war generation medium range submarine, 
built to a total of only 20 boats. The small number of 
the second generation units actually delivered suggests 
a major reassessment of the utility of this type of 
vessel3 and that this reassessment may also have affected 
the tail end of the W class production. The twenty R 
class boats may well have been constructed on the basis 
of long-lead-time items already to hand before the 
programme was drastically cut. 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.543. 
2 Authorities vary widely in their estimates of how many 
of these vessels were built and the time span over which 
they were produced. Janes suggests 240 were eventually 
delivered between 1951 and 1957 and this is MccGwire•s 
figure as well. Breyer puts the total as low as 145 
built between 1952 and 1959. MccGwire puts the number 
of Ws originally planned at 336. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.546. MccGwire, 
'Procurement', p.78 and 79. Breyer, Guide, p.280. 
3 MccGwire•s figure for the originally planned number of 
Rs is 576 at a rate of 72/year - the same rate as the Ws 
in the final stages of construction. 'Procurement•, p.78. 
TABLE XII: 
NATO desig. 
Class 
R 
No. 
20 
MEDIUM RANGE SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION - KHRUSHCHEV PROGRAMMES - 1953/54 - 1959/60 
Displacement 
1,100 tons 
surface, 
1,600 tons 
submerged 
Source: 
Armament 
6 21 11 torpedo 
tubes in blow. 
Construction 
Began building 
1958, 
completed 1961 
Speed/Radius 
17 knots 
surface, 
l4knots 
submerged. 
Radius 
13,000 
miles at 
cruising 
speed. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.545. 
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p.286. 
Machinery 
Diesel 
electric 
Comments 
An improved W class 
design with a modern-
ised superstructure. 
This would probably 
have been intended 
as a much larger class. 
Janes suggests it 
appeared in small 
numbers due to the 
advent of nuclear 
propulsion. A more 
likely explanation is 
that the Soviets 
reassessed the need 
for these medium range 
vessels - see text. 
,_. 
co 
"" 
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This period also saw the virtual elimination of the 
small coastal range submarine which had featured 
in the pre World War II Soviet submarine fleet. 
so heavily 
The only 
units to fulfil this role, the Q class, were produced in 
relatively small numbers and the programme was evidently 
l 
cut back. 
The cut back in these units, the most numerous items 
in the original Stalin submarine construction programme, 
indicate quite clearly that these medium and short ranged 
boats, primarily useful for fleet area defence, were no 
longer regarded as appropriate in the late 1950s when 
strikes from long-ranged carrier based aircraft emerged 
as the major sea based threat to the Soviet Union, replacing 
the amphibious landings and short-ranged carrier attacks 
whick Stalin's navy was designed to thwart. 
Naval aviation 1953/4 - 1959/60 
A variety of naval aircraft, among which were modern 
jet fighters and light bombers, took part in the 1951 
Soviet Air Day display. These aircraft progressively 
replaced the obsolete piston-engined combat aircraft 
throughout the period from 1953/4 to 1958/9. 2 
The reorganisation of the Armed Forces, which resulted 
ln the Navy coming once more under the control of a single 
Ministry of Defence, does not appear to have affected the 
naval air arm, which remained under Navy control throughout. 
Whether this relationship would have remained 
unchanged in the event of hostilities is difficult to judge. 
1 The Q discussed earlier (p.106 above), would have required 
a considerable effort in the development of its hull/ 
propulsion system and it seems incredible that so few of 
these vessels were actually intended. MccGwire 
'Procurement' suggests 96 units were originally projected. 
Janes Fightin~ Ships indicates 13 were built in one year, 
which tallies Wlth NccGwire•s suggested construction rate. 
If this was so then clearly the decision to cut affected a 
programme in full swing. 
2 Armour, 'The Soviet Naval Air Arm', p.l90. For a general 
discussion of the development of aviation in the period, 
see Yakovlev, Soviet Aircraft Construction, p.99-l09. 
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Evidence from the Great Patriotic War would suggest that 
the Naval Air Forces might come under the command of the 
various army fronts 1but since 1953 naval aviation has 
acquired important roles other than that of naval base 
defence. Its aircraft have been progressively equipped 
with specialised equipment for anti-submarine warfare, 
for long ranged cruise missile attack and for maritime 
reconnaissance, so that it is unlikely that they could be 
used effectively for other than maritime activities. 
The only exception to this, fighters, were withdrawn from 
the naval air force in 1960 and transferred to the Air 
Force, which resubordinated most of them to the operational 
2 
control of P.V.O. Strany. 
All the aircraft which operate with the Naval Air 
Forces appear to be modifications of aircraft originally 
designed for use ln the other branches of the armed forces 
which must mean great economies for the Naval Air Force 
and the Soviet Defence budget as a whole. The 
modifications generally involve a more elaborate set of 
navigation aids and the installation of specialised 
equipment in those units involved in maritime reconnaissance, 
anti-submarine warfare, and attack missile aviation. 
The absence of aircraft carriers has meant that with 
the exception of helicopters all Soviet naval aviation 
1 Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, p.49, cites the History 
of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-45 
(Moscow, 1961) Vol. II p.44, 80, 81 and 86 for examples 
where 'Practically all fleet aviation was enlisted for 
the operations against the German ground forces•. See 
also Salisbury, H.E. The S¢~ge of Leningrad, p.356 for 
the comment. 'Fleet air protection was weak. The fleet 
air fighter arm and its A .. A. guns had been put under the 
Leningrad Air Defence Command. Admiral Tributs complained 
repeatedly that the warships ... were poorly protected.' 
See also Salisbury, p.358 for an account of events on 
21 August 1941 when Germany put 180 aircraft in the air to 
attack Kronstadt and the Soviets could only muster five 
fighters in defence. 
2 Breyer, Guide, p.l81. 
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1 has been shore based 1 hence the variety of missions that 
it has been able to accomplish have been limited. Whereas 
naval aviation can aid a fleet commander by providing 
reconnaissance, air borne early warning of air or surface 
attack, air defence against hostile aircraft, airborne 
strike against enemy ships and help in conducting an anti-
submarine battle, (in addition to the more independent 
tasks of destroying enemy shipping in port or on the high 
seas, mine laying and hunting ballistic missile submarines) 
its ability to do so depends on its availability. Aircraft 
carriers can provide air support integrally combined with 
the fleet, operating within the same weather zone (though 
this may not always be an advantage vis a vis shore based 
aircraft) and under the close, direct control of the naval 
commander. This can ensure not only quick reaction and 
reliable support, but also confidence on the part of the 
naval forces that their interests will prevail with the 
air commander . 
While shore based aircraft are able to provide most 
of the above services within a limited geographic zone, 
they do so according to a more standardised set of 
procedures, and may well be unavailable at the crucial 
time. To overcome this problem a large number of aircraf·t 
are required in each fleet area to provide a continuous 
on-station coverage. Shore based aviation is also 
constricted by problems of basing and overflight rights 
which may deny their effective use in times of tension. 
It also detracts from their availability when fleet units 
operate at great distances from shore. 
The problems of defence against air attack can to some 
extent be offset by individual ship anti-aircraft capability, 
either :Ln the form of missiles or dual purpose artillery, 
but these lack the flexibility afforded by aircraft. 
1The Kresta I class which first appeared in 1967 was the 
first surface unit designed with helicopter facilities 
incorporated. Some of the modernised Kotlins had a 
helicopter pad provided. 
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In the period 1953/4 - 1959/9 Soviet Naval Aviation 
continued to replace piston-engined with jet aircraft and 
continued to draw on other branches of the air force or 
the civilian sector for its basic aircraft, which were 
adapted for maritime use. It also received a large number 
of medium range bombers (Badger) which were considered 
outmoded for str.ategic air use. 
(a) Fighters 
A range of Soviet fighters served in the Soviet Naval 
Air Force. As in the Great Fatherland war they were intended 
primarily for use in the defence of Soviet naval bases. The 
eventual transfer of these aircraft to the P. v .0. strany ~n 
1960 was in fact an organisational rationalisation. 
The high speedjat altitude,of the fighters, together 
with their short range, meant that they were unsuited to 
the task of providing fleet protection, except in the 
immediate vicinity of the fleet areas. Whereas high speeds 
are no disadvantage in aerial combat what the jet aircraft 
lacked was the low speed capability which would enable them 
to loiter over the ships to be defended. Moreover the short 
range of these aircraft meant that protection could not be 
extended much beyond the fleet areas. 
A representative fighter available to the fleet in the 
late 1950s the MIG-21 is credited with a maximum speed of 
1,385 m.p.h. at 36,000 feet (800 m.p.h. at low altitude) 
and a range of 683 miles which could be extended to 1,120 
miles with the addition of three external tanks. 1 
(b) Bombers 
In general the bombers serving with the Soviet Naval 
Air Arm have been used for carrying a variety of weapons 
systems including bombs, mines, torpedoes, depth charges, 
and, more recently, air to surface missile systems (ASM). 
1 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft, 1973/4, p.477-479. 
Variants of these same bombers have also served in a 
reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare role while 
others have been converted to tankers for in-flight 
refuelling. 
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A major advance in naval aviation came with the fitting 
of ASMs to the Badger bomber. Soviet naval commentators 
during the 1960s afforded Soviet naval missile aviation 
second place only to missile firing submarines in the 
1 hierarchy of forces available to the Navy. By 1960 two 
of these missiles, the Kennel and the Kipper, 2had entered 
the operational inventory and formed the basis for further 
development in this field. The ASM is a major anti-surface 
vessel weapon but it is difficult to credit Soviet claims 
that these weapons enable attacks to be made on carrier 
3 task forces outside the range of task force defences, 
1 eg. Gorshkov 'Soviet Naval Science•, p.l8, where he refers 
to the 'strike capabilities of the submarine air forces•. 
2 See Appendix at the end of this chapter for details of 
ASMs. 
3 Sokolovsky, V.D., ed., Military Strategy (Moscow, 1962) 
translated by Dinerstein et al. for RAND (Englewood Cliffs, 
1963) p.42. 'Attack carrier units can also be successfully 
combatted by long-range naval aircraft. These planes have 
air-to-ship missiles with nuclear warheads and can deliver 
strikes without coming within firing range of a carrier 
force's anti-aircraft defence.' 
In the second edition of Military Strategy (Moscow, 1963), 
translated by H.F. Scott, the existence of a radar picket 
and forward defences are acknowledged. 'but these forces 
and weapons can no longer reliably protect the attack 
carriers and other elements of the force from missile 
strikes from submarine and naval aircraft. 1 
This is retained in the third edition, published in 1968 
A more recent formulation still makes the same claim: 
Anokhin, A.P., Col. 'Aviation in combat against naval 
strike forces', Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, p.33-36, 
translated USN, p.33. 'Today an aircraft no longer has to 
enter a ship's air defence zone, since the firing ranges of 
aircraft missiles exceed the range of shipboard weapons in 
destroying aircraft.• A positive judgement which is 
allowed to stand despite the fact that 'ship forces began 
to employ dispersed battle formations for protection by 
deploying air defence weapons of great distances from the 
warships being escorted. This deeply echeloned air defence 
system for ship formations includes fighter aircraft (from 
aircraft carriers), anti-aircraft missiles and artillery 
systems. 
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Name--WH11 
NATO Designer and 
Designation Speed Range Armament Op. date comments 
TU-14 
BOSUN 
MIA-4 
BISON 
IL-28 
BEAGLE 
TU-95 
BEAR 
TU-16 
BADGER 
Maximum of 560 mph. 
Maximum 56U mph. 
Maximum of 580 mph. 
cruise 450 mph. 
Maximum of 500 mph. 
over target at 
41,000 feet. 
Maximum at 35,000 
feet 587 mph. 
cruise speed 
480 mph. 
2,980 miles 
5,900-7,140 
miles 
2,485 miles 
with maximum 
bomb load 
1 500 
7,800 miles 
with maximum 
bomb load of 
11 tons. 
With maximum 
weapon load 
3 1000 miles. 
At cruising 
speed with 3 
tons of 
weapons 
3,975 miles. 
4 23mm. guns, 
maxi mum bomb or 
equivalent load 
2.5 tons 
7 23mm. guns, 
maximum bomb or 
equivalent load 
9.5 tons. 
4 23mm guns 
1.5 ton bombs 
torpedoes for 
mines 
6 23-mm. cannon 
maximum weapon 
load for Bear A 
11 tons 
2 23mm. cannon 
Badger A, 9 tons 
internally. 
Badger B, 2 kennel 
ASM missiles. 
Badger C, 1 Kipper 
ASM. No bombs. 
Badger, G, 2 Kelt 
ASM. 
Tupolev, developed 
1948-49, seen 1951 
Air Force Day 
Display. 
Developed 1953-4. 
First seen 1954 
in series 
production 1955-59. 
First appeared 
1950 
Tupolev, developed 
1953-54. Appeared 
1955. 
Tupolev, appeared 
1954, Badger 
entered service 
in 1956 although 
naval versions 
not sighted until 
1961. 
A medium reconnaissance and torpedo bomber. 
Solely used by the Naval Air Forces. 480 
bailt. Replaced since 1961 by variants of 
the BADGER. 
Naval version has more navigational and :radar 
equipment and a greater range. Used in long 
range reconnaissance and anti-submarine 
warfare. Military Balarice 1966-7 gives no 
mention of tfie·B~son for the Naval Air Force 
but mentions it in connection with Long Range 
Air Force and Military Balance in 1973-4 as 
a bomber and tanker. 
First operational jet bomber in Soviet Air 
Force. Military Balance 1973-74 gives a total 
o.f 40 in serv~ce - torpedo equipped light 
bombers. 
A long range bomber also suited for maritime 
reconnaissance. The Bear now is known in 
four versions: 
Bear A - basic bomber. 
Bear B - first seen 1961 Air Force Day. Has 
additional radar equipment in an underno~e 
radome. Carries the Kangaroo air to 
surface missile. Also equipped with in 
flight refueling nose probe. 
Bear C - identified September 1964 overflying 
NATO naval forces in Exercise Teamwork. 
Bear D -maritime reconnaissance version, 
photographed August 1967. Militarf Balance 
1973/4 gives a total of 50 1n serv1ce. 
There are at least 7 versions of this bomber 
serving with the Soviet Naval Air Force. 
Badger A- basic bomber, some used as tankers. 
Badger B - Kennel ASM, since July 1961 
official sightings. 
Badger C - Kipper ASM. 
Badger D, E, F - Early warning version and 
maritime reconnaissance. 
Badger G - Kelt ASM ox bombs. 
Military Balance 1973-4 reported 300 Badgers 
wLth m1ss1ies, !so in a tanker or reconnaiss-
ance mode. About 2,000 are believed to have 
been built in all. The TU-104 airliner 
derived from same design. 
Source: Janes Fighting Ships, 1973/74, p.632-33. 
1974/75 p.623-24. 
Military Ba'!ance, 1965/6 to i973/4. 
Ja~es All the Worlds Aircraft, 1973/4 various and 1963/4. 
Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p. 327-335. 
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even for the longer-ranged missiles which entered service 
in the 1960s. Not only are the missiles relatively slow 
and therefore liable to be shot down but the launching 
aircraft themselves are subject to detection by radar 
picket vessels, and counteraction by carrier based aircraft. 
(c) Helicopters 
The naval air force has made use of helicopters for 
a variety of purposes. In the period prior to 1960 these 
were mainly land based, though a limited number of 
modified Kotlins were built with a helicopter pad1which 
enabled helicopters to land but did not make them an 
organic part of the vessel, for which a hangar and 
helicopter servicing facilities would be required on board. 
Their main use was for communications purposes and for 
2 
coastal ASW. In the mercantile and fishing fleets they 
are used for ice reconnaissance along the Northern sea 
route. 3 As with other sectors of the naval air force the 
helicopters are adaptations of craft 
of the armed forces or from civilian 
(d) Flying Boats 
used in other 
. 4 
servJ.ces. 
branches 
The Soviet Naval Air Force has continued to find a 
substantial role for amphibious aircraft in reconnaissance 
and anti-submarine roles. 
The Be 6 or Madge flying boat was first seen in 1954. 
It has a speed of 240 m.p.h., a maximum range of 2,800 
miles and can carry bombs, mines and torpedoes. 5 It has 
now been replaced by the turbo-propeller flying boat, the 
Mail M-12. 6 
1 Janes Fighting Ships, 1963/4, p.421. 
2 Armour, 'The Soviet Naval Air Arm•, p.l91. 
3 Ibid, and Harbron, 'Communist Ships and Shipping', p.l69. 
4 Fo.r details of the Mi-I and Ka-15 see Breyer Guide to 
the Soviet Navy, p.334; and Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 
1963/4, p.302 3. The Ka-20 was the first of the Soviet 
helicopters in naval use specifically fitted out for ASW. 
5Ibid, p.332; and Janes all the Worlds Aircraft, 1959/60. 
6 Ibid, p.332; and Janes Fighting Ships, 1974/5, p.624. 
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Auxiliary Fleet 
It has been argued previously1 that the Soviet 
submarines constructed under the immediate post war 
programme were not intended for anti-sea-lines-of-
communication operations in the Atlantic. This hypothesis 
is further sustained by the fact that the mid 1950s -
when the threat from medium ranged carrier based aircraft 
emerged - there was no evidence of a construction 
programme to provide submarines with afloat support. 
During the 1950s the number of submarines based with the 
Northern Fleet in particular grew dramatically2 and must 
have placed a strain on the existing shore facilities. 
This strain, plus the need for dispersion of submarine 
forces, raised the requirement for submarine tenders, some 
of which could provide support to submarines on patrol at 
the perimeter of the submarine operating zone. This 
requirement was met by the conversion of Kolomna class 
freighter and Soldek class tankers to Atrek and Tovda 
class submarine tenders which entered service in the 
1958-60 period. 3 At least two former German Navy vessels, 
the ex Otto-Wu~che and Waldemar Kophamel, were re-
habilitated. By 1963 Janes Fi<;,1htin9 Ship~s reports some 
4 19 submarine tenders converted or restored. 
If support for the diesel submarines had to be achieved 
by an interim policy of conversions and restorations the 
provision of afloat support for nuclear submarines would 
appear to have been a far more orderly process. The Don 
class submarine support vessels, built at Nikolayev from 
1952-196~, entered fleet service at the same time as the 
1 See p.l09-l0 above. 
2 See the figures provided in Macintyre, D. 'The Soviet 
Submarine Threat•, in Saunders, ed., The Soviet Navy, p.l70. 
3 See Janes Fighting Ships 1963/4, p.437, and Breyer, 
Guide, p.310 for details. 
4 Janes Fighting Ships 1963/4, p.43l. These figures are 
probably too high as subsequent editions report lower 
numbers. 
Breyer, Guide, suggests 6 Atrek class vessels and 4 Tovda, 
p.3l0. 
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nuclear powered submarines and were followed from 1961 
1 
onwards by the Ugra class. Between 1957 and 1966 five 
Dnepr class submarine repair ships were delivered. They 
were followed by the Lama class (5 units) which may also 
2 be intended as missile supply ships for the surface navy. 
Not until 1960 when the Sofia, a conversion of a former 
merchant tanker, 3 appeared did the surface navy gain its 
first large replenishment vessel. Previously the navy 
had had to make do with replenishment from the merchant 
4 fleet's tankers or from its own small fleet of oilers 
which in some cases had been taken over from the merchant 
fleet. 5 
The Merchant Navy 
While it is not the intention of this study to discuss 
in any detail the growth of the Soviet Union's merchant 
fleet it is appropriate to note that during the Khrushchev 
period a variety of merchant vessels began building at 
Soviet shipyards. In the period 1949-52, fQllowing the 
restoration of the shipyards, the Soviet Union concentrated 
on building the Sverdlov cruisers, the Skory destroyers 
and the submarines, which characterised the post-war Stalin 
naval construction programme. Units for the merchant 
marine were constructed either in recently-occupied Poland 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, 
also Breyer, Guide, p.312. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, 
p.312-4. 
p.570-l for details. 
p.572. Breyer, Guide, 
3 Janes 
4 Ibid. 
Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.580. 
See 
5 Among the support vessels available to the Soviet Navy 
were the Kazbek class 16,250 dwt oilas -formerly 
Leningrad class merchant fleet originally built 1954-7, 
Altay class 5,500 tons standard oilers built from 1967 
onwards. Uda class 7,200 tons full load oilers built 
since 1961, and the Kanda, Khobi and Nercha class 
coastal tankers all built in the mid 1950s. The Khobi 
(800 tons standard 2,000 tons full load) was built in 
large numbers from 1956-1959 and were the standard oilers 
of the Navy. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.582-3. Breyer, Guide, 
p.316. 
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1 
and Hungary or Finland and Western Europe. 
In 1953 some merchant construction occurred in the 
Soviet Union and this was increased throughout the period 
to 1960. Several of the yards which from 1949 to 1952 
had been allocated to naval construction began producing 
merchant ships of various types. That this was the result 
of Government policy was revealed by Khrushchev in 1964 
when he told a group of Swedish shipbuilders 
I will be revealing no great secret to you when 
I say that we have freed our shipyards from the 
building of large naval ships - battleships and 
cruisers - since such ships will no longer 
represent a serious military force in the 
conditions of a future thermonuclear world 
war .... We are now using the plants and shipyards 
for the construction of an oceangoing fishing 
and merchant fleet.2 
Certainly in the Baltic and Black Sea area slipways 
which had previously been used for cruiser construction 
were used for large merchant ships. 3 However in the 
North, at Severodvinsk, and in the Pacific, at Komsomolsk, 
the ways appear to have been used for nuclear submarine 
. 4 construct~on. 
From the evidence available to date this major 
reallocation of ship construction facilities from the 
Navy to the merchant marine has not as yet been 
significantly reversed. 
1 For details of construction for the Soviet merchant 
fleet in the period 1945-1952, see Soviet Merchant Ships, 
p.6-8. 
2 Pravda, 25 June 1964, p.l. 
3Times and Soviet Merchant 
4 MccGwire, •Procurement', 
Ships, passim - see Chronology. 
p.74 and 75. 
srJRFACE TO SURFACE 
Strategic 
Designation and Name 
Launch Platform 
and launchers/platform 
Range (estimated) 
Operational Date 
Other 
Tactical 
Designation and Name 
Launch Platform 
~~d launchers/platform 
Range 
Speed (Mach) 
Control 
0? Date 
Other 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 
Missiles Available and About to Become Operational 
SSN-1 
Scrubber/Strela 
SS-N-4 SARK 
2-V(2) G(3) H(3) 
350 miles 
1958 (test firing 1955) 
First SLBM fitted for 
surface launch. 
SSN-2 
STYX 
KILDIN(l) KRUPNY(2) KOMSAR(2) OSA(4) 
150 miles 
0.9 
Radio guidance 
Radar for target 
information 
Infra red homing 
1958 
Req~ired mid-course 
guidance at maximum 
range 
26 miles 
0.9 
auto pilot 
(radio -::ommand) 
Radar homing, possibly 
infra red on later 
models. 
1960 
SS-N-5 
GII{3) 
800 miles 
SERB 
HII(3) 
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1963 (test firing 1962) 
2nd generation SLBM. Submerged launch 
system retrofitted to all Hs and half 
the Gs. Possibly a second generation 
SSBN was intended as vector. 
SSN-3 
SHADIXXK 
KYNDA(8) KRESTA I (4) 
J(4) EI(6) EII(B) 
w long bin (4) 
W twin cylinder (2) 
300+ miles 
0.9 -1.5 
Radar tracked 
course corrections by radio 
Infra red homing 
1961-62 
Requires mid-course guidance at 
maximum range. Also used as coastal 
defence missile. 
APPENDIX 10 C.'-IAPTER V (contd.} 
SURFACE TO AIR 
Designation and Name 
SAN 1 GOA 
SAN 2 GUIDELINE 
AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES 
Designa~ion and Name 
AS-1 Kennel 
AS-2 Kipper 
AS-3 Kangaroo 
AS-4 Kitchen 
Launch Platform 
KOTLIN SAM {2} 
KANIN {6) 
KASHIN (4) 
KYNDA (2) 
KRESTA (4) 
1 SVERDLOV 
conve't"sion (2) 
Aircrat't and No. 
of Launchers 
BAOOER B (2) 
BADGER C (1) 
BEAR B + C (1) 
BLINDER B (1} 
Range 
(Slant) 
17 miles 
25 miles 
Range 
60 ailes 
130 miles 
460 miles 
200 miles 
Speed 
Mach 2 
Mach 3.5 
Speed 
Mach 
0.9 
1.0+ 
1.5+ 
2+ 
control 
radar/ 
radio 
radar/ 
radio 
Control 
beam riding 
radar or 
radio command 
possible 
passive or 
active homing 
radar 
radar guided 
Sow:ces: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.637-4Q. 
Janes Weapons Systems~ 1973/4, various entries. 
MCcGwire, The Structure of the SOviet Navy, p.l40-l. 
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op Date Other 
1961-62 Obviously successful fitted 
to vessels from 1961-1968. 
From Soviet Axmy. 
reported Although successful on land it 
ashore 1957 was a failuxe at sea, probably 
due to need for radar to acquire 
missile within first 6 seconds 
of flight. 
0p date 
1958 
1960 
1961 
Other 
Missile must be launched from 
below 25,000 feet and at reduced 
speed. Possible derivative of 
coastal defence missile the 
SAMLET from the German KDMET. 
No restrictions on missile launch. 
very similar to a fighter aircraft. 
Gives Bear a long-range stand-off 
capability. 
CHAPTER VI 
INTRODUCTION 
In the period 1946 to 1953 the Soviet Navy's traditional 
role, protecting the Soviet land mass from sea based attacks 
and supporting the ground forces, remained unaltered. More 
significantly it was assumed that the previous zones of 
operation, the restricted seas and coastal waters, would 
continue to be the major areas of operation for the post-war 
fleet. During the 1950s however it became obvious that fulfil-
ment of the traditional role implied an ability to operate on 
the high seas if only in a sea denial capacity. The requirement 
for high seas operations was necessitated by the introduction 
of strike aircraft of increasing range to the attack carriers 
of the major naval powers and the development of submarine 
launched missile systems. Unacceptable damage could be inflicted 
on the Soviet land mass by sea based strikes launched from waters 
beyond the traditional zones of operation of the Soviet fleet. 
Soviet ship construction of the 1950s concentrated on 
missile armed surface ships, submarines, both diesel electric 
and nuclear, and aircraft. The cut back of the previous pro-
gramme, the emphasis on smaller surface vessels and missile 
armament,and the relocation of submarines to the Northern Fleet 
indicated a navy attempting a sea denial strategy in the Barents 
and subsequently Norwegian Seas. 
To fulfil its role in Soviet strategic thinking the Soviet 
Navy required an ability to attack aircraft carriers at their 
launch points, if not before these were reached, to locate, 
track and destroy missile armed submarines, in addition to 
supporting ground forces and defending the coast. The dis-
ruption of the sea lines of communication implied an oceanic 
as opposed to coastal waters capability. In addition the Soviet 
Navy had acquired a submarine launched ballistic missiles system 
capable of inflicting direct damage on the United States. 
Despite the drawbacks of the initial SLBM systems, pPi-er-t-e-t+;e· 
1::,-:. ~ /--; 
~, no other arm of service was able to carry out thisj prior 
to the 1960s. 
In the light of these increasingly important defensive 
and offensive missions it was now publicly conceded by the 
Soviet Defence Ministers that the role of the Soviet Navy 
would be of immeasurably greater importance in a subsequent 
war. 
This chapter seeks to provide evidence that the increased 
importance of the Navy was recognised by military and political 
leaders, albeit in a restricted and purely functional way, that 
the Navy had important new missions assigned to it, which would 
require operations outside of the traditional zones of 
operation, and to critically evaluate the Navy's ability in 
1958/59 to carry out the missions which had been claimed. In 
addition attention is drawn to the initial forward deployments 
undertaken by the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and Norwegian 
Seas, following the introduction of longer ranged aircraft to 
the attack carriers of the United States Navy. 
We also note the use of the Navy in a series of crisis 
situations not directly involving the Soviet Union. Despite 
the qualitative growth of the Soviet Navy it was not able to 
assert control of the sea outside its ovm waters and remained 
far less flexible than the United States Navy in such situations. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Changing Missions of the Soviet Navy 1953/4 - 1959/60 
The missions of the Soviet Navy from 1945-1953 have 
already been described. Briefly they were to ensure 
'command of the coast'. In addition it was suggested that 
the original Z class long-range submarine was able to 
combat aircraft carriers either in an advanced position 
along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap or, more 
plausibly, in the North Cape-Bear Island-Spitzbergen gap. 
In the period 1953 to 1960 the Soviet Navy responded 
to the introduction of cruise missile submarines into the 
US Navy and the deployment of longer-range nuclear-weapon-
carrying aviation aboard the aircraft carriers of the USN 
and RN. The Soviet Navy devoted greater attention to the 
anti carrier role, improved the ASW capability of existing 
surface units, and designed vessels with considerable ASW 
potential which did not enter the fleet until the mid to 
late 1960s. The introduction of an SLBM capability laid 
the foundation for its fu,ture role as a major part of the 
Soviet strategic forces. The coastal defence units1 were 
strengthened by the addition of missile equipment and 
short ranged powerfully armed light naval forces 2 
continued to be produced so that at no time was the defence 
of the coast downgraded in Soviet naval thinking. Rather, 
these other missions were added to the role of the Navy. 
1 The first of the widely used missiles for coastal defence 
was probably the Salish cruise missile (range 60 miles 
approx.) which, like its successor, the longer ranged 
Samlet (120 miles) and the A-S Kennel missile are all 
derivatives of the German Komet. These were succeeded in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s by the SS-N-3 Shaddock. 
Missiles were probably introduced to the Coastal 
Artillery and Rocket Troops in 1955 or 1956. 
2 
Janes Weapon Systems 1973/4, p.4l-42. 
Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.29. 
Khrushchev, op.cit., p.3l 
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Evidence for this changing mission structure can be 
found in the speeches of naval officers and others, in 
retrospective articles on the development of the Soviet 
Navy and, most convincingly, in the naval construction 
undertaken and initiated in this period, reviewed in the 
previous chapter. 
In his first Navy Day address, that of July 1955, 
Admiral Gorshkov claimed •we have a strong navy for the 
defence of the State interests at sea.• 1 Although it 
was premature to be talking in this way in 1955 Gorshkov 
was indicating his hopes for the future. 
Zhukov, proceeding from a more circumscribed military 
outlook, observed to the Twentieth Party Congress 
In building up the navy, we proceed from the 
fact that in a future war combat at sea will be 
of immeasurably greater importance than it was 
in the last war.2 
The role of the Navy in a future war was commented on 
in all the Navy Day celebrations. The comments took the 
form of vague general assertions as to capabilities. 
Armed with modern devices for combat at sea, our 
navy is not only capable of defending the states 
coastal borders but can operate jointly with the 
air forces to destroy enemy naval forces on the 
seas and oceans, and can also strike mighty blows 
at targets in other continents.3 
1 Gorshkov, S.G. 'Text of article broadcast' USSR Home 
Service, 25 July 1955, 0851 GMT in Russian Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBS) No. 143, 1955, 
p.cc-5. 
2 Speech by Zhukov to 20th Party Congress, Pravda 
20 February, p.4., trans. Current Soviet Policies, 
Vol. II, ed., L. Gruliow (New York, 1957), p.l04. 
3 Pravda 27 July 1958, and FBIS No. 145, 28 July 1958, 
p.cc-2. 
See also Armed Forces Day broadcast Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service No. 37, 1958, USSR National Affairs, 
2 4 February 1958, p.cc-11 for a similar formulation. 
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An article ln International Affairs (Moscow) made the 
point that 
Rockets with nuclear warheads fired from 
submarines make vulnerable not only the 
territories of islands but also continents, 
to a considerable depth from the coastline. 
Moreover 
the new rocket weapons have radically changed 
the nature of naval warfare. Missiles with 
nuclear warheads sharply diminish the advantages 
of aircraft carriers and the surface fleet in 
general. 
Hence 'Different weapons will now be dominant on the high 
seas. The traditional factors of domination are being 
replaced by new ones.• 1 
Malinovsky, the new Defence Minister, 2claimed in 
early l95q •our Navy has become entirely up-to-date and 
is capable of accomplishing any strategic tasks in its 
province'. After reviewing claims made about the USN by 
Western spokesmen he warned 
some people across the ocean ought to pause 
and give thought to the fate of their own 
coasts and extremely extended communications, 
the vulnerability of which has now become 
monstrously apparent ... America's traditional 
invulnerability has now been ended for all time. 3 
The greater role which Zhukov had envisioned for the 
Navy appears to have involved four separate missions 
1) The disruption of lines of communication at sea. 
2) The defensive mission of attacking enemy aircraft 
carriers by means of missile firing vessels and 
aviation which were entering service. 
1 Talensky, N. Maj. Gen. 'Military Strategy and Foreign 
Policy' International Affairs (Moscow) No.3, 1958, p.28-29. 
2 Malinovsky became Minister of Defence following Zhukov's 
dismissal on 26 October 1957. Previously Malinovsky, a 
military professional and one of the wartime •Stalingrad 
Group' had been lst Deputy Minister of Defence and 
commander of Ground Forces. Kolkowicz The Soviet Military. 
p.l34 and 367. 
3 Pravda, 4 February 1959, p.4-5. 
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3) The radically new mssion of launching 
ballistic missiles against the United States. 
4) The traditional mission of supporting the 
ground forces and defending the coast. 
In his February 1967 Morskoy Sbornik article, Gorshkov 
draws attention to the search for 'new forms and methods' 
to be applied by submarines in 'the fight against enemy sea 
transport'. He categorises as one of the fleets most 
important missions 
the disruption of oceanic lines of communication, 
the special arteries feeding the military and 
economic potentials of these countries (the 
United States' European allies).l 
What Gorshkov and Malinovsky do not spell out is how 
this disruption of oceanic communications was to be achieved, 
or what was required to achieve it. Whereas in the past 
disruption of enemy transportation had involved operations 
in coastal waters, what was now required was an ability to 
disrupt in the distant waters of the Atlantic. The Soviet 
Navy did not have this ability in 1959/60. 
Gorshkov is also explicit when considering the threat 
from aircraft carriers. In the post war period, following 
the introduction of long ranged, nuclear weapon carrying , 
jet aircraft in the mid 1950s, 2carrier strike forces were 
equipped •to deliver nuclear strikes against strategic 
objectives deep within the territory of the Soviet Union•. 3 
While claiming that the carrier's role as primary strike 
force was waning in the light of the technological 
development of the 1950s Gorshkov admits 'carriers were, 
at that time, powerful, and would, for some time to come, 
1 Gorshkov, S.G., •soviet Naval Science', p.l5-l6. 
2 The A-3 series of Skywarriors entered service from 1954 
onwards. Capable of speeds in excess of 600 M.P.H. they 
had a range of over 2,000 miles. In 1955 the A-4 Skyhawks 
entered service. They were capable of speeds in excess 
of 650 M.P.H. and had a range of 1,700 miles. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G. 'Soviet Naval Science', p.l7. 
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still be able to pose a serious threat to our motherland•. 1 
The means of combatting carriers was at hand in the 
developing 'strike capabilities of the submarine and air 
forces•. 2 As to the other sea based nuclear threat, missile 
firing submarines, Soviet spokesmen appear to be understand-
ably reticent. 
During the 1950s, when the US Navy appeared to be 
developing a submarine and surface ship cruise missile 
force, the Soviet Navy had no effective means of carrying 
out large scale ASW operations in the Barents and Norwegian 
Sea area. It was not until the mid to late 1960s that the 
vessels designed to counter this threat, and that posed by 
a predicted short rage SLBM system, appeared in the 
operational inventory. By this time however the Americans 
had dropped the cruise missile programme in favour of the 
Polaris SSBN system. The underwater launched missiles and 
the increasing range of subsequent generations of the 
Polaris missile conferred an almost complete invulnerability 
on these submarines.Soviet naval forces, designed to counter 
a less sophisticated submarine launched missile threat were 
rendered obsolescent. 
As a result of decisions taken in the mid 1950s the 
Navy 
along with the Strategic Missile Forces (created 
in late 1959) ... had become the most important 
weapon available to the Supreme Command, one 
which could exert a decisive influence on the 
course of an armed struggle.3 
In the late 1950s it is probably true that the Navy 1 s.. 
ballistic missile submarines were,in fact,the prime weapon 
system available to the Soviet Supreme Command.capable of 
delivering nuclear strikes on United States territory. 
1 ibid.' p.l7. 
2 ibid. ' p.l8. 
3 ibid. ' p.l9. 
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Khrushchev made frequent references to the size and 
destructive power of the Soviet Union's intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs}, 1but in fact it was the Navy's 
Z conversions,and such units of the Hand G classes of 
submarines as existed, armed with small numbers of 350 
mile range SLBMs, which presented the most reliable means 
of exerting 'a decisive influence' directly on the United 
States. The Long Range Air Force was not rated highly by 
Khrushchev because of its slow speed, vulnerability to 
anti-aircraft defence systems and inability to return to 
base, and it is doubtful if it was envisaged as an inter-
continental force. 2 
Gorshkov•s claims are supported by Major General M. 
Cherednichenko. 
Under the new system (in the period 1954-1959) 
the Navy had a number of important missions: 
encounters with enemy fleets at sea and at bases 
primarily using assault aircraft (missile carriers), 
missile launching ships and submarines; disruption 
of lines of communication on seas and oceans: and 
destruction of enemy ships in coastal regions. 
According to Cherednichenko primary emphasis was g1ven to 
the development and improvement of submarine and aviation 
tactics to take account of the new weapons, missiles and 
nuclear torpedoes, which they carried. Primary targets for 
1 For a reconstruction of the Soviet test programme and 
eventual missile dep.loyments see Ball, Strategic Missile 
Programme, p.92-l05. Ball cites U.S. Department of 
Defense statements made in April and August 1964 implying 
that at the end of 1961 the USSR had about five operational 
ICBMs, p.l02. 
For an account of Soviet missile deception in the period 
1957-1960, see Horelick, A. and Rush, M., Strategic Power 
and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago and London, 1966), 
p.35-70. 
2 For Khrushchev's assessment of the bombers available to 
the Long Range Air Force in the late 1950s see The Last 
Testament, p.39 and p.43 
the new weapon systems were listed as shore targets, 
surface ships and submarines. 1 
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The equipment for these claimed missions was under 
development. First generation missiles did not enter 
fleet service during the late 1950s and it was not until 
the 1960s that 
the Navy is characterised by the rapid 
development of submarines armed with various 
purpose missiles. Nuclear powered submarines 
are armed with ballistic and homing missiles 
and torpedoes. The underwater fleet has 
become the principle force of the fleet, its 
main striking force. At the same time long-
range naval aviation with missile armament 
continued to develop. Fast missile and 
anti-submarine vessels appeared in the Navy 
along with coastal missile installations.2 
Any assessment of the Soviet Navy's ability and 
preparedness to carry out the missions which it claimed 
for itself in the late 1950s must be based on the forces 
available to the Navy, the characteristics of these 
forces, their distribution between the four fleet areas, 
the areas in which fleet exercises were conducted and the 
nature of those exercises. Unfortunately, it is difficult 
to be precise about any of these factors. Yet allowing 
for the gaps in our knowledge it is possible to arrive 
at some overall estimate. Particular attention must be 
g1ven to the submarine forces and naval aviation, which, 
as we have seen, were acknowledged to be the primary force 
of the Soviet Navy. Moreover the task can be somewhat 
1 Cherednichenko, M. (Major General) 'Post war development 
of the art of war• Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 6 
1970 translated JPRS Translations in USSR Military Affairs 
No. 628, p.39. 
For a similar account see Sokolovsky, V. (Marshal of the 
Soviet Union) and Cherednichenko, M. (Major General) 
•Aspects of Soviet Military development in the post war 
period', Voyenno-Istoricheski¥ Zhurnal No. 3, 1965, 
JPRS Soviet Military Translat1ons, No. 193, p.ll and 17. 
2 Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko 'Soviet military 
development', p.l7. 
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simplified 
because of 
by concentrating on the Northern Fleet, which, 
1 
access to the Atlantic Ocean, must be counted 
as the Fleet which would be primarily involved in cutting 
sea communications between North America and Western 
Europe, delivering nuclear strikes on the United States 
and combatting the aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy 
and the US Navy's Second Fleet. 
Using figures taken from Janes Fighting Ships 1958/59 
and 1959/60, modified to take into account later information, 
the size of the total Soviet Fleet in the late 1950s would 
appear to be as follows: 
Estimate of Total Units Available to Soviet Navy 
circa lst January 1960 
Submarines 
torpedo attack 
475 Janes 1958/9 
430 in 1960 (a) 
of which 350 of post war origin (b) 
including perhaps 100 coastal defence submarines 
240 W class and 22 Z class and the lead units 
of the R and F classes. 6 or so of these 
submarines were fitted with cruise missiles -
the Twin Cylinder W conversion. 
3 N class SSNs possible by 1959. 
ballistic missile 7 Z-V SSB 
Cruisers 
lead boats of H class SSBN and G class SSB 
possibly a total of 7 by late 1959. 
25 of which 14 were post war Sverdlovs and 
ll were pre World War II vessels 
1 Even here access to the Atlantic would have to be fought 
for in the North Cape-Bear Island-Spitzbergen region and 
subsequently in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. 
Destroyers 
150 of which 70 were post war Skorys 
34 were Kotlins and approximately 50 were 
pre World War II vessels" At least 4 Kildin 
destroyers were available. 
Escorts 
80 post war construction Ri<;Ja and Kola class. 
Sub-chasers 
340 Kronstadt and SO-I class. 
Missile patrol 
50 possible - Komar conversions from P-6 
torpedo boats and early units of Osa. 
Motor torpedo and gun boats 
500 with the fleet areas. 
Amphibious warfare 
120 - coastal operations only 
(mean tonnage estimated at 350 tons) (c) 
Minesweepers 
150 ocean going 
160 coastal and inshore. 
Naval aviation 
3,500 aircraft of which perhaps 
2,500 were short ranged jet fighters. (d) 
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Of the remainder possibly 50 long range Badger 
bombers fitted with 2 early generation Kennel ASMs. 
(a) figure from 'The Soviet Naval Threat: Reality and 
Illusion' Defense Monitor, May 1972. 
(b) from material provided to u.s. Senator Proxmire by 
Admiral Zumwalt C.N.O. on 2 June 1972. Congressional 
Record - Senate - 12 June 1972, p. S9l88. 
(c) Blechman, B. The Changing Soviet Navy (Washington, 
1973) p.9. 
(d) Based on Breyer Guide, p.lSl. Armour, 'Soviet Naval 
Air Arm•, p.l9l, and Janes 1974/5, p.640. 
Sources: I have used Blechman, p.6-9 to provide sub-
headings and my own figures from the 
construction programme 1953/4 - 1959/60. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1958/9 - 1959/60. 
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Whereas all these forces could have been used for 
coastal defensive and offensive operations, where they 
would have enjoyed a protective umbrella of land based 
fighter aircraft, it is noteworthy that a vast number 
of them were sui table for this role only. Of the surface 
ships only the cruisers, destroyers and some of the 
escorts possessed the requisite .range and sea keeping 
qualities, although not the anti-aircraft capability, 
which would enable them to operate on the high seas. 
Of the attack submarines available to the Soviet Navy 
in late 1959 perhaps as many as 270 could have been used 
outside coastal waters. Of these, 240 were medium ranged 
W class boats (13,000 miles at 8 knots surface cruising). 
The rest were long ranged Zs, Fs (20,000 miles surface 
cruising) and no more than 3 N class SSns. Two 
independent observers indicate that in 1957-8 the 
distribution of these long and medium range boats was 
as follows 1 
Long and Medium Range Submarine Distribution 
between Fleet Areas 1957-8 
Long and Medi urn 
range submarines 
North 
110 
Baltic 
40 
Black 
60 
Pacific 
70 
Source: Nicholl, A.D. Rear Admiral 'Geography 
and Strategy', p.245 and Macintyre, D. 
Capt. 'The Soviet Submarine Threat•, 
p.l70, both in Saunders, ed., 
The Soviet Navy. 
Total 
280 
1 Distribution of other units ~n the fleet areas 1957-8 
North Baltic Black Pacific Total 
Cruisers 8 6 8 6 
Destroyers 35 45 30 30 
Frigates 10 20 15 25 
Coastal Subs 90 70 60 
a) probably based on the current assumption that 17 
Sverdlovs had or would be completed. 
Source: Nicholl, A.D. Rear Admiral 'Geography and 
Strategy' in Saunders, ed., The Soviet Navy, 
p.245. 
28 
140 
70 
220 
a) 
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The most significant point about these 1957-8 figures 
is that they show a major reallocation of submarines to 
the Northern Fleet since 1953, when only 30 submarines of 
all classes were stationed there. This major reallocation 
can be explained not only in terms of ease of access and 
proximity to the Atlantic supply routes but most 
importantly because of the Northern Fleet's proximity to 
the launch areas used by aircraft carriers in NATO sea 
exercises since the early 1950s. 1 The authors of Military 
Strategy, first published in 1962 also drew attention to 
the continuing use of the Norwegian Sea for NATO naval 
. 2 
exerc~ses. 
In his retirement speech A~niral Wright, the American 
Supreme Commander, Atlantic, indicated that there was 
increasing evidence of Soviet submarine and aircraft 
activities in waters off the Norwegian coast in the 1958/9 
period. Although he described this activity as area 
familiarisation, such familiarisation, and exercises 
designed to test coordination between the submarine and 
air forces, would be essential for the Soviet Navy's anti 
3 
carrier operations off the Norwegian coast. 
The ability of these submarines to counter an aircraft 
carrier task force or to attack convoys crossing the 
Atlantic is easy to exaggerate. The 6 W class Twin 
Cylinder SSGs were noisy and slow when proceeding 
submerged and hence liable to detection by task force or 
4 
convoy ASW defences. If they or any other conventionally 
1 See p.72-3above, and also Bulganin's speech to the 19th 
Party Congress in October 1952 where he complains of 
exercises conducted off 'the Northern shores of Norway 
to the Danish island of Bornholm' which were characterised 
as •clearly aggressive and provocative•. Trans. Current 
Soviet Policies, Vol. I ed. Leo Gruliow (New York, 1953), 
p.l87. 
2 Sokolovsky, ed., Military Strategy, lst edition Rand 
translation p.42l. 
3 New York Times, 19 December 1959. 
4 The carrier born ASW aircraft became available in 1953 
when the first of the Tracker S-2 series enetered service. 
Rowe,J.S. and Morison, S.L. Ships and Aircraft of the US 
Fleet 9th edition (Annapolis, 1972), p.l7l. 
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powered submarine attempted a more rapid surface transit 
they, and the Kildin class missile armed destroyers, 
risked attack from the air, particularly once they passed 
beyond the rang2 of effective land based fighter protection. 
The short range aircraft, which comprises the bulk of 
the carrier attack planes in the early 1950s, required a 
carrier task force to launch aircraft from the sea space 
1 to the North of Norway, that is at the western perimeter 
of the Northern Fleet's traditional combat zone and withi'n 
range of shore based aircraft. The introduction of the 
longer range Skyhawks and Skywarriors 2 to carrier service 
meant that carriers could attack major Soviet cities such 
as Leningrad from sea space in the Norwegian Sea to the 
west of Trondheim Ford. 3 This was well beyond the reach 
of the Soviet land based fighters. In fact a Soviet naval 
force attempting to destroy such a task force would have 
to transit approximately 800 miles along the Norwegian 
coast line,without air cover,before reaching the task 
force. 
Only the few available N class SSNs could reach the 
attack carrier launching zone submerged and at reasonable 
speeds. But even these may have been vulnerable because 
of the noise generated by their hull shape and first 
generation nuclear propulsion systems. 
It is unlikely that the naval air forces would have 
had any greater success. Prior to 1960 only the Kennel 
missile, range 60 miles, fitted to the Badger bomber was 
available to the Soviet Navy. The limited number of 
Badgers available to the Northern and Baltic Fleets, flying 
without fighter escort, was unlikely to penetrate the task 
1 See p. 115a .. above. 
2 Skywarrior range 2,500 miles, Skyhawk range 1,700+ 
miles. Ships ~~d Aircraft, p.l72. 
3 The distance from a point in the Norwegian Sea 100 
miles west of Trondheim Ford to Leningrad is approximately 
800 miles. 
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forces' anti-aircraft screen which, by 1960, consisted 
not only of ship borne radar and defence systems on 
forward picket duty, but also airborne early warning 
aircraft, 1 and carrier based fighter aircraft. 2 
The introduction of longer ranged attack aircraft, 
and the variety of early-warning and anti-submarine 
systems available to a carrier task force, had clearly 
altered the requirements of a successful anti-task force 
operation. At the very least a reliable anti-aircraft 
system was required to protect surface transit forces and 
at best an underwater transitting force was highly 
desirable. The improved capabilities of carrier task-
forces were undoubtedly one element in the major 
reassessment of Soviet naval requirements which occurred 
in the mid to late 1950s and accounts for the limited 
number of SSM ships delivered. Not until 1962 when the 
Kashin class SAM armed destroyers appeared did the Soviet 
Navy possess a reliable anti-aircraft capability. The 
N class SSN gave a limited number of units capable of 
submerged transit but it was not until the appearance of 
the E-II SSGN class in 1963 that an 
available. 
adequate underwater 
Therequ~e~nt fm transitting force became 
surface launch was still a major handicap even then. 
In the late 1950s it was unlikely that the submarines 
attached to the Northern Fleet could have disrupted 
convoys on the trans-Atlantic routes. Whereas it might 
have been possible to overwhelm the ASW forces of a carrier 
1 The Trac~r E-lB carrier borne early warning aircraft 
was delivered to the Navy in 1958 range 2,000 miles. 
Morison and Rowe, Ships and Aircraft, p.l7l. 
2 The Crusader F-8A fighter, which was also available in 
a reconnaissance version, had speeds of over 1,000 M.P.H. 
and ranges of 1,500 miles for the slower versions to 
1,000+ miles for faster types. 
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task force by a massive surge 
submarines (something between 
deployment of all available 
1 60 and 70 boats), such 
surge deployments are not applicable in an anti commerce 
operation. Disruption of commercial traffic requires a 
fairly constant presence on station in the path of the 
convoy routes, preferably at some considerable distance 
from the land bases of hostile ASW aircraft. 
For the Soviets, this would have implied an ability 
to keep submarines, surplus from the anti-carrier role, 
on station in the mid Atlantic A generous estimate 
would give the Soviets a capability of up to 25 2 
submarines on mid Atlantic station over an extended period. 
Moreover the overwhelming majority of these vessels would 
be W class medium range vessels, the on-station time for 
which would be quite low. There is no evidence that the 
Soviets took up this option. 
Amongst the negative evidence available to substantiate 
this point is the absence of reports of Soviet submarine 
transits to the Atlantic ocean. Since NATO provides anti-
submarine coverage of the area north of Norway and between 
Greenland and the United Kingdom, it is unlikely that 
exercises designed to test Soviet ability to establish a 
submarine blockade would have passed undetected. In 
September 1970 the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
Admiral Holmes claimed that prior to 1960 
The sight of Soviet ships on the high seas 
was exceedingly rare except for occasional 
transfers of units between the Baltic and 
Northern Fleets. These transfers were 
conducted in haste and left the impression 
1 The assumption is that roughly one third of the total 
number of units will be undergoing repairs, crew training 
or some other form of activity which keeps them out of 
action. 
2 This rounded approximation is based on German operating 
experience during World War II adjusted to allow for the 
greater transit distances involved for units from the 
Northern Fleet. The fact that theW submarine would have 
a more limited on station time because of its shorter range 
makes this notional figure too high in all probability. 
that the Soviets felt somewhat uncomfortable 
outside the waters of their own fleet areas.l 
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Gorshkov's review of the tasks of the Soviet Navy in 
February 1963 acknowledged that 'cruising in the Arctic by 
our surface ships and submarines has been a more or less 
routine matter for a long time' , 2a claim that he did not 
advance for any other region. The article as a whole reads 
as a demand that his fleet should in future exercise on 
the high seas under realistic conditions. 
Moreover the Soviet Navy's lack of submarine tenders, 
submarine rescue ships and support vessels;suggests that 
no forward deployment of submarines had been planned. 
Support vessels for attack submarines did not appear until 
1958-60, and these were conversions and restorations of 
merchant freighters, tankers and captured German vessels. 
There was one significant out of area deployment of 
submarine forces during this period. In late 1958 a 
number of W class medium range submarines, conventionally 
armed, were based at the Albanian port of Valona. 3 These 
submarines, which never exceeded twelve units, 4remained 
until June 1961 when the Soviets lost their base rights 
due to Albanian adherence to the Chinese camp in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. 5 
1 Holmes, E.P. Admiral 'The Soviet Presence in the 
Atlantic' NATO Letter Vol. 18, September 1970, p.6-ll. 
2 Gorshkov, S.G. 'The Great Tasks of the Soviet Navy' 
Red Star 5 February 1963, FBIS 14 February 1963 
USSR National Affairs, p.cc-3. 
3 New York Times, 8 April 1959, and Times, 20 April 1959. 
4 New York Herald Tribune, 15 November, 1960. 
5 Times, 13 June 1961. New York Times, 17 June 1961. 
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The submarines for the Albanian base were drawn from 
the Baltic Fleet. 1 Their presence occasioned some other 
Soviet naval activity in the region,primarily by fleet 
transports, a few destroyers and a fleet hydrographic 
vessel. 
It is possible that while the Soviet navy was 
occupying the Valona base facilities Albania received 
four W class submarines, together with 
boats, 4 sub chasers and a variety of 
twelve P-4 torpedo 
. 2 
mJ.nesweepers as 
part of a naval arms agreement. Such vessels were still 
in Albania after the Soviets had withdrawn from the region. 
If these vessels were in fact Albanian property then this 
would reduce to eight the number of Soviet submarines in 
the region. 
Robert Weinland has exhaustively studied the Rapport 
Annue.l sur le Mouvement des Navires a Travers les Detraits 
~T~u~r~~~s~,issued by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs~ 
which gives 'details regarding the movement of foreign 
vessels of war through the Turkish Straits•,under Article 
24 of the Montreux Convention. 
While it would serve no useful purpose to repeat his 
analysis here, the raw figures of transits between the 
Black Sea and Mediterranean for the period 1954-1961 are 
relevant. 
1 Article 12 of the Montreux Convention reads: 'Black Sea 
Powers shall have the right to send through the Straits 
for the purpose of regaining their base, submarines 
constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided 
that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of 
such submarines shall have been given to Turkey. 
Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be 
entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in 
dockyards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed 
information on the matter is given to Turkey. 
In either case, the said submarines must travel by day 
and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits 
singly. 1 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.20-2l. 
3 Weinland, R 'Soviet Transits of the Turkish Straits 
1945-1970' C.N.A. Professional Paper No. 94 (Washington, 
1972) reprinted in MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Development 
(Halifax, 1973) p.293-310. 
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TABLE I: TRANSITS OF SOVIET WARSHIPS BEIWEEN THE BlACK SEA AND TI-m MEDITERRANEAN 
1954-1961 
y E A R 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Total transits by 
Combatants 6 5 6 22 18 18 29 8 
Cruisers 8-M 1 1 2 1 3 
M-B 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Destroyers B-M 2 2 7 6 7 
M-B 2 2 3 3 4 
Escorts B-M 
M-B 
Patrol Cr a:ft B-M B 3 
M-B 1 
Submarine B-M 2 
M-B 
Minesweepers B-M 2 6 5 3 4 
M-B 2 2 5 2 1 
Othex B-M 1 1 2 6 
Combatants M-B 1 1 
Total transits 
by Auxiliaries 2 24 72 102 52 
Military Trans B-M 3 19 21 B 
M-B 1 21 10 4 
Replenishment B-M 2 7 18 14 
M-B 1 9 18 10 
Hydrographic B-M 1 4 4 3 5 
M-B 1 3 5 4 2 
Tugs B-M 3 2 5 4 
M-B 2 2 9 3 
Other B-M 3 3 5 1 
M-B 2 9 1 
B-M = Black Sea to Mediterranean 
M-B = Mediterranean to Black Sea 
source: R. Weinland 1 op.cit. 
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The data, incomplete as a record o£ total Soviet naval 
presence in the Mediterranean because they do not cover 
transits through the Gibraltar Straits (the major entry 
point £or submarines), do indicate broad changes in the 
levels of deployment. Clearly there was an upsurge o£ 
activity dating from 1957 until the end o£ the period, 
the increase being quite dramatic in the case o£ naval 
auxiliaries. 
Not only did the vessels come and go more frequently 
but the mean length of stay £or surface combatants also 
appears to have increased at this time. 
Table II: Mean Length o£ Stay £or Major Surface 
Combatants in the Mediterranean 1954-1961 
Year 
Cruisers 
Destroyers 
Escorts 
Minesweepers 
1954 1955 
6 
days 
6 15 
days days 
15 
days 
1956 1957 
15 33 
days days 
15 45 
days days 
18 
days 
Source: Weinland, R. op.cit. 
1958 1959 1960 
38 12 
days days 
42 14 
days days 
65 
days 
1961 
In the period 1954 to 1957 Soviet naval activity in the 
Mediterranean consisted primarily o£ deployments o£ small 
numbers o£ cruisers and destroyer units making port visits. 
Because o£ the limited duration o£ these sorties no 
auxiliary deployment was necessary. 
Soviet naval units paid port visits1 to Yugoslavia and 
the port o£ Durres in Albania in May and June o£ 1954. In 
May-June 1956 a Soviet cruiser and two destroyers visited 
Split and Durres. The destroyers also called at Alexandria 
in June while a year later Durres was visited by a cruiser 
and destroyer £rom the Black Sea Fleet and in September 
1 I am indebted to Harlan K. Ullman £or making his 
'Chronological Listing o£ Soviet Naval Visits• available 
to me. The listing originally appeared in his unpublished 
thesis Des air and Eu horia: Pers ectives o£ Soviet Naval 
Development 1917-1973 Fletcher School, 1973), p.255-266. 
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a cruiser and destroyer from the Baltic Fleet visited 
Split and Latakia. During October 1957 a separate Black 
Sea contingent of a cruiser and two destroyers visited 
Yugoslavia. 
The period from 1958 to 1961 saw a sharp increase ~n 
the level of activity although there is no evidence of any 
Mediterranean port visits during this time. As the tables 
above show, auxiliaries account for most of the increase. 
Although the number of combatants stayed relatively low, 
they did stay longer in the area, and this in part accounts 
for the increase in the number of auxiliary vessels. The 
auxiliaries most in evidence in this period were transport 
and replenishment vessels which were involved in the 
establishment of the Soviet naval base in the Gulf of 
Valona. Possibly the Albanians were in no position to 
offer anything more than a sheltered port and storage 
facilities so the Soviets had to bring in their own 
supplies. The reduction in activity in 1961 is explained 
by the fact that the Soviets were forced out of the base 
in the middle of that year. 
The establishment of the Soviet naval base at Valona, 
primarily for a submarine force, can be interpreted as a 
Soviet response to the threat posed to the southern USSR 
by the introduction o£ long range aircraft aboard the 
aircraft carriers o£ the Sixth Fleet. From launch areas 
in the Eastern Mediterranean the Skywarrior could reach 
Odessa, Sevastapol, Rostov and possibly Kiev and Baku; 
that is the major agricultural, industrial and oil 
producing regions o£ the USSR. 1 Moreover the Sixth Fleet 
was a direct obstacle to Soviet ability to control the 
Black Sea outlets, in the event of war occurring. 
1 Soviet proposals for a nuclear free zone in 'the Balkans 
and Adriatic region' were more concerned with the 
establishment of missiles in these regions as agreed by 
NATO governments in December 1957. 
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In 1960 some 20 vessels exercised in a region between 
the Ionian Sea and Crete. 1 These included a cruiser and 
two destroyers from the Black Sea Fleet, additional 
submarines from the Baltic and submarines from the Valona 
base. This exercise area could be an excellent choke 
point for disrupting Sixth Fleet activities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
The Soviet squadron's operations were subject to a 
number of handicaps, not the least of which was the 
deterioration of political relations between Moscow and 
Tirana. Valona is situated just inside the Adriatic Sea 
and the submarines based there would need to transit the 
Strait of Otranto,one side of which is dominated by Italy 
from the nearby Taranto naval base. Operations in the 
Ionian Sea would be subject to close observation from 
the established British base at Malta. 
While the anti carrier role was the primary mission 
of this squadron the hydrographic vessels and Lentra 
class auxiliaries equipped with electronic detection 
devices carried out basic data gathering functions in 
the 
the 
region and closely 
2 NATO forces. 
observed the naval exercises of 
By the 1950s the Soviet Union's SLBM force comprised 
7 Z conversions and no more than 7 units of the H and G 
class. It is possible that all of these units were 
situated in the North where they would be able to transit 
most rapidly to firing zones off the American east coast, 
but it is more reasonable to assume that some were based 
in the Pacific. 
It is doubtful that any of these boats were kept on 
station at this time. On February 4, 1959 Rear Admiral 
Charles Weakley, executive officer ln charge of anti-
submarine warfare at the Pentagon, told a New York Times 
reporter that United States forces had never positively 
1 Times, 19 September, 1960. 
2 Ibid. 
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identified a Soviet submarine in or near United States 
coastal waters and specified that this included distances 
of 1,000 to 1,500 miles from the shores of the United 
States. 1 In May 1959 a Soviet submarine was sighted in 
the waters off Iceland and photographed. 2 Such a 
sighting was not coincidental. The US Navy had maintained, 
at irregular intervals, an anti-submarine barrier in the 
Iceland-Faeroe Islands gap composed of ASW aircraft and 
submarines. 3 In the summer of 1961 the US Navy was to 
take over existing defence installations from the US Air 
Force enabling the previously intermittent patrols to be 
carried out on a continuous basis. 4 Moreover the United 
States had deployed surveillance and detection systems 
off the American coastline since the early 1950s. 5 By 
1960 it is probably that the highly classified CAESAR 
system was . . 6 1n operat1on. 
Given the state of the ASW art in the late 1950s 
and, more significantly, the state of the Soviet SLBM 
art at the same time, it is doubtful that the Soviet 
system posed a major threat to the United States. Soviet 
F.B.M. submarines appear to have remained within Arctic 
waters,rather than conduct regular patrols off the 
American coast. They would therefore have to transit 
during period of crisis. Not only were the majority of 
F.B.M. submarines available conventionally powered, 
transitting most economically and quickly on the surface, 
1 New York Times, 6 February 1959. 
2 New York Times, 19 August 1959. 
3 New York Times, 19 December 1960. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Booda, L.L. '"Barrier" concept complements mobile systems 
in anti-submarine warfare• Underseas Technology November 
1968, p.42;..50. 
6 Studies for the CAESAR system were begun by Western 
Electric Company in 1956. The system's reliability was 
demonstrated during the Cuban crisis of 1962 following 
which it was expanded and upgraded. Defense Market 
Survey April and September 1967 cited in SIPRI Yearbook 
of World Armaments and Disarmament 1969/70 (London, 1970) 
p.l48-9. 
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but they also had to pass across the restricted seas to 
the north of Norway and between Greenland and the United 
Kingdom. During periods of tension these could, even in 
the 1950s, have been heavily patrolled by ASW aircraft and 
ships. The fact that submarines had to surface in order 
to launch their short range missiles was a further handicap. 
In effect it required a submarine to surface within range 
of ASW aircraft patrols off the American coast. A regular 
patrol could either force a hostile F.B.M. submarine to 
remain submerged, and hence render it unable to fire its 
missiles, or else attack a submarine once it had surfaced, 
forcing it to resubmerge or to risk being sunk. 
It 1s possible that, faced with such a situation, the 
Soviet Supreme Command may have chosen to use the SLBMs 
against European targets. This could hardly have served 
as the rationale for such a force in the first instance as 
it could legitimately be claimed,,by those seeking to 
introduce economies into the area of military expenditure, 
that this was a mere duplication of ground force capability. 
The Soviets may now have a 'triad' of nuclear retali,ation 
forces but it is unlikely that during the middle to late 
1 1950s such a duplication of effort would have been tolerated. 
The argument in favour of the original SLBMs must 
therefore have been that they provided a vehicle for 
conducting nuclear strikes on the United States. In the 
event that judgment may have been revised, at least until 
the deployment of the second generation SLBM, which was not 
only longer ranged but was also capable of underwater 
launch. 2 
1 See Chapter 4 for the impact of Khrushchev's policies 
on overall military spending. 
2 The SS-N-5 has been credited with a range of 800 miles 
and is a dived launch missile. Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, 
p.639, and Janes Weapon System, p.l57. 
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Soviet Naval Visits and the Soviet Use and Evaluation of 
Navy in Crisis 
In the period from the end of the war to June 1956 
Soviet naval units paid few visits to non-communist 
countries. The exceptions were the visits to Portsmouth, 
in 1953, for the coronation review, in 1955 and in 1956 
when a Soviet visit was occasioned by the Bulganin and 
Khrushchev visit. Soviet vessels had also visited non-
communist Baltic states. 
In June 1956 two Black Sea fleet destroyers visited 
Alexandria. Undoubtedly the visit was considered 
appropriate following the successful arms deal of the 
previous year>which had included the supply of naval 
units, some of which were transferred in May and June 1956. 
Soviet-Egyptian relations had improved post-1954 when the 
Soviet Union attracted a favourable press in Cairo and 
Damascus because of its support for the Arabs against 
Israel. Egypt and the Soviet Union had entered a series 
of trade agreements, which resulted in increasing Egyptian 
economic dependence on the Soviet Union, through Soviet 
purchases of Egyptian cotton. The arms agreement of 1955 
increased Soviet influence in Egypt, strengthened the hand 
of Arab countries opposed to the establishment of the 
Baghdad Pact, thus weakening the impact of the alliance 
on the Soviet Union, and offset the trade deficit which 
h d . t 1 a run aga~ns Moscow. 
By mid 1956 the Soviet Union had substantial political, 
economic, security and military interests in Egypt. Whether 
Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in July 
1956 was made with this commitment in mind is not certain; 
however, the Soviet government expressed its support for 
the Egyptian move in the diplomatic activities occasioned 
by the nationalisation. 2 
1
see Ra'anan The USSR Arms the Third World, p.l3-34 and 
Macintosh Strategy and Tactics, p.l79-183. 
2 Thomas, Hugh The Suez Affair (Ringwood, Vic., 1970) and 
Appendix IV. Bulganin's Letter to Sir Anthony Eden, ll 
September 1956, p.206-210. 
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During the Suez crisis of October-November 1956 
Soviet moves must have cast some doubt in the minds of the 
Egyptians as to the degree of support the Soviet Union was 
willing to provide. Advisers received instructions not to 
become involved in the fighting and the Il-28 bombers 
provided by the Soviet Union were withdraw~1 first to upper 
Egypt, and eventually to Syria. 
Bulganin's letter to Eden of 5 November 1956, 
displayed considerable Soviet disquiet over the Anglo-
French invasion but did not commit the Soviet Union to 
any specific course of action. 1 More interesting, for 
our purpose, was Bul9anin' s letter to President Eisenhower, 
on the same date, in which he pointed out that the Soviet 
Union and the United States, as permanent members of the 
Security Council and the major military powers, bore 
'special responsibility for stopping the war• and put 
forward a proposal for close cooperation in halting 
aggression. 
The United States possesses a strong navy in 
the Mediterranean zone. The Soviet Union also 
possesses a strong navy and powerful aviation. 
The joint ~Dd immediate use of these means by 
the United States of America and the Soviet 
Union, on a decision of the United Nations, 
would be a reliable guarantee for ending 
aggression against the Egyptian people, against 
the countries of the Arab East. 
This proposal was simultaneously introduced to the 
United Nations Security Council in a Note from Mr. Shepilov, 
the USSR's delegate on the Council. The Note reiterated 
the obligations o.f the United Nations and the Soviet Union 
and called for the dispatch of 'naval and air forces, 
military units, volunteers, instructions, materiel and 
other aid' and declared the Soviet Union's readiness to 
send 'the necessary air and naval forces•. 3 
1 For the text of Bulganin's letter see Documents on 
International Affairs 1956 (London, 1959), p.288-289. 
2 Ibid, 
3 Ibid, 
p.292-4. 
p.286-288. 
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The costs of this proposal, which was rejected by the 
United States, 1 would have been minimal to the Soviet 
Union and, with United States cooperation, but only with 
that cooperation, quite within the Soviet Union's capability. 
Without that cooperation the task was beyond Soviet means 
and nothing more was heard of the suggestion. 
The Soviet naval visit to Latakia, Syria, in September 
1957 occurred at a time of pressure on the Soviet-leaning 
Syrian regime. On 7 September Mr. Dulles spoke of the 
'apparently growing Soviet Communist domination of Syria 
and the large build-up there of Soviet-bloc arms' and 
expressed concern over border incidents, propaganda and 
subservise activities direct against the governments of 
Syria's neighbours. He then reminded his audience of 
Eisenhower's message to Congress on 5 January 1957 in which 
the President successfully sought authority to help the 
nations of the Middle East defend their independence. 2 
The Soviet vessels, a Sverdlov cruiser and a destroyer 
escort, which had been visiting Yugoslavia, arrived in 
Latakia on 19 September and remained until 2 October 3 by 
which time it appeared as though the immediate cause for 
concern, accusations that the United States, Britain and 
Turkey intended to invade Syria, no longer applied. 
Such a limited naval presence, while not in itself a 
major military commitment, implied support for the Syrian 
regime and as such may be seen as a clear example of the 
Soviet use of a naval presence for diplomatic effect. 
No Soviet vessels appeared in the Mediterranean during 
the Lebanese and Jordanian interventions of 1958 which 
l Ibid, p.294-295. 
2 Ibid, p.233-4l for Eisenhower's message to Congress. 
'Statement by Mr. Dulles to the Press regarding United 
States Policy in the Middle East, 7 September 1957 1 • 
Documents on International Affairs, 1957 (London, 1960), 
p.332-3. 
3 Macintosh, M. Strategy and Tactics, p.227. 
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followed the overthrow of the Iraqi government in July 
1958. In a letter to Eisenhower, 19 July 1958, proposing 
a summit conference to discuss the crisis in the Middle 
East, 1 Khrushchev reminded the Americans 
that the Soviet Union, too, has atomic and 
hydrogen bombs and an air force and a navy, 
and also ballistic missiles of all kinds, 
including intercontinental missiles. 
The only overt military response was a series of exercises 
in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan military districts. 2 
Even Khrushchev's call for a summit conference, and his 
reminder to theAmerican President of Soviet military 
might, came after the British and American landings had 
stabilised the position in Jordan and Lebanon respectively. 
It was not until some weeks had passed that the first 
Soviet submarines and the accompanying tender were sent 
to Albania. 3 
In the Far East the Soviet Union had protested at the 
Nationalist Chinese •piracy' which had resulted in the 
interruption of shipping to mainland China. She had also 
blamed the United States for condoning such actions, 4 but 
the complaints and protests were not accompanied by any 
military activity. During the offshore islands disputes 
of August 1958 the Soviet Union acted with considerable 
caution. No doubt to the chagrin of the Chinese 
Communists, Khrushchev spoke of the conflict in the Far 
1 Text of letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr Eisenhower 
19 July 1958 in Agwani, M.S., ed., The Lebanese Crisis 
1958 (London, 1965) p.299-304 The quotation together 
with some harsh words on the mental condition of the 
Commander of the Sixth Fleet occurs on p.300. 
2 Macintosh, M. Strategy and Tactics, p.234. 
3 Statement of Office of Naval Intelligence in United 
States Congress, House Committee on Armed Forces: Sea 
Power Subcommittee, Status of Naval Ships. 9lst Congress, 
1st Session (Washington, 1968) p.244. ' 
4 Korovin, E. 'U.S. Violation of freedom of the seas• 
International Affairs (Moscow) March 1955, p.57-65. 
See also New Times 1954, No. 22, p.l9; No. 27, p.2l-22, 
and No. 46 •stop the Piracy•. 
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East as an American diversion to draw attention away from 
the real crisis spot in the Middle East. 1 Indeed it 
appears as though Khrushchev was reluctant to interrupt 
his holidays for he did not enter the fray until 7 
2 September. 
Earlier ~n 1958, there had been an attempt to 
establish a long range radio station on the Chinese main-
land, to establish Soviet facilities in Chinese ports for 
the refueling of Soviet submarines, and to provide an 
3 
opportunity for Soviet sailors to enjoy shore leave. 
This was rejected out of hand by the Chinese, who, at the 
height of the Sino-Soviet polemics in 1963, accused the 
USSR of making 'unreasonable demands designed to bring 
4 China under military control'. 
It would appear that the Soviet Union indeed sought 
to restrain the Chinese. Soviet Pacific Fleet vessels 
remained in their home area throughout the crisis5 and 
not until late August, almost a month after the initial 
crisis moves, did the Soviet Union acknowledge the 
Quemoy issue as a major international incident. On 7 
September 1958 Khrushchev w~ote to Eisenhower pointing 
out 'An attack on the Chinese People's Republic ... is an 
attack on the Soviet Union•. 6 but this was only after 
the crisis appeared capable of resolution and one day 
1 . . 7 l Moscow Sov~et Home Serv~ce 2 August 958, broadcast 
of g:article 'Vladim):ov, What is behind the slander?' 
Izvestia cited Howe, J.T. Multicrises (Cambridge, Mass., 
1971) p.2l9. 
2 Wall, R.F. 'Formosa and the Chinese offshore islands' 
in Barraclough, G., ed., Survey of International Affairs 
1956-1958 (London, 1962), p.568. 
3 Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p.l85-9. 
4 
'The origin and development of the differences' 
Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 37 (13 September 1963). 
5 For an exhaustive study of naval movements, see 
Howe, J.T. Multicrises, p.l63-282. 
6 Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, 
Moscow 7 September 1958, in Documents on International 
Affairs l958,(London, 1962), p.l82-l89. 
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after American-Chinese talks had been proposed by Chou 
1 . 1 En- a~. 
In the course of his letter Khrushchev complained 
to Eisenhower about the United States• assuming the role 
of world gendarme. The gendarme's night stick was the 
US Navy. 
The practice of rushing United States warships 
from one place to another has in general become 
frequent of late (Lebanon). Indeed, it can be 
almost unmistakably determined where the next 
blackmail or provocation will occur by the 
movement of American naval units.2 
This theme was taken up by the Soviet press which also 
reiterated his call for the return home of the American 
fleets. 3 
Despite this concern Khrushchev queried whether 
•such dispatching of warships now in one direction, now 
in another• still made sense •at least with respect to 
countries possessing modern weapons• .. 
It seems to us they (US military officers) 
cannot but know that the Neyday of surface 
navy powers is over. In the age of nuclear 
and rocket weapons of unprecedented power and 
rapid action these once formidable warships 
are fit, in fact, for nothing but courtesy 
visits and gun salutes, and can serve as 
targets for the right type of rockets.4 
This reaction to the movements of the Seventh Fleet shows 
on the one hand a healthy respect for naval power and at 
the same time an attempt to diminish its significance. 
1 Statement by Premier Chou En-lai, 6 September 1958, 
in Documents 1958, p.l79-l82. 
2 Khrushchev's Letter, 7 September 1958, in Documents 1958, 
p.l83-4. 
3 
'The World's Gendarme's Policy' International Affairs 
(Moscow), No. 10 1958, p.8. Khrushchev Letter, 7 
September 1958, Documents 1958, p.l89. 
4 Khrushchev Letter 7 September 1958, Documents 1958, 
p.l84-5. 
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It neatly illustrates the frustrations of Soviet naval 
policy under Khrushchev. The political significance of 
a large surface naval fleet was obvious,but,because of 
the Premier's fascination with the new military innovations 
and the desire for military economy, it had to be denied by 
stressing the vulnerability and alleged irrelevance of the 
surface navy in general nuclear war. No matter how much 
the Soviets concentrated on building a navy capable of 
effecting a sea denial strategy, the United States 
continued to demonstrate that command of the sea was not 
irrelevant, and in so doing placed the Soviet Union in 
the embarrassing position of either initiating a conflict 
at sea,with the attendant risk of escalation into nuclear 
war, or doing nothing. 
APPENDIX I Soviet Naval Aid to the Third World 
1956-61. 
226 
Mention has already been made of the Soviet Union's 
approaches to the third world countries during this period. 
One aspect of this approach can be seen in the supply of 
arms, especially to those areas where the threat of 
Western encirclement could be broken by exploiting the 
regional rivalries and anti-imperialist nationalism, 
which had been ignored by the West. 
The fact that naval equipment from the Stalin era 
was part and parcel of overall arms agreements had three 
implications. First, the Soviet Union felt itself over-
equipped in some units. Second, because of their early 
post war design these units could be dispensed with 
without fear of giving away any technological secrets. 
Third, naval arms aid could add to the reputation of the 
Soviet Union as a significant military power in the 
third world areas where such arms were sent. 
Such a distribution of arms also introduced the Soviet 
Union into strategically important areas such as the Middle 
East and, later, into the Indian subcontinent and South 
East Asia, thus marking the beginning of efforts to break 
the West's monopoly in these areas. Incidental to this 
was the general increase in influence in third world areas. 
By 1960 the Soviet Union had supplied naval vessels to 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the Middle East, and had begun 
the trans fer of units to Indonesia. All such supplies 
continued into the 1960s. 
With the vessels went specialist instructors, as was 
the case with other Soviet arms. A not unwelcome by-
product of this activity was the openly expressed anxiety 
of some Western commentators at the equipment of navies 
in sensitive areas with Soviet vessels. The instruction 
units would also certainly have gained some knowledge of 
areas outside the Soviet base areas. 
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Soviet Naval Arms Aid to the Third World 1956-61 
Egypt 
DESTROYERS 
2 Sko.ry class 
ll June 1956 
to Alexandria. 
Dec. 1959 report 
of 16 of these 
vessels trans-
ferred or to be 
transferred 
2 delivered to 
Alexandria 
Jan. 1962 
SUBMARINES 
W class 
4 from Soviet 
Navy June 1957 
3 24 Jan. 1958 
l Jan 1962 
MV class coastal 
sub transferred 
June 1957 
CORVETTES 
TORPEDO BOATS 
P6 type 
12 in 19 April 
1956. 
+6 in 1960. 
MINESWEEPERS 
T43 type 
delivered 
1956. 
Syria 
P4 type 
5 to Latakia 
7 in Feb.l957 
12 in others 
later. 
P6 type 
2 in 1959 
4 in Nov. 
1960. 
6 in Jan. 
1961 
Source: Janes Fighting Ships 1963/4. 
Indonesia 
4 Skory class 
destroyers 
purchased from 
Poland and 
transferred to 
Indonesia ~n 
1959. 
AUX. 
2 Soviet 
tankers to 
Indonesia 
29 June 1959 
W class 
6 transferred 
from Polish 
Navy August 
1959. 
Kronstadt class 
14 transferred 
from Soviet 
Union 30 Dec. 
1958. 
• 
( 
successfully carry out such a task is doubtful. G~~ 
-~~~ Soviet submarines needed to transit to 
the Atlantic to cut the sea lanes of importance and NATO point 
defence ASvJ was improving throughout the post war period. The 
further the anti SLOC mission was from the Soviet front line 
the more difficult it would become. 
The Soviet deployment of W. class torpedo attack sub-
marines to the Mediterranean in the late 1950s was a direct 
attempt to counter the Sixth Fleet's carrier strike force. 
Soviet Naval activity increased in the Norwegian Sea. Exercises 
here involved surface vessels, submarine and shore based naval 
aviation and were designed to test Soviet ability to launch 
coordinated attacks against carrier task forces operating· off 
the Norwegian coast. 
The Soviet political leadership claimed that it now 
possessed a strong navy but its use of naval forces in diplo-
matic crises not directly involving the Soviet Union was 
extremely cautious and low level. Soviet vessels frequently 
did not put in an appearance until after the event and Soviet 
leaders confined themselves to verbal attacks on the "g·endarme 
role" of the United States Navy. 
Despite Soviet claims that the large surface navies had 
passed their zenith, events indicated otherwise and the United 
States in particular continued to demonstrate that while it 
maintained command of the sea there was little that the Soviet 
Navy, primarily a sea denial force, could achieve. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
During the 1950s there was a growing awareness, in the 
political and military leadership of the Soviet Union, that 
a) 
the role of the Navy would be of far greater importance in 
future conflicts than it had been in the past. This realization 
steF~ed in large part from technological advances which altered 
both the future offensive and defensive missions of the Soviet 
Navy in a variety of ways. By the la~e 1950s only a few SSBs 
and SSBNs were available to the Soviet Navy. Despite the 
difficulties of access to the open seas, the problems inherent 
in surface transit for the diesel electric boats of the ZV and 
G~lass and the fact that the first generation SLBMs had limited 
range and required surface launching these SLBMs were the main 
strike force available to the Soviet Union against the United 
States land mass. By 1960 the soviet operational ICBM force 
was barely in existence and the Long Range Air Force was con-
sidered inadequate to the task. 
The defensive missions of the Soviet Navy, destroying 
sea based attack forces at. or prior to their launch points, 
meant that the Soviet Navy had to extend its perimeter of 
operations beyond the coastal waters and enclosed seas. Such 
an extension of operations could only be undertaken >·lith 
difficulty for the Soviet Navy had no forward bases in the new 
zones of operations and no attempt had been made to provide the 
large auxiliary fleet required by a Navy which was to find 
itself increasingly operating beyond home waters. Moreover 
during hostilities the surface ships and transitting submarines 
would lack reliable air protection beyond the effective 
operational range of shore based aircraft. The installation 
of surface to air missiles on surface vessels could pl~ovide a 
point defence capability but had little impact on the offensive 
capability of the fleet. 
Although interdiction of the enemy sea lines of communication 
remained a mission for the Soviet Navy whether or not it could 
CHAPTER VII 
INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to fully understand the particular 
development of the Soviet Navy without an appreciation of the 
changing strategic environment, the military debates occasioned 
by such change and the political-economic context within which 
naval development has occurred. The significance of these 
factors is particularly important in the early 1960s. As we 
have seen Khrushchev was committed to a basic re-orientation 
of Soviet production away from emphasis on heavy industry 
towards an increase in consumer goods. He also adopted an 
interventionist stance on military matters, in particular over 
the implications of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems 
for the force levels and equipment of the various branches of 
the armed forces. 
In January 1960 Khrushchev announced major cuts in all 
the traditional branches of the armed forces. These cuts 
occasioned widespread military debate and opposition and 
eventually in 1961 the cuts were suspended. The economies were 
being attempted at a time when increased importance was being 
attached to the Strategic Racket Troops,(the ICBM delivery 
programme 1vas about to commence,) and to the air and missile 
defence programmes. 
Although there was a continued interest in the development 
of the SLBM programme and in coastal defence operations the role 
of the Na~y in a future war was judged by many non-naval 
officers to be uncertain. Zhukov had made the point, in the 
1950s, that the Navy would be of greater significance in the 
future but in the early 1960s military leaders were far more 
conditional in their assessments. In particular the non-naval 
military and political leadership dismissed the importance of 
surface vessels and the naval leadership fought a campaign to 
defend the new missile equipped vessels entering service at the 
time. Even among the naval leadership the major surface vessels, 
large attack carriers, battleships and artillery firing cruisers 
were said to have lost their importance and the submarine, 
and in particular the nuclear powered missile firing submarine, 
was considered to be the basis of naval fighting power. 
During the early 1960s the SSBNs, of the United States 
Navy in particular, replaced the attack carrier task force as 
the major sea based threat to the Soviet Union. The first 
generation Polaris system operated in seas beyond the coastal 
region and posed additional problems of location, tracking and 
destruction. Moreover if these boats were to be successfully 
countered before their missiles were launched they would need 
to be located and tracked during peace time. In the period 
1960-1964 such public discussion as occurred on the new sea 
based threat appeared designed to reassure the public. In 
the non-naval writings there was an apparently unintended 
confusion between ballistic and cruise missile submarines. 
The most realistic proposals for countering the SSBNs involved 
ICBM strikes against their home ports and the navigation and 
communications infrastruct.ure. 
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CHAPTER VII 
The Khrushchev Navy 1960-1964 
The Military Debates 
The period from 
high level of debate 
1960 to 1964 was characterised by a 
over fundamental military 
concerning the likelihood, utility, nature and 
questions 
duration of 
a future war. Other questions, on the need for military 
superiority in strategic weapons, the possibility of 
limiting wars which may occur, the size of the armed forces, 
the relative positions, in order of importance, of the 
branches of the armed forces and the nature of political 
military relations were widely discussed. 1 The debates 
were conducted not only within the military profession 
but also between the military and the political leadership. 2 
The military debate occurred within the context of 
Khrushchev's efforts to reorganise the Soviet economy. 
Fundamental to the change was an increased emphasis on the 
consumer sector in the effort to hasten the Soviet Union's 
'development along the path of communism'. This involved a 
major reassessment of Soviet economic priorities which 
previously had laid emphasis on heavy industry. 3 
The military debate also involved issues which 
features strongly in the intensified polemic with the 
Chinese. 4 
The occasion of these debates on military fundamentals 
was undoubtedly the increasing availability of nuclear 
weapons and the development of limited numbers of first 
generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as 
d l . . 5 e 1.very un1.ts. 
The Soviet ICBM programme was facing difficulties. 
By April 1958 some 10 ICBM test launches had been carried 
out, of which six were successful, but in April 1958 tests 
were stopped completely until March 1959. Only in May 1961 
did a series of tests begin which,by their frequency and 
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Footnotes to Page 228 
1 The major documents of the debate are: 
(a) N.S. Khrushchev, Report to the Fourth Session of the 
Supreme Soviet. 'Disarmament is the Path towards 
Consolidating Peace and Ensuring Friendship among Peoples•. 
Moscow Home Service 0800 GMT, 14 January 1960, BBC S.W.B., 
USSR No. 233, 15 January 1960, p.C/1-C/29. 
(b) R. Malinovsky, Speech to 22nd Congress C.P.S.U~, 
Moscow Home Service, 10.30 GMT October 1961, BBC SWB, 
USSR No. 778, 26 October 1961, p.C/8-C/15. 
(c) V.D. Sokolovsky, ed., Military Strategy, 1st edition 
(Moscow, 1962} translation H.S. Dinerste~n, L. Goure & 
T.W .. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963) under the title 
Soviet Military Strategy, henceforth 'RAND translation•. 
(d) V.D. Sokolovsky, ed., Military Strategy 2nd edition 
(Moscow, 1963) translated H.F. Scott, in Translation of 
3rd edition of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy for the 
Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, henceforth 
'Scott translation'. 
(e) V.D. Sokolovsky and M. Cherednichenko, 'The Revolution 
in Military Affairs, Its Importance and Consequences', 
Krasnaya Zvezda 25 and 28 August 1964, translated C.D.S.P. 
Vol. 16, No. 38, p.l4-18. 
The debate is specifically analysed in detail in T.W. Wolfe 
Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). 
See also T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Euro e 1945-1970 
(Balitmore and London, 1970 , p.73-216 for a d~scuss~on 
setting the issues in a European foreign and military 
policy context. 
A useful summary of the debate until 1962 can be found in 
H.S. Dinerstein, L. Goure and T.W. Wolfe, 'Analytical 
Introduction' in Soviet Military Strategy, RAND translation. 
The major changes between the 1st and 2nd editions of 
Military Strategy are noted in L. Goure, Notes on the Second 
Edition of Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky's Military Strategy', 
RAND memorandum RM-3972-PR, February 1964. 
2 The characterisation of the discussion as a debate is 
unfortunate because it suggests an open dialogue. In fact 
the analyst of the 'debate' spends much of his time noting 
nuances, omissions and changes in emphasis from one speaker 
to another. This is not to deny that differences were 
specifically aired in public. Of course participants in 
the 'debates', used to playing the signalling game, are 
attuned to the subtleties. 
Footnotes toP 228 cont. 
3 This change in emphasis can be seen quite clearly 
in most of Khrushchev's speeches devoted to Soviet 
internal development. It reached a climax in the 
campaign for the development of 'big chemistry• at the 
Plenary Sessions of the Communist Party Central 
Committee on 13 December 1963 and 14 February 1964. 
See Pravda, 15 December 1963 and 15 February 1964 for 
the text of Khrushchev's speeches. 
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4 For a discussion of the wider context within which the 
military debate occurred seeM. Tatu, Power in the 
Kremlin from Khrushchev to Kosygin, translated Helen 
Katel (New York, 1970). 
5 f h . . In act t e Sov~et Un~on, 
had very limited numbers of 
by the beginning of 1960, 
ICBMs. 
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regularity, suggested that the production of operational 
models was not far off. The Institute for Strategic 
Studies judged that the May 1961 programme involved the 
use of missiles with storable liquid propellant. 
In January 1963 United States Secretary of Defense 
McNamara indicated that the Soviet Union had begun the 
hardening, and dispersal of its missile sites, although 
the great majority of missiles were still in •soft' 
configurations. 
Using retrospective information released by American 
Defense officials it appears that by 1961 the Soviet Union 
probably had only about five ICBMs, and in April 1961 may 
not have had a single ICBM operational that could have hit 
the U.S. By October 1962 only about 30 SS-7 ICBMs 
were operational. At the end of 1964 the USSR had between 
100 and 150 ICBMs in the operational inventory. 1 
By mid-1962 it was claimed that ta.ctic al nuclear 
weapons had been introduced to all branches of the armed 
forces. 2 
The political attempts to establish a detente with 
the West and the acceptance of a series of limitations on 
the testing of nuclear weapons 3 brought sharp denunciation 
from the Chinese. Criticism of Khrushchev's efforts in 
this sphere also occurred within the Soviet leadership, 
particularly in relation to the U-2 affair. 4 
The U-2 affair brought home to a wider circle of 
party and military personnel within the Soviet Union the 
fragility of the strategic bluff which Khrushchev had 
5 initiated and nurtured. Powers• U-2 was intercepted on 
1 May 1960, but Khrushchev, in the subsequent revelations, 
admitted that this had by no means been the first such 
flight. He referred to an incursion into Soviet air space 
in 1956 which had not previously been made public 6 and 
indicated that such intrusions had not been unique. 
Clearly the veil of secrecy so important for the strategic 
bluff to remain a credible tool in foreign policy had been 
Footnotes to Page 231 
1 The above information has been drawn from D.J. Ball 
'The Strategic Missile Programme of the Kennedy 
Administration 1961-1963 1 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Australian National University) 1972, p.92-105. 
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2 
'The principal fact is that the process of equipping 
the army and navy with atomic nuclear weapons has been 
completed'. S.G. Gorshkov, 28 July 1962, speech marking 
Soviet Navy Day. Moscow in Polish to Poland 2100 GMT 
28 July 1962, FBIS 30 July 1962, USSR National Affairs, 
p.CCl. -
Gorshkov's claim was probably an over-estimate but there 
was no doubt that the main firepower of the ground forces 
and the navy had shifted to tactical missile weapons which 
would deliver nuclear weapons. 
V.D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, p.341-44, RAND 
translation. Marshal V. Chuikov 'Modern Ground Forces•, 
Izvestia, 22 December 1963. 
3 On 25 July 1963 agreement was reached on the halting of 
tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space and 
on 17 October 1963 the UN General Assembly endorsed a 
US-Soviet sponsored statement calling on all states to 
refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons in space. 
20 June 1963 also saw agreement on the need to establish 
a 'hot line' between Washington and Moscow. 
See L.P. Bloomfield, W.C. Clemens Jr. and F. Griffiths 
Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interest in Arms 
Control and Disarmament 1954 1964 {Cambr~dge, Mass., and 
London, 1966) p.l89-193. 
4 M. Tatu, op.cit., p.53-68. 
5 A.L. Horelick and M. Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet 
Foreign Policy {Chicago and London, 1966), p.35-l02. 
6 N.S. Khrushchev, speech at the Czechoslovakian Embassy 
9th May 1960, Pravda May 1960. 
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damaged, and was known to have been damaged, prior to the 
Soviet Union's exaggerated and belligerent statements on 
the alleged range and power of its ICBMs. Moreover, 
Khrushchev had to retreat reluctantly, under pressure of 
the critics of detente, from the 'Spirit of Camp David•, 
and denounce the US President for his role in the U-2 
affair. 
The Soviet naval leaders do not appear to have played 
a major role in the broader debate during this period. 
Rather they appear as a beleaguered group trying to 
maintain their position in a situation where the Navy's 
claim for consideration was not strong. 
By April 1964 the American Department of Defense was 
making public its estimates of the extent of the USSR's 
missile capability1and it appears that the highest levels 
of the US Defense fraternity were aware of the state of 
Soviet missile forces 1961-1962. 2 Moreover, the Kennedy 
Administration continued the accelerated rate of procure-
ment for Minuteman and the submarine launched ballistic 
3 
missile system (SLBM). 
In these circumstances the soviet Union continued to 
direct its major defence effort to the production of ICBMs 
and to the global missile system (FOBS). The 'Griffon• 
and 'Galosh' systems were claimed to be capable of 
providing a ballistic missile defence when they came into 
operation in 1962 and 1964 respectively. Thus the newly 
formed Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and the air and 
1 New York Times, 15 April 1964. 
2 D.J.Ball, 'Strategic Missile Programme of the Kennedy 
Administration', p.l05. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute World 
Armaments and Disarmaments Yearbook 1973 (Stockholm, 
New York and London, 1973, p.76-77. 
3 D.J. Ball, op.cit., p.l75-l84 and tables in Appendix II. 
U.S. Strategic Ballistic Missile Deployment 1959-1967, 
p.382-396. 
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missile defence programme continued to attract the 
finances and attention in the context of an effort to 
increase expenditure on domestic consumption programmes. 
The Role of the Navy in a Future War. 
In this situation the Soviet Navy found that doubts 
were being raised as to the actual role of the Navy in a 
future conflict,which,according to Soviet military doctrine 
of the period,would inevitably take on the character of a 
global missile war once the super-powers were involved. 1 
Thus Khrushchev, after pointing to the availability of 
powerful rocket equipment, claimed in January 1960: 
The Air Force and Navy have lost their previous 
importance in view of the modern development of 
military equipment. This t~pe of weapon is not 
being reduced but replaced. 
Admiral V.A. Kasatonov, Commander of the Black Sea 
Fleet, did not seek to take up the broad question of the 
importance of the Navy at the Supreme Soviet but focused 
on the 'Fundamental qualitative changes' occurring in 
the Navy, i.e. the increasing importance of the submarine 
which Khrushchev had also indicated. 3 
Malinovsky, Minister for Defence, indicated in 
October 1961 that the power of the Navy had grown and 
that it was now 'a truly modern Navy capable of under-
taking any active operations assigned to it far beyond 
our territorial waters, 4a view that the collective 
authorship of Military Strategy supported but with the 
1 See for example, N.S. Khrushchev Speech to Fourth 
Session of the Supreme Soviet; V.D. Sokolovsky, Soviet 
Military Strategy, RAND & Scott translations, passim; 
V.D. Soko1ovsky & M. ChereJtchenko, 'The Revolution in 
Military Affairs'. 
2 N.S. Khrushchev, Speech to the Fourth Session of the 
Supreme Soviet, p.C/16. 
3 V.A. Kasatonov, 'Speech to the Fourth Session of the 
Supreme Soviet', Moscow home service 12.45 GMT 16 January 
1960, BBC SWB, USSR No. 235, 18 January 1960, p.C/17. 
4 R. Malinovsky, Speech to 22nd Congress, p.C/13. 
qualification that 'these operations will hardly be 
decisive for the outcome of the war•. 1 
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After a brief summary of operations during the Great 
Patriotic War - support of the Ground Forces in coastal 
operations and protection of maritime communications - the 
authors state: 
A future world war may confront the fleet with 
more responsible tasks. The world's oceans may 
prove to be military theatres.2 
In the second edition this formulation had undergone 
a minor but important change. 
In a future world war the fleet may have more 
important responsibilities. The-wDrld's oceans 
will be the theatres of military operations for 
the Navy.3 
In August 1964 Marshal Sokolovsky, joined by Major-
General Cherednichenko, claimed that: 
It is fully possible that if the imperialists 
should unleash a nuclear missile war, no 
application will be found in it for the 
traditional forms of military action - attack 
and sometimes defence in the ground theatres, 
as well as the action of fleets in the naval 
theatres - even though their content and 
methods of conduct are being changed 
substantially in comparison with past wars. 4 
According to Military Strategy the main aim of the 
Soviet Navy's operations, assuming such operations to be 
necessary, was to defeat the enemy navy and to sever his 
maritime communications 'by conducting "operations on the 
high seas 11 ' : 
1 Sokolovsky, ed., Soviet Military Strategy, RAND 
translation, p.420, Scott translation, p.308. 
2 Sokolovsky, ed., Soviet Military Strategy, RAND 
translation, p.420, emphasis added. 
3 Military Strategy, Scott translation, p.308. 
4 V.D. Sokolovsky and M. Cherednichenko, 'The Revolution 
in Military Affairs', p.l5. 
In addition the need may arise for missions to 
deliver missile-nuclear strikes on coastal 
targets joint operations with units of the 
ground forces, naval transport, and protection 
of one's own naval communications.l 
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Particular emphasis was given, by the joint autho.rs, to 
the task of destroying the sea based nuclear weapons 
systems of the major adversary. In the first edition the 
destruction of enemy carrier attack forces •from the 
first minutes of the war• was held to be one of the most 
" important t~s of the navy, while the defence against 
US Polaris submarines was seen to be •an important naval 
task 1 • 2 
The second edition of Military Strategy reflected a 
growing preoccupation with methods of combating the Polaris 
submarine. An additional paragraph was included in the 
text explaining methods of combating the SLBM. 3 This 
increased concern was further reflected in the Sokolovsky 
Cherednichenko article of August 1964 where 'the primary 
task of military actions in the ocean and sea theatres• 
was said to be 'the destruction of the missile armed 
submarines' . The disruption of enemy carrier 
units was described as 'an extremely important 
strike 
4 task'. 
Other important tasks included defence against the 
enemy's amphibious operations5 and carrying out their own 
. . . . . . 6 
amph1b1ous operat1ons 1n cooperat1on w1th the army. 
1 Sokolovsky, V.D., ed., Soviet Military Strategy, RAND 
translation p.420; Scott translation p.309, emphasis added. 
2 
"d 1 . Ib1 , RA~D trans at1on p.420. 
3 Fast, H.S. translation Military Strategy, 2nd and 3rd 
edition indicates no change in the wording describing the 
anti-SLBM system. However, L. Goure, Notes on the Second 
Edition, p.88 claims the second edition character1sed 
Polaris defence as 'the most important naval task'. 
4 Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko, 'The Revolution in 
Military Affairs•, p.l8. 
5 Scott, 
6 Scott, 
H.F. translation, p.312. 
H.F. translation, p.263. 
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The uncertainty over whether a future war would be of 
sufficient duration f~or the navy to perform a role ,and the 
doctrinal assertion of the secondary nature of naval 
operations;which as we have seen were judged to be 'hardly 
decisive' on the outcome of the wa~ must have left the 
navy in a precarious position so far as funding was 
concerned. Obviously the Strategic Rocket Forces, whose 
mission was decisive for the outcome of the war, would 
have first claim to defence resources, to be followed by 
the strategic defence forces. The ground forces, while 
not decisive in the sense of the SRF, played the important 
role of seizing and holding territory,after inflicting the 
'final rout• on the enemy troops, which was essential for 
victory, 2at least on the Eurasian land mass. 
The Navy does not appear to have had such obvious 
functions assigned it. Indeed, Soviet experience and 
Party dogma asserted that in the past enemy navies had 
inflicted only marginal damage on the USSR. The lack of 
attention given the SLBM systems in the first edition of 
Military Strategy suggests that the high ranking army 
officers who wrote the book considered that the Soviet 
Union had little to fear from enemy navies. 
However, it was still necessary to determine the type 
of naval force required for whatever tasks might arise. 
That is, what sort of equipment was necessary for the anti-
carrier and anti-Polaris active defence task. This question 
related specifically to the place of the surface vessel in 
the Navy. 
1 
'It is fully possible that the war will even end during 
this (the initial period marked by the nuclear exchange) 
period since further military actions may very well not 
be needed after the exchange of nuclear blows'. 
Engagements, battles and operations ... in the ... sea 
theatres of military action will be conducted on the basis 
of utilising the results of the strikes by strategic 
nuclear weapons for the purpose of completion of the rout 
of the enemy. 
Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko, 'Revolution in Military 
Affairs', p .16. 
2 Ibid, p.l7. 
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The Role of the Surface Navy 
Khrushchev's report to the Fourth Session of the 
Supreme Soviet., 'Disarmament is the Path toward 
Consolidating Peace and Ensuring Friendship among Peoples•., 
contained a number of pronouncements and announcements 
which affected all branches of the services. The armed 
forces were to be reduced by 1,200,000 men to a total of 
2,423,000, the Navy and Air Force were judged to 'have 
lost their previous importance in view of the modern 
development of military equipment', and 'In the Navy, the 
submarine fleet assumes great importance whereas surface 
ships can no longer play the part they did in the past.• 1 
There were three reasons given for these reductions 
and reassessments: the alleged increase in firepower 
available to the armed forces because of the acquisition 
of 'the necessary quantity of atomic and hydrogen 
weapons' , 2 (a process not completed until after 1962), 
the doctrine that any future war between the major powers 
would be a global nuclear missile war, and the 'fact' that 
we already possess so many nuclear weapons both 
atomic and hydrogen, and the necessary rockets 
for delivering these weapons to the territory 
of a potential aggressor that should any madman 
launch an attack on our State or on other 
socialist states we should be able literally to 
wipe off the face of the earth the country or 
countries which attacked us.3 
The following day the Minister of Defence, Marshal 
Malinovsky, addressed the Supreme Soviet. While agreeing 
with the First Secretary's premise 'that a future war ... 
1 Moscow Home Service 0800, GMT 14 January 
SU/233/C/16, 15 January 1960. 
1960, BBC SWB 
Khrushchev made much firmer remarks on the Air Force ln 
the same paragraph of his speech. 'Almost the whole of 
the Air Force is being replaced by rocket machinery. 
We have by now cut down sharply - and, it seems, shall 
continue to cut down and even discontinue the manufacture 
of bombers and other obsolete equipment'. 
Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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will be waged with the massed use of nuclear arms• and 
that a reduction in armed forces manpower was 'a quite 
sound and timely measure' he seriously qualified the main 
thrust of Khrushchev's address of the previous day. 
The rocket troops of our armed forces are 
undoubtedly the main type of armed forces: 
we understand however that it is not 
possible to solve all tasks of war by one 
type of troops .1 
This line of argument was developed by Gorshkov on 
23 February 1960 from a naval viewpoint. 
The primary branch of the armed forces 
possessing the most firepower is rocket troops. 
From this, however, it does not quite follow 
that the necessity for the remaining branches 
falls away. Victory in modern war can be 
achieved only with the utilisation of all 
means of armed combat. The geographic features 
of our country - which is washed by many seas 
and oceans - dictate that the Navy, in 
particular, will occupy an important place 
in the system of the Soviet Armed Forces. 
Furthermore, of course, it ought to be kept 
in mind that in modern war at sea, surface 
ships can no longer play as important a 
role as they played in the past. On the 
other hand, the significance of submarines, 
which are an exceptionally effective means 
of combat, is sharply growing.2 
Gorshkov's claim that the Navy 
will occupy an important place in the system 
of the Soviet armed forces because of the 
geographical features of the Soviet Union 
3 
was repeated on May 9, 1960. 
1 Moscow Home Service, 11.25 GMT, 15 January 1960, 
BBC SWB SU/234/C/12. 
2 Gorshkov, S.G. 'Faithful Guard of the Security of the 
Homeland', Sovetskiy Flot, 23 February 1960, cited 
Ullman Despair and Eurphoria, p.l24. 
3 
'The geographic position of the USSR and our allies 
dictates an important place for the Navy in our defence 
system'. Gorshkov, S.G. 'Great Victory', Sovetskiy Flot, 
9 May 1960, cited Ullman Despair and Euphoria, p.l25 
fn.34. 
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He also moderated Khrushchev's views on the utility 
of surface vessels. While admitting that surface vessels 
would no longer play •as important a role as they played 
in the past•, this stopped short of the First Secretary's 
formulation that •surface ships can no longer play the 
part they did in the past•. Gorshkov, in fact, was 
supporting the position adopted by Admiral Kasatonov, the 
Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, in his speech to the 
Supr erne Soviet. 
Kasatonov supported the reduction of the size of the 
armed forces because such a reduction could be achieved 
•without any loss of defence potential' but on the 
question of surface vessels he significantly departed 
from Khrushchev's vie.w. 
The classes of major surface vessels, on which, 
until recently, conceptions about naval power 
was based, have lost their importance.l 
By specifying 'classes of major surface ships', i.e. 
aircraft carriers, battleships and artillery carrying 
cruisers, Kasatonov was omitting the new missile carrying 
surface ships which were building, the Kildin and Krupny 
class destroyers and the Kynda missile cruisers, as well 
as those guided missile ships, the Kashin destroyers and 
the Kresta cruisers, which by 1960 had been approved. It 
was these vessels, together with the missile armed 
submarines and aircraft, whichconsti tuted the basis for 
Kasatonov's claim that •fundamental qualitative changes 
have been and are taking place in the Navy•. 2 
While attempting to dissociate these new vessels from 
Khrushchev's all-embracing comments on the surface fleet, 
the naval leadership did not dissent from Khrushchev's 
appraisal of the submarine which •assumes great importance•. 3 
1 Kasatonov, Moscow Home Service, 12.48 GMT, 16 January 1960, 
BBC SWB, SW/235/C/17, 18 January 1960. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Khrushchev, op.cit., p.C/16. 
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Gorshkov had claimed 'the significance of submarines ... is 
sharply growing• 1 and Kasatonov unequivocally stated that 
the basis of the fighting power of the Navy has 
become the submarine. This has substantially 
increased the war potential of the Navy.2 
Khrushchev repeated his general sweeping attack on 
'military ships' in March 1960. He condensed all his scorn 
into one paragraph. Military vessels were categorised as 
militarily 'obsolete•, 'out of fashion• and 'good targets 
for missiles'. Their only use was 'to make trips for 
state visits•. 3 
In other statements of this period naval spokesmen 
continued to emphasise that it was only the large ship 
classes which had lost their former significance; they 
avoided mention of the missile vessels and stressed that 
submarines were now the fundamental combat force of the 
fleet. This fact was used to bolster the claim that 
'the combat capabilities of the fleet have essentially 
broadened'. In addition, the claim that geographic 
features gave a special importance to the Navy was 
repeated from time to time. Not only was the Navy 
attempting to protect its new classes of surface vessels 
from the First Secretary's condemnation, but naval 
spokesmen, with varying degrees of aggressiveness, were 
attempting to create a recognition of the growing combat 
capabilities of the fleet. They hoped to overturn what 
was possibly a prevailing view in higher military councils 
in the early 1960s: that in the past enemy navies had 
only inflicted marginal damage on the Soviet Union and 
that this situation still obtained. 
1 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Faithful Guard of the Security of the 
Homeland'. 
2 Kasatonov, op.cit., S.W.B., p.C/17. 
3 
'A cruiser is Struck from the Lists•, Leningrad Pravda 
23 March 1960, cited R.W. Herrick Soviet Naval Strategy, 
p.71/fn.l0. 
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On Navy Day 1960 Admiral Gorshkov endorsed, but in 
a manner sufficiently qualified to indicate the Navy's 
position, Khrushchev's speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet. 
Comrade Khrushchev stressed among other things 
that submarines were becoming very important in 
the Navy, while surface ships could no longer 
play the role they had played in the past. 
The large surface artillery ships and aircraft 
carriers, which only recently embod~ed the ~dea 
of naval m~ght, now represent the yesterday of 
navies .1 
Gorshkov did not specifically endorse the surface 
missile armed ships which were under construction at the 
time. Once again they were placed beyond criticism 
by contrast with 'the large artillery ships•. He did 
point to 
the development of rocket weapons (together 
with) radio electronic and other types of 
modern equipment {which) greatly restricts 
the fighting capacity of aircraft carriers 
and further claimed 
Those tasks which until recently were considered 
to be the privilege of an aircraft carrier navy 
can now be carried out to greater effect by 
other means.2 
Although it is not specifically claimed that these •other 
means' include missile firing surface vessels the 
construction plans of this period suggest that they formed 
at least a part of the 'other means•. 
Gorshkov, in his effort to promote the Navy as a 
branch of the armed forces, stressed the importance of 
submarines: 
(T)he ~avy which most fully answers the 
demands of ... modern warfare must be based on 
submarines. It is precisely in this direction 
that the navy of the Soviet Union is now 
1Gorshkov, S.G., 'True Sons of their Motherland•, Pravda, 
31 July 1960. Moscow Home Service 12.00 GMT 31 July 1960, 
BBC SWB, SU/399/C/2, emphasis added 
2 Ibid. 
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developing. Its fighting potential has grown 
considerably, first and foremost because of an 
increase in the striking power of its submarines. 
This has produced a navy which 'is capable of 
solving successfully the extremely complicated 
problem of sea warfare•.l 
Gorshkov commented specifically on the issue of 
reduction in the armed forces. 
The reduction of the Navy means not only the 
reduction in the number of its personnel and 
the scrapping or laying up of some of its 
vessels. Serious work must still be carried 
out, the final aim of which is to achieve a 
further increase in the combat readiness of 
naval forces. 
This involved attention to training of servicemen ln ships 
and units and to the structure of the Navy so that both 
should accord with existing technical equipment. 
As is well known, far-reaching changes have been 
and will continue to take place in the Navy, 
beyond all comparison with the changes which 
about 100 years ago .. marked the transition 
from sailing to steam ships.2 
By July 1961 the Soviet Union had reversed its policy 
on troop cuts and increased the publicly acknowledged 
defence expenditure by R.3,144 million or approximately 
one third of its previously acknowledged outlay. 3 
This reversal was explained in terms of growing 
East-West tension over Berlin, the question of a German 
peace treaty and the defence policies of the new Kennedy 
administration. 4 It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
l Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Khrushchev, N.S. 'Speech to the Graduates of the Military 
Academies of the USSR Armed Forces', Pravda 9 July 1961. 
4 For a Soviet assessment of the Kennedy defence programme 
see B. Teplinsky, 'Washington's Military Programme' 
International Affairs (Moscow) September 1961, p.26-32. 
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Khrushchev's critics within the military seized on these 
issues to add weight to their arguments against the troop 
cutslwhich appear to have been very unpopular, despite 
the verbal endorsement they received at the Supreme Soviet 
. 1 
sess~on. 
In speeches celebrating Navy Day 1961 Gorshkov and 
Marshal Grechko both placed importance on the surface ship. 
In part they may have been emboldened by Khrushchev's 
retreat from his position at the January 1960 session of 
the Supreme Soviet,but an equally important factor was 
certainly the beginning of missile ship deliveries to the 
fleet units. The original classes of these vessels, the 
Kynda, Kresta I and Krupny, all appeared in very small 
numbers suggesting that a radical reassessment of these 
vessels was undertaken in the late 1950s 2 It is unlikely 
that Gorshkov and Grechko would have expressed whatever 
doubts they shared about the utility of the new vessels 
in their speeches delivered at the first major public 
appearance of these ships. 
Gorshkov characterised his navy as 'wholly modern• and 
•capable of performing any operational task• and continued: 
Its combat opportunities have grown considerably, 
as a result of an increase in the striking power 
of atomic submarines, surface vessels, the naval 
air force and rocket weapons.3 
1 Marshals Konev, Sokolovsky and Timoshenko, the First 
Deputy Minister for Defence commanding the Warsaw Pact 
forces, the First Deputy Minister for Defence, Chief of 
General Staff and Commander of the Byelorussian military 
region respectively, refused to endorse Khrushchev's 
14 January 1960 proposals for troop cuts. They were all 
subsequently removed from their posts and given lesser 
positions in a reshuffle of the military high command 
which occurred in April or May 1960. 
Tatu, Michel, Power in the Kremlin, p.70-73. 
2 To be discussed in Chapter 8. 
3 Broadcast by Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, Moscow Home service, 
14.45 GMT 29 July 1961, BBC SWB, No. 706, 2 August 1961, 
p.B/4. 
Marshal Grechko on the following day claimed: 
The basic fighting power of the Soviet Navy 
consists of up-to-date atomic powered 
submarines armed with rockets for various 
purposes, surface ships, the fleet air arm 
and coastal units equipped with rocket weapons.l 
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TASS reported that the Leningrad Naval Review involved 
not only 'veteran ships of the Soviet Navy' but also 
'modern cruisers, destroyers, submarines, patrol vessels 
and minesweepers equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, 
including rockets•, and highlighted •rocket carrying boats 
for the destruction of large surface vessels'. The same 
report announced that 'for the first time ... rocket carrying 
cruisers, destined for the dstruction of large surface 
ships, such as aircraft carriers and cruisers• were now 
with the fleet and that these vessels were 'capable of 
making long voyages•. 2 
Besides the obvious highlighting of the new surface 
vessels the speeches of Navy Day are interesting because 
of Marshal Grechko's remarks. 
Grechko was one of a number of officers closely 
identified with Khrushchev through wartime and post-war 
service in the Ukraine. 3 He had replaced Marshal Konev 
as the First Deputy Minister of Defence, in charge of the 
Warsaw Pact Forces, after the reshuffle of positions which 
occurred in March-April 1960, as a result of Konev's 
failure to endorse the January announcement on troop cuts. 
Grechko, however, was not a creature of Khrushchev. He 
had taken a hard line over the detente policy in the 
1 Speech at the Leningrad Naval Review, Moscow Home 
Service 15.00 GMT 30 July 1961, BBC SWB No. 706, 2 August 
1961, p.B/2. 
2 Tass report in English, 8.18 GMT 30 July 1961, BBC SWB 
No. 706, 2 August 1961, p.B/1. 
3 M. Tatu, op.cit., p.70-73. 
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aftermath of the U-2 affair, 1 and was a supporter of the 
military's claim that its needs should be afforded a 
high priority in the development of communism. 2 
Grechko's assessment of the role of the new surface 
warships which were about to enter service, may well have 
reflected Khrushchev's own views of these new vessels, for 
Khrushchev himself had noted in his report to the Supreme 
Soviet in May 1960 that the Navy's forces were •in the 
process of converting to missile weapons, and strictly 
speaking, have already made the change-over•. 3 
As Ullman has noted, Grechko's reference to surface 
ships suggests that sections of the Army leadership were 
prepared to recognise the increased significance of 
surface vessels,and hence accepted, at least in part, 
the budgetary claims of the Navy for these vessels 
especially in the post reassessment atmosphere of July 
1961. 4 
The TASS report of 30 July 1961 highlighted the role 
of these rocket-carrying cruisers: 'the destruction of 
large surface ships such as aircraft carriers and cruisers• 
1 Prior to Khrushchev's departure to the Paris summit 
Grechko stated - •we are convinced that at the Conference 
N.S. Khrushchev will know how to defend with honour the 
cause of peace, and how to unmask and undermine the designs 
of aggressive circles. We wish Nikita Sergeyevich success 
in the difficult Paris talks'. Pravda, 7 May 1960. 
2 
'··.to build Communism does not mean to be concerned 
only with the development of the nation's economy, but 
to be concerned in every possible way with the strengthening 
of the Motherland's defensive capabilities and to raise the 
military readiness and might of the armed forces•. 
Grechko, A.A., Vysokoe 7rizvanie (A High Calling), 
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1962 p.S, cited in R. Kolkowicz, The 
Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967) 
p.266. 
3 Khrushchev, N.S. Concluding Remarks to the Supreme Soviet 
Session of 7 May 1960, Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 May 1960, cited 
R.W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, p.77. BBC SWB USSR 
328/C.l3, 1960, puts the statement more generally: 'We are 
going over to rocket weapons. Actually we have already gone 
over'. 
4 Harlan Ullman, Despair and Euphoria, p.l28-l3l. 
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and noted that the new vessels were capable of 'long 
voyages•. No mention was made of the fact that the new 
vessels, the Kildin and Krupny class missile destroyers, 
had a very limited wartime capability outside the range 
of shore based aviation. 
Khrushchev made his position clearer in May 1962 when 
he told the All-Union Conference of Railroad Transport 
Workers of his recent visit to the Leningrad shipyards: 
And the naval vessels are very good too! More 
than once in the past we criticised the naval 
comrades for shortcomings in the development 
of the navy and demanded that it be modernised. 
This criticism was not wasted (emphasis added). 
What I saw were vessels that completely 
correspond to the modern development of the 
navy, the modern development of naval science 
and technology. 
Khrushchev 'observed both civilian and naval shipyards, 
both surface and submarine shipbuilding' and confessed 
that he •returned from Leningrad in a very happy mood•. 1 
While in Leningrad Khrushchev must have seen among 
other things the missile firing surface ships of the 
Kynda, Krupny and Kashin (SAM} classes. 
By May 1962, if not by May 1960, the Navy seemed to 
have won endorsement for a programme of construction, 
including surface vessels, which corresponded to 'the 
modern development of naval science and technology• not 
only from sections of the Army but also from the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party. There was thus a 
measure of agreement on the development of what might be 
termed a 'balanced fleet'. 
The debate, however, was by no means concluded. One 
of the claims put forward by advocates of a large ocean-
going navy,at least since Stalin's pre-war construction 
programme,was that the Soviet Union as a nation •washed by 
1 Pravda, ll May 1962, p.l-3. 
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many seas and oceans' needed a strong navy. Gorshkov had 
claimed in 1960: 
The geographic features of our country ... dictate 
that the Navy in particular will ocupy an 
important place in the system of the Soviet 
Armed Forces.l 
This argument was refuted in the important Military 
Strategy edited by Marshal Sokolovsky which criticised 
Stalin's pre-war construction programme, based as it was 
on cruisers, battleships, and probably aircraft carriers, 
No consideration was given to the fact that 
two of our fleets were based in closed seas 
(the Baltic and Black Seas) while the Northern 
and Pacific fleets faced great difficulties in 
reaching the open seas. In this situation the 
main emphasis should have been on a submarine 
fleet and naval aviation.2 
As has previously been indicated, the changed 
political map of Europe had done nothing to alter these 
basic geographic facts of Soviet naval life~ The comments 
in Military Strategy not only denied that geography imposed 
a special importance on the Soviet fleet but directly 
opposed the view of the naval leadership that surface 
vessels played or should play a significant role in the 
Soviet Navy. The implications of geography could not be 
altered even by the fact that the new surface vessels of 
the 1960s 'completely corresponded to the modern development 
of the navy'. The authors of the Sokolovsky volume, none 
of whom was a naval officer, represent a significant group 
opposed to Grechko's apparent sanctioning of the surface 
vessels. 
It is also highly probable that the views expressed by 
these writers were shared by Malinovsky, the Minister of 
Defence. His speech to the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. 
1 S.G. Gorshkov, 'Faithful Guard ..... ', Sovetskii Flot, 
23 February 1960. 
2 V.D. Sokolovsky, editor, Soviet Military Strategy, 
RAND translation p.233. 
3 p. 82 above. 
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noted the •marked changes' which had occurred in the Navy 
and described it as a •truly modern Navy capable of 
undertaking any active operations assigned to it far beyond 
our territorial waters• 1 - a hollow claim as was indicated 
by events in the Caribbean a year later. Malinovsky 
continued: 
Submarines for various purposes constitute the 
Navy's main force. In conditions of rocket 
nuclear warfare, they are incom~arably more 
effective than surface vessels. 
Given the previous assertion that a world war, should 
it be •unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, will 
inevitably assume the character of a nuclear rocket war•, 3 
Malinovsky was providing little comfort for those naval 
leaders who advocated a more balanced fleet. The invidious 
comparison with submarines was the only mention of surface 
vessels in the whole speech. Missile firing submarines 
were afforded an additional paragraph: 
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev reminded the 
over-zealous admirals of the West that modern 
military technology makes it possible to take 
under fire the vital centres and to destroy 
the naval vessels of any aggressors from 
submarines by means of ballistic and self-
guided rockets.4 
One cannot help but wonder whether the over-zealous admirals 
were confined solely to 'the West'. For Malinovsky at 
least, modern military technology had made it possible to 
accomplish the major naval missions of war from one basic 
type of vessel: submarines. The only other branch of the 
Navy to be specifically mentioned was the 'naval rocket-
carrying air force' which was called on •to carry out 
military operations in cooperation with submarines•. 5 
1 Marshal Malinovsky, Moscow Home Service 10.30 GMT 
24 October 1961, BBC SWB SU/778/C/13. 
2 ibid, C/13. 
3 ibid, C/9. 
4 ibid, C/14. 
5 ibid, C/13. 
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Malinovsky•s view on Gorshkov•s claim for an 
'important place in the system of Soviet Armed Forces' for 
the Navy was reflected in the fact that the Navy occupied 
the last place in the listing of the branches of the Armed 
Forces. 
Malinovsky 1 s speech highlighted the need for •the 
combined action of all types of armed forces• and claimed 
that a fu.ture war would be fought with •mass armed forces 
in all their millions• 1 - a notable advance on his more 
cautious modification of Khrushchev's views in January 
1960. The main firepower of the armed forces 'is now their 
rocket detachments and tactical operation units armed with 
nuclear and other rockets•. 2 The motorised infantry had 
more than quadrupled in firepower since 1945 and the number 
of tanks in the 'modern motorised infantry• was increasing. 
Such a view of a future war involving 'mass armed 
forces in all their millions• implied a need to develop 
the ground forces both in numbers as well as ~n quality 
of equipment. It presented a dramatic departure from the 
tone of discussion of January 1960 and was no doubt 
connected with Khrushchev's retreat from his earlier 
position. The implied demand for a larger slice of the 
defence budget for the ground forces meant that the Navy 
would find it particularly difficult to gain approval for 
the construction of large numbers of surface vessels which 
were not only expensive but, to paraphrase Malinovsky, 
incomparably less effective than submarines. 
Khrushchev's address to the 22nd Congress also 
highlighted the role of the missile firing submarine 
without mentioning the new surface vessels. 
1 
The USSR is a continental Power. Those who wish 
to unleash war against us will be compelled to 
conquer the water. This is why we are building 
a powerful submarine fleet armed with target 
ibid, C/10. 
2 ibid, C/12 
seeking rockets, so that it may be possible to 
shoot down in the ocean ships which approach the 
frontiers of the socialist countries. The Soviet 
submarine fleet with ato~ic engines, armed with 
ballistic and target seeking rockets, is standing 
alertly on guard over our socialist achievements. 
It will reply with a crushing blow against the 
aggressors, including their aircraft carriers, 
which in case of war will be quite a good target 
for our rockets launched from submarines.l 
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Not only did Khrushchev evaluate the role of the 
missile firing submarine in terms which implied there was 
little else for any other branch of the Navy to do, but 
he also implied a primarily defensive role for the Navy, 
that of denying the control of the sea to those who sought 
to invade, or launch sea based nuclear strikes against, 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, Khrushchev claimed that the 
primary task, destruction of aircraft carriers, had been 
solved by missile firing submarines. 
Admiral N.V. Isachenkov, Chief Naval Engineer, and 
responsible for the Navy's ship and submarine building 
programme, so~ght to interpret Khrushchev's claims with 
regard to submarines so that they included surface ships 
as well, by using the more ambiguous term •warships': 
Armed with homing missiles, Soviet warships 
have the capability of destroying at sea, 
from hundred of kilometres away, the merchant 
vessels and warships, in particular aircraft 
carriers which, as was correctly observed by 
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev at the XXIInd 
Congress of the CPsu2 make good targets for our homing missiles. 
Rear Admiral V. Prokofiev was far less subtle in his 
critique of the Kbrushchev/Malinovsky position on the navy: 
1 N.S. Khrushchev, Speech Opening 22nd Congress, CPSU, 
Moscow Home Service 0600 GMT 18 October 1961, BBC SWB 
SU/772/C/25, 19 October 1961. 
2 N.V. Isachenkov, 'New Weapons of Warships', Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 18 November 1961, cited ~n Ullman, Despair and 
Euphoria, p.l32. 
Soviet naval thought opposes the one sided 
exaggeration to an extreme of any particular 
arm (of the Navy). Naval combat operations 
will develop over enormous ocean and coastal 
areas and will require the cooperation of all 
forces as well as comprehensive combat support 
for the main striking for1ce - submarines. 
Surface ships in particular will have to solve 
a large number of tasks, which in contemporary 
warfare conditions have become exceptionally 
complex . 1 
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The Rear Admiral affirmed the position of the submarine 
as 'the main striking force' and yet clearly saw a large 
number of complex tasks for surface vessels, one of which 
was the combat support of submarines. In other writings 
the need for combat support for submarines, when it was 
raised at all, was assigned to naval rocket-carrying 
aviation. 
Khrushchev's uncharacteristic accolade to naval 
4 
vessels in May 1962 had been preced/\n 29 April by the 
elevation of Gorshkov to the rank of Fleet Admiral which 
corresponded 'to the combined arms rank of General of the 
Army and Marshal of an Arm of Service•, 2 i.e. to four-star 
rank. 
That year Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov addressed 
the Northern Fleet on Navy Day. He described the Northern 
Fleet as comprising 
the most modern submarines with might~ rocket 
weapons. It is a fleet of the latest rocket 
carrying attack aviation, surface carrying 
rocket ships and other contemporary weapons 
which make it possible to crush any aggressor 
if he attempts to violate the northern sea 
frontiers of the USSR. 3 
1 V. Prokofiev, 'Principal Striking Power in Warfare at Sea', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 January 1962, cited in Herrick, Soviet 
Naval Strategy, p.73. 
2 
Pravda, 29 April 1962. The rank of Admiral of the Fleet 
was specially created for Gorshkov. Before 1962 there was 
a gap between Admiral {3-star) and Admiral of the Fleet of 
the Soviet Union (5-star). 
3 Moscow Tass in Russian to Europe, 17.36 GMT 9 July 1962, 
FBIS USSR National Affairs CC/19, 30 July 1962. 
Gorshkov described the Army and Navy as 
equipped with the latest military technology 
weapons and ships (all of which) ... fully meet 
the demands of conducting military action in 
the nuclear rocket era.l 
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Gorshkov was at pains to stress the suitability of his new 
vessels to the demands of the new age, for they were the 
end product of the very same military technology which had 
enabled the Army to move into the nuclear age. 
Nonetheless Gorshkov acknowledged that •main attention' 
was still directed to the submarine programme, especially to 
the nuclear powered 
submarine fleet•. 2 
boats which were 'the backbone of our 
At this stage, he must have 
referring to theN-class attack submarines, the 
been 
H-class 
Fleet ballistic missile submarines, and the early E-class 
SSGN, although others were undoubtedly being planned and 
developed at the time. 
Gorshkov also mentioned in this talk the new concept 
of the 'sea-air force' and the fact that surface missile 
ships were continuing to be built. 
The most significant of the 1962 Navy Day statements, 
however, was to appear in the Pravda article which marked 
the occasion. Gorshkov repeated the claim that 'atomic 
submarines were the foundation of our Navy', and then 
added 'on a level with submarines in the armament of our 
Navy are surface ships carrying missile weapons and the 
latest equipment•. He further reported that naval missile 
aviation was being perfected and that coastal units were 
being •armed with missile weapons ASW weapons, torpedoes, 
mines and artillery.• 3 
The statement that missile armed surface vessels were 
on a level with submarines marks the high point for claims 
by naval spokesmen on behalf of the surface fleet. 
1 
. b" d J. J. • 
2 Moscow in Polish to Poland 2100 MT 28 July 1962, FBIS 
USSR National Affairs, p.CC/22 30 July 1962. 
3 S.G. Gorshkov, 'True Sons of the Homeland', Pravda, 
29 July 1962. 
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Another significant observation made on Navy Day 1962 
was that 
The might of the Navy is now determined in the 
first place not by the number of pennants, but by 
the quality of the vessels, by their being 
equipped with modern military ~weapons . 1 
In a June 1963 discussion with Harold Wilson, Khrushchev 
claimed that the Soviet Union had discontinued production of 
surface vessels because of their total vulnerability. 2 
The speeches for the 1963 Navy Day continued to 
emphasise that missile armed atomic submarines formed the 
basis of the Soviet Navy. 3 This said, however, Admiral 
Isakov went on to claim that 'our naval forces can solve 
any operational problem' and that 
This situation has been achieved as a result 
of the radical rearming of the navy, and the 
equipping of submarines and surface craft with 
long range rockets. 4 
Isakov then repeated Gorshkov's claim of the previous year 
that naval strength was determined by qualitative features 
and not by the number of pennants and concluded •today we 
possess a most modern navy•. This new Soviet Navy based 
on submarines and surface vessels and equipped with nuclear 
propulsion, rocketry and new electronic and computing 
equipment, 'has put an end to the undivided domination of 
the high seas by the traditional sea powers•. 5 
Gorshkov's contribution to Navy Day celebrations 
declared that the Soviet Navy was an ocean-going navy 
l ibid, FBIS USSR National Affairs 30 July 1962, p.CC/22-23. 
2 Times, 11 June 1963, p.l2, New York Times, 11 June 1963, 
p.l. The sources for this comment do not make it clear 
whether Khrushchev was referring to all surface vessels or 
merely to the artillery firing vessels. 
3 For example, Vice Admiral V.A. Grishanov, Moscow Home 
Service 0630 and 1700 GMT 27 July 1963, BBC SWB SU/1313/B/3. 
4 Isakov, interview, p.B/4, emphasis added). 
5 
'b'd ~ ~ . 
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capable of fighting the enemy at great distances from its 
bases and destroying surface ships and submarines as well 
as launching blows directly at enemy land targets. 
Emphasis was placed on the technical advances that had been 
made in the Navy and the power of nuclear missiles. No 
attempt was made to distinguish between the submarine and 
the surface ship as carriers of these weapons 'just as 
aircraft carriers replaced battleships, the first are 
increasingly losing their value as compared to the new rocket 
forces of the modern navy•. 1 
During his Scandinavian tour of mid-1964 Khrushchev 
told a meeting of Swedish shipbuilders: 
We have freed our shipyards from the building 
of large naval ships - battleships and cruisers -
since such ships will not represent a serious 
military force in the conditions of a future 
thermo-nuclear world war .. . 2 
Khrushchev returned to this theme, an attack on the 
large artillery firing vessels of the Stalin era, at a 
Kremlin address to the graduates of the Military Academies: 
Ten years ago (i.e. in 1954) the question arose 
of the need for rearming our navy which was based 
at the time on cruisers, destroyers and other 
vessels, mostly surface ships. These weapons 
had become in many ways obsolete for waging war 
in present day conditions ... 3 
Gorshkov also looked back to 1954 as marking the 
beginning of a decade 'which has been marked by revolutionary 
changes in naval construction ... changes which are un-
precedented in significance in naval history•. 4 
1 Pravda Article by Admiral Gorshkov, text of report, Tass 
in English 11.09 GMT 28 July 1963, BBC SWB SU/1313/B/4. 
2 N.S. Khrushchev, 'Speech to Swedish Shipbuilders•, Pravda 
25 June 1964, p.l. 
3 N.S. Khrushchev, Speech at the Kremlin in Honour of 
Graduates of Military Academies, Pravda, 9 July 1964, p.l-2. 
4 Pravda, article by Admiral Gorshkov, Text of report, Tass 
Russian for Abroad 22.40 GMT 25 July 1964 and in English 
8.15 GMT 26 July 1964, BBC SWB USSR 1616/C/2. 
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Whereas Khrushchev, in his remarks to the graduates, 
stressed the role of nuclear powered submarines in the 
post-1954 naval construction programme, Gorshkov claimed 
that the naval forces as a whole were the most modern in 
the world, and pointed to the advanced engineering 
principles 'contained in the designs of our submarines, 
aircraft and surface ships•. For the future Gorshkov 
looked to 
our advantages ... being reliably consolidated 
(b)y building even more up-to-date submarines, 
surface vessels and aircraft, as well as a vast 
arsenal of new technical means of naval warfare.l 
Gorshkov was, however, under no illusion as to the primacy 
of the 'qualitatively new nuclear-missile submarine and 
naval air arm' which he alleged 'alters the balance of 
sea power in favour of the Soviet Union.• 2 
The material cited above suggests that, from 1962 at 
least the division between Khrushchev and the navy was 
3 
nowhere near as wide as is sometimes suggested. Even ~n 
January 1960, when Khrushchev made his most sweeping 
attack, it is possible that he was referring to artillery 
firing vessels. Certainly in the report 'A Cruiser is 
Struck from the List', the context suggests that only 
these vessels were the object of his scorn. In this, as 
has been indicated, he was supported by the Soviet Admirals. 
There was divergence over the question of positive support 
for the new generation of missile-armed surface vessels. 
Khrushchev had said that these vessels were •very good' 
after his visit to the Leningrad shipyards. In general, 
however, he avoided mention of the surface fleet except 
to pour scorn on Stalin's building programme. However, 
he placed great emphasis on the submarine fleet and in 
particular, the nuclear powered vessels, which led some 
Soviet naval spokesmen to warn against 'one-sided emphasis' 
on any branch of the navy. 
1 ibid. 
2 ibid. 
3 for example, R .. W. Herrick Soviet Naval Strategy, p.67-9l. 
257 
One interesting point, frequently overlooked in 
assessing Khrushchev's relations with, and views on, the 
Navy, is the attempt in October 1961 to blame Marshal 
Zhukov for the navy's shortcomings. Izvestia claimed that 
Zhukov had deemed the Navy archaic and had opposed the 
introduction of modern weapons. 1 While the charge may or 
may not be correct, this campaign was obviously undertaken 
to shift the responsibility for the current weaknesses in 
the state of the navy onto the shoulders of the former 
Minister for Defence. Khrushchev thereby sought to avoid 
any internal naval criticism and was able to claim that all 
that was best in the navy originated post-1954. It is true 
that Khrushchev viewed the uses of the Navy in a specifically 
nuclear war context but there is little or no evidence at 
this time of the naval leadership making any claims or 
2 preparations for a wider role. 
Soviet Public Evaluation of Polaris 1960-1964 
The appearance of the work Military Strategy in 1962 
gave another opportunity for debate - this time about the 
missions of the Navy. As we have seen, the authors claimed 
as the main aim for fleet operations the defeat of the 
enemy navy and the severing of his maritime communications. 
In addition, the navy may be called on to deliver missile 
nuclear strikes on coastal targets, conduct joint operations 
with units of the ground forces, provide naval transport and 
defend the Soviet Union's own coastal sea lines of 
. . 3 
commun:Lcat:Lon. 
The main mission of (NATO) naval forces in a 
general nuclear war is to win naval supremacy, 
in conjunction with strategic offensive forces 
and tactical air forces, by delivering nuclear 
1 Izvestia, report cited New York Times, 10 October 1961, p.lO. 
2 The role of protecting state interests at sea had been 
mentioned but never defined and in the context in which it 
had been used it suggested a wartime requirement. 
3 Sokolovsky, ed., Soviet Military Strategy, RAND translation, 
p.420. 
strikes on enemy missile installations, on naval 
and air forces in bases or at sea, and on other 
military and industrial targets. 
The basic naval power of the coalition is 
provided by the US Navy, and to a lesser extent 
by the British Navy, which have substantial 
means for delivering nuclear weapons.l 
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It was also suggested that 'the main striking power 
of the American and British navies is provided by carrier 
. . 2 av~a t~on. ' 
The most striking aspect of this account of the 
'Imperialist States'' naval forces is the omission of any 
reference to the 'Polaris' system. The listing of major 
components of the American and British naval forces 
includes 21 attack carriers, five submarines armed with 
Regulus missiles, 15 nuclear submarines armed with torpedoes 
and 27 ships with guided anti-aircraft missiles. 3 It is 
possible that this omission is deliberate. It effectively 
removes the anti-Polaris role from the list of naval concerns, 
for the navy is specifically charged with countering the 
enemy navy, presumably as itemised above. The Polaris 
system had previously been described in some detail, so it 
is not likely that the authors omitted reference to it by 
mistake. The Polaris missile carried by nuclear powered 
submarines ranked only after the Minuteman missile in 
importance. It was noted that 
1 
2 
3 
4 
The ability of these submarines to cruise 
submerged for a prolonged period and to launch 
missiles while submerged assures high mobility 
and good concealment and makes them practically 
invulnerable to enemy ballistic missiles.4 
ibid, p.l86. 
ibid, p. 187. 
ibid., p.l86-7. 
ibid.' p.l74. 
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Despite the realistic assessment of the Polaris 
system, which was coupled with an acknowledgement of the 
development of longer ranged missiles for the nuclear-
powered submarines, a subsequent resume of the imperialist 
powers' naval equipment and the missions assigned to them 
in a future war still gave priority to the attack carriers. 1 
In the chapter 'Methods of Conducting Warfare•, the 
Polaris system is specifically mentioned. Here the reader 
is assured that counter to the claims of the foreign press 
(and perhaps even to the impression previously given 
earlier in the book). 
these weapons are also vulnerable. Homing 
missiles launched by submarines and surface ships 
are an effective weapon against missile carrying 
nuclear submarines. 
Missile carrying aircraft can also fight nuclear 
submarines by taking advantage of certain of their 
weak features, particularly the lengthy preparations 
required to launch missiles. In addition, strikes 
by the Missile Forces can destroy submarine bases.2 
This optimism mirrored that expressed on a number of 
public occasions and suggests that at least in non-naval 
circles there may have been some confusion between the 
Polaris SLBM and the Regulus cruise missile. Malinovsky 
claimed in his address on the occasion of the 44th 
Anniversary of the Armed Forces: 
1 
2 
Our country's submarine fleet is equipped with 
various types of missiles that can destroy enemy 
ships hundreds of kilometres distant from the 
shores of the socialist camp and that can reduce 
the enemy naval and land bases to dust. Nor will 
the submarines equipped with Polaris missiles on 
which the imperialists have placed such hopes be 
spared from destruction and they too will find 
graves in the depths of the sea.3 
Ibid, p.348. 
Ibid., p.409. 
3 
'On Guard over the Peaceful Labour of the Builders of 
Communism', Pravda, 23 February 1962, p.4. 
A newspaper commentator, Yury Zhukov, attempted to 
diminish the extent of the effort that would be required 
to combat the Polaris system,and the threat that the 
system posed,by pointing out that the United States Navy 
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had 'only nine Polaris armed atomic submarines in operation•. 
Zhukov chose to overlook the fact that the nine would 
eventually rise to a total of forty-one units, capable of 
operating in regions as distant from the Soviet Union's own 
fleet areas as the Indian Ocean. Zhukov claimed that it 
was difficult seriously to consider 
These nine vessels will be able to attack all of 
Eurasia with impunity. Especially since the 
Soviet atomic submarine fleet is not napping and 
has long been prepared against the eventuality of 
the need to neutralise the aggressors.l 
The vagueness of Zhukov's reassuring formulation leaves 
it open to doubt whether he was claiming the existence of a 
fleet of atomic powered hunter-killer submarines to 
neutralise Polaris or whether he had in mind 'a retaliatory 
blow to the homeland of the aggressor•. What is certain is 
that by deliberately omitting any reference to the full 
extent of the Polaris programme he was contributing to the 
broad public campaign of reassurance and confidence ~n the 
ability of the Armed Forces to combat the Polaris system. 
Boris Teplinsky, in similar vague and reassuring vein, 
reminded his readers of Khrushchev's warning to 
the militarists who boast that they have 
Polaris submarines ... (that they) would do 
well to remember that we are not empty 
handed either.2 
Gorshkov himself contributed to this public campa~gn 
when he claimed: 
1 Yury Zhukov, 'Caution! An Aggressor is Hiding under Water•. 
Pravda, 11 February 1963, p.3. 
2 B. Teplinsky, 'Polaris and US Strategy', New Times, No.8, 
1963, p.9. 
Like submarines with ordinary engines, 
American atomic submarines have been spotted 
more than once by the forces of the Soviet 
Navy in various regions of the oceans. 
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On a more realistic note he observed 'these submarines no 
less than ordinary ones are in need of bases•, 1 implying 
that this was at least one weak point in the Polaris system. 
Malinovsky returned to the theme of the Soviet Navy's 
ability to counter the threat in February 1963. 
Present day submarines are capable of fighting 
successful actions against aircraft carriers 
and missile carrying surface ships, and 
destroying his military installations on land ... 
Along with submarines, naval missile carrying 
and anti-submarine aircraft have also become 
a very important arm of our navy. These planes 
have the ability to hunt down at sea and destroy 
both enemy surface ships and submarines . 
. . . I must declare with full responsibility that 
this will not yield the Pentagon chiefs the 
military advantages they are counting on. Our 
navy, in cooperation with missile forces and 
air force is capable of coping equally well 
with land and underwater missile bases.2 
In the non-military writings of the time another line 
was adopted on methods to counter 'Polaris'. There was an 
attempt to denigrate the system as such, thereby reassuring 
the wider periodical and newspaper reading public. It was 
claimed for example that the missile itself was unreliable, 3 
and that the nuclear submarines which carried the missile 
were liable to breakdowns. R.W. Herrick has also pointed 
to the fact that the submarines were alleged to be noisy, 
at a disadvantage vis a vis aircraft in respect of speed, 
and highly vulnerable to underwater explosions. 4 
1 S.G. Gorshkov, 'Short Sighted Strategy', Izvestia, 19 May 
1963, p.3. 
2 Malinovsky to Ceremonial Session of the Moscow Soviet, 
Pravda, 23 February 1963, p.2-3. 
3 B. Teplinsky, 'Dangers, Facts•, New Times, No. 28, 1962, 
p.9-ll. 
4 Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, p.ll6. 
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In addition to this attempt to reassure through 
denigration, a variety of apparently non-naval solutions 
to the problem posed by 'Polaris• appeared in the Soviet 
Press. On the occasion of the 43rd Anniversary of Great 
October, Kozlov told the Moscow Soviet that the 
establishment of the Holy Loch base as a 'send off point 
for American atomic submarines equipped with nuclear armed 
rockets' would 'distinctly heighten the danger for Britain 
itself should a conflict break out.• 1 This warning was 
repeated in a TASS statement on 11 December 1960 which 
ridiculed Prime Minister MacMillan's statement that in the 
event of a possible 'provocation' by Polaris submarines 
outside British territorial waters, 'counter measures 
should apply to these boats only and not to their base in 
Britain 1 • 2 The TASS release characterised as naive people 
who held that a state attacked by a missile firing 
submarine should strike back only at the place in the 
ocean where the submarine was thought to be and not at 
its supply base. Rather, the release pointed out, 
The Soviet Union holds a different view on 
this score. And so did the British 
Government in past conflicts when ... it struck 
back not only against the enemy submarines 
but also against their bases.3 
Besides indicating that 'strikes by Missile Forces can 
I 4 destroy submarine bases, pronouncements such as the one 
above provided support for those domestic opponents of 
overseas fleet ballistic missile submarine (FBMS) bases in 
the host countries, who argued that the establishment of 
such bases decreased the security of the country. 
1 F.R. Kozlov, 'Formal Meeting of the Moscow Soviet• 
6 November 1960, Pravda, 7 November, p.l-3. 
2 TASS report 'Dangerous juggling', in English 1505 GMT 
11 December 1960, BBC SWB USSR 13 December 1960, 513/Al/1-3. 
3 
'b'd J. J. . 
4 Sokolovsky, ed., Soviet Military Strategy, RAND 
translation, p.409. 
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The destruction of bases and the FMBS tenders would, 
however, have no effect on the ability of the Polaris 
boats at sea or on station to launch their sixteen missiles. 
There lS an indication that at least some members of the 
Soviet Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations recognised the second strike role of the Polaris 
system: 
The Naval Command (US) urges that the spotlight 
be directed at its Polaris missile atom-
powered submarines which are being hailed as 
the specific retaliation weapon and, hence, a 
deterrent.l 
The Soviet Union could launch missile strikes against 
the fixed and highly vulnerable land based navigation and 
communications facilities in an attempt to counter the 
submarines already at sea. 
submarines were 
It was held that the Polaris 
by no means an isolated autarkic system of 
weapons capable of operating independently 
in the ocean depths. On the contrary, their 
efficien¢y depends entirely on the work of 
surface bases and installations. 
In particular they needed 'an extensive communication 
system and control and navigation stations• 2 
If such stations transmitting orders and 
navigation instructions were knocked out, 
the submarine missile carriers would find 
themselves in the position of the mythical 
Cyclops. Blinded, they would have either 
to stop operating, or strike blows in the 
dark.3 
The implied threat of a holocaust on the territory 
of any country which allowed the establishment of Polaris 
submarine support, communication or navigational facilities 
' 
1 Sheinin, Y. Disarmament or 'Balance of Terror•, 
International Affairs (Moscow) August 1961, p.26. 
emphasis added. 
2 Shvedkov, Y. 'Bases in Pentagon Strategy' International 
Affairs (Moscow) May 1964, p.57. 
3 ibid, p.60. 
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on its territories was a continuing theme of articles and 
statements throughout this period. 1 
This campaign blended with the more positive attempt 
to establish nuclear free zones especially in the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The nuclear free 
zone proposals met with a degree of success, particularly 
among the nations of the neutralist Third World, but as a 
whole the effect was not sufficient to inconvenience the 
Polaris effort. It is probable that there was a great deal 
of propaganda behind these essentially non-naval •solutions• 
to the Polaris problem. Not only did the USSR, until the 
mid-1960s, have too few ICBMs to use on the Polaris 
infrastructure but, more importantly, the Polaris systems 
of the early 1960s were primarily to be employed against 
'soft' targets, i.e. in a counter city role. This implies 
that the navigational accuracy available from the 
submarines' internal inertial navigation system,upgraded 
by periodic correction from external fixed site systems,is 
sufficient for the task. Hence the submarine is not 
continuously dependent on external navigation stations, 
as had been claimed. Nor, in the counter city role, is 
the submarine entirely dependent on communications. Langer 
has correctly observed: 
1 See, for example: 
Malinovsky, Address to 44th Anniversary of the Armed 
Forces, Pravda, 23 February 1962, p.4. 
Editorial, 'The NATO Council Meeting', New Times, No. 22, 
1963, p.4. 
N.S. Khrushchev, Speech to the Denmark-USSR Society and 
Students Association, Pravda, 21 June 1964, p.l. 
A. Kafman, 'The Mediterranean-Seat of Atomic Danger•, 
International Affairs (Moscow) July 1963, p.lOS-6. 
Facts and Figures, 'NATO Military Bases in the 
Mediterranean', International Affairs (Moscow) July 1963, 
p.lOS-7. 
Y. Shvedkov, op.cit., p.56-61. 
Facts and Figures, 'The US Sixth Fleet• International 
Affairs (Moscow) June 1964, p.l07-108. 
Stop Spread of Nuclear Weapons! Note from the Soviet 
Government to the US Government, Pravda, 10 April 1963, 
p.l and 3. 
For counter city warfare all that is really 
required is a single message that gives the 
code to unlock the firing mechanisms on the 
missiles. Even if all further communications 
are cut off, the local commander can then 
proceed to hit preassigned targets. It is 
of course preferable that more detailed 
command and control should be possible, but 
it is not absolutely essential. Moreover, 
for the purpose of 'deterrence• it does not 
matter much how great a delay there can be 
in receiving such a message. The certainty 
that no matter how greatly a communications 
network is damaged, eventually such a 
message will get through (although'it may 
involve the submarine in surfacing or 1 sending up an aerial) is quite sufficient. 
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The Strategic Rocket Forces were apparently attempting 
to claim the major role in the task of combatting the 
submarines at the expense of the navy. They may not have 
been aware of the high level of autonomy the Polaris 
system possessed, for the Soviet Union at that time had 
no equivalent weapons system. 
1 A. Langer, Omega, Poseidon and the Arms Race, AICD 
Occasional Paper No. 5, AICD Sydney, January 1974, p.lS. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The military debate occasioned by the availability of 
a new generation of tactical weapons and the initial deployment 
of Soviet ICBMs had important implications for the Navy. The 
developments were of particular significance because of the 
limited functional orientation which the rest of the armed 
forces and the politicians brought to their consideration of 
naval affairs. During the period 1960-64 the Navy was a 
beleaguered service: non-naval officers held that its role 
in a future war was uncertain anc naval operations would be 
hardly decisive. Within this context of uncertainty there 
was general agreement that the Navy vwuld play its major role 
in countering sea based strikes against the USSR and that this 
could best be carried out by submarines. 
The Navy therefore had two major tasks which were reflected 
in a number of statements and articles by senior naval officers 
in the period: to establish the importance of the naval con-
tribution in a future war and to protect, to the extent possible, 
the new missile armed surface fleet. Naval spokesmen emphasised 
the importance of the submarine fleet, and in particular the 
nuclear pov1ered missile armed boats, which were seen as the 
basis of the navy's fighting power. This reorientation it was 
claimed substantially increased the war potential of the Navy. 
Although the naval spokesmen did not particularly single out 
th~ SLBM component of the submarine arm this was not true of 
other military figures who rated the SLBMs second to the ICBMS 
in their accounts of Soviet military might. Naval spokesmen 
limited their criticisms of surface vessels to battleships, 
artillery firing cruisers and attack carriers which were con-
signed to the "yesterday of navies". 
By mid 1961, following the introduction of the first 
classes of missile armed surface ships a variety of figures 
commented positively on their contribution to Soviet naval 
power. Despite this endorsement it was apparent that among 
non-naval leaders the submarine fleet was regarded as the 
primary force of the navy, with which naval officers by and 
large agreed, and that its combat capabilities were ~lSSiilf 
exaggerated. 
Having to some extent re-established the importance of 
the Navy,by emphasising the major re-orientation brought about 
by the development of the qualitatively new submarine fleet, 
many naval writers turned their attention to the campaign 
against extreme one sided exaggeration of any branch of the 
service. Submarines, acknowledged as the main striking force 
of the navy, needed combat support, not only from naval aviation 
but also from surface ships if they were to successfully carry 
out their role. 
CHAPTER VII I 
Post 1960 Naval Construction 
* Overview of Naval Construction 
The design decisions of the mid 1950s resulted in a 
shift away from conventionally armed large surface ships 
and submarines, which had been the basis of the immediate 
post war construction programme, to a force of vessels 
and aircraft armed with long range cruise missiles. These 
missile armed vessels, which were considerably lighter 
than their predecessors, required shore based air support, 
and hence had a restricted operational radius,during a 
future conflict against a major sea power equipped with 
aircraft carriers. 
Towards the end of the 1950s submarines, including 
some armed with SSM, and aircraft armed with ASM began 
to conduct coordinated exercises off the Norwegian coast 
designed to test the capability of these systems against 
the high value attack carriers of the USN and its major 
European allies. These exercises, conducted outside the 
range of Soviet fighter protection, confirmed that a 
major reassessment of Soviet naval requirements was a 
matter of some urgency. 
During the late 1950s and early to mid 1960s decisions 
were taken which had the effect of downgrading the long 
range missile equipped surface ships and substituting 
vessels equipped with SAM. The SAM equipped vessels, 
together with improvements in shipboard AA artillery, 
increased the probability of Soviet surface vessels being 
able to survive in a hostile maritime-air environment 
without fighter support. 'l.'he,h~~-ange SSP!':'! entry 
k·nto service aboard tho Kresta I Is and snbseq•wnt s11t face 
~:rs~·ci:r cun:rverrt,ett'' the problems of mid eotlcl' se gttidance 
and high altitude :fli<jjht paths, but 1 as· we shall see, at~ 
* This section has not been footnoted. Relevant footnotes 
may be found in the detailed ship type sections. 
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The ASW capabilities of surface ships were significantly 
increased during this period by the inclusion of single 
helicopters and hangars aboard the missile cruisers and 
destroyers \<Jhich were designated anti-submarine vessels by 
the Soviets. These vessels \~ere also equipped with nev1 
sonar equipment and improved ASW weapons including an AS':I 
missile system aboard the Moskva and Kuril classes. In his 
"United States Military Posture for F.Y. 1977" statement the 
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed that the 
Kara class cruiser also carried an ASW missile. Previously 
it had been thought that these vessels together with the 
Kresta II and Krivak destroyers had carried a horizon range 
SSM which had been given the NATO designation SSN-10. It is 
now apparent that all these vessels are AS':I vessels (which 
has always been their Soviet designation). 
Some commentators have also persuasively argued that 
the Kashins and Kildins 1 which previous Western opinion had 
held were armed with SSN-lls, are in fact ASW vessels and 
that the SSN-11 (NA'I'O) although outv1ardly resembling the SSM 
on the OSA II is an ASW weapon. 
This information and argument suggests that from 1966 
onwards all major Soviet surface vessels have been ASW ships, 
as the Soviets have consistently maintained. Indeed the only 
new surface ships currently under construction with an SSM 
capability are the small 800 ton vessels of the class Nanuchka_,• 
The dramatic change in emphasis from SSM to ASW arma;u~nt---/ 
suggests a possible attempt to provide a strategic ASW 
capability, although such vessels appear more suited to a 
tactical ASW role, offering the possibility of a sanitised 
area surrounding high value vessels. 
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·seme-~'li to the security of the la.tweh platferm. 
'!'he- taetica~AS'i,1 capa&ilities of~~ .. r:tace ships wcr e 
~ficant~~~:r:ee:se&, prima~~y the if'wlusion of 
s4B~·~·~OO hel~ptar hangars aboaxd the 
~~·=.u.i~s and destroyers, which wore designated 
~~&macrcinoQ..,JJ~y the Smd ets ASW capabi 1 i t.i,e,s 
were also4ft~S"ed··by~h:e deployment-o:rnew sonar 
~~)3mBnt··and.improvements···i·&·~W~ inclctt~41e 
.;hntroduction of an ASW missile system aboard tlle Moskva 
~~-:b.J. .. c1sssas~ These two cJa!>i>Eillii themseJ"es sngg\i!st<Sd 
a possi.&J.e..~t.tempt w provide a st:rategie ~f'rSW eapabi'l:-i~, 
~gb··&ble·A···~ls appear m0re swited to a tactical 
ASI•J role,·~+ng-+hepossibility of a •sanitised' area 
surrounding groupings ef surface ships. 
The development of surface units for coastal defence 
operations has been subject to an important change in recent 
years. The original post-war programme had seen the 
construction of three broad types of vessels for coastal 
operations, frigates, submarine chasers and numerous 
torpedo boats, which were to be partially replaced by the 
Komar and Osa missile boats. It would appear that the 
recent Grisha and Nanuchka missile corvettes are to replace 
these vessels. Both are considerably lighter than the 
artillery armed frigates, enabling the Nanuchka to be 
built on ways at Petrovsky, the former site of missile 
. H<-J,t..~m boat construct~on. HoEi~o~ range SSM provides the Nanuchka 
with greater hitting power than the frigates against 
surface warships while its larger size provides a more 
stable platform for its missile systems than the missile 
boats. Protection against aircraft is provided by the 
SA-N-4 system common to both classes"" A !!>lwr"--
The anti-submarine capability for coastal areas is 
provided by the Grisha armed with two 12-barrelled A/S 
rocket launchers and four A/S torpedo tubes. This 
represents a diminished A/S armament over the former 
Mirka and Petya class frigates which were also provided, 
after modifications, with variable depth sonar (VDS). 
ASW Armament of Recent Soviet Frigates and the 
Grisha Corvette 
Rocket launchers Torpedo tubes VDS 
Petya I 
Petya II 
Mirka I 
Mirka II 
Grisha 
4 16-barrel 
2 12-barrel 
4 12-barrel 
2 16-barrel 
2 12-barrel 
5-406mm 
l0-406mm 
5-406mm 
10-406mm 
4-406mm 
(Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p. 563 ) 
VDS on some 
VDS on some 
Submar~nes in all three major categories, SSBN, SSGN 
and attack continued in production subject to the hiatus 
between 1963 and 1967 in SSBN and SSN already discussed. 
The number of nuclear powered units increased substantially 
in all categories. Conventional power has been used only 
in the construction of medium range SS. 
Improvements in SLBM technology permitted the retro-
fitting of longer ranged missiles capable of submerged 
launch into existing units of the H and G class. There 
was no second generation hull/propulsion system adopted to 
the SSBN role but in 1967 the first of a new generation 
SSBN,complete with new missile system,appeared; the Y-class 
submarine. Missiles for the Y-class, 16 per boat, have a 
range of approximately 1,500 miles and are submerge-
launched. The follow-on D class SSBN, equipped with a new 
4,800 mile missile, has recently entered service, possibly 
in two versions; the first equipped with 12 launchers and 
the second with 16 launchers. 
The construction of SSGN's, which had taken precedence 
over new SSBNs and SSNs during the period 1963-67, continued, 
but at a slower rate than previously. The new C class SSGN 
was equipped with an underwater launch horizon range missile, 
and is apparently to be used in operations against aircraft 
carriers and other high value surface units. 
The Soviet Navy introduced a new SSN, the V-class, the 
production rate of which has been quite low, probably due 
to the demands of the SSBN programme. In all the Soviet 
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Navy has 12 N-class vessels and possibly 14 V SSNs together 
with a single unit A and it is unlikely that these 27 
vessels are sufficient for Soviet requirements, given their 
possible roles of counter enemy SSBN and protecting own 
SSBN. The recently observed modification of EI units, 
involving the removal of missile launchers from three of 
the class, could represent a Soviet attempt to make good 
this lack, at least until such time as the current SSBN 
programme is completed, or slowed, as a result of reaching the 
upper limits agreed to under the SALT I agreements. This 
would allow the release of facilities for additional SSN 
construction. 
From Khrushchev to Brezhnev - Kosygin 
The present force structure of the Soviet Navy is very 
much a product of the Khrushchev period, given a minimum 
ten-year lead-time between design decisions and the entry 
of vessels into service. As we have seen the former Premier 
and First Secretary was a radical innovatory interventionist 
in military affairs and his interventions had a dramatic 
impact on the Navy. 
The collective leadership which replaced Khrushchev has 
not shown the same inclination to intervene publicly in 
military affairs. Undoubtedly they are concerned with the 
economic impact of military programmes and have intervened, 
from time to time, but at Politburo-level. The mystery 
surrounding the fortnight gap between Malinovsky's death, 
following a prolonged illness, and the appointment of 
Marshal Grechko as Defence Minister; the impact of the 1967 
Basic Law on Military Service, not only on the period of 
service and training of enlisted men but on the revised set 
of retirement ages of senior officers; the continuing 
problems arising out of the issue of the military's role in 
defence policy making have all been discussed by others. 1 
The important point is not that the politicians have met 
resistance to their programmes from the military but that 
this resistance has, by and large, been contained behind 
closed doors. Thus the evidence available for such rifts 
Footnote to Page 269 
1 For a brief account of the evidence suggesting that 
the initial preference of the politicians for the new 
Defence Minister was Party Secretary Ustinov, a man 
whose career has been in the administration of 
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armaments production, see Gallagher, M.P., and Speilmann, 
K.F., Soviet Decision Makin for Defense (New York, 
Washington, London, 1972 , p.4l-42. 
The impact of the law on manpower has been covered in 
Jukes, G., 'Changes in Soviet Conscription Law', Australian 
Outlook, Vol. 22, No.2, 1968. 
For an account of its impact on the lower levels of the 
officer corps, see Erickson, J., Soviet Military Power 
(London, 1971), especially p.l3-40. 
Gallagher and Speilmann, op.cit., report that after a 
check on some 30 top level officers at least 20 are 
continuing in service despite having passed the age of 
obligatory retirement. 
The politicians' desire for a rejuvenated officer corps 
has, for whatever reason, apparently been stalled by the 
military. 
The problem of the role of the military professional 
in defence policy making has been given an additional 
twist by the Soviet military's recent adoption of a wide 
range of analysis and management techniques, designed to 
provide more and better information on a wide range of 
procurement, and command questions. 
See Holloway, D. 'Technology, Management and the Soviet 
Military Establishment', Adelphi Paper No. 76, (London, 
April 1971). 
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lS purely circumstantial. 
The politicians may have come under criticism from the 
military over their handling of the political side of the 
Czechoslovakian invasion. 1 The 1967 Middle East War also 
appears to have caused some rumblings within the government, 
which may have been reflected in the military. 2 More 
recently it has been suggested that the military may have 
opposed Brezhnev's apparent agreement at the Vladivostok 
summit that forward based systems should not be taken into 
account during SALT II negotiations on the grounds that 
such weapons •are not suitable for a significant attack on 
the Soviet Union' . 3 
Despite these possible differences of opinion, recent 
years have seen the importance of orderly and regular 
procedures stressed and new techniques of analysis 
introduced into military policy planning. 4 This is,at 
least in part,a reflection of the belief that Khrushchev's 
•subjective' style of leadership unduly affected the 
substance of military policy. 
1 Wolfe, T.W., Soviet Power & Europe 1945-70 (Baltimore and 
London, 1970) p.380-385, for a brief account of the invasion 
and its political aftermath. See also an interesting 
article by Shub, A., on Dubcek's eventual relin~uishing of 
office. 'Czech Backdown Laid to Efforts of Grechko', 
Washington Post, 18 April 1969. 
2 Nikolai Yegorichev, the first secretary of the Moscow 
City Party was removed from office, according to Western 
reports, because of his outspoken opposition to Politburo 
policy on the Middle East. Whether Yegorichev was urging 
the Politburo to take firmer action or whether he was 
demanding to know how the Soviet Union had become immersed 
in the Middle East and suffered a loss of prestige when the 
Egyptians, heavily armed with Soviet equipment, were routed 
is not at issue. Sections of the armed forces could have 
been in support of either view. Wolfe, T.W., Soviet Power, 
p.339. Dornberg, J., Brezhnev (London, 1974), p.2l4, 
suggeststhat the major impact of Yegorichev's demotion 
was to undermine the power base of Shelepin. 
3
zorza, V. 'SALT and the Military', International Herald 
Tribune, 12 December 1974, p.6. The quotation is attributed 
to Dr. Kissinger. 
4 Holloway, op.cit., for an excellent survey of these 
techniques, their introduction and impact on Soviet 
military-political relations. 
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The introduction of the new analytical techniques has 
not necessarily given rise to the dominance of the military 
professionals in defence policy~but has rather improved the 
quality of their advice to the political leadership. This 
may have resulted in a strengthening of the professionals' 
case. Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanov claims 
the more the political leadership relies on 
conclusions based on military science (as 
opposed to military philosophy or the leaders 
own subjective notions?) the more effective 
and effectual will be the decisions they take, 
and the greater will be the unity of political 
and military leadership.l 
It would be naive to suggest that there is a simple, 
direct connection between the fruits of analysis and the 
outcome of defence decision, yet it is probably true that 
analysis has strengthened the position of the military 
professional against the subjectivism, hare-brained 
scheming, hasty conclusions and rash decisions for which 
the new leadership condemned Khrushchev. 
In areas Where there is evidence of apparent conflict 
between the political leadership and the military, the 
politicians have been flexible. Grechko, the military 
heir-presumptive to Malin~~sky rather than a civilian 
was made Defence Minister. Senior officers have not been 
forced into retirement under the provisions of the military 
service law either because of direct pressure from the 
' 
military to safeguard their colleagues, or because of an 
assessment that rejuvenation, to the extent desired, was 
not possible within a limited time span. 
Moreover, the present political leadership has done 
much that would tend to satisfy the armed forces. The 
military budget allocation was substantially increased in 
19672enabling the major surge in Soviet missile deployments 
1 Ivanov, V., 'The Scientific principles of leading the 
defence of the socialist fatherland', K.V.S. 1969 No. 16, 
p.l2, cited in Holloway, op.cit., p.36. 
2Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1974, (Cambridge, Mass., 
and London, 1974), p.l91, and The Military Balance 1974-5 
p.80, Both these sources indicate a levelling out of 
Soviet military expenditure from 1970 on. 
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which began in 1966. 1 The present leadership has glven 
consistent support for the expansion of strategic forces 
so that the Soviet Union now occupies a position of rough 
parity (some would maintain superiority) vis-a-vis US 
strategic forces. 
It is difficult at this stage to be sure of the 
political leadership's attitudes towards the Navy. We 
know that Brezhnev had a significant association with 
Gorshkov dating to the war years. Gorshkov was deputy 
commander of the Novorossiysk defence region and commander 
of the Azov sea flotilla. His naval units played major 
roles in the battles for the Caucasus and on the Black Sea 
in 1942 and 1943 where he and Brezhnev first met. (At the 
time Brezhnev was politicalcommissar of the Carpathian 
Military District). Their paths crossed again when Brezhnev 
became chief political commissar of the Navy in March 1953, 
a week prior to the abolitio~ of the separate navy ministry. 
Gorshkov at the time was chief-of-staff of the Soviet Navy. 2 
Wartime acquaintances may not count forever, and there 
is an increasing tendency to suggest that Gorshkov and 
Brezhnev may have had a recent series of disputes. 
Brezhnev's biographer suggests that following the mining of 
North Vietnamese harbours Gorshkov advocated sending in 
minesweepers to clear the ports. Brezhnev rejected the 
idea. 3 There is also a great deal of Gorshkov's 'Navies in 
War and Peace' series which can be used as urging a greater 
role for the navy in the face of the political leadership's 
0 "ff 4 lndl erence. 
1 SIPRI Year Book 1975, p.89, and Ball, D.J., 
Misslle Programme, p.l00-104. 
2 Dornberg, Brezhnev, p.87, 123 and 125. 
3 Ibid, p.265. 
Strategic 
4 See my own analysis of this series, Chapter XI below. 
MccGwire 1 s analysis of the series suggests a cleavage 
placing Gorshkov on opposite sides to Brezhnev and Grechko. 
MccGwire, M.K. 'Advocacy of Seapower in an internal debate• 
in A&niral Gorshkov on 'Navies in War and Peace', Center 
for Naval Analyses, C.R.C. 257 (Arlington, September 1974) 
p.26-27. 
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We shall be in a better position to judge this 
question when the results of the early 1970s decisions 
affecting naval procurement become clearer. Unfortunately 
we are not likely to see the results of these decisions 
until the l980s,although there will undoubtedly be straws 
in the wind prior to that date. 'Navies in War and Peace• 
may be the first such straw and certainly future assessments 
of the design decisions of the early 1970s would be well 
advised to compare the fruits of the programme with 
d . 1 Gorshkov 1 s state requ~rements. 
The Kuril Class: Aircraft Carriers 
The construction of two units of what may prove to be 
a much larger class of aircraft carriers seems at first to 
contradict earlier pronouncements by Soviet spokesmen. 
Khrushchev told the XXII Congress of the CPSU that carriers 
f . . 2 d made good targets or m~ss~les an Gorshkov had relegated 
the attack carrier to the yesterday of navies. 3 
The implied reversal is probably more apparent than 
real. Firstly, the Soviet designation for the Kuril class 
is not aircraft carrier, but rather anti-submarine cruiser 
4 (Protivo lodochny kreyzer) as is the Moskva class. 
1 See in particular the last article in the series 'Some 
Problems in Mastering the World Oceans'. 
2 Khrushchev, N.S., Speech to the XXII Congress of the 
CPSU. Khrushchev's memoirs indicate that this may have 
been another example of Khrushchev's self confessed sin 
of public boasting. In a critical review of Stalin's 
post war construction programme he states: 'A navy without 
aircraft carriers is no navy at all' (p.20). Later in 
justifying the cancellation of the surface navy he claims: 
•carrier based aircraft can easily sight and sink surface 
ships•, (p.30). His own assessment of carriers appears to 
be higher than his public pronouncements while in office 
indicated. - 'Aircraft carriers, of course, are the second 
most effective weapon in a modern navy. The Americans had 
a mighty carrier fleet - no one could deny that. I'll admit 
I felt a nagging desire to have some in our own navy, but 
we couldn't afford to build them. They were simply beyond 
our means. Besides, with a strong submarine force we felt 
able to sink the American carriers if it came to war 1 .(p.3l) 
Khrushchev, N.S. Last Testament. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G., Navy Day Article, Pravda, 31 July 1960. 
4 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.532-3. 
Secondly, Soviet comments on aircraft carriers have by 
large been limited to the role of aircraft carriers 
as a 'primary strike weapon'. 
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In a 1967 article Gorshkov conceded that the carriers 
of the Western naval powers had posed a serious threat to 
the USSR in the 1950s and early 1960s. But their status 
as 'primary strike force in the armed struggle at sea had 
no future' because of the allegedly superior 'strike 
capabilities of submarine-air forces•. In 1967 Gorshkov 
wrote with apparent conviction: 
correctness of these views•. 1 
'Time has confirmed the 
None of this is a rejection of aircraft carriers. It 
merely suggests that carrier aircraft can no longer be 
considered a primary strike force in a nuclear war~ either 
against land targets, where they have been superseded by 
SLBMs, or against another fleet where the major strike will 
be carried out by missile-armed submarine-air forces. Left 
innocent by omission are the reconnaissance, anti-
submarine warfare and fleet protection roles of carrier 
based aircraft. The role of carriers as a primary strike 
force in limited wars and interventions such as Korea, 
Vietnam and the various Middle East crises has been 
3 4 
recognised by Khrushchev and Gorshkov. 
Recent Soviet evaluations of aircraft carriers 5 have 
stressed these general purpose roles although there is some 
evidence that the role of the carrier, as a nuclear force, 
1 Gorshkov, 'The development of Soviet naval science•, p.l7. 
2 This coincides with the official view of the United States, 
where carriers have been listed among the General Purpose 
Forces, rather than the Strategic Forces, since 1962. 
3 See p.224 above for Khrushchev's comments on carriers 
during the Quemoy crisis. 
4 Gorshkov, 'Soviet Naval Science•, p.l8. 
5 See Teplinsky, B. 'America.1 s naval programmes•, 
U.S.A.-Economics Politics and Ideology, No. 10, September 
1972, translated in Survival, March/April 1973, p.75-80. 
Korotkin, I.M., et al, Aircraft and Helicopter Carriers, 
{Moscow, 1972) JPRS Translat~ons ~n USSR Mil~tary Affa~rs 
No. 933, and Shiltov, v., Capt. lst Rank, 'An old ~dea ~n 
new form•, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 May 1972, p.2. JPRS 
translation in USSR Mil~tary Affairs No. 817. 
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is still highly regarded. An article on American proposed 
sea control ships warned that claims •that attack carriers 
are becoming extinct ... are being uttered only for the 
purpose of making the concept of small carriers more 
attractive•. 1 
A recent book on helicopter and aircraft carriers 
comments: 
Although at present attack carriers are technically 
excluded from the list of strategic offensive 
nuclear forces, they are capable of launching 
nuclear attacks on major ground objectives in 
enemy rear areas, including military-industrial 
and administrative-political centres and army 
and naval shore installations.2 
Nonetheless primary attention is being g~ven to the 
general purpose non-nuclear roles of ship based aircraft 
in Soviet literature. The ability of sea control ships 
to acquire and maintain supremacy at sea, their use in the 
ASW defence of large ship formations, convoys or carrier 
task forces,and as a means of conducting naval air 
operations beyond the range of shore based aviation, 
together with the ability to bring pressure to bear on 
small countries, are highlighted and in general positively 
evaluated by Soviet commentators. 3 The use of carriers to 
move amphibious troops to landing regions and provide 
support aircraft for an amphibious landing has been 
frequently mentioned in recent writings. 4 Teplinsky notes 
without comment that 
1 
2 
The (US) Navy believes that the freedom of sea 
communications and the maintenance of control 
over the world ocean cannot be achieved without 
attack aircraft carriers ... 
(U)nder conditions of 'normal' war they supplement 
Shiltov, V., op.cit., p.4. 
Korotkin, I.M., et al, p.SO. 
3 k" Korot ~n, et al, op,cit., p.38 and p.SO. Shiltov, op.cit., 
p.3. 
4 Korotkin, et al, op.cit., p.ll3 and Gorshkov, S.G., 
'Navies as a weapon of the aggressive policy of imperialist 
states in peacetime', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 12, 1972, USN 
trans. p.S-6 and 12-14. 
Class No. 
Kuril 2 
TABLE I: 
Displacem_ent 
30,000 tons 
- 40,000 
tons 
(estimates 
available 
vary) 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER CONSTRUCTION - POST 1960 PROGRAMMES 
Armament 
SSM 
SAM 
]"twin SA-N-3 
GOBLET 
~
launchers 
2-8-57mm guns 
(l4x2) 
ASW 
212-barrelled 
MBUs 
1 twin ASW 
roCket launcher 
Aircraft 
25 fixed wing 
VSTOL 
Freehand type 
25 Hormone 
A. ASW 
Helicopters 
or Hind A 
total of 
40-50 
aircraft 
expected 
Construction 
Data 
Kiev - laid 
1969-70 
currently 
undergoing 
sea trials 
in Black 
Sea 
Minsk -
under 
construction 
both at 
Nikolayev 
Range & 
Speed 
probably 
30+ 
knots 
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Com:nen ts 
From information available it would seem 
that the 1 Kuril• class has no aircraft 
catapults, arresting cables or mirror 
landing aids. 
Aircraft landings may prove difficult 
without these aids. 
The forward section is taken up with missile 
armament leaving a flight deck of approxi-
mately 600 feet. 
The inclusion of a number of side mounted 
guns - possibly for point defence~may present 
difficulties for underway replenishment. 
As these vessels are still undergoing sea 
trials and have not been observed in 
exercises or in deployment it is difficult 
to be precise as to their intended role - see 
text. Expected in service late 1975. 
Possibly 6-B of these vessels are planned 
provided they prove satisfactory. 
Sonar systems probably include VDS in 
connection with the ASW rocket launcher. 
Soviet designation: Anti-submarine cruiser. 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.532. 
Palmar, N., 'The Soviet Aircraft Carrier',~ May 1974, p.l58-161. 
'Aircraft Carrier for Russia 1 , The Navy (Aust.), February, March, April 1972. 
Military Balance 1974-1975 (London, 1974) p.lO. 
Weyer's Warships of the World 1973, p.l88. 
the power of overseas groupings of land based 
aircraft (while) in many regions carriers can 
form the main or in same cases the only 
representatives of US air power.l 
He concludes: 
... a tremendous role- one which largely 
determines the success of any naval actions -
is played by aircraft. All recent practical 
measures testify that naval air power is being 
allocated particularly crucial importance for 
the fulfillment of the long term strategic 
task of winning dominance at sea.2 
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Gorshkov's appreciation of the role of United States 
aircraft carriers in wars in the 'third world' has already 
t-e been noted. arrdlhas also acknowledged that aircraft carriers 
are the most prestigious warships for port visits or 
displays of naval might. 3 There is no direct reference 
to future carrier construction for the Soviet Navy in 
Gorshkov's recent series of articles, although he does 
claim 
The utilisation of the achievements of science 
and production together with the introduction 
of scientific methods in determining the most 
advantageous mix of weapons and equipment 
characteristics, taking into account economic 
factors, has permitted naval development to 
approach its vital requirements to the maximum 
degree without copying naval construction in 
the Western countries and while following our 
own national path most commensurate with the 
specific tasks facing the navy and the conditions 
for carrying them out.4 
The significant differences between the navies of 
the Soviet Union and Western states are also attributed 
to the gee-military position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis 
1 Teplinsky, op.cit., p.78. 
2 Ibid., p.79. 
3 See Gorshkov, 'Navies as a weapon in peacetime', passim. 
4 Gorshkov, 'Problems in mastering the World Ocean', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1972, JPRS Translations of USSR 
Military Affairs No. 905, p.l7. 
279 
the United States. 1 
This suggests that at present the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Soviet Navy does not contemplate the inclusion of 
large attack carriers in his fleet. Yet the question of 
large carriers is probably not finally resolved, even 
within the Navy. Soviet commentators on the US Navy, 
while acknowledging the high costs of construction, 
maintenance and operation of carriers, and their vulner-
ability, note that 
the principal role in acquiring supremacy on 
the seas and in operations against an enemy's 
shores, will still be played by the CVAs, as 
long as they continue to exist. 
Moreover, 'the concept of the small carriers is ln no 
way meant to cast doubt upon the continued need for attack 
carriers 1 • 2 
Perhaps the most important factor in determining 
whether or not the Soviet Navy will eventually construct 
a series of attack aircraft carriers is the Soviet 
assessment of the future of the US Navy's attack carrier 
programme. 
would wish 
It would seem unlikely that the Soviet Navy 
to begin an attack aircraft carrier race. The 
US Navy has had over fifty years of experience in the 
construction and operation of such ships and at present 
has a considerable force of attack carriers, carrier 
aircraft, experienced pilots and crew, not to mention the 
essential support and training facilities. Soviet 
construction of attack carriers could only be expected to 
stimulate de:nands that the us increase its carrier fleet 
at a time when US attack carriers have been reduced to 
fourteen vessels. 3 
1 Ibid, p.l9. This point had been previously made by the 
authors of Military Strategy, who claimed that geography 
alone ruled out successful Soviet operation of •large 
surface ships' because •two of our fleets were based in 
closed seas {the Baltic and Black Seas) while the Northern 
and Pacific Fleets faced great difficulties in reaching the 
open seas•, RAND trans., p.233. 
2 Shiltov, 'An old idea•, p.3. 
3 Janes Fighting ShiPs 1974/5, p.380 and 404. 
2<lU 
The Soviet Navy is more likely to continue its 
practice of attempting to evolve a counter to the attack 
carrier. Whereas this may provide a solution to the 
carrier threat against the Soviet Union it will leave as 
a major unresolved problem the question of countering US 
intervention in Third World countries and the problem of 
control of the high seas in situations short of general 
nuclear war. 
If the Soviet Union were able to limit US construction 
of attack carriers by means of an arms limitation agreement 
which also allowed the Soviets to reach an eventual state 
of parity in this type of vessel, the above constraint 
would be removed. However, at the Vladivostok meeting 
between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev in November 
1974, at which agreement was reached on negot.iating 
positions for SALT II, this issue does not appear to have 
been contentious1as it was during the SALT I negotiations. 2 
Soviet commentators are aware of the disadvantages of 
VSTOL aircraft especially when operated at sea. In 
particular it has been observed that the take off streams 
1 Mr. Brezhnev appears to have agreed with Dr. Kissinger's 
comment that tactical nuclear weapons 'are not suitable 
for a significant attack on the Soviet Union'. Although 
this comment appears to have been directed specifically at 
tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, it applies 
equally well to CVAs. 
Undoubtedly, it is a view that the military professionals 
would dispute vehemently. 
See Zorza, V., 'SALT and the Military', International 
Herald Tribune, 12 December 1974, p.6. 
For a Soviet view on the role of CVAs in general nuclear 
war, see p.276 above. 
2 For an account of the Soviet position on Forward-Based 
Systems, including aircraft carriers, during the SALT I 
negotiations, see Newhouse, J., Cold Dawn,p.l75-5, 176, 
189-190, 194-5. 
An appreciation of how far the Soviets• views on F.B.S. 
have changed since SALT I is indicated in Kissinger's 
Congressional Briefing following the adoption of the 
SALT agreements: 'The Soviets believed that strategic 
means any weapons system capable of reaching the Soviet 
Union or the United States. This would have included 
our forward based aircraft and carrier forces ... 1 
Kissinger, H.A., Congressional Briefing at the White 
House, 15 June, 1972, cited Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p.l95. 
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of VSTOL aircraft lead to deck heating which is a drawback 
if a catapult is being used. This problem may well explain 
the apparent lack of catapults on the Kuril carriers 
Similarly, the absence of arrester gear on the Kuril LS 
probably due to the fact that as yet the Soviets have been 
unable to devise a satisfactory modification of the 
aircraft nose wheel design capable of absorbing the strains 
imposed by arrest systems. Finally, it is noted that the 
take-off weight of an aircraft, and hence its fuel and/or 
weapons load, is dependent on the ambient air temperature. 1 
The operation of helicopters at sea has also been 
subject to a balanced appraisal. 2 On the one hand it is 
acknowledged that helicopters can extend the range and 
improve the effectiveness of shipboard ASW weapons systems. 
On the other hand 'the slow cruising and search speed of 
ASW helicopters makes it impossible for them to carry out 
ASW missions sufficiently effectively•. Moreover, ship-
borne helicopters cannot be used in bad weather and area 
search using dip sonar requires continual hovering and 
slow manoeuvre making the helicopter extremely vulnerable. 
The conclusion of the appraisal is that 
The helicopter carrying cruisers, as their 
displacement tonnage and dimensions are 
increased, can over the long run completely 
replace the obsolete anti-submarine aircraft 
carriers, and for this reason many specialists 
in the foreign navies feel that over the next 
decade a new class of ships will appear in 
the shipbuilding programmes, that is, anti-
submarine helicopter cruisers.3 
The tactic of referring to the opinions of unidentified 
'specialists in foreign navies' suggests that the role of 
anti-submarine helicopter cruisers was, at least at the time 
of writing, still controversial. Reference to increased 
1 Korotkin, I.M., et al., Aircraft and Helicopter Carriers, 
p.ll-12. 
2 ibid, p.l2. 
3 ibid., p.ll8. 
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tonnage and dimensions suggests that the authors have in 
mind continued production of vessels of the Kuril class 
size. 
Although the Kuril class is designated anti-submarine 
cruiser by the Soviets, a designation justified by its 
ASW armament and probable sonar systems, this does not, 
of course, exclude it from performing other roles. The 
most important alternate role is that of amphibious assault. 
Indeed, the possibility that the Kuril class may embark 
Hind-A helicopters, 1 used by the Soviet Army for troop 
lift, would, if it eventuated, dramatically increase the 
credibility of the Soviet Navy as an interventionary force. 
Such a use, while possible, would mark a revision of 
former Soviet policy on the commitment of troops to regions 
outside the immediate Warsaw Pact area. In the past, with 
the notable exception of forces stationed in Egypt prior 
to July 1972, 2 Soviet troops outside the Pact area have 
been utilised in an advisory capacity. 
Perhaps of greater significance than the pattern of 
past behaviour, however, is the fact that Soviet amphibious 
exercises continue to emphasise short coastal transits 
rather than oceanic exercises. 3 Moreover, the projection 
capability of the Soviet Navy remains relatively modest 
despite the reactivation of the naval inf#antry in 1963. 
At present this force, whose function is to spearhead a 
landing.,or to engage in coastal spoiling attacks and raids, 
rather than to carry out a major landing operation in its 
own right, consists of approximately 17,000 men, divided 
among the four fleet areas. 4 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.532. 
2 For an account of Soviet military activity in Egypt, 
see Becker, A.S., 'The Superpowers in the Arab Israeli 
Conflicts, 1970-73 1 , RAND Paper p.5167 December 1973, 
passim. 
3 Amphibious assaults were an integral part of recent 
Soviet exercises including Sever in 1968, Oder-Neisse 
in 1969 and Okean in 1970. 
4 Military Balance 1974/5, p.9-l0. 
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The size of the Alligator class, the newest and 
largest vessels in the Soviet amphibious force, is 4,000 
Lt 1 
tons, and4has a carrying capacity of 1,700 tons. This 
fact, together with the continued deployment of even 
smaller vessels for the amphibious forces 2 suggests that 
the naval infantry is intended primarily for coastal 
operations. 
Soviet comment on American amphibious landings during 
the war in Vietnam confirms this view. It is claimed that 
the Americans found it necessary to carry an amphibious 
battalion group and at least thirty heavy 
helicopters to achieve the most efficient 
transport 
3 
results. It 
would appear at this stage that vessels of the Kuril class 
are too small to enable a troop lift on this scale, 
especially if air support has to be provided from the same 
source. 
This still leaves open the option of using the Kuril 
class as part of an amphibious force undertaking an 
unopposed landing, or of using the Kurils as ferry vessels 
to deliver aircraft and arms to embattled pro-Soviet regimes, 
should this be considered politically necessary and/or 
profitable by the Soviet leaders. 
There are two other possible roles for the Kuril class 
that may have been given considerable weight in the decision 
which led to the initial approval of the class: they could 
be used to enhance the Soviet Union's general sea control 
capabilities and they could be used to protect the Soviet 
Union's own SSBN force. 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/S, p.568. Weyers Warships 1973, 
p.l96-7. 
2 The PollOcny class of approximately 60 units has a 780 ton 
displacem\nt and a 220 ton carrying capacity and the next 
most numerous class, the Vydra has a 300 ton displacement 
and a 250 ton carrying capacity. For these and other 
amphibious forces, Janes Fighting Ships 1974/S, p.568-9, 
and Weyers Warships 1973, p.l96-7. 
3 Korotkin, et al., op.cit., p.l20. 
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It is unlikely that the Kurils were designed for an 
anti-SSBN role and unlike the Moskvas there is no evidence 
to suggest that they may have been intended as anti-SSGs or 
SSGN vessels. The difference between the limited search 
area imposed by the range and endurance of helicopters, and 
the range of their sonar systems, and the sea space 
available to an enemy SSBN equipped with Polaris A-3 or 
Poseidon missiles, to say nothing of the Trident successor, 
is so great that it is unlikely that the Soviet leadership 
would have sanctioned the development of a new vessel for 
1 
such an apparently hopeless task. The fact that USN SSBNs 
can deploy to launch areas without having to transit any 
geographical choke points once they have left base only 
adds to the apparent futility of a Soviet surface force 
response to the SLBM threat. 
The Kuril class vessels will improve the sea control 
capabilities of the Soviet Navy by offering at least a 
duplication of the ASW capabilities provided by the Moskva 
class. In addition they represent a considerable step 
forward in AAW. Not only is there a heavy SAM armament, 
including the latest generation SA-N-4, but the fixed wing 
V/STOL aircraft,which presumably will be deployed,will 
extend sensor and combat range not only for AAW but also 
for anti-surface ship warfare. The Kuril class constitutes 
a potential quantum jump for the Soviet Navy in terms of 
protection afforded to a surface task force. 
1 It has been estimated that a helicopter equipped with dip 
sonar can examine a corridor approximately 6 x 60 miles in 
an hour. 
SIPRI Tactical and Strategic Anti-submarine Warfare, p.25. 
Given the operat~onal availability of seven or e~ght 
helicopters, it is possible that an area of 2,900 square 
miles could be covered during any given hour. However, a 
submarine armed with a 2,875 mile missile has at least six 
million square miles of sea space from which it can launch 
its missiles to hit Moscow. If we assume that the missiles 
are targeted on any site within the USSR, then the 
submarine may be anywhere in fifteen million square miles 
of sea space and still within range of some targets. 
Scoville, H. 'Missile submarines and national security:•., in 
Arms Control,(San Francisco, 1973) p.238. 
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Operational areas from which present and proposed SLBMS 
could hit targets within 200 miles o£ the borders of the 
USSR. 
Area within 200 miles of the borders of the USSR. 
l Polaris A-1 range 1,2.fb nautical miles. 
2 Polaris A-2 range 1,500 nautical miles. 
3 Polaris A-3 and. Poseidon C-3 range ;:t,5oo 
nautical miles~ 
4 ULMs 1 range 4,500 nautical miles. 
5 ULMs 2 range 6,000 nautical miles. 
Source: Scoville, Herbe+t Jnr., 'Missile Submarines and 
National Security•, Readings from Scientific 
American Arms Control, Introduction H.F. York, 
p.239. 
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Whether the Soviets intend to use the new air capable 
ships in a pro-SSBN role must remain a matter of conjecture. 
The requirement for SSBN protection stems from the fact 
that at present the maln component of the Soviet SSBN force, 
theY-class submarine, must penetrate ASW barriers before 
it can reach launch stations from where it can attack the 
United States. The ASW capabilities of the United States 
are highly rated by Soviet writers. 1 
The problem of reaching launch areas is compounded 
for the Soviets by their practice of maintaining only a 
few SSBNs on patrol. In 1973 only two or three of these 
boats were within range of the USA on a continual patrol 
basis, 2 far fewer than considerations of distance and 
operational availability alone would allow. 
therefore, that the Soviets intend to deploy 
either during crises or once war has actually 
In the latter case, SSBNs will be required to 
It seems, 
in surges 
broken out. 3 
break through 
the ASW barriers which at present consist of ASW aircraft, 
(shore and carrier based), surface ships and SSNs together 
with surveillance devices which probably include fixed, 
bottom-mounted, sonars or sonar buoys,carefully sown across 
1 Soviet commentary on American ASW 
conjunction with the Soviet missions 
USA with SLBM on p.365-367 below. 
is discussed in 
of attacking the 
2 Star-News,, (Washington), 20 April 1973, cited in 
Dismukes, B., 'Roles and Missions of Soviet Naval general 
purpose forces in wartime: Pro SSBN operations?'., 
Professional Paper 130, Center for Naval Analyses, August, 
1974. 
3 It has also been suggested by J. McConnell that the 
Soviets are practising a •withholding strategy' on the 
grounds that SSBNs in being are vital for intra-war or 
post-war bargaining. James McConnell 'Admiral Gorshkov 
on the Soviet Navy in War and Peace•. Center for Naval 
Analyses Working Paper, Mimeo, 20 July 1973. Even if 
McConnell is correct in his analysis, the USN's ASW 
barriers will still have to be overcome before Soviet 
SSBNs become a realistic bargaining chip. 
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Soviet assessments of United States anti-submarine warfare 
defence zones in the Atlantic and Pacific (1968). 
Atlantic Ocean 
Pacific Ocean 
•• 'r:..~., ... <o~J,~•"''-"' 
• ... 
• 
[J Geographic narrows. 
ASW carriers &/or 
c::>helicopter carriers. 
~U.S. submarines . 
...o. U.S. shore based 
rv aircraft. 
&' Fixed hydroacoustic 
systems for long 
range detection of 
submarines. 
Source: Suzolev, N.I., Submarines against Submarines, as reproduced 
in Funkhouser 1 Sov~et Carr1er Strategy', uSNIP, December 1973, 
p.35. --
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selected choke points. 1 (see map). The Kuril class, with 
its AAW, ASW and anti-surface ship capabilities, appears 
to be an extremely valuable component of any task force 
sent to gain control of the sea in a reasonably limited 
area and coordinate the major operations required to 
combat the component parts of the anti-submarine barrier. 
As the D class vessels, with their 4,600 mile 
missiles, enter service in larger numbers, the requirement 
for deployments to stations off the US coast will be 
reduced, as missiles will be able to hit US targets from 
the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. 2 This will require 
that the security of the fleet areas be guaranteed against 
enemy intrusions, especially by SSNs. Again, the Kuril 
class vessels appear well suited for the role. 
If the Soviet military are thinking seriously about 
the protection of their own SSBNs, then the Kuril air 
capable ships could be an essential component of a force 
charged with the defence of the fleet areas against an 
expected Western penetration, or for the penetration of 
a Western strategic ASW defence. 
l The ASW barriers across, say the Greenland-Iceland-UK 
gap, may provide for a tactical area defence of the North 
Atlantic by denying Soviet submarines access to the 
Atlantic sea lanes. However, such systems are also 
capable of providing strategic area defence by denying 
SSBNs access to ocean area from which missiles may be 
launched. 
It would appear that the air and naval patrols along the 
Greenland-Iceland-UK passages to the North Atlantic are 
intended to deny all types of Soviet submarines access to 
the North Atlantic during any future conflict. The 
development and deployment of CAPTOR, a sensor-triggered 
torpedo released from a mine, will greatly enhance this 
capability. 
See SIPRI, Anti-submarine Warfare, and Garwin, R.L., 
~nti-Submarine Warfare and nat~onal security•, p.248 and 
259, in Arms Control, for further discussion on ASW 
barriers and weapons systems and their impact on the 
strategic system based on mutual deterrence. 
2 Missiles from the Sea of Okhotsk and in the North 
Pacific off Petropavlovsk Kamchatska could hit targets 
in the United States. A recent report in the International 
Herald Tribune, 29 April 1975, states that the new D class 
vessels have not left the Barents Sea area although as 
many as eight of these SSBNs are said to be on patrol. 
Class 
KRESTA 
II 
KARA 
No. 
6 
2 
TABLE II: 
t:iisPT.iCemerit 
6,000 tons 
standard 
7, 500 tons 
full load 
8,200 tons 
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GUIDED MISSILE CRUISERS - POST 1960 PROGRAMME 
Armament 
.,_.;;.....;·~,~· S@M~j{~ 
2 quadi:uple 
' SS-N-10 ~ 
SAM 
2twin SA-N-3 
4-57mm (2x2) 
d.p. guns 
8-30mm (4x2) 
AA guns 
ASW 
'212-baxrelled 
MBU fwd. 
2 6-barrelled 
MBU a£t. 
Tor~edo Tubes 
10- 33 mm {2x5) 
ASW 
S&M j'; ~ "':.> ,~.~l!"'~ 
2qua~l~ -. .. ,., 
~SS-N-10 ~ 
SAM 
2twin SA-N-4 
2 twin SA-N-3 
4-76mm (2-X2) 
4-30mm 
ASW 
216-barrelled 
MBU launchers 
(forward) 
2-6-barrelled 
MBUs (aft) 
Torpedoes 
l0-533mm (2x5) 
CoriStruction 
Data 
Built at 
Leningrad 
since 
1968 to 
1971 
Zhdanov 
yard 
Built at 
Nikolayev 
keel laid 
1970 £irst 
seen in 
Mediterranean 
March 1973 
Range & 
Speed 
s,ooo 
miles at 
18 knots 
speed 
33 knots 
M<iEfiinery 
Steam 
geared 
turbines 
Gas 
Turbine 
Cririi.'llents 
The Kresta !Is carry a Hormone A helicopter for ASW. 
In same respects a development of Kresta I with same hull 
lines and propulsion plant. 
Has advanced missile armament 
~ 1 """"A- ¥1-SV0 
ss-N-10 ~ 9l £h::ll get netion missile with range of 29 miles, i.e. 
horizon range .. ·.Helicopter primarily ASW 
SA-N-3 an improvement on SA-N-1. 
Soviet designation - large anti-submarine ship -~ 
weapons a.a oS 1962 ori,jn- no VDS reported. 
~ systems presumably available from Moskva. 
~0;:>""'-! ----
3-D radar systems similar to that an Moskva. 
~~- ~l -"'•i l?:$o~ Kresta II ars~a to introduce..._~ missile systemf and 
hence improve the capabilities of Kresta I but without 
the necessity for Soviet designers to produce a completely 
new keel up design. 
Apart from the specialised Moskva class this is the first 
large cruiser in the Soviet Navy since Sverdlovs. It is 
the largest warship in the world with gas turbine propulsion. 
A new SA-N-4 system in addition to Kresta II armaments, plus 
a VDS ~ A/S mi;ssile launchers. 
The large size of the Kara, and the array of electronic 
equipment suggests a flagship capability with these vessels 
replacing the Sverdlovs in this role. 
However, if this is so, crew space must be quite frugal 
given the below-deck requirements for missile and artillery 
magazines and for radax and ECM accommodation. Despite 
its size the class appears none too big given the weapons 
it carries. 
Helicopters embarked. 
T -
I~Ni€1lf*p- F ·? 
Soviet designation: Large anti-submarine Ship. 
See text for Sverdlov conversions. 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.S50-5Sl. 
USNIP August 1973, p.122. 
F1sher, E.C., 'A look at the Nikolayev•, USNIP March 1974, p.ll6-lla. 
Baker, A.D., •soviet Surface Combatants•,-usN!P June 1974, p.75. 
Military Balance 1974/75, p.?. -----
Weyers Warships of the Wgrld 1973, p,l86-9. 
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Kresta II and Kara 
The Kresta II class, designated "large anti-submarine 
ship" by the Soviet Navy, appears to be a development. from 
Kres·ta I. Kresta II incorporates the weapons system, previously 
known as the SS-N-10, 1 which has nov; been identified as an ASiv 
missile, 2 and the SA-N-3 also deployed aboard the Moskva, Kara 
and Kuril classes and evidently the current long range AAW 
weapon, into a hull/propulsion unit similar to those of the 
Kresta I class. 3 
The presence of a Hormone A helicopter, configured for 
ASW, 4 together with two quadruple ASW missile launchers, ASW 
torpedoes and multi-barrelled rocket launchers suggest a 
formidable anti-submarine capability for tactical point defence. 5 
The Kara class is significantly larger than any Soviet 
surface ship since the Sverdlov cruisers, excepting the Moskva 
and Kuril classes. This fact, coupled with the array of 
electronic corr®unication equipment carried, suggests that these 
vessels are intended as command ships for squadrons on distant 
deployment. The mix of weapons systems "an ASW missile and 
two surface to air missile systems" is not in conflict with such 
a role. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, pp. 550-551. 
u.s. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Hilitary 
Posture for F.Y. 1977, p. 59. 
According to Janes Fighting Shir.s 1974/5, pp. 551-2, the 
Kresta IIs are heavier, slightly longer and draw more water. 
vJeyer' s 1973 confirms these differences but offers slightly 
different figures. 
Hormone B is equipped for surface target acquisition and mid-
course guidance functions. 
Tactical point defence ASW aims to defend a particular point 
in the ocean occupied by a high value target. Protective 
screens of ASW equipped surface vessels, aircraft where 
available, and hunter-killer submarines are organised to 
"sanitise" the area around the potential target being 
afforded protection. 
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The Kara is the largest vessel in the world to be 
powered by gas turbines, suggesting that Soviet technology in 
this field is in advance of the United States. The advantages 
of quick get away time and rapid acceleration mark a major 
innovation in vessels of this size and are of obvious utility 
in an anti·· submarine vessel. It is possible that the lead 
time required to design a gas turbine unit capable of driving 
such a large warship was longer than the rule of thumb ten 
years suggested for other vessels. Its weapons systems fit 
suggests an original decision date in the early 1960s. 
The fact that both these classes of vessels have dis-
pensed with their SSH armament and adopted anti-submarine 
systems suggest a major reorientation of Soviet concerns. 
Previously major Soviet surface vessels had been equipped with 
SAH or SSM but since 1968 no major Soviet warship has entered 
service with a purely SSM capability. 1 A.s we shall see vessels 
in the 3,500-5,000 ton range Kashin, Kildin and the new Krivak 
have also had ASW weapons systems fitted. Moreover Kresta Is 
now appear to carry a Hormone A helicopter and bear the Soviet 
designation large anti- submarine ship suggesting that it too 
has undergone conversion to fit it for the ASW role. 
It was previously argued that the SSH vessels, which 
originated from decisions in the 1953 period, were very much 
a product of Soviet concern to counter the threat posed by the 
aircraft carriers of the NATO allies. It would appear that 
this task is now the prime responsibility of the submarine 
fleet and the dramatic change to ASW armament for surface 
vessels arose out of decisions made in the early 1960s which 
took int:o account the fact that submarine launched missiles 
attacks were now the major sea based threat to the Soviet Union. 
That there was a major reassessment of the nature of the 
sea based threat at this time has been made perfectly clear by 
1 
It is possible that the missile launchers involved are dual 
purpose. If so this would indicate another technological 
advance for the Soviet Navy. 
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l Gorshkov >vhose statement we have already noted. The re·· 
assessment is also a major difference in the first two 
edit.ions of Sokolovsky2 and accords with t.he sta.tement of the 
u.s. Secreta.ry of Defence McNamara in 1962 that CVAs were nmv 
regarded as part of the General Purpose Forces. 
The est.ablishmen·t of a major ASW role for the Soviet 
Navy's surface fleet appears to have been 
advent of the submarine launched missile. 
a response to 
.-~ lt was 
the 
probably a response taken before the operational characteristics 
3 
of the SSBN were fully understood or possibly at a time when 
potential threat. 4 In the the SSG or SSGN were regarded as a 
present circu.'Tlstances, when the area of sea space available 
to SSBNs has increased dramatically, the nev1 ASW surface 
vessels, which seem suited pri1narily for tactical ASW, may be 
used to protect the Soviet Union's own SSBNs from enemy ASW 
forces, in particular the SSNs, or to protect high value 
surface warships from submarine attack. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See pp. :h't:l.. above. 
See pp. ')_ 3b ~~a.bvv~ 
See Admiral Alafuzov's critique of Sokolovsky's Military 
Strategy, lst edition, p. 369 below on this point. 
See the discussion of the Moskva prograJTh'Tle pp. 150-156 
above. 
Soviet Union has done with its missile e:r:'liseJOs or~r 
1 capable-~>essels. As-we sha±-1-see this practice has 
affected the latest Krivak class of destroyers, which 
also ea:rry a :range oi SSM, SAM, ASV., torpedo tubes and-
'imti aircraft a:r tillery. 
Admiral Gorshkov has pointed to the need for high 
habitability standards to be incorporated in vessels if 
high combat capabilities are to be maintained among the 
crew during •the long stay of ships in the ocean 
frequently under extreme climatic conditions•. 2 Yet, 
2Y2 
as Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5 points out, despite the 
fact that the Kara is a significantly larger vessel than 
the preceding classes, when account is taken of the 
magazine requirements of the various weapon systems and 
the space requirements for the below deck radar displays 
and other electronic gear, habitability standards must be, 
by Western standards, quite spartan. 3 Kara is ln fact 
quite a small ship, given its weapons systems, probable 
role as a command centre, 
of officers and crew must 
and the fact that its complement 
4 
approach the 550 mark. 
During 1972 two Sverdlov class cruisers reappeared, 
having undergone conversions. The Admiral Senyavin•s 
rear turrets were removed and replaced by a helicopter 
hangar and landing pad. A SA-N-4 mounting was added to 
the armament together with 4-30mm gun mountings. The 
Zhdanov had only one rear turret removed and this was 
1 The decision to equip the Moskva and Kuril class with 
a major ASW missile launcher in the middle of the fore-
deck together with SAM sys,tems has reduced the off ec t ive 
length of the flight deck in each case. (In the case of 
the Moskva this has been compounded by building the 
superstructure across the width of the ship.) 
2 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Problems in mastering the world ocean', 
trans. p.22. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships, 1974/5, p.551. 
4 Although no figures are available for the crew 
complement of the Kara, this would seem to be a minimal 
figure. It has been derived by adding to the complement 
of the Kresta II given as 500 in Janes, p.551. 
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replaced by a SA-N-4 launcher. Both of these vessels were 
extensively refitted with communications equipment 
necessary for their new role as command ships. 1 
It is an interesting comment on the state of the Soviet 
Navy that it has been found necessary to refit two twenty-
year-old Sverdlovs for this role. Now that the Soviet Navy 
is increasingly involved in forward deployments, it is 
essential to increase the number of command ships, yet 
apart from the Moskvas, which spend most of their time in 
the Mediterranean Sea, and the Kurils, about to enter 
service, it is doubtful whether any other vessel has the 
space to accommodate the additional staff, and the 
communications equipment required. 
Guided Missile Destroyers. 
In 1967 units of the Krupny class SSM destroyers were 
taken in to the Zhdanov yard at Leningrad for conversion to 
SAM destroyers which have been renamed the Kanin class. 2 
This conversion occurre,d at the same time as the second 
batch of Kotlin destroyers were being converted to Kotlin 
SAM. Both conversions highlight the importance of SAM 
armament to a navy which increasingly found itself conducting 
high seas operations beyond the range of shore based 
aircraft. The Krupny conversion indicated the demise of 
the pure SSM destroyer, brought about by the increase in 
range of carrier based aircraft, which enabled the carriers 
to launch attack planes from distances beyond the combat 
radius of Soviet air cover. The removal of the cumbersome 
and obsolete SS-N-1 missile system was probably justified 
in its own right, 3 but it is significant that they were 
replaced not with a new SSM but rather by an early generation 
SAM, the SA-N-1. 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.547-8. 
2 For details see Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.556. 
3 Breyer, S., Guide, p.58 notes that the missile has a 
110 ft. launcher, an elevation not exceeding 30° and it 
must be brought back to the horizontal for re-loading. 
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At the same time as the SAM armament was being fitted 
the ASW capabilities of the former Krupny class were 
increased. The two hand-loaded 16-barrelled ASW rocket 
launchers Here removed and three semi-automatic loading 
12-barrelled launchers were installed in their place. 
Additionally two sets of triple ASW torpedo tubes were 
replaced by two quintuple mountings. This aspect of the 
conversion appears to have been the most significant so 
far as the Soviet Navy is concerned for the former Krupny 
class 'rocket ship' is now designated 'large anti-submarine 
ship'. As an ASW vessel the Kanins could only be effective 
1 in a tactical ASW or pro-SSBN role. 
During 1972 a Kildin class destroyer was modernised 
in Hhat appears to be a continuing programme. The SS-N-1 
system was removed and replaced by two twin turrets for 
76mm artillery and four launchers for the SS-N-11 29 mile 
range missiles, which is now thought to be an ASW millile. 
KrtVc1/" 
'l'he,.(class vlhich is building at the relatively slow 
rate of two per year, appears to be the replacement for 
the navy's ageing Skory and Kotlin class destroyers. 
Designated a 'large anti-submarine ship', it is fitted 
with the new ASW missile system two 12-barrelled ASW 
rocket launchers and 8 21" ASW torpedo tubes. The rapid 
acceleration and timely availability conferred by its gas 
turbine propulsion are obvious advantages in a tactical 
ASW ship. The vessel inclu0.es both bow mounted sonar and 
a VDS system but has not been designed with in-built 
helicopter facilities, possibly indicating that its role 
1 
SIPRI Anti-submarine vmrfare, p. 34-37, for a discussion 
of tactical ASW. 
Class No. 
Kanin 6 
Krivak 7 
TABLE III: 
Displacement 
3,700 tons 
standard 
4,600 tons 
full load 
4,800 tons 
standard 
5 1 200 tons 
full load 
Sources: 
GUIDED t4ISSILE DESTROYERS - POST 1960 PROGRAMME 
Axmament 
SAM 
1 twin SA-N-1 
(aft) 
8-57mm (2x4} 
(fwd) 
8-3Dmm (4x2) 
ASW 
3 12-ba.z:relled 
MBUs 
torpedo tubes 
10-533mm 
(2x5) A/S 
~:>~~ ~;~,;.}(; 
S:tiiM )-~ .... ~.)~,.,."'"'" 
~ quadruple 
SS-N-10"-
SAM 
two SA-N-4 
Guns: 
4'=70mm d.p. 
(2x2) 
4-30mm 
ASW 
~2-barrelled 
MBUs :fwd 
torEjdo tubes 
8-5 DID1 {2x4) 
A/S 
Construction 
Data 
Conversions 
from K:rupny 
at Zhdanov 
yard 
Leningrad 
from 1967 
on 
Leningrad 
launched 
1969 
first 
appeared in 
1971 
Range & 
Speed 
Speed 
34 knots 
Speed 
30+ 
knots 
(Janes 
gives 
38 knots) 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.554 and 556. 
Machinery 
geared 
steam 
turbines 
gas turbine 
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Comments 
Conversion of Krupny SSM destroyer to 
AAW and ASW escorts. 
The cumbersome SS-N-1 launchers and 
missile hangers were removed and a 
SA-N-1 system installed. 
During conversion the hull was slightly 
altered to allow a new bow mounted sonar 
to be installed and the helicopter pad 
was enlarged. 
Triple torpedo tubes mountings replaced 
by quintuple sets. 
Three automatically loaded 12-tubed 
MBUs replaced earlier hand loaded 
16-barrelled MBUs. 
Soviet designation: Large anti-submarine 
ship. 
Equipped with new generation missiles, 
bow sonar and VOS. 
Appears to be light on electronic warfare 
associated radomes and antennae. 
Has ~e, AAW ahd ASH capability in a 
hull designed for speed and seakeeping, 
which is similar in shape to the larger 
cruisers. Gas turbine propulsion gives 
rapid acceleration and availability. 
Building rate approx. 2/year Which may 
be low. 
Soviet designation: Large anti-submarine 
ship. 
Baker, A.D., •soviet major combatants',~ June 1974, p.77-78. 
Breyer, S. 1 'Soviet Krivak. Class•, ~' December 1972, p.l20. 
weyer•s Warships of the World 1973. Kildin conversions in text. 
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is to destroy already located submarines rather than search 
for them along the perimeters of a task-farce screen. On 
the other hand, the fact that the major adversary fleet, 
the US Navy, has no cruise missile submarines, and, prior 
to the 1960-61 time period, when the Krivaks must have 
been approved, had cancelled the Regulus cruise missile 
programme suggests that a detection system capable of 
searching over a 10-mile radius was considered adequate. 1 
Corvettes. 
The Grisha corvettes or •small anti-submarine ships•, 
to use the Soviet designation, are smaller than the Mirka 
corvettes although somewhat larger than the Poti submarine 
chasers, whose functions they seem to have subsumed. Armed 
with the new SA-N-4 system and a twin 57mm artillery 
mounting, the Grisha has a more assured AA defence 
capability than its predecessors, while only slightly 
2 
reducing the ASW armament. 
The Nanuchka 'missile cutters• are considerably heavier 
than the Osa and Komar class. Their main armament consists 
of 6 (2x3) launchers for the SS-N-9 system which is credited 
with a range variously estimated at between 40 to 150 miles. 3 
The Nanuchka class also carries an SA-N-4 launcher and a 
twin turret for the 57mm gun system. These vessels, with 
their heavy SSM armament provide an all-weather surface 
attack capability which had previously been provided by the 
artillery of the larger frigates and the SS-N-2 missiles 
of the Osa and Komar missile cutters, the operations of the 
smaller craft being limited by extant sea states. 
It would appear that the Soviet Navy is in effect 
replacing three types of vessels - escorts, large submarine 
chasers and missile boats, with two classes of ship in the 
1 SIPRI Anti-Submarine Warfare, p.9, suggests that the 
range of contemporary homing torpedoes is 10-20 kilometres. 
2 See Table p.268 above. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.638. 
Weyers Warships 1973, p.450. 
Flight International, 'World Missile Yearbook', 14 March, 
1974. 
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700 ton range. 1 MccGwire has suggested that this 
eliminates the escort frigates, which were, at 1,000-
1,500 tons, larger than necessary for the task of fleet 
area support but too small for effective use on distant 
deployment, and has enabled the Soviet Navy to circumvent 
to some extent the limited shipbuilding capacity for large 
vessels suitable for distant deployment imposed by the 
resumption of some former cruiser and battleship ways for 
2 
merchant vessels during the 1950s. There are reports 
that the Nanuchka class is under construction at the 
former torpedo boat yard which built the Komar and Osa 
hulls3 while the Grisha class is apparently building at 
the yards which previously produced the Poti submarine 
4 
chasers. This has freed the former escort yards at 
" Kalin~rad for construction of the larger Krivak class 
5 destroyers. The difficulties imposed by the practice 
of building vessels in yards previously equipped for 
handling smaller types explains in part the relatively 
low annual production rate of the Krivak, Nanuchka and 
Grisha classes to date. In addition, the production of 
increasingly sophisticated weapons systems causes 
production bottlenecks. 
Ballistic Missile Submarines. 
No new SSBN entered service with the Soviet Navy from 
1962/3, when construction of the nine unit H class ceased, 
until late 1967 when the first Y-class vessel was delivered. 6 
1 MccGwire, M., 'Soviet Naval Programmes', Survival, 
September/October 1973, esp. p.222-225. 
2 See. p.l94 above for Khrushchev's resumption of naval 
building ways. During the 1950s other major surface 
shipbuilding ways in the North and Pacific were apparently 
given over to the construction of nuclear submarines. 
3 The Petrovsky yard at Leningrad, USNIP January 1973, 
p.ll6-ll7. 
4 MccGwire, op.cit., p.223. 
5 Revue Maritime, July 1971, cited MccGwire, op.cit., p.223. 
6 Explanations for this hiatus have been advanced on 
p.l7l-l77 above. 
TABLE IV: 
Class No. Displacement 
Grisha 14 750 tons 
full load 
Z9B 
CORVETTES - POST 1960 CONSTRUCTION 
Armament 
SAM 
Si\-'N-4 
guns 
2-57mm 
{1x2) 
ASW 
2-Tz 
barrelled 
MBUs 
torpedoes 
4-406mm 
A/5 tubes 
Construction Range & 
Data Speed 
commenced 30 knots 
series 
prod. in 
1969-70 
period at 
a rate of 
3/year 
Machinery Comments. 
Gas turbines A successor to Poti class. 
and diesels Incorporates SA-N~4 missile 
system. Possibly has three 
screws: lateral for diesels 
central for gas turbines. 
Soviet des ig: Small anti-
submarine ship. Coastal 
operations and sighted in 
Mediterranean. 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.563. 
~November 1972, p.l20. 
Class No. Displacement 
Nanuchka 9 800 tons 
full load 
Weyers Warships of the WOrld 1973, p.l90-191. 
Armament 
SSM 
6 (2x3) 
SSN-9 
SAM 
'Si\-'N-4 
guns 
2-57mm 
(lx2) 
ASW (possibly) 
1 or 2 MBUs 
(Janes only) 
Construction 
Data 
Range & 
Speed 
Machinery 
Built from 1969 speed diesels 
onwards at the 32 knots 
Petrovsky Yard 
Leningrad 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.S64, 
.1!!W.!f January 1973, p.116·7. 
Weyers Warships of the World 1973, p.l90-ll. 
Comments 
Larger size and in particular 
the high beam to length 
ratio may give ship more 
stability than the light 
OS.!\s and Komar s. 
Soviet designation: 
'Missile boat•. 
Building r~te 3/year. 
Coastal operations 
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During this period the first generation SSBNs were retro-
fitted with second generation SLBM, the SS-N-5, which had 
a longer range, approximately 800 miles, and an underwater 
launch capability. Following the refitting of the H-class, 
which was extended over a four year period to ensure the 
availability of some SSBN capability during the mid-l960s, 
units of the G-class SSB have been taken in hand and 
similarly retrofitted. 
Reports that the first sustained patrols of ballistic 
missile firing submarines off the American coast did not 
take place until 19641 suggest that no such patrols were 
instigated until missiles with an underwater launch 
capability became available. Prior to 1964 the existing 
SLBMs may have been part of a hostage Europe strategy or 
more likely they were deployed on an irregular basis which 
could be increased in a crisis or after the outbreak of war. 
The experience of the Cuban operation in 1962, when 
a number of Soviet submarines"having been detected and 
tracked for days, were forced to surface within sight of 
US ASW air patrols and surface ships, 2 was a convincing 
1 Senator Symington quoted Washington Post, 29 May 1966. 
2 
Adnural Anderson the USN's C.N.O. at the time of the Cuban 
missile crisis told a Navy League meeting in New York on 
9 November 1962: 'The presence of many Russian submarines 
in Caribbean and Atlantic waters provided perhaps the 
finest opportunity since World War II for US Naval anti-
submarine warfare forces to exercise at their trade, to 
perfect their skills and to manifest their capability to 
detect and follow submarines of another nation•. See also 
Anderson's testimony U.S. Congress. H of R Committee on 
Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture 88th Congress, 
lst Session, 1963, p.897. New York Times, 10 November 1962. 
Subsequent accounts indicate that all of the six 
submarines sent to escort the merchant vessels to Cuba 
were forced to surface after protracted periods of tailing. 
New York Times, 18 April 1963, and Abel, E., The Missiles 
of October (London, 1966), p.l43. According to Defense 
Market Survey (April and September 1967) the CAESAR system 
of hydrophones anchored to the US continental shelf 
•sufficiently proved its value (during the Cuban episode) 
to be expanded and upgraded'. In 1962 the system was 
probably capable of providing approximate locations of 
submarines to be further refined by mobile ASW systems. 
TABLE V~ 
Class No. Displacement 
SSB ll 2,350 tons 
GII surfaced 
Z,BOO tons 
submerged 
SSBN B 3,700 tons 
HII surfaced 
4,100 tons 
submerged 
H III 1 -ditto-
y 33 a,ooo tons 
surfaced 
9 ,ooo tons 
submerged 
D I 10? 8,000 tons 
or surfaced 
12 9,000 tons 
dived 
DII 17 or 
18 ? 
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BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES - POST 1960 CONSTRUCTION 
AI.mament 
3 launchers for 
55-N-5 ballistic 
missile range 
800 miles 
3 launchers for 
SS-N-5 ballistic 
missile range 
BOO miles 
test vessel for 
SSN-B 
16 launchers 
for SS-N-6 
ballistic missile 
range 1,500 miles 
12 launchers for 
SS-N-8 ballistic 
missile range 
4,800 miles 
16 launchers tor 
the SS-N-8 
Construction 
Data 
conversions in 
post 1967 after 
His had been 
refitted 
conversions 
occurred 
1963-67 
197Z (circa) 
built at 
Komsomolsk 
and 
Severodvinsk 
Komsomolsk and 
severodvinsk 
delivered since 
late 1972 
Komsomolsk and 
Severodvinsk 
announced in 
November 1973 
Range & 
Speed 
25 knots 
25 knots 
Comments 
Data as for G except as indicated. The retro-
fitting of the SS-N-5 2nd generation SLBM gave 
not only a longer range but also a submerged 
launch capability. 
Contra to information in Janes 1974/5 these 
ballistic missile submarines cannot be traded 
in for new D class submarines under SALT I 
agreements - see text. 
Only one of these vessels - used for testing 
purposes. May have contravened the spirit of 
SALT I SLBM agreements - see text. 
Third generation hull/propulsion unit. 3rd 
generation SLBM .- underwater launch range of 
1,500 miles. Probably based on own experience 
with SLBMs in earlier units plus American 
Polaris programme. 
The calculation of numbers of D I is tentative 
and assumes that the Soviets will build to the 
maximum number of submarines while staying just 
under 950 SLBM limit. Missile gives ability to 
hit US while in fle.et areas. 
Without a 16 hole submarine for the SS-N-8 the 
Soviets could only build to 876 SLBMs if they 
kept within the 62 submaxine limit. As yet no 
details of this class exist although sightings 
were reported by Norwegians. 
? indicates that these are numbers to be expected. 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5 1 p.S35-538. 
Breyer 1 ~. p.292 for G II and H II. 
SIPRI Year Book 1974, p.ll6-117 for D I and D II. 
Weyers Warships of the World 1973 1 p.l92-3. 
vi 
c 
\ 
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demonstration to the Soviets of American ASW capabilities 
and must have induced a cautious approach to submarine 
deployment. 
There was little point in giving the Americans ASW 
practice along their established ASW barriers and coastlines 
or allowing them to gain additional information on the 
relatively inferior Soviet submarine operational character-
istics. The absence of forward basing facilities also 
meant that sustained patrolling could involve no more 
than one third to one quarter of the available submarines. 
By foregoing forward patrols the Soviets also made savings 
in manpower, operating costs and may have increased the 
operational readiness of their submarines for surge 
deployments. 
There was considerable ambiguity over the status of 
the H and G class submarines as a result of the SALT 
negotiations. Mowever subsequent clarifications between 
two governments concerned appear to have resolved these 
difficulties. Under the original terms of Article III of 
the Interim Agreement relating to SLBM,and the important 
Protocol attached to the agreement,it was unclear whether 
the Soviet Union could reach the maximum number of SLBMs 
(950) by trading in only the high yield long range ICBMS -
the SS-7s and SS-Ss or whether a mix of ICBMs and submarine 
launchers from the G and H class could be traded. In 
addition there was a problem that the Interim Agreement 
may have allowed for the deployment of modern missiles on 
old submarines thereby allowing the Soviets to exceed their 
950 quot~ for SLBMs. Initial American attempts to dispel 
the ambiguity over the status of the G and H class submarine 
missiles and to ensure that the ICBMs were tradeq1 were 
resisted by the Soviets until 24 July 1972 when Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger signed an agreed 
clarification. However the clarification, as revealed by 
Dr. Kissinger to a press conference on 24 July 1974, 
contained its own ambiguity. In the attempt to clear up 
the status of the G and H boats a formal definition of a 
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modern ballistic missile on a submarine was offered: 'a 
missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear powered 
submarines commissioned in the USSR since 1965 1 • This was 
unambiguous in the case of the H class SSBNs but it could 
be,and .was,read by Pentagon officials to allow the Soviets 
to deploy modern missiles on the G class SSBs and thus 
exceed the 950 SLBM quota. The Soviet negotiators refused 
to close this new loophole until 18 June 1974. The 
position now agreed is that the Soviets are only permitted 
trade in ICBMs to reach the 950 quota for SLBMs and any 
modernisation of G and H class vessels must count against 
the 950 total. 1 
The conversion of one HII SSBN into a test vessel for 
the new 4,600 mile SS-N-8 missile therefore may be counted 
as one of the Soviets 62 SSBNs and its missiles -
presumably three in all - against the 950 total. 
The Y class submarine which was first delivered in 
1967 gave the USSR an SSBM similar in many respects to the 
USNs boats fitted with Polaris A-2 missiles. The Y class, 
a third generation hull/propulsion unit fitted with 16 
launchers for the 1,500 mile underwater launch SS-N-6, will 
probably build to some 33 units, that is to just over half 
the maximum number of SSBNs allowed the USSR under the terms 
of the Protocol to the SALT I Interim Agreement. 
Although theY class meant a considerable improvement 
~n the capabilities of the Soviet Unions SSBN they are still 
subject to some of the same limitations as earlier ballistic 
1 f . b . The textso the 1 Inter~m Agreement etween the Un~ted 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Weapons' and the 'Protocol to the 
Interim Agreement• 26 May 1972, have been reproduced in 
various places. I have used President Nixon in Moscow, 
U.S. Information Service. For an account of the ambiguities 
of the original Agreement and the efforts undertaken to 
clear them up including Kissinger's press conference on 
24 July 1974 in which he revealed the substance of the 
interpretive agreement of 24 July 1972, see Gelb, L.H., 
'Washington dateline: the story of a flap•, Foreign Policy 
No. 16, Fall 1974, p. 165-181, and the New York Times, 
Washington Post and International Herald Tribune from 
21 June 1974 - 25 June 1974. 
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missile submarines. The range of the SS-N-6 requires boats 
to be stationed off the US coastline,having in effect to 
run the gauntlet of the US Navy's anti-submarine forces 
(see map p.286a above). Recent reports of the development 
of even more sophisticated large fixed hydroacoustic systems 
in the United States can only compound this Soviet problem. 1 
Sophisticated American ASW technology, together with 
the difficulties imposed by long transit times and the costs 
of maintaining SSBNs on distant deployment, has resulted in 
a significantly different deployment pattern than that 
adopted by the Americans. Whereas American practice and 
crew organisation2 is geared to maintaining the greatest 
number of units possible on station,Soviet practice still 
involves keeping only a very limited number of boats on 
station. 3 These boats are presumably prepared to launch on 
the instant that orders are received,providing they escaped 
destruction. The remainder of the SSBN force, which presumably 
are maintained in a high state of combat readiness, may then 
leave the fleet areas and transit to their stations following 
an attack on the ASW barriers undertaken by the surface 
fleet and naval air force. 
1 For a detailed discussion of large fixed arrays see SIPRI 
Yearbook 1974 p.316-318. In addition to the 'Caesar• system 
off the Atlantic coast, now in its fifth generation,the 
United States installed 'Colossus' off the Pacific Coast in 
the mid-1960s. There are additional systems reported in the 
Aleutian Islands off Kamchatka and one under construction in 
the Gulf of Mexico. There is a large hydrophone north of 
Hawaii and a system situated north of the Azores capable of 
monitering and localising submarines transitting the Straits 
of Gibraltar. 
A suspended array system capable of surveying an entire 
ocean is under development~as is a moored surveillance system 
consisting of air-dropped Long-life sonobuoys,which can 
moor to the bottom of the ocean and transmit information to 
satellite or airborne receivers for relay back to central 
processing and operation stations. See also SIPRI, Anti-
Submarine Warfare, esp. p.29-3l and p. 78-81. 
2 For a description of the blue and gold crew cycle see 
Polaris Missiles and Men {US Navy, 1967), p.l7-18. 
In 1973 it was reported that the Soviets sustained 
deployments were in the order of 2 or 3 SSBNs. 
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The Soviet attempt to establish a forward facility 
for SSBNs in Cuba was a response to the problem of transit 
times, and it may also have provided a solution to the 
difficulties imposed by the United States ASW capabilities, 
for at the time of the initial deployments it is unlikely 
that the Gulf of Mexico arrays were in operation. 1 The 
fact that Cuba lies 150 miles off the Florida coast, 900 
miles from the main East Coast operational carrier base at 
Norfolk Virginia)and only 600 miles from Charleston,the 
East Coast home base for American SSBNs, suggests that 
Soviet Y class submarines stationed in the area would be 
continually within range of these and other prime targets. 2 
The withdrawal of Soviet equipment from the site at 
Cienfuegos during 1970-7llprior to the establishment of a 
SSBN base~ doubtless has a number of explanations, 
including the determination of the US administration, the 
caution of the Soviet leaders, and, most importantly, the 
expectation that in 1972-3 the first of a new SLBM,the 
SS-N-8 with a 4,600 mile range,would be entering service. 
This missile and its subsequent deployment aboard the 
D class submarine enables the Soviet Union to •fire right 
1 Although I have not been able to check this point it may 
be that the Gulf of Mexico system was a response to the 
Soviet incursions into this area. 
2 A 1,500 mile missile from Cuba could reach as far north 
as Boston and cover targets in an arc from Boston, Chicago 
to Texas. 
3 Requirements for a SSBN base are limited. A sheltered 
berth for a submarine tender and associated barges is the 
absolute necessity. Rest and recreation facilities for the 
crew are highly desirable as is a supply of water and 
electricity. 
It was reported in December 1970 that the Soviet Navy 
had moved barges capable of accepting radioactive salt 
water waste into the area,and that a submarine tender had 
recently left the area. A submarine net had been laid, 
recreation areas laid out and logistics and communications 
centres established. 
Brownlow, C., 'Soviets boost Caribbean presence•, 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 December, 1970, 
p.l6-17. 
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out of Murmansk and hit the United States. 1 That ls, 
there is no necessity for the D class submarines to leave 
their fleet areas in order to be on station. There is 
thus no need to cross the North Cape let alone the 
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom barriers, or to leave 
the vicinity of Kamchatka in the Far East. Moreover the 
on station availability of the Ds will approximate 100%, 
since all but submarines undergoing major overhauls will 
be 1 on station' while in base. While remaining within 
the confines of the fleet areas Soviet SLBMs can be 
protected by the whole range of surface, subsurface and 
land based aircraft and missile systems available to the 
Soviet Navy within its fleet areas. 
Some attention has already been glven to the SALT I 
agreement provisions as they affect the fitting of either 
the SS-N-6 or SS-N-8 missiles to earlier generations of 
ballistic missile submarines. In addition it should be 
noted that the Interim Agreement conferred potential 
numerical superiority to the Soviet Union should it choose 
to exercise the option. This was conceded by the United 
States on the grounds that the Soviet Union had an on-
going construction programme with an annual production 
rate of 9 - 102 SSBNs, which could leave the Soviet Union 
with a fleet of 80-90 SSBNs by 1977, the expiry date of 
3 
the Interim Agreement. 
1 Schlesinger: 'United States and Soviet Strategic Doctrine 
and Military Policies', Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Sub-committee on Arms Control, International Law and 
Organisation, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, p.48. 
2 M.R. Laird, Secretary of Defense to Senate Armed Services 
Committee on F.Y. 1973 Defense Budget and F.Y. 1973-1977 
programme, February 15 1972. U.S. G.P.O. Washlngton, 
p.39-40. 
3 . . f H. Klsslnger, Secretary o State, Press Conference, 
Intourist Hotel, Moscow incorporated in 'Military 
Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-
ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms'. Hearings before 
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 
2nd Session, p.l07. Kissinger used an annual production 
rate of 8-9 boats. See ibid., p.l06, and SPASO House 
Press Conference, ibid, p.l02. 
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Whether the Interim Agreement did prevent the Soviets 
constructing up to this number of submarines or made any 
impact on their construction programme at all is open to 
considerable doubt. 
In 1972 the United States Secretary of Defense, 
Laird, stated that the Soviet Union had 25 Y class units 
operational with a further 17 in various stages of 
assembly and fitting out. By mid-1972 he estimated that 
there would be a total of 31 Y class submarines in 
existence. 
Secretary Laird indicated that the construction rate 
in 1972 had risen to 9-10 units per year compared with a 
rate of 7-8 units per year in 1971. 2 In 1971 Laird had 
also indicated 'a longer range submarine launched 
3 ballistic missile is under active deployment'; the 
SS-N-8, 4,600 mile range missile of the D class submarine. 
Whether the increase in production rate~noted in 
Laird's FY 1972 and FY 1973 speeches to the Armed 
Services Committees,represented a deliberate pre SALT I 
move by the Soviets~or whether this was a planned 
increase in production cannot be reliably documented. 
Dr. Kissinger obviously accepted the high production run 
of 1972 as being a sustainable on-going programme. 
Regarded in this light the Agreement to limit the 
Soviet Union to 62 submarines~although conceding a 
numerical advantage,appeared a reasonable price to pay. 
On the other hand, accepting a total of 31 boats 
complete by July 1972, the Soviets had the option of 
continuing their programme at an average rate of 6 units 
complete/year to give them 62 boats by 1977. This would 
not seem an unreasonable target given the intention of 
1 Laird, op.cit., p.39-40. 
2
· "d d "d' f ~b~ ., an La1r , F.Y. 1972 De ense Budget and F.Y. 
1972-1976 Defense Programme'to Armed Services Committee, 
House of Representatives (Washington, 1971) p.47. 
3 . 'l I La1rd, F.Y. 1972, p.47. 
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building two variations of the existing Y class vessels, 
the DI class with 12 launchers for the SS-N-8 and the 
DII class with 16 launchers. Thus rather than halting a 
construction programme in mid course the United States 
may well have ratified an intended Soviet programme. Nor 
is there any guarantee that following the expiration of 
the Interim Agreement in 1977 the Soviet Union will not 
continue to assemble and launch SSBNs without a break, 
should they choose to keep this option open. 
A further ambiguity in the SALT agreements,of concern 
to us,stems from the fact that the Soviets cannot build 
950 launchers on 62 SSBNs (nor can the Americans reach 
710 launchers on 44 boats). If the Soviets are to build 
to 62 vessels they can either have 50 16-launcher boats 
of theY and DII classes and 12 12-missile boats,for a 
total of 944 launchers)or else they could exceed their 
agreed launcher total by 2 opting for 52 16-launcher boats 
and 10 12-launcher vessels. Thus it appears that by May 
1977 the Soviet Union could possess 33 Y class, and 10 or 
12 Dis and 17 or 19 DIIs. Alternatively the Soviets 
could use their nuclear submarine construction capability 
to construct SSNs, at present in short supply in the 
Soviet Navy. This however could only be achieved if the 
SSBN programme were cut short of the 62 units allowed by 
1977. 
Cruise Missile Submarines. 
In the period 1963/4 - 1967 27 units of the EII class 
SSGN were delivered,suggesting an average rate of about 
6 deliveries/year. This was the maximum number of units 
capable of being produced from the yards at Severodvinsk 
in the North and Komsomolsk on the Amur River in the Far 
East which,during the period,were the only yards producing 
nuclear powered submarines. 1 These deliveries of the EII 
1 Polmar, Norman, 'Soviet shipbuilding and shipyards', 
USNIP Naval Review Issue, May 1972, p.277-278. 
Class 
SSGN 
c 
p 
No. 
11 
1+? 
TABLE VI: 
Displacement 
4,300 tons 
surface 
5,100 tons 
submerged 
Sources: 
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES - POST 1960 PROGRAMMES 
Armament 
8 tubes for 
SS-N-7 
missile 
range 30 
miles dived 
launch. 
Torpedo 
Tubes 
8-533mm 
Construction 
Data 
lst deliv. 
1968 
building 
at Gorky 
Range & 
Speed 
submerged 
30 knots 
approx. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/S, p.S39. 
Comments 
A third generation hull/propulsion 
unit. The short range of the missile 
and its dived launch capability 
presents a great advance on the EI 
and EII systems~notably in the 
absence of the need for mid-course 
guidance. There may be some 
difficulties or uncertainty about 
the class given a slow building 
rate of 2/year. Role apparently 
anti-carriero 
No further information available 
Weyer's Warships of the World 1973, p.l92-3. 
w 
0 
"' 
brought the total of SSGNs to 32 (5 EI + 27 Ell) while 
operational SSGs numbered 32 units (16 Js and 7 W 
Longbins). 1 The figure of 32 SSGNs available in 1967, 
compared with the 13 N class SSNs and the 9 H class 
SSBNs, clearly reflects the priority given SSGN develop-
ment, in the naval construction programme of the mid-
l960s. This priority in turn reflects the importance 
given to counter carrier systems and may reflect soviet 
expectations,circa 1957/B,that a major American SSBN 
threat would not develop until the late half of the 
1960s. It also suggests that apparent defects in the 
lst generation hull-reactor units (and possibly 2nd 
generation units) and dissatisfaction with the range of ) 
lst and 2nd generation SLBMs,may have le~d the Soviets 
to refrain from constructing SSBNs and SSNs during this 
. 2 per1.od. 
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Since 1967 this concentration on SSGNs has given way 
on Y class SSBNs and their D class to a concentration 
3 
successors. This has been reflected in a slow production 
rate of the C class SSGN which since 1968 has delivered 
4 
approximately 14 units at the current rate of 2/year. 
These vessels have been constructed at the Gorky shipyard; 
which had previously been involved in constructing 
. l b . 5 convent1.ona su mar1.nes. 
One unit of the P class has been reported but as yet 
no details have come to light. It is possible that this 
was the first of the follow-on class to the C;such a 
1 I have left out of account 5 W twin cylinder type which 
were experimental craft. 
2 See p.l71-177 above for discussion on these points. 
3 The conversion of some EI SSGNs to SSNs is taken up in 
the subsequent section. It can also be seen as part of 
the down-grading of the SSGNs as the threat from SSBNs 
has increased. Soviet SSBNs are a deterrent to the use 
of the US equivalents and SSNs a means of actively 
countering them in a war situation. 
4 Total from Berman 'Soviet naval strength and deployment• 
and construction rate from Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, 
E.539. 
Palmar, 'Soviet shipbuilding', p.275 and 277. 
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development being expected at about this time1 but the 
lack of detail and evidence of a continuing construction 
2 programme must leave this conclusion tentative. 
The C class, the third generation SSGN, is armed with 
8 SS-N-7 sub-surface to surface missiles_, which have a 
range of some 30 miles. Clearly such a system loses its 
effectiveness if it has no organic guidance for missiles 
or effective target discrimination and so such capabilities 
must be assumed. 
The advantages conferred by a submerged launch 
missile system are obvious enough. Unlike the surface 
vessels, which since Kresta II have been armed with 
short range SSMs, the C class is more immune to surface 
detection. Moreover the short range of the missile,if 
accompanied by reliable organic guidance systems, suggests 
that the chances of attaining an accurate strike are such 
that high explosive warheads could be used. However the 
fitting of a short ranged missile has meant that the 
submarine will have to penetrate the ASW defence zones 
surrounding the task force or convoy. It may be that the 
slow building rate of the C class,and the apparent 
hesitation over developing the P class lindicates an 
awareness of these difficulties although unless additional 
' 
nuclear submarine construction facilities are made 
available it may be difficult to significantly increase 
the construction rate above 2/year. 
1 Evidence for the probable existence of a fourth 
generation SSGN is derived from the development of a 
fourth generation propulsion/hull unit for SSBNs, the 
appearance of a new SSN ,the A class, which to date 
has not been developed, and the timing of the P's 
appearance}some 6 years after the first C class. 
2 Although the P class was first reported in Janes 
Fighting Ships 1973/4, neither Janes 1974/5 nor Berman's 
list as of 1st July 1974 indicate any add1tional 
construction. 
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Attack Submarines. 
If the production rate of the C class SSGN appears 
slow the same applies to recent V class SSN construction 
which has had an apparent building rate of 
1 
the first units were delivered in 1967/8. 
2/year since 
This apparent 
slowness is difficult to account for as it would appear 
that the SSN, used ~n a trailing mode, offers the Soviet 
Union the greatest opportunity of countering the Polaris 
submarines. 2 Moreover one might have expected a more 
rapid construction rate given that the first generation 
SSNs, theN class, are noisy and relatively unreliable 
and hence disqualified from the SSBN trailing role. 3 
The slow production rate,at first sight,does not 
appear to be due to the lack of construction facilitie~ 
as is the case with Soviet surface ships. Estimates 
suggest that Soviet nuclear submarine yards have a total 
capacity 
b . 4 as~s. 
of 20 boats per year working on a one-shift 
This has come about by increasing the number of 
ship yards capable of building these vessels. The Gorky 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.542. 
2 SIPRI Anti-submarine Warfare, p.45 suggests that 'the 
overlap of any Soviet area-defence tactical ASW with 
counter SSBN operations seems small' a conclusion which 
appears reasonable in the light of the vast areas of sea 
space available to the USN's SSBNs and the fact that they 
do not have to cross major Soviet ASW barriers which 
appear to be situated primarily in the vicinity of the 
USSR's fleet areas. On p.43 of the SIPRI report it is 
noted that the American SSBNs are invulnerable to a first 
strike unless the Soviet Union undertakes a long range, 
and necessarily highly visible programme of hunter-
killer submarine construction which would deliver a 
number of SSNs several times the total number of Polaris/ 
Poseidon craft. 
3 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, reports that theN is a 
no~sy boat. As such they are subject to detection by the 
passive acounstic systems incorporated in SSBNs. See also 
Breyer, S., Guide, p.286. Wells, R.D., Lt. Commander, 
U.S.N., 'The Soviet submarine force• USNIP August 1971, 
p.73 reports that the Ns are the most frequently sighted 
of the nuclear submarines,suggesting that they find it 
necessary to surface frequently. Wells also points to the 
well know n fact that at least one SSN has sunk at sea in 
April 1971>, at the time of the OKEAN exercise. ' 
4 Polmar, 'Soviet shipbuilding', p.278. 
312 
yard, as we have noted, was responsible for the construction 
of the C class SSGN and further facilities have been made 
available at either, or both, 
. . d 1 Sudomech yards 1n Len1ngra . 
apparent anomdly between ship 
the Ordzhonikidze and 
It is possible that this 
yard capability and need on 
the one hand and actual production rates on the other, may 
be due to difficulties in coordinating the deliveries of 
components or to problems in producing sufficient 
propulsion systems or weapons outfits for submarines. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to arrive at a firm 
conclusion in favour of either of these suggestions. 
Gorshkov 1 s series of articles 'Navies in War and Peace' 
suggests that there may be budgetary constraints2~but it 
must be remembered that ship building is a complex assembly 
industry and)viewed in this perspective,the ability of 
submarine yards to produce to 65 or 70% of their capacity 
would seem to be a reasonable achievement. 3 
The present scarcity of SSNs in the Soviet fleet stems 
from the priority that was given to SSGN construction 1n 
the mid-1960s. After 1967 the major effort in submarine 
construction has been directed to making good the backlog 
in SSBN construction. In an apparent effort to make good 
the present shortage of SSN the Soviet Navy has taken in 
hand several units of the first generation SSGN the EI and 
removed their missile launchers. 4 This effort to make good 
1 The ordzhonikidze yard built the nuclear powered ice-
breaker Lenin in 1956-1959 and has since built 4 further 
nuclear powered ice breakers. Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, 
p.583. Breyer, S., Guide notes that 'There 1s a submar1ne 
section that works independently and coordinates submarine 
development; (at Ordzhonikidze) for this purpose, the yard 
is an external agency of the Atomic Institute of Leningrad 
University'. 
2 See Chapter XI below. 
3 This assumes a building rate of 8 or 9 SSBNs, 3 SSGNs 
and 2 SSNs a year giving a total of 13 or 14 nuclear 
powered submarines annually. As I have suggested earlier 
this rate may be expected to decrease as the SSBN yards 
switched to DI or DII construction. 
4 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.540 indicates that only 
one unit of the EI class remains. 
Class 
SSN 
v 
A 
ss 
B 
T 
No. 
14 
1 
4 
1 
TABLE VII: 
D~splacement 
3,600 tons 
surface 
4,200 tons 
submerged 
3,000 tons 
surfaced 
2 1 500 tons 
surface 
2,800 tons 
submerged (Janes) 
1,000 surface 
1,100 submerged 
(Weyer) 
1,000 
- 1,500 
ton range 
Armament 
torl_:!P-do 
tubt:;.; 
~,- -,_13mm 
Torpedo 
tubes 
6-533mm 
Sources: 
ATTACK SUBMARINE - FQST 1960 PROGRA."'ME 
COrist:r:uction 
Data 
first units 
delivered 
1967-8 
completed 
1970 
Launched 
1968 
Range & 
Speed 
20 knots 
surfaced 
30+ knots 
submerged 
16 knots 
submerged 
Machinery 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.542, 54~. 
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Comments 
Its fast underwater speed makes this a formidable ,;·h 
N class craft. Building rate 2/year. 
Although there is no information available on this 
boat Janes suggests that it is possibly a prototype 
test vesiel to try a new silent class which may begin 
delivery in substantial numbers soon. 
Weyer's Warships 1973, lists the A under conventionally 
powered boats. 
The number of B class submarines has remained static 
since 1968-9 and the class does not appear to be undex 
construction. Janes suggests that these boats are 
spread evenly among the four fleet areas implying an 
experimental,as distinct from operational role. 
A new class of medium range SS first seen at the 
Sevastopol review July 1973. It follows some 5 years 
after the B class. As yet it is difficult to interpret 
policy for the small numbers of SS coincides with a 
very gradual building programme for SSNs. 
R. Berman, 'Soviet Naval Strength & 
MccGwire, Booth & McDonnell, eds., .::.uv.1."'"' nava.1. 
Policy: nh-i., .... +;.,.,., "'n.-1 r,.....,,.,.,.,.; ,..,,.., I p.,.,.,.,..,.,..,. Ofin 
Weyer's Warships of the World 1973, p.l92-5. 
l.i" 
\rt 
an obvious backlog would seem to be a temporary measure 
until a new class of SSN can be introduced on a large 
scale. 
As with the SSGNs there is a prototype of new SSNs 3 
the A class. However this class does not appear to have 
been developed beyond the initial prototype delivered in 
19701 possibly because additional development work was 
required before large scale production of a quieter boat 
was initiated. 
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At present the vast majority of SSNs operate from the 
2 Northern Fleet area. They are undoubtedly engaged in 
hunting for Polaris/Poseidon boats 1 as is indicated by 
recent reports of 
submarines in the 
role in defending 
a collision between American and Soviet 
3 North Sea, and they probably have a 
Soviet SSBNs. 
The deployment of the SS-N-8 missile suggests that 
by 1977 almost half of the Soviet SSBN force may not find 
it necessary to leave the fleet areas to target American 
cities and installations. This suggests a requirement 
for SSBN protection within the fleet areas which could be 
carried out by conventionally powered submarines1 given 
the short distances involved between Murmansk and Bear 
Island. 
There have in fact been two new classes of diesel 
electric submarines reported. In 1968/9 four units of 
the B class were delivered. To date there is still 
confusion about the details of this class with Janes 
Fighting Ships 1974/5 reporting a displacement slightly 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.542. 
2 Berman, R., 'Soviet naval strength and deployment•, 
suggests that all the V class and 9 of the N class are 
in the Northern Fleet Area. Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5 
reports 2 V class and 5 N class units with the Pacific 
Fleet. 
3 Canberra Times, 7 January 1975. Rear Admiral La Rocque 
(USN retd.) claimed that other collisions had occurred 
•one in the Mediterranean and the other at the approaches 
to the Straits of Gibraltar•. 
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heavier than the F class. If this ~s correct then the 
B class may h~e been intended as a follow-on class to 
the Fs. We~er•s Warships 1973 however gives displacement 
figures suggesting that the Bs may h~e been intended as 
a prototype class designed to test new propulsion units 
for a class designed to replace the Ws. 
Although it is impossible to be certain at this stage 
it appears as though the figures in Weyer's may be the 
correct ones. The Bs only built to four units, an adequate 
run for a prototype class, and a new class of what appear 
to be medium range diesel submarines has recently been 
reported. Although sources differ as to the numbers 
l produced it seems as though all units of the newT class 
are stationed in the Northern Fleet. If they are in fact 
medium range boats, as suggested by the available figures 
for their displacement, then it is almost certain that they 
are to be involved in fleet area protection rather than 
commerce disruption in the Atlantic. 
2 Air Cushion Vessels. 
In 1967 the Soviet Navy acquired its first hovercraft 
and conducted investigations designed to test and evaluate 
the potential of hovercraft for naval applications. Since 
then a military version of the Skate)SO passenger amphibious 
hoverferry
1
has entered naval service. 
no numbers available for this type of 
Although there are 
craft they appear to 
be used as fast amphibious transports for the Soviet naval 
infantry. A much larger 200 ton amphibious hovercraft is 
undergoing trials for the naval infantry and will probably 
be used as an assault craft. 
l 
Berman, op.cit., suggests 4 units; 
1974/5, suggests l. The difference 
of publication. 
Janes Fighting Ships 
may be due to the date 
2 
This section is adapted from information in Janes 
Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.569, Janes Surface Skimmers 1974/5, 
p.ll6-l25, esp. p.l20-l2l, and 'The great Casp~an Sea 
Monster•, Time, ll February 1974. 
Such craft have obvious utility over rivers, 
sheltered bays, and ice and can attain speeds in the 
region of 150 miles/hour. However their ability to 
operate over rough terrain and high seas is suspect. 
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Reports that a large Soviet experimental wing-in-
ground-effect machine has undergone tests in the Caspian 
Sea are of considerable interest. Although details are 
scanty the craft known as Ekranoplan has been credited 
with a speed of 300 knots at an operating height of 25-50 
ft. above water, It is powered by eight gas turbines 
forward and two other turbines aft and has been reported 
as having a range of 7,000 miles and a flight time of two 
or three days. The Ekranoplan is expected to be fully 
developed and possibly in service by the late 1970s. 
Soviet experts maintain that the craft can negotiate 
sand spits, shallows, marshes, ice, snow and sloping 
planes and to be sufficiently seaworthy to operate over 
rough seas. 
It is possible that such a craft will be used by the 
Soviet Navy for amphibious operations: they have the 
capacity to carry an estimated 900 men and material to 
selected landing areas with little regard for sea conditions, 
underwater obstacles or minefields. 
Technical experts have thought, on the basis of 
artists impressions, that the Ekranoplan may not be able 
to operate in extremely turbulent weather conditions. 
Moreover the relatively wide wing span and its low 
operating height suggest that the craft may have limited 
manoeuvrability. This may throw some doubt on its future 
use in ASW patrol work,although this role has been high-
lighted in Western comment on the machine. Soviet sources 
have also noted ASW,minesweeping, anti-surface ship, patrol 
and fast supply roles. The anti-surface ship role seems 
to be quite inappropriate,given the poor manoeuvrability 
characteristics and the relatively low speeds and operating 
height,for although a low operating height may enable the 
craft to avoid radar detection it also limits the range 
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from which ASMs can be fired and thus brings the launch 
platform within reach of target counter measures. 
Naval Aviation. 
At present the Soviet naval air arm, the world's 
second largest, operates approximately 1,200 fixed wing 
aircraft and helicopters in the four fleet areas. The 
major units and their combat roles are indicated in 
Table VIII. 
The more important combat characteristics of bomber 
aircraft not previously listed are also tabulated. 
The Soviet naval air force continues to perform three 
major roles; maritime reconnaissance, anti-surface ship 
and anti-submarine warfare, and the subsidiary roles of 
mid-course missile guidance, electronic intelligence 
gathering and electronic countermeasures. While the fixed 
wing components are still land based the construction of 
at least two Kuril class carriers suggests that in the 
near future V/STOL fighters will be taken to sea. As 
had already been noted this will improve the sea control 
capabilities of the Soviet Navy and may be used to give 
the Navy an enhanced intervention capability. 1 
The most widely reported aircraft for this role is 
an improved version of the Yakovlev Freehand which was 
first seen at the Domodedovo air display in 1967. At 
the time Western experts rated the aircraft as inferior 
to the British Harrier and noted that it was clearly 
subsonic and had a combat radius of less than 100 miles 
from the carrier deck. 2 Since then advanced versions 
1 This will mean the reintroduction of fighter aircraft 
to the Soviet naval air force for the first time since 
1960. Prior to 1960 the fighters were all land based. 
2 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 May 1973, p.l41. 
TABLE VIII: SOVIET NAVAL AIR FORCE STRENGTH - 1974 
Designation 
TU-16 
Badger 
TU-22 
Blinder 
IL-28 
Beagle 
TU-95 
Bear 
M-12 
Mail 
IL-38 
May 
Mi-4 & Ka-25 
Hound and 
Hormone 
Other 
No. 
280 
150 
55 
20 
50 
100 
60 
270 
200 
Sources: 
Brief Description 
Long range medium 
bomber 
medium range 
supersonic bomber 
light bomber 
long range bomber 
medium range 
amphibious 
medium range 
militaxised version 
of commercial air 
freighter 
helicopters 
Armament 
ASM 
ASM or free 
fall bombs 
torpedo equipped 
ASM or free fall 
bombs 
anti submarine 
torpedoes depth 
charges and ASW 
search equipment 
anti submarine 
torpedoes depth 
charges and ASW 
search equipment 
anti submarine 
weapons and 
search equipment 
Military Balance 1974/5, p.lO. 
Role 
anti-surface shipping 
reconnaissance and tanker 
anti-surface ship and reconnaissance 
anti-surface ship 
anti-surface ship and reconnaissance 
anti-submarine and reconnaissance 
anti-sUbmarine and reconnaissance 
anti-submarine and mid course guidance for 
long range ship borne SSM. Carried aboard 
Moskva, converted Sverdlovs, Kara, Kresta, 
I and II classes. Many of the recent 
destroyers have helicopter landing pads. 
transport, training and general utility 
aircraft - both fixed wing and helicopter. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.530 and 623-4. 
Janes All the World's Aircraft 1973/4, various pages. 
w 
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Designation 
TU-22 
Blinder 
Possibly 
also 
TU 
Backfire 
TABLE IX: 
Speed 
Max Speed 
at 40,000 
ft - 920 
mph 
Max speed 
of the 
order of 
1,750 mph 
LAND BASED BOMBERS IN SERVICE WITH NAVAL AIRARM (POST 1960 ONLY) 
Range 
1,400 miles 
+ in flight 
refueling 
capability 
at high 
altitude 
possibly in 
the 5,500-
6,000 mile 
range 
Armament 
Kitchen ASM 
or internal 
bomb load 
free fall 
weapons or 
a stand off 
ASM at least 
the equiva-
lent of 
Kitchen and 
possibly 
penetration 
aids 
Op. Date 
lst shown 
publicly in 
1961 Aviation 
Day fly past 
prototype 
observed in 
July 1970 
possibly 12 pre-
production 
models for full 
range of test 
and evaluation 
in early 1973 
Comments 
The TU-22 was originally intended for 
a strategic role, but range is 
inadequate. Subsequently 2 naval 
versions: 
Blinder B - equipped to carry Kitchen 
ASM recessed in weapons bay. 
Blinder C - reconnaissance version six 
cameras reported in weapon 
bay, modifications to nose 
cone suggest electronic 
intelligence or electronic 
counter-measurese 
It is not clear as yet whether this 
variable geometry wing aircraft will 
enter the Naval Air Arm. However 
if past practice is followed it may 
do so especially as some of the 
earlier bombers dating from the 1950s 
must be retired soon. One report 
suggests that a prototype remained 
airborne for 10 hours after in-flight 
refuelling. 
Sources: Military Balance 1974/5, p.lO. 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.530 and 623-4. 
Janes All the World's Aircraft 1973/4, various pages. 
w 
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have flown at Ramenskoye and have been tested aboard 
the Moskva. 1 
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The Soviet Union appears to have upgraded the status of 
naval aviation in anticipation of its increased importance. 
The late Naval Aviation Commander I.I. Borzov, was promoted 
to the RankfMarshal of Aviation during 1972. 2 
It has been suggested that the Naval Aviation Commander 
has considerable autonomy within the naval hierarchy in 
that he may carry over the war-time organisational structure 
which enabled the Commander to formulate plans, programmes, 
carry out operations and possibly supervise the development 
and procurement of naval aircraft. 3 Erickson has noted 
that the patterns of exercises and operations has occasion-
ally shown that the Naval Air Force executes its role with 
a degree of wilful independence, a fact which may stem 
from a tendency of naval aviators to align themselves out 
4 
of professional instinct with the Soviet Air Force. 
It is possible that this identification with the Air 
Force, observable even in the official titles of rank, 
will gradually dissipate as the naval air arm takes to sea 
aboard the new aircraft carriers. 
During the 1960s land based bombers overflew American 
aircraft carriers on an increasingly frequent basis. The 
first of these incidents, reported in March 1963, took 
place in the North Pacific, while in the Atlantic the 
Forrestal was overflown by 'Bears• while positioned off 
1 Janes All the World's Aircraft 1973/4, p.498-9; and 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.623. 
2 It will be noted th~tBorzov was given an airforce type 
promotion rather than being made an Admiral. 
3 Kuznetsov, The War Years {Moscow, 1967) cited in Barry, 
James A. Jr., 'Institutional Factors in Soviet naval 
policy' paper prepared for the Third Annual Seminar on 
Soviet Naval Developments, Halifax, September 1974. 
4 Erickson, John 'The Soviet Naval High Command', USNIP 
Naval Review Issue, May 1973, p.Sl-82. 
the Azores, a round trip of some 4,000 miles from Soviet 
territory. 1 After the June 1967 war, when Soviet air 
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units were stationed in Egypt, flights over the Sixth Fleet 
in the Mediterranean were commonplace until Sadat demanded 
the withdrawal of Soviet advisers. 2 
Such demonstrations of shore based naval aviation 
capability raise the possibility that aircraft armed with 
long range ASMs could successfully attack carriers. While 
this role is undoubtedly part of Soviet naval aviation 
doctrine it would seem as though the early warning radar 
systems, shipborne and carrier aircraft borne, provide 
sufficient warning to enable the aircraft to be intercepted 
before they reached missile range and for counter measures 
to be taken against the missile itself. 
Auxiliary Fleet 
During the 1960s the Soviet Navy maintained an 
increasing number of vessels on forward deployment. One 
of the limiting fact~s on Soviet attempts to sustain 
vessels on distant deployment was the number of support 
vessels available. To some extent this deficiency could 
be made good by using vessels from the merchant marine, by 
reaching facility agreements with countries in the 
deployment region, and by a great deal of improvisation. 
The recent construction at Leningrad of three units of 
Chilikin class fleet replenishment ships of 20,500 tons 
full load and the acceptance of at least one Manych class 
vessel from Finnish shipyards indicates that the requirement 
1 See text of McNamara statement on these first over-
flights, New York Times, lst March 1963. 
2 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 July 1972, p.l6, and 
5 February 1973, p.28. 'There have been almost no Soviet 
reconnaissance flights over Western surface operations in 
the Mediterranean since the expulsion from Egypt.• 
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for purpose built vessels for fleet support had become 
widely accepted. However it is uncertain whether this 
awareness preceded the move to forward deployment or 
whether the awareness stemmed from actual operating 
experience. Certainly the fact that the Chilikin class 
is based on the design for the Veliky Oktyabr merchant 
tanker and may have been built in the same yards suggests 
that the usual ten year lead time for new construction 
could have been cut considerably. 1 
There can be little doubt that the logistics services 
of the Soviet Navy have assumed greater importance now that 
the Navy has left its fleet areas and undertaken distant 
deployments necessitating a greater reliance on afloat 
2 
support. Given the degree of political insecurity inherent 
in base facilities arrangements outside the confines of the 
Soviet Union, the expansion of the auxiliary fleet can be 
expected to continue, unless there is a radical change of 
policy over the practice of forward deployment. 3 
Future Size of the Soviet Navy. 
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter on naval 
construction with some observations about the expected 
size of the Soviet Fleet in the first years of the 1980s. 
For the purpose of the exercise only the submarine fleet 
and vessels with an ocean going capability will be taken 
into account. It is assumed that whereas new classes of 
each type of vessel may be built it is unlikely that the 
building rate of each type will dramatically alter or 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.580, and soviet Merchant 
Sh~ps, p.ll7. 
2 Gorshkov notes 'Long oceanic cruises by naval ships 
present new increased demands on rear service support•. 
•some problems in mastering the World Ocean•, Morskoy 
Sbornik No. 2, 1973, p.22. 
3 See Chapter XI below for suggestion that the argument that 
forward deployment enhances foreign policy options may be 
under attack. 
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that if it does it will do so at the expense of some other 
type. 
The SSBN construction programme limited under the 
terms of the SALT I agreements will deliver no more than 
62 units of theY + DI + DII class by May 1977. It is 
unlikely that this limit will be exceeded in the 1980s 
because of more pressing requirements for hull/nuclear 
propulsion units particularly for SSNs. This expectation 
may be nullified if the Soviets perceived a growing ASW 
threat to their SSBNs or a major American construction 
progra~~e for this type of vessel. Even then it may be 
considered more advisable to concentrate on increasing 
the safety of their own SSBNs by building protective 
SSNs which would also be capable of countering enemy 
SSBNs. 1 
It 1s unlikely that the numbers of SSG~s will increase 
at a rapid rate. The threat from carrier aircraft is still 
taken seriously but is not afforded the same priority as 
the threat from SSBN. In the 1980s units of the EII class 
will still be available and there could be as many as 20-25 
units of the C class and its successors. It will be 
interesting to see whether the Soviet Navy does in fact 
build t.o a total size of 50-55 SSGN units (EII + c and 
possible successors) or whether it will divert SSGN 
production capabity to the construction of SSN. It may 
be decided to continue with SSGN production, thereby 
deriving the advantages of a more modern force and 
utilising the long lead time components of the SSGN, and 
to convert some EII units to SSN as has happened with the 
1 See the detailed analysis of Kuenne, R.F., The Polaris 
Missile Strike on this point. He concludes p.387-394 
that the cheapest and most effective way of preserving a 
given SLBM capability against enemy SSNs is to increase 
the number of SSNs used in a protective role rather than 
to construct additional SSBNs. 
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earlier EI class. Undoubtedly assessments of the combat 
utility of the horizon range SS-N-7 system based on 
experience in exercises and testing will play a major 
role in this decision. 
At present construction rates and assuming dis-
satifaction with the performance of the N class SSN it 
is to be expected that by the early 1980s the Soviet 
Navy would have no more than 25-30 operational SSNs. 
This would appear to be far fewer than warranted either 
by comparison with the American SSN fleet 1 or in terms 
of probable Soviet requirements for an anti-Polaris/ 
Poseidon/Trident system or for protection of its own 
SSBN fleet. However following the completion of the 
SSBN and possibly SSGN programmes it may be expected 
that some of the additional shipyard capacity and 
propulsion units will be available for SSN building. It 
~s difficult to be precise but such a step could lead to 
an annual construction rate of 10-14 units of the SSN 
compared with the currently estimate rate of 2-3/annum. 
So far as conventionally powered submarines are 
concerned it is unlikely that any further construction of 
SSBs is contemplated. Despite the range of the SS-N-8 
SLBM it ~s unlikely that the Soviets would forego the 
advantages of on station concealment conferred on the 
ballistic missile submarine by the use of nuclear 
propulsion. Moreover to put long ranged SLBMs on diesel 
powered submarines in excess of 62 submarines or 950 
launchers would break the agreement between the Soviet 
Union and United States arrived at in the aftermath of 
SALT I. 
1 By the early 1980s the US SSN force will consist of 90 
units; 26 Los Angeles class; 53 other SSNs of the Skipjack 
and later classes and 8 older vessels for training and 
research purposes. An experimental quiet design SSN has 
just joined the fleet and it is expected that some 
features of this experimental class will be incorporated 
in units of the Los Angeles class. 
325 
It would seem unlikely that the Soviet Navy would 
wish to construct any new SSGs given the advantages of 
concealment currently possessed by the nuclear-powered 
C class and its under-water launched missile system. If 
there is to be a new cruise missile submarine, and the 
reported existence of a new 400 mile range missile1 
suggests that this is likely, then in all probability it 
will be nuclear powered. 
Conventionally powered SS construction appears to 
have virtually come to a halt. W class vessels which 
built to a total of 240 units are being retired at a 
2 
reported rate of 20/year and the scrapping of the Z class 
cannot be delayed much longer. This leaves a present SS 
force of some 56 Fs, 14 Rs, 4 Bs and perhaps 4 Ts, the 
last three all being medium range vessels. As yet there 
appears to be no construction of a follow-on class for 
the Fs and the building rate of the Ts is as yet unknown. 
It is unlikely that the construction rate of the replace-
ment vessels will approach the massive proportions of the 
post war building programme. Conceivably the Soviet Navy 
could enter the 1980s with a conventionally powered 
attack submarine force of under 100 units only half of 
which,_ the Fs, would be available for operations requiring 
long deployment periods. 
Not only are the numbers of submarines declining in 
overall terms but the proportion of task specific 
submarines is rising. Thus the SSBNs are not likely to 
be used in any but their deterrent role, a considerable 
number of the available SSGNs 3 will be involved in anti-
1 Notebook', USNIP, February 1974, p.ll7; Janes Fighting 
Ships 1974/5, p.638; Janes Weapons Systems 1973/4, p.55. 
2Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.546. 
3 The number of 'available' units of any class is but a 
fraction of the total number. If we consider the SSGNs 
assume the existence of 55 units in 1980 and distribute 
these among the fleet areas in the same proportions as at 
present then we may expect 38 units with the Northern 
Fleet and 17 units in the Pacific. Of these no more than 
2/3 could be relied on to be operational at any given time. 
326 
carrier operations and the SSNs may be fully occupied in 
SSBN related activities. Therefore although it is 
possible that some SSGNs and SSNs may be assigned to anti-
commerce activities it is not expected that this will be 
their major operational role. Perhaps only the 56 large 
SS boats will be involved in the anti-sea lines of 
communication role in a future war involving the super 
powers. If this is so then given the continuation of 
present deployment patterns (31 North, 14 Baltic and 11 
Pacific) it ls unlikely that more than 8 - 10 units could 
be operated on a sustained basis in the mid-Atlantic. 1 
It would be possible, if the Soviets continue their 
present practice of building vessels of over 15,000 tons 
in only one yard, to have four units of the Kuril class 
in operation by the early 1980s to which should be added 
the 2 Moskva units already in service. Depending on their 
fleet distribution,it would seem as though the Soviets 
may be able to keep one Kuril in fairly constant operation 
with both the Northern and Pacific Fleets. 
The Kara at present building at the rate of less than 
one/year is under construction at Nikolayev. It may be 
possible for the Zhdanov yards ln the Baltic, which have 
been involved in the Kresta II programme, to take part in 
the programme. On the assumption that this will occur. it 
' 
3, Page 325 Cont. 
That is, perhaps only 24 units will be avilable for the 
anti-carrier role in the North Atlantic waters and 
Mediterranean Sea. This total is likely to be much less 
in fact because for reasons cited in the text Soviet 
SSGN are not likely to build to this total. 
1 Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.53l and Berman, op.cit., 
for deployment patterns. It is important to remember the 
effectiveness of American anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities in this context. We have noted the success 
of American ASW forces during the Cuban crisis when they 
forced conventionally powered submarines to surface in 
full view of ASW aircraft and ships. It has been 
reported that the tactic of •riding out• submarines by 
aircraft is no less successful in the Greenland-Iceland-
UK gap and may even be effective against nuclear powered 
craft. See Kuenne, R.E., Polaris, p;90. 
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seems that production could be stepped up to an average 
f}S,W 
rate of threelmissile cruiser units every 2 years 1 thereby 
producing some 11 units by the early 1980s. If there are 
in fact 11 units of Kara ,or a Kar,,a follo;v-oi\ by 1980 this [?'~ X,_ Q ~-- O""'"·jci,_ _.,'),J-"Y'~~"~- ~ -~~cyc'~''-
Will give a tRtal of twenty bi"'l1'e ~'S'~le £J::~eir-s 
~~~~~~~~~~- JHz7."";,~-r~Fo~f -~ these- vessel~;huth~~ s~n urv>~l 
Kyndas, are suspected of poor seakeeping gualities,and 
the absence of an on board helicopter robs the vessel of 
its full utility. 
By the 1980s the Sverdlov class cruisers which have 
not been modified will either be scrapped or else join 
the aging Chapayevs and Kirovs as training vessels. It 
is also to be expected that the Skory class, originally 
built to some 75 units, will have been paid off and the 
conventionally armed Kotlins (26 units) may well have 
joined them. This will mean a deficit of some forty 
five1 surface ships from the present surface fleet of 
about 115 units. "To offset '(;\:lis loss we have seen 
some 9 addi tiona{~~~~~__;:;-r;r}';;:r;.s can be added to 
that 
the 
fleet. In the destroyer category only the Krivak class 
is at present under construction. At a current building 
rate of 3 units every two years it is unlikely that this 
class will have produced more than 16 units by 1980 unless 
additional yard space is given over to construction. 2 
In short old age is overtaking the soviet Navy,and 
the numbers of its surface units and conventionally 
powered attack submarines can be expected to show a 
continuation of the decline which had been evident since 
1 The figure of 45 includes 9 Sverdlovs, 17 remaining 
Skorys and 19 Kotlins. 
2 If additional escort yards are being redirected to the 
construction of destroyers as has been suggested 
previously then it is possible that yards at Khabarovsk 
in the Far East and at Kamysk Barun in the Black Sea 
could be utilised. If this is done then the rate of 
decline in surface ships may not be as drastic as 
suggested in the last years of the 1970s. This reduction 
in the rate of decline would be due to policies adopted 
under the post Khrushchev regime. See MccGwire, 
'Soviet Naval Programmes', p.223. 
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the late 1960s. In part this decrease in overall slze 
is accounted for by the fact that recent ship construction 
has been more costly and the ships produced have been 
qualitatively different from those constructed during the 
1950s. The more important factor in bringing about this 
decline in the 1960s and 1970s was undoubtedly the policy 
adopted by Khrushchev: the cancellation of an on going 
building programme and the handing over of battleship and 
cruiser ways to merchant ship and nuclear submarine 
construction. The replacement programme of theKhrushchev 
I 
era has resulted in only four ships of over 15,000 tons 
being constructed since 1958, an~~~ ~,~;~~se are yet to 
enter service. To date some 17 m~~~~~~s have been 
delivered since 1962,at an average building rate of less 
than 1~ vessels per year,and 34 new destroyers have 
entered service in the same period>at an average building 
rate of 2~ vessels per year. 
Whether, and to what extent, the present leadership 
has taken steps to alter this situation will become 
clearer in the next few years when post 1964 construction 
programmes begin to deliver new units, but it is unlikely 
that new programmes will reverse the trend of overall 
decline in numbers prior to the 1980s. 
This decrease in quantity is combined with qualitative 
improvements hence comparisons of fleet strength cannot be 
made in terms of combatants alone. 1 However at a time 
when the Soviet Navy is appearing in virtually all the 
world's oceans,and is apparently incurring additional 
responsibilities,a reduction of forty five surface vessels 
in the next six years will present difficulties given 
that it lS unlikely that current production rates will 
produce 20 surface replacements. 
1 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Some problems in mastering the world's 
oceans', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1973. JPRS Trans in 
USSR Military Affalrs No. 905, p.20. 
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To reverse this trend of an overall numerical decrease 
the Soviet Union would need to undertake a major effort to 
construct new shipyards or to reallocate existing yards, 
as may be the case with yards previously producing escort 
vessels. While this would not reverse the trend to 
reduced numbers by 1980 it would enable some expansion 
during the 1980s. It has however, been suggested that 
Many yards, especially the big ones, have 
exhausted all possibilities of expansion 
because of space limitations. And it is 
very difficult for the Soviets to build 
new yards, because suitable land is often 
not available and the cost of making land 
suitable may be prohibitive.l 
Alternatively the Navy could press for the return to the 
fleet of construction facilities which were lost to the 
merchant marine in the 1950s. This would require a policy 
decision to be made at the highest political levels. 
In other areas of what appear to have been Soviet 
neglect new units are appearing but not in sufficient 
) 
numbers to make good the backlog in the near future. Thus 
new support ships are being constructed2 but not at a 
sufficient rate to support the requirements of a Navy 
the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian, Pacific operating in 
and Atlantic Oceans. Recent testimony 
Committees points to the continued use 
by the Navy for support services. 3 The 
before Congressional 
of merchant vessels 
Soviet Navy has no 
equivalent to the underway replenishment groups to be 
found in the United States Navy,nor does it have an 
elaborate network of bases to compensate for its deficien-
cies in this area. The amphibious forces of the fleet are 
growing,but descriptions of exercises suggest that these 
forces are still primarily intended for local coastal 
operations over comparatively short distances. 
1 Breyer, S., Guide to the Soviet Navy, translated M.W. 
Henley, US Naval Institute Annapolis 1970, p.227. 
2 The Chilikin and Manych class of fleet replenishment 
ships. 
3 Admiral 
Committee 
and South 
Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., 
on Foreign Affairs 
Asia. 
US Navy C.N.O. to House 
sub-committee on Near East 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII: 
Sur£ace to Surface 
Strategic 
Designation and Name 
Launch Platform 
and launchers/platform 
Range 
Operational Date 
Other 
Tactical 
Description 
and Name 
SS-N-7 
SS-N-9 
SS-N-10 
SS-N-11 
Launch Platform & 
launchers/platform 
C SSGN (8) 
NANUCHKA ( 6) 
missile corvettes 
KARA cruisers (8) 
KRESTA II (B) 
KRIVAK destroyers 
( 4) 
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MISSILES ENTERING THE SOVIET FLEET POST 1965 
Range 
30 miles 
150 miles 
30 miles 
30 miles 
ss-N~6 
Y SSBNs (16} 
1,500 miles 
1967 aboard 1st Y class 
dived launch: two stage 
solid propellant 
Speed Control 
Mach 1.5 autopilot 
active and 
homing 
Mach 1.0+ radar with 
mid course 
guidance 
beyond 
ho.rizon 
Mach 1.2 radar 
Mach 0.9 
Op. Date 
1968-9 
1968-9 
1968 
1968 
SS-N-8 
DI (12) + DII (16) 
4,600 miles 
1973 aboard DI 
dived launch said to be an improved version 
of the SS-N-6 has the greatest range of any 
current SLBM and can hit US targets while 
remaining in fleet areas. not thought to 
have a multiple warhead. 
Other 
dived launch from vertical tubes 
mounted in triple launchers. 
suggestions that it may also be fitted to 
P class SSCN. 
b, {I z:,,~o'>J ~t''.-..nd,Jes. 
note the trend t~~~-SSM in post-
1968 deliveries. 
55 OSA (fast missile 
cutters (4) 
modified KILDINS (4) 
terminal 
radar 
homing 
probably a modified STyX 55-N-2 credited with 
loW altitude capability. _f,t j,,,l» i"~·":'" '~'''J.i'""'t""-•1, t;;},w·-t tho:. k,l(il"" ;o>,·'"·?,L (;,·"'" tj,,.,,., 
SS-N-13 
;;.·n,,,d· {\;>J'J,dJ bn!/nt.~. k<tl.-;.,h-:-~ 
There have been recent reports1 that the Soviet Union has developed a new l g r $~ J;;;Q;;13:h~~.;-~*" the SS-N-13 with 
an estimated 400 mile range M -a speed .i.a the Haeh 4-~ (Flight ·eti'lfle ftr*"*i 7 ainso 5~-.:seee.::~ua:t e?cimn r nge). 
Information on target location, speed and course could be beamed down from an aircraft to a vessel carrying the missile 
which would be fired towards the general target area. The flight time is such that a task force moving at 20 knots 
would have moved no more than 3 miles from its original position suggesting that a terminal homing device could bring 
the missile OntO target. i-),;,;,I.?._Mr"_ ,1.::1\,.;: ,'\'\~'J'~'":'•t'f'f'n:;_,,/&~ f;;.,- ,;;,,,.,; ,::, £f'0evt -~ r,, b.,;. ,,.--,f,«,"<IA~I'IIi? f"h<t ...;.J\Qo"4<of"<.tt'l~f"lf.S· 
l "-'"t """J 'Pc•ll1\'>'t'o'-- \l'>'l.<<;.,'_..,j"<' • .....,;-rct<.'Jf'O~I'\,J'F' ""- f~,_,:: f 1,,.-<: 4'J>TM-P..•"• '"<e.s- '~-'"-'i 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.638; 
/"<)f\'l,T"I)!"),J, 
Janes.Weauons Systems 1973/4, p.55; 
~' February 1974, p.ll7. 
\..<\"'>¢;. t';tt;, .... 1 "'"'th -'U'\ ft%,,.v 
Vhh·~,l.e "''J~tefn :C:-<; ·11,-d 
\<..;-;;-
~-·_.,, 1-h""-
MlCy~,l"< 
""- "'~·'·"''~-~, "1";,"'-•"'-'~" 
y;.," ""'~~---- h .;>.rn~!';w.,;,:> 
'-'1&1'\ 
SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES 
besigiiatwn Launch Plafrorm 
and Name Launchers/Platform Rang_!!_ _ __ §p_eed __ _f_ontrol Op. Date Other 
SAN-3 Goblet 
SAN-4 
AS-5 KELT 
AS-6 
KURIL {4) 
MOSKVA ( 4) 
KRESTA II ( 4) 
KARA (4) 
KURIL (6) 
2 SVERDLOV 
conversions (2) 
KARA (4) 
KRIVAK (4) 
NANUCHKA ( 2) 
GRISHA (4) 
BADGER G (2) 
BADGER G 
Backfire 
20 miles 
20 miles 
AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES 
130+ miles 
350 miles 
Mach 9 radio command 
+ terminal 
radar and 
homing. 
Mach 3 inertial 
navigation + 
radar homing 
Sources: Janes Fighting Ships 1974/5, p.637-640 and p.531. 
Flight International, 'Missile Yearbook', March 1974. 
Janes Weapons Systems, 1973/4, various pages. 
Weyer's Warships 1973, p.450. 
1968 
1970-71 
Possibly a derivative 
of the land based. 
Gainful system. 
Normally housed in silo 
raised to :fi~ and 
retracted £~ reloading 
and stowage. Possibly 
a barrage system using 
multiple unguided 
rockets. 
w 
w 
..., 
CHAPTER IX 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter VII showed that naval spokesmen were engaged 
in a defensive operation to maintain the role of navy and to 
establish the continuing importance of the surface fleet in 
particular. However, the introduction of new weapons systems 
into the navy occasioned an intra-navy debate over operations, 
tactics, the relative importance of the navy and the role of 
surface vessels in the new navy. 
This debate, while interesting in its own right, is 
significant because the arguments of one loose faction "the 
naval radicals" supported those non-naval figures who maintained 
that it was not necessary to emulate the other major naval 
pmvers in order to achieve Soviet objectives at sea. Missiles 
launched from a relatively few small surface vessels, submarines 
and naval aircraft could accomplish the limited defensive tasks 
of the Navy. 
The remainder of the chapter is an assessment of the 
capabilities of the Soviet Navy circa 1967 to undertake the 
missions assigned it: contribution to the strategic strike 
force, suppression of hostile ASW forces, countering sea based 
nuclear weapon systems, enemy commerce disruption, cooperation 
with the ground forces 1 in an attempt to indicate the impact of 
fiscal parsimony on the Navy's ability to carry out its assigned 
functions. 
CHAPTER IX 
Tactical Debates and Operational Requirements 
in the mid-l960s. 
Introduction: The Revolution in Military 
Affairs and Naval Issues. 
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'The revolution in military affairs' has become a 
stock phrase in the writings of Soviet military 
theoreticians and lS used to convey those changes which 
had their origins ln the 'outstanding successes in the 
development of the Soviet economy and science and 
1 technology' permitting 'the creation of an absolutely 
new military technical base and new weapons for the 
armed forces'. 2 
For the possibilities opened by science and 
technology in the fields of atomic energy (nuclear 
weapons and means of propulsion), rocketry (delivery 
vehicles), radio-electronics and cybernetics (command 
and control), to be successful in affecting a revolution 
theoreticians claimed two further necessary conditions. 
(1) The timely anticipation by the political leader-
ship of the trends in the development of new 
military equipment and weapons, the disclosure 
of the nature of a future war, and the carrying 
out of basic reforms in military affairs. 
and 
1 Malinovsky, R. Ya. (Marshal of the Soviet Union, 
Minister of Defence), 'The Revolution in Military Affairs 
and the Task of the Military Press', in Col. P.M. 
Derevyanko, ed., Problems of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (Moswcow, 1965) translation in R.W. Kintner and 
H.F. Scott The Nuclear Revolution in Military Affairs, 
University of Oklahoma Press (Norman, 1968) p.l9. 
2 Sbytov, N.A. (Lieutenant General of Aviation, Candidate 
of Military Science), 'The Revolution in Military Affairs 
and its Results• in Problems of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs, translation Kintner and Scott, op.cit., p.25. 
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(2) The availability in the armed forces of such 
personnel, especially of leaders, who will 
have the ability to master quickly the new 
means of armed conflict and use them in any 
combat conditions with the greatest effective-
ness.l 
According to Soviet authorities 'The Communist Party 
and its Leninist Central Committee were the organisers and 
leaders of this revolution ... 1 
(T)o the questions of what the nature of a new 
world war will be if the imperialists succeed in 
unleashing it: what direction the structure of 
the Armed Forces must take: what the trends of 
the development of the means of armed conflict 
and the ways of waging it will be 
the party 'gave clear and scientifically based answers•, 
viz. 
(T)he Armed Forces and the country, as a whole, 
must prepare for a war in which nuclear rocket 
weapons will be used most widely: which will 
represent a decisive, classic collision of two 
opposed world social systems: and which will be 
distinguished by unprecedented violence (on the 
whole territory of the participants) dynamic force 
and high manoeuvrability of combat operations.2 
Besides developing views on the nature of modern 
warfare the party was credited with the successful re-
equipment of the Army and Navy with nuclear missiles and 
the reorganisation of the Armed Forces by establishing a 
new and independent arm of service, the Strategic Rocket 
Forces. 3 In addition, the reprocessing of manuals and 
regulations to take into account the peculiarities and 
requirements of nuclear rocket war; the training of all 
personnel in the mastering of the new weapons and of 
officers in the newest methods of waging warfare; the 
inculcation of the necessarily high moral-political 
l Ibid., p.25. 
2 Ibid., p.26. 
3 
c.f. the situation in the United States where the 
U.S.A.F. Strategic Air Command was responsible for the 
development and control of ICBMs, the USN for the SLBMs 
and the Army for tactical missiles and IRBMs. 
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qualities and the combat qualities of readiness and 
ability to defeat the enemy; and the further strengthen-
ing of the political organisations in the Army and Navy, 
1 
attracted the concern and attention of the party. 
It is not necessary for us, as outsiders, to accept 
the above descriptions of the role of the party during 
this period of change. However the claims of the Party 
that 'the prime foundation of military development and 
organisation ~s the leadership of the CPSU over the Armed 
Forces• 2 and that the leadership bases its conclusions on 
'scientific' (scholarly) investigation of the facts, had 
a considerable impact on the style and substance of debate 
among those closely concerned with the implementation of 
policy. 
The revolution in military affairs brought to the 
fore a number of important issues of concern to the Soviet 
Navy. Broadly stated these issues revolved around the 
type of war for which the Navy was to prepare, the 
operations which the Navy would face in the event of a 
3 future war, the relative position of the Navy vis-a-vis 
Ibid., p.26-27 and Col. I. Prusanov, article in 
Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 3, 1966, p.S-16, 
translated as 'Activity of the Party in Strengthening 
the Armed Forces under conditions when a Revolution is 
underway in Military Art•. JPRS, Soviet Military 
Translations, No. 243, p.l-13. The Prusanov article 
was recommended by the Journal Communist of the Armed 
Forces for use in studying the general subject of the 
role of the party during a period when there is a 
revolution in military affairs coinciding with the danger 
of a new world war. 
2 Materials of the 22nd Party Congress, p.405, cited in 
Col. S. Baranov and Ye Nikitin Communist of the Armed 
Forces No.8, Ap 1963, p.l7-25, translated as 'The CPSU 
Leadership - The Prime Foundation for Soviet Military 
Development', JPRS Soviet Military Translations, No. 126, 
p.l. 
3 By the mid 60s it had been established that the Navy did 
have a role to play. The debate was over what that role 
was to be. During the mid 1950s Gorshkov claims that 
'influential authorities' with 'leftist• tendencies argued 
that there was no need for a Navy at all. It is apparent 
that the reference is to Marshal Zhukov and Secretary 
Khrushchev. 
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other branches of the Armed Forces, and the applicability 
of former tactical doctrine in the sphere of operations. 
One of the subjects of debate in the mid-sixties was 
whether naval missions were confined to the initial (and 
in Soviet doctrine the decisive) stage of general nuclear 
war, or whether the Navy had a role in the subsequent 
stages of general war or in other types of conflict. 
Moreover the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy argued 
for a re-evaluation of the role of the Navy in furthering 
the 'state interests of the Soviet Union in time of peace'. 
This particular debate merged into a discussion of 
the operations the navy could be called on to effect 
during a future conflict. Besides carrying out nuclear 
strikes from the sea and destroying the enemy's sea based 
nuclear weapons systems, operations on which there was a 
high level of intra navy agreement other questions arose. 
Was there a need for operations against the enemy's sea 
lines of communications (SLOC) and for protection of 
Soviet coastal lines of communications (CLOC)? Was there 
a likelihood of amphibious operations in a future war and 
if so on what scale and at what range? The continuing 
relevance of 'battle', 'manoeuvre• ,'coordination' and 
'massing'>as tactical imperatives in the naval theatre, 
was also subject to questioning,as was the relative 
importance of the Navy vis-a-vis the other branches of 
the Armed Services. 
The answers to these questions were, 1n part, 
determined by the respondents views on the nature of a 
future war and in part by their views on the implications 
of the revolution in military affairs for the future 
development of the Navy. The fact that some contributors 
to the debate on tactics and missions advocated solutions 
beyond the current capabilities of the Soviet Navy 
indicated either a knowledge of future building programmes, 
as in the case of the SSBN, or else advocacy of a new 
type of fleet capable of carrying out the missions 
regarded as being of greatest importance. In particular 
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some contributors were clearly in favour of re-examining 
the relative weight afforded to surface ships, nuclear 
and conventionally powered submarines, and naval aviation, 
whereas, others appeared content to operate within the 
confines of a submarine-aviation fleet. 
One important result of the •revolution ~n military 
affairs' was to increase the threat to the Soviet Union 
presented by NATO sea based nuclear weapons systems. 
This fact was alluded to by all participants in the 
disputes over the issues outlined above. We have already 
examined the efforts to counter the CVAs of the NATO allies 
and the increased attention given the Polaris weapon system 
during the early 1960s. A representative selection of 
quotations indicates that this concern had not diminished 
~n the mid 1960s and into the 1970s. 
In 1966 Gorshkov observed: 
In their preparations for a new world war our 
probably enemies ... are assigning a special 
role to their fleets. Over one third of all 
the strategic nuclear weapons available to 
all branches of the armed forces are 1 
concentrated at present in the American fleet. 
Prior to the 24th Congress of the CPSU First Deputy 
' Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet, 
V.A. Kasatonov claimed: 
Naval forces are being given the role of a 
shock force in the adventures of the imperialists 
... They contain strike carriers with nuclear 
bomb-carrying aircraft and about 50 nuclear 
submarines armed with long range missiles. 
(Here he is summing the SSBN fleets of the US, UK and 
France.) 
l 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'The XXIIIrd Congress of the KPSS and 
the Tasks of Navymen', Morskoy Sbornik, No.5, 1966, 
p.3-l3, US Navy translations p.9. 
These forces, concentrating about 40% of the 
strategic nuclear potential of the aggressor, 
are already deployed on the seas and oceans 
and are aimed at the U.S.S.R. and other 
socialist states.l 
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Marshal A.A. Grechko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Defence, 
in the Navy Day issue of Morskoy Sbornik for 1971 wrote 
that the military and political circles of the United 
States were 'hypnotised by this increased naval potential' 
and were declaring a 
so-called oceanic strategy, capable in their 
opinion, of ensuring a successful nuclear strike 
against our territory and removing their own 
territory from the threat of a retaliatory blow. 
Its essence consisted of shifting their main 
strategic nuclear potential from land to sea.2 
Finally Admiral Gorshkov in the concluding article 
of his series 'Navies in War and Peace' noted that under 
modern conditions 'vast areas of the oceans (have) 
become launching pads for nuclear missile weaponry• and 
that in the post-war era 
the U.S.S.R. and other socialist states found 
themselves surrounded on all sides by a hostile 
coalition of maritime states posing the serious 
threat of a nuclear missile attack from the 
direction of the sea.3 
1 Kasatonov, V.A., 'To meet the 24th Party Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', Morskoy 
Sbornik, No. 11, 1970, p.3-8, U.S. Navy trans. 
2 Grechko, A.A., 'The Fleet of our Homeland' Morskoy 
Sbornik, No. 7, 1971, p.3-9, U.S. Navy trans. 
3 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Some Problems in Mastering the World 
Ocean', Morskoy Sbornik, No.2, 1973, p.l3-25. JPRS 
translations of U.S.S.R. Military Affairs, No.905 p.l6. 
The Revolution ~n Military Affairs and 
the Navy: A Question of Numbers 
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The discussion of tactics and operational require-
ments within the Soviet Navy had their basis in the 
revolution in military affairs, in the size and shape of 
the existing Soviet Navy circa 1967, and in assessments 
made about the desirable future size and shape of the 
Soviet Navy. 
Subsequent discussion makes reference to the major 
units available to the Soviet Navy in 1967 which are 
tabulated in Table I. 
It is important to keep these figures in mind when 
considering the claims that by 1968 the revolution in 
naval affairs had been completed. 1 
Whereas Gorshkov could point to the beginnings of 
•an ocean going subillarine and aviation fleet capable of 
successfully carrying out its tasks in a nuclear rocket 
war• 2 it is doubtful whether the numbers of •rocket 
carrying atomic powered submarines• (32 E I & E II 
SSGNs and 9 H SSBNs), •rocket carrying surface vessels 
armed with up-to-date anti-naval, anti-aircraft and other 
weapons' (30 missile destroyers, 8 missile cruisers and 
1 (+l) helicopter cruisers), •rocket carrying naval 
aircraft' (approximately 200 based primarily in the 
north western and south western sectors of the U.S.S.R.), 
•highly mobile marines with means for their landing' 
(perhaps 3,000 men in all) and •coastal rocket artillery 
units• 3 constituted that mass influx of new equipment 
said to be essential for the revolution to be complete. 
Captain Penzin highlighted the importance of the 
quantitative aspect of the change. 
1 Gorshkov, S.G., 'The Fleet of our Motherland', Krasnaya 
Zvezda ll February 1968, 'now the period of complete 
reconstruction of our naval system is behind us•. 
2 ibid. 
3 
"b"d ~ ~ . 
fr 
fl 
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TABLE I: MAJOR UNITS AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET NAVY CIRCA 1967 
Submarines: SSB 
SSBN 
Cruise Missile 
Attack Submarines 
Surface Vessels: Cruise:rs 
Missile Cruisers 
Dest:roye:rs 
Missile Destroyers 
Naval Aviation: 
~ 
7 
Class 
Z-V 
Prooulsion 
Conventional 
Main A.I:mament 
2 - SS-N-4 missiles sur face launch 
350 mile range 
22 
12 
5 
7 
5 
27 
16 
22 
40 
13 
170 
app:rox. 
12 
1 ( +1) 
4 
4 
1 
50 
app:rox. 
1 
26 
4 
8 
8 
10 ( +9) 
400 bombers 
ASM 
G 
H 
W conv 
W conv 
EI 
Eli 
J 
z 
F 
N 
w 
Sverdlov 
Moskva 
Kynda 
Kresta I 
SAM Sverdlov 
Skory 
Tal lin 
Kotlin 
Kildin 
Krupny 
SAM Kotlin 
Kashin 
Conventional 
Nuclear 
Conventional 
Conventional 
Nuclea:r 
Nuclea:r 
Conventional 
Conventional 
Conventional 
Nuclear 
Conventional 
approx. 200 fitted with ASM 
3 x SS-N-4 missiles 
3 x SS-N-5 missiles submerged launch 
650 mile range 
1 o:r 2 x SS-N-3 missiles, approx. range 
300 miles. 
4 x 55-N-3 missiles 
6 x SS-N-3 missiles 
8 x 55-N-3 missiles 
4 x 55-N-3 missiles 
torpedoes 
torpedoes 
torpedoes 
torpedoes 
12 - 5.911 guns 
Helo cruiser with SAM and ASW 
6 x SS-N-3, 1 x 2 SA-N-4 
4 x SS-N-3, 2 x 2 SA-N-4 
2 SA-N-2 
artillery: some modified to imp:rove 
ASW cap. 
artillery 
artillery 
1 55-N-1 range 100 miles 
2 SS-N-1 
2 SA-N-1 
4 SA-N-1 
AS-1 to 50 Badger x 2 range 55 miles 
AS-2 to 150 Badger x 1 range 115 miles 
AS-3 to 20 sear x 2 range 400 miles 
AS-4 on Blinder x l range 185 ~iles 
it is not enough to have extremely modern, 
single models of a new weapon in order for 
there to be considerable, and even basic 
revolutionary transformations in military 
affairs. The weapon must be a mass one, 
and it must have the corresponding carrier. 1 
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Penzin stated quite plainly that 
today (is) the missile• 2 and he 
'the primary weapon of 
was equally firm in his 
contention that although in the past 
the main strike force in our Navy consisted 
of surface warships and diesel submarines, 
today the role of main strike force, capable 
of operating against targets at sea, as well 
as ashore, has passed to the atomic submarines 
and naval missile air force which has powerful 
nuclear missiles at its disposal. For carrying 
out the other naval missions, there are surface 
warships of appropriate types.3 
Yet in 1967 the missile firing atomic submarines had 
been introduced slowly into the fleet at a rate of just 
over four units per year since 1958. Diesel submarines 
had continued in production to make up the numbers. Thus 
the ballistic missile fleet consisted of twelve nuclear 
powered H class vessels and 22 conventionally powered G 
class submarines constructed between 1958 and 1962. 
1 Penzin, K.V., Captain lst Rank, Candidate of Naval 
Sciences 'Changes in methods and forms of armed conflict 
at sea', Morskoy Sbornik No.7, 1966, U.S. Navy trans. 
p.38. See also Pante~~ev, Yu. A. Admiral, Professor, 
'Some Questions of fl&et actions in contemporary war', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1966, U.S. Navy trans. p.l7 states 
•revolutions in military affairs are the result not only 
of the creation of new types of equipment for use in 
combat, but of their mass introduction in units and 
forces, of the development and the mastering of the 
forms and methods of using them•. Kharlamov, N.M., 
Admiral 'Trends in naval developments•, Morskoy Sbornik 
No. 1, 1966, U.S. Navy trans. p.24, writes of the 
•modernisation and full equipping of the fleets with 
nuclear missiles, with electronic gear, and with atomic 
propulsion' which allegedly resulted from the revolution 
in military affairs. Admiral Gorshkov noted •new weapons 
can only have a decisive impact on changing methods of 
warfare when used on a mass scale by the armed forces•, 
'Naval might of Soviet Power•, Soviet Military Review, 
July 1965, p.4. 
2 op.cit., p.38. 
3 . 
op.c1t., p.40. 
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While the E II nuclear powered cruise missile units were 
being produced in 1963-1967 16 J class conventionally 
powered units were delivered and the F class attack 
submarine ran to some 56 units while the nuclear powered 
N class numbered 13. 
The influential former army officers Sokolovsky and 
Cherednichenko observed that 'Diesel-electric submarines 
with modern armaments have not lost their importance 
(against aircraft carriers)' and the influential volume 
Military Strategy noted that 'Diesel-electric submarines 
will obviously be used against lines of communication•. 1 
Whereas the latter observation can be justified, the 
sacrificing of the advantages of under water endurance 
and speed in submarines designed to attack major, well 
protected, surface units, capable of carrying out nuclear 
strikes against the land mass, suggests a false economy 
imposed on the navy by the more powerful arms of the 
Soviet defence establishment. 
The limited production runs of various classes of 
surface vessels also suggest difficulties in applying the 
revolution in military affairs. By 1967 six of the eight 
Kru?ny class SSM destroyers were about to undergo a major 
conversion to produce the Kanin SAM class, a clear 
indication that they had not proved satisfactory as 
built. The solitary Sverdlov conversion was a sufficient 
testament to the failure of that attempt at modernisation 
while the construction of only two 'Moskva units - nearing 
completion by 1967 - suggest a radical rethink about the 
requirements for anti-submarine warfare. 
Thus when Soviet naval writers spoke of a mass 
influx of new equipment, based on the new technologies, 
necessary for a revolution in military affairs, they were 
1 Sokolovsky, v. & Cherednichenko, M., 'Military Art at 
a New Stage', Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 August 1964, translated 
in~ Vol. 18, No. 38, p.l8, and Sokolovsky, ed., 
Military Strategy, RAND translation of 1st edition p.423 -
retained in 2nd and 3rd editions H.F. Scott, trans. p.3ll. 
not describing an existing state but rather advocating 
the large-scale series production of new classes. 
Undoubtedly some of the writers quoted must have known 
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of the forthcoming submarines and surface vessels planned 
for the late 60s and early 70s. Their contributions 
aopear to be designed in part.as protection of these new 
' ' ' 
programmes which if fulfilled could bring about the 
desired mass increase. 
What exactly was to be increased; the submarine and 
aviation arms only, or the surface fleet aswell? To a 
great extent the answer to this problem can be gleaned 
from the writings on tactics and operations which 
appeared during the early and mid-l960s. In a wider 
perspective those, such as Gorshkov, who concerned 
themselves not only with the war fighting capacity of 
the Soviet Navy but also looked to the role of the Navy 
in peacetime found themselves in disagreement with 
colleagues whose conclusions were based on an examination 
of specific war related questions. 
Authors of the 1960s who concerned themselves with 
tactical and operational questions necessarily had to 
take into account the ships and weapons systems already 
available. Hence some conclusions may have arisen,not 
from the consideration of the impact of new weapons on 
old forms and methods alone but from a realistic 
' 
appreciation of what equipment was available. Others 
noted the new weapons but appeared to base their 
conclusions on what, in their view, was necessary rather 
than immediately available. 
Missiles and the Question of Tactics 
The introduction of nuclear armed missiles to the 
Navy was generally accepted as a major revolutionary 
event in naval development. It was widely held that 
battles, formerly characterised by long duration, close 
combat and great expenditure of ammunition, 1 would now 
consist of nuclear missile strikes which were defined as 
the rapid employment of powerful weapons by a 
single vector, or by one or several tactical 
vector groups, against a selected objective 
for the purpose of destroying it.2 
For some this change completely altered the old verities 
of naval combat. 
These properties of the modern weapon (the 
destruction in one blow not only of a single 
ship but of several at one time,the ability 
not just to inflict damage on a base but 
completely to destroy it and all its 
installations,as well as to sink all the 
ships present) have, at one blow, nullified 
all the old laws for conducting war.3 
The more cautious observed 'Conditions for combat at sea 
and the essence and nature of this combat are now entirely 
changed'~ Such changes required 
Tactics, theory and practical methods for 
conducting naval operations (which) have been 
developed in conformity with the new equipment, 
and with consideration given to the actual 
capacilitles of our likely opponents.S 
1 
'The Theory of Naval Science and the Modern Navy•, 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1964, JPRS Soviet Military 
Translations No. 136, p.29. 
2 Kolesnikov, Yu.V., capt. 1st Rank, 'Certain categories 
of naval tactics', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11, 1963, 
U.S. Navy trans. 
3 Panteleyev, 'Some questions of fleet actions in 
contemporary war•, p.l8. 
4 . Petrov, B.F., Rear Adm1ral 'The Essence and Nature of 
Modern Naval Warfare•, Morskoy Sbornik, No. 1, 1965, 
JPRS, Soviet Military Translations, No. 177, p.l. 
5 Sergeyev, N.D. Admiral 'The Navy of a great power•, 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 7, 1965, U.S. Navy trans. p.8. 
emphasis added. 
344 
Admiral Gorshkov noted that the transition had not been an 
easy one 
when the first models of combat equipment made 
their appearance in the fleet arsenal our 
scientific thought attempted to use those 
provisions of the operational art and tactics 
which they already had, adapting them to new 
conditions.l 
However, 
The more new combat weapons the fleet 
received ... the more clearly the fleet felt 
the need to develop means and methods which 
were new in principle for utilisation of its 
forces in combat.2 
There followed a period of 'critical analysis of the 
established theory of naval science' resulting in the 
'breaking down {of) obsolete views and notions' out of 
which 'Quite a few new, original and extremely effective 
methods for conducting the armed struggle against a 
3 powerful naval enemy were found'. 
Besides indicating that changes in naval tactics, 
which were not specified, were required Gorshkov notes 
The theory of naval science ... was completely 
re-oriented to support the practical require-
ments of the fleets in carrying out strategic 
and tactical-operational missions corresponding 
to the new combat capabilities.4 
1 Gorshkov, 'The Development of Soviet naval science', 
p.20. It seems likely that Gorshkov is referring to the 
period between the late 1950s and 1963. During this time 
new missile units were being added to the fleet but there 
was little evidence of any major changes in fleet training 
or operational areas. 
In a major address to the fleet in February 1963 - i.e. 
in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis - Gorshkov 
claimed to 'possess a most modern navy' but then had to 
instruct his men to take their ships to sea and undergo 
realistic training. 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'The great tasks of the Soviet Navy', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 February 1963, translation FBIS 
14 February 1963, U.S.S.R. National Affairs p.ccl-6. 
2 Gorshkov, 'The Development of Soviet naval science, p.20. 
3 ibid.' p.20. 
4 ibid. 
These new combat capabilities meant that 
for the first time in its history our Navy 
was converted, in the £ull sense of the word, 
into an offensive type of long range armed 
force.1 
---
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There is an important widening of focus which can be 
traced through these quotatio.ns. In the first Admiral 
Panteleyev fixed l1is gaze on the increased potential of 
the new weapons and attempts a revision of tactics from 
this standpoint. Indeed he goes further and implies 
conclusions about the future growth and shape of the 
fleet. This relatively fixed concern is shared by others 
who for convenience can be labelled 'the naval radicals 1 • 2 
They include Admiral Kharlamov and Captain Kolesnikov 
whose ideas we shall explore in greater detail. 
The broader view of Admiral Sergeyev took note of the 
•actual capabilities of our likely opponents' in addition 
to the new capabilities of the Soviet fleet. His view was 
1 Gorshkov, S.G., 'The development of Soviet naval science', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1967, U.S. Navy trans. p.l9 and 20. 
Emphasis added. 
2 It is not suggested that these 'naval radicals' necessar-
ily formed a self conscious cohesive group or that as a 
group or individually they actively lobbied for the 
acceptance of their ideas within the Navy or within the 
Politburo. I have found no evidence to support the 
existence of intra-navy group conflict and therefore 
suggest that this debate can be best understood in terms 
of what Franklyn Griffiths calls 'tendency analysis' or 
what the Soviets call 'non-antagonistic contradictions'. 
As Griffiths points out, 'the articulations of political 
participants will ultimately be influential only to the 
extent that they form part of existing tendencies ... At 
the subsystem level the presence of a tendency would be 
indicated by a pattern of articulation associated with a 
loose coalition of actors operating at different levels 
of the political structure, whose articulations tend in 
the same direction but who are unlikely to be fully aware 
of the common thrust and consequences of their activity'. 
(p.358). This is not to deny that factions within the 
political leadership, anxious for a variety of reasons 
to keep naval expenditure to a minimum, may have been 
impressed by the arguments of the naval radicals and used 
them to bolster their case. 
See Griffiths, F., 'A Tendency Analysis of Soviet 
Policy-Making' in Skilling, H.G. and Griffiths, F., 
editors, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, 
1971), p.335-377.~ 
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extended by Gorshkov who was concerned with the require-
ments of a navy recently converted to •an offensive type 
of long range force' as opposed to its former status as 
a 'defensive type of coastal protection force•. 1 
Gorshkov was moreover concerned to establish the role 
of the Soviet Navy in protecting the Soviet 
'expanding interests in the seas and oceans 
Union's 
. . 2 ~n peacet~me'. 
There was general agreement that the power of the 
nuclear strike increased the importance of achieving 
surprise and 'firing the first salvo'. 
(T)he importance of the factor of surprise is 
constantly increasing. In the last world war 
surprise can be said to have provided a 
relatively short-lived advantage for the 
attacker: today surprise strikes by nuclear 
weapons are frdught with catastrophic 
consequences.3 
and 
(U)nder present day conditions the 'first salvo• 
has taken on a new meaning, since in fact the 
first blow by a missile with a nuclear charge in 
the vicinity of the target can completely destroy 
it. Now the 'first salvo• is the 'to be - or not 
to be' for if the first salvo is not successful 
one must expect a retaliatory strike by the 
enemy, the results of which will be decisive.4 
Captain Kolesnikov and Admiral Kharlamov concurred in 
this view stressing that success depended on the enemy 'not 
be(ing) permitted to use his powerful weapon•. 5 
Soviet naval writings were and still are replete with 
exhortations to maintain a high state of combat readiness 
1 . . . Gorshkov, op.c~t., p.l4 ~nd~cates 'the strengthening of 
defensive tendencies' in the navy in the immediate post 
war period,which resulted in the advocacy of the 
'operational utilisation of surface forces for defensive 
purposes in coastal engagements.' 
2 ibid.' p.2l. 
3 Sergeyev 'The Navy of a great power•, p.S. 
4 Panteleyev, op.cit., p.l9. 
5 Kolesnikov, op.cit., p.l2, and Kharlamov, op.cit., p.27. 
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at all times (as are Soviet military writings in general) -
a doctrine very much in keeping with the importance of the 
'first salvo'. The only concession to this doctrine, with 
its implications of a pre-emptive strike, was the equally 
popular injunction that fleet forces be maintained 'in 
constant combat readiness to inflict immediate retaliatory 
strikes against the aggressor in order to disrupt his 
surprise attack 1 • 1 
The urgency of striking first had obvious implications 
for the tactical coordination of different types of naval 
force. It was on this issue, and that of massing, that 
those I have loosely labelled 'the naval radicals' were 
clearly distinguishable from other writers. 
The view of the radicals was su~cinctly put by 
Kolesnikov who held that to insist on tactical coordination 
was 
totally incompatible with the situation which has 
developed: if we take into account the time 
factor - we win, if we disregard it in favour of 
coordinated action - we lose. Therefore, in this 
case it would be more correct to substitute the 
principle 'no-one waits for anyone' for the 
coordination principle •we proceed alone- we 
fight together •. 2 
Panteleyev although agreeing with the above proposition 
stopped short of completely dismissing the importance of 
tactical interaction of different types of forces. '(I)t 
remains a superior way of using forces to achieve a goal•, 
and 'such or.ganisation is always desirable, even though 
it may not always be mandatory, or even possible today•. 3 
Admirals Panteleyev and Kharlamov were both concerned 
that given the likelihood of combat operations in distant 
waters coordination would no longer be possible. They 
dismissed the problem by asserting that such organisation 
was not mandatory,and bolstered their argument by reference 
1 Sergeyev, op.cit., p.S. 
2 Kolesnikov, op.cit., p.l2. 
3 Panteleyev, op.cit., p.20. 
to 
The powerful nuclear weapon (which) now makes 
it possible for a limited group of similar 
forces to carry out a mission independently. 
Therefore, the concentration of a great many 
different types of forces is simply superfluous 
at times.l 
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The only other reservation expressed was that some minimal 
coordination would be necessary 'to ensure the safety of 
(our) own forces•. 2 
Those who maintained that coordination remained an 
important principle of naval warfare, to be achieved 
wherever possible, agreed that it would be folly to allow 
opportunities to slip away since 
in the time required to bring proper forces to 
the area the enemy grouping may be able to evade 
the strike, damage the forces being concentrated 
or do both, and may even use his weapons to carry 
out his primary mission.3 
Yet coordination was still of relevance, even in 
remote areas, because 'individual strikes cannot always 
attain the desired objectives•. 4 
It was apparent that a prerequisite for tactical 
coordination, particularly in distant areas, was the 
availability of reliable global intelligence. Recent 
innovations in the miniaturisation of electronic equipment 
made possible the surveillance of vast tracts of the globe 
by aircraft and more significantly by satellite reconnaiss-
ance. Given that this was attainable 
1 ibid., p.20. Kharlamov, op.cit., p.28 argued that the 
effectiverrss of a missile strike remained high 'regardless 
of its launch source' and so coordination of a variety 
of forces was not mandatory. 
2 Kharlamov, op.cit., p.28. 
3 
'The theory of naval science and the modern navy', op.cit., 
p.33. 
4 
"b"d ~ ~ ., p.33 
The present status of means for conducting 
surveillance and communication for all practical 
purposes imposes no limit on the possibilities 
for controlling one's forces. Thanks to these 
means it is possible to locate an enemy in time, 
to deploy one's forces ... l 
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The pre-planning of strike forces and their coordinated 
deployment may no longer be rendered impossible by lack of 
information. Given the removal of this major handicap it 
was argued that coordination, even in distant waters, should 
be achieved for 1 
It makes it possible for the formation to 
manoeuvre flexibly, to put the enemy under 
the most unfavourable conditions, to strike 
powerful coordinated blows and to maintain 
mutual support and aid in combat.2 
Indeed the fact that 'Now the ships do not travel, as 
before, in solid ranks, and are frequently out of visual 
and technical range• 3 intensified the need for careful 
coordination and planning. 
The issues which arose in the debate over the continued 
relevance of the tactical doctrine of •massing' were 
outlined in an anonymous article which appeared in Morskoy 
Sbornik in February 1964. On the one hand there were 
those who held it no longer necessary to mass forces and 
weapons because 
Rocket nuclear weapons offer an incomparably 
higher probability of striking the target with 
colossal destructive power than was the case 
with conventional weapons. Individual weapons 
can hardly be shot down by the present means of 
defence.4 
1 Petrov, B.F. 'The essence and nature of modern naval 
warfare•, p.23. 
2 Editorial Krasnaya Zvezda 21 May 1968 translated as 
'Need for coordination in naval operations• JPRS S.M.T. 
No. 449, p.lO. 
3 ibid., p.8. 
4 . . Kolesn~kov, op.c~t., p.ll. Panteleyev, op.cit., p.l9 
and Kharlamov op.cit., express similar views. 
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Spokesmen for this view rejected the necessity for 
large-scale use of nuclear rocket weapons in single 
strikes. 1 On the other hand more cautious writers 
continued to insist on the importance of massing because 
of the vulnerability of the cruise missile. 
(T)he use of nuclear warheads, as the most 
powerful striking weapons, does not exclude, 
but on the contrary, presupposes massing, 
because this increases the probability that a 
missile will reach the target even when there 
is a powerful defence.2 
The conclusion of the anonymous correspondents on 
this issue was 
if the number of missiles in the salvo is 
increased, beyond a certain minimum, the 
effectivenessof the strike (attack) can 
be sharply increased. The power of such a 
strike will be considerably greater than 
the total pow er of several sequential 
strikes with~ smaller number of missiles. 
This circumstance in the opinion of the 
authors predetermines the necessity of 
massing firepower and forces in battle.3 
cruise Missiles 
The naval radicals were sustained ~n their views on 
tactics by the properties they imputed to the missiles 
which had entered service. Whereas there was general 
agreement that missiles were 1 able to put nucl:ear charges 
on targets quickly, accurately and in a short period of 
time, 4 there was less agreement as to the certainty of 
their reaching the target. If we discount the effects 
of missile failure in firing, flight or on impact,there 
1 Panteleyev, op.cit., p.l9, (the strength of the action 
is not the result of the number of missiles launched, 
but, rather, the size of the nuclear charge they carry•. 
2 Svetlov, A.G. Capt. 1st Rank, Morskoy Sbornik, No. 12, 
1962, p.l9. See also Petrov, op.c~t., p.29 for the 
view that enemy defences can destroy cruise missiles. 
3 
'Theory of naval science and the modern navy•, p.32. 
4 . Sergeyev, op.c~t., p.S. 
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are four other ways in which the cruise missiles 
available to the Soviet Navy could be countered. 
Firstly and most obviously the launch platforms 
themselves could be eliminated. (It should be remembered 
that even the SSGNs had to surface in order to launch 
their missiles). Protective sea based air cover available 
to an enemy task group could either prevent a submarine 
from surfacing or else attack a surfaced submarine before 
it had the opportunity to launch its missiles. Surface 
ships and naval aircraft equipped with missiles could 
also be detected and countermeasures taken against them. 
Even if missiles were launched at maximum range - about 
300 miles in 1967 - there is no guarantee that the launch 
platforms would be beyond the detection range of the 
outer picket vessels and carrier based early warning 
aircraft, despite constant Soviet assertions to the 
contrary. 
The speed of the Soviet cruise missiles, ranging from 
approximately Mach 1.0 in the case of the SS-N-1 to a 
possible Mach 1.5 for the SS-N-3 and perhaps to Mach 2.0 
for the AS-3, meant that these missiles fly at speeds 
comparable to those of contemporary aircraft,and hence 
were vulnerable to the weapons systems available to 
naval air power and to shipboard point defence systems. 
If the flight time of the missile is taken into account, 
there would in many cases be adequate warning time to 
enable these systems to be activated. 
Mid-course guidance was required by all the early 
soviet cruise missiles when used against targets beyond 
the horizon. The guidance systems also provided the 
target discrimination necessary to ensure destruction of 
the major target (e.g. a carrier, rather than one of its 
escorts). This guidance, provided by aircraft as a rule, 
raised problems of coordination in attacks in distant 
waters, as all Soviet fixed wing aircraft were land-based. 
Guidance may be provided by shipborne helicopters (with 
attendant problems of vulnerability to attack by aircraft), 
by satellites (where coordination of satellite launch 
from remote sites and selection of suitable orbits 
present major difficulties), or submarines (which if 
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not in sight of the target cannot perform their function, 
and if ln sight of it may be fully occupied in surviving 
attack by enemy ASW ships, aircraft and helicopters). 
Incoming missiles may also be countered by inter-
fering with, or confusing, their terminal homing devices. 
Terminal homing, based on active radar or infra red 
systems, can be diverted by decoys or else select a low 
value target. Radar can be jammed by the defensive use 
of chaff or by electronic countermeasures, and subjected 
to constructive deception causing the missile to home in 
1 
on false targets. 
This is not intended to discount the utility of the 
cruise missile systems. It does however suggest that the 
naval radicals were overoptimistic in their claims for 
the new weapons. 
Fleet Size and Composition 
The most important conclusions drawn by the radical 
tacticians concerned the size and composition of the 
fleet and the question of numerical supremacy in combat. 
Panteleyev, during his discussion of coordination claimed 
that 'submarines and aviation can, (together and 
separately) with the help of nuclear weapons, carry out 
• • t 2 . large scale mlSSlons , and as we have seen hls rejection 
of the need for massing and coordination was based on 
the supposition that 'the powerful nuclear weapon now 
makes it possible for a limited group of similar forces 
to carry out a mission independently. •3 
1 1" c J E lOt' • • ' 
November 1972, 
p.241-251. 
(R.N. ret.) 'Ship to ship missiles•, USNIP 
p.lOS-114, and Janes Weapon Systems 1973-4, 
2 Panteleyev, op.cit., p.20. 
3 
"b"d 20 l l ., p .. 
Admiral Kharlamov was more forthright in his assessment 
(A)ny grouping of ships at sea can now be wiped 
out in an extremely short period of time by a 
comparatively small group of long range nuclear 
missiles stationed in predetermined areas, in 
advance.l 
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The naval battles of old would be replaced by nuclear 
strikes, 'carried out by small numbers of highly manoeuvr-
able groups of carriers of nuclear missiles and torpedoes• 2 
and 
the primary concern of the commander in charge 
of directing combat activities at sea is now 
not the massing of his forces ... but rather the 
organisation of a small number of nuclear 
strikes by a formation which is comparatively 3 few in numbers, and even single weapon carriers. 
Kharlamov concluded with the observation that 
Whereas at one time it was believed that the 
primary need in order to gain victory was 
numerical superiority over the enemy forces, 4 this today is not given so decisive importance. 
There was, in all of this, the basic claims of 
Herrick termed the 'neo young school' of the Soviet 
what 
5 Navy 
and indeed there are close affinities between the spokesmen 
of 'the naval radicals' and the propositions advocated by 
Soviet naval spokesmen in the period from the early 1920s 
to the mid 1930s. This affinity was highlighted in the 
cautious contribution of Captain Penzin to the debate. 
1 Kharlamov, op.cit., p.28. It is possible that Admiral 
Kharlamov had the Mediterranean squadron of the Black Sea 
Fleet specifically in mind. At the time of publication, 
January 1966, this 'comparatively small group' of ships 
armed with long range missiles fluctuated between a high 
po:Lnt of some five major surface combatants, five 
submarines and ten auxiliaries and a low of one surface 
combatant and three auxiliaries. 
2 ibid. ' p. 28. 
3 ibid.' p.29. 
4 ibid., p.27. 
5 Herrick, R.W., Soviet Naval Strategy. 
Penzin claimed that in the past 
the mine and the torpedo cast doubt on the 
primacy of large, gun firing ships, particu-
larly when they were operating close to 
enemy bases 
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which was precisely the claim of the young school doctrine. 
These weapons reduced the necessity of supremacy at sea, 
at least to ensure the safety of the homeland, the central 
historical concern of the Soviet Navy and the Russian 
navy before it. Penzin implied that the new missile 
weapons have further 'reduced in scope the old framework 
in which the form of conflict used to fit'; in particular 
the former requirement for numerical superiority and 
1 
subsequent supremacy at sea. 
However, he warned of the dangers inherent ln 'the 
overstatement of capabilities' by 'enthusiastic adherents' 
of new technologies and weapons 'who at times go to 
extremes in evaluating them' and invoked not only 'the 
very nature of armed conflict' but the •universal 
dialectical law', 'the law of unity' and 'the conflict of 
opposites' to suggest that 
The development of a means of protection against 
every effective offensive medium begins 
immediately upon the appearance of the latter. 2 
This would have been little more than an interesting 
internal debate within the Navy were it not for the fact 
that the naval radicals received now, as they had in the 
past, the blessing of the party and the rest of the armed 
forces concerned at the cost of any attempt to emulate 
the major naval powers. If 
radicals' were correct then 
Panteleyev and 'the naval 
it would be possible to achieve 
the operational requirements of the navy relatively 
1 
"b"d :t J_ ., p.43. 
2 Penzin, K.V. Capt. lst Rank, 'Changes in the method and 
forms of armed conflicts at sea', Morskoy Sbornik, No.7, 
1966, U.S. Navy trans. p.4l. 
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inexpensively by utilising missiles on a relatively small 
number of surface ships, submarines and naval aircraft. 
The frugality of the party and the armed services 
vis-a-vis the navy's requirements up to 1968 requires no 
further evidence than the slowness of introduction to the 
navy of even that equipment required for a neo young 
school strategy; nuclear powered submarines and missiles. 
One representative offering from a non naval officer 
will suffice - 'A small fleet may be said to have become 
equal in the power of its armament with the large ships 
of the line', so that 
Now ... one torpedo boat is capable of destroying 
or putting completely out of action any large 
surface ship, even an aircraft carrier, with one 
or two torpedoes.l 
If this was accepted then the investment of funds 1n 
aircraft carriers and other large surface vessels was 
clearly superfluous. 
The position of those who would argue against such a 
party sanctioned line was unenviable, particularly if they 
also occupied high ranking positions in the Soviet Navy. 
Of necessity, the Party and Government had to be lauded 
for its role. Thus, 
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government 
display wise judgement in taking all necessary 
measures to have the armament and organisation 
of our navy correspond to its increased role 
in the country's defence and in the protection 
of its state interests.2 
Moreover the Commander in Chief had to consider the 
morale of his officers and men. He could hardly 
explicitly cry woe over the state of his service, 
particularly on public occasions such as Navy Day addresses. 
1 Derevyanko, Col. P.M. 'Changes in the armed forces and 
their operations' from The Revolution in Warfare - Its 
Nature, JPRS SMT No. 386, p.ll. See also Cherednichenko 
and Sokolovsky. 
2 Gorshkov, S.G. 'The great tasks of the Soviet Navy' 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 February 1963, FBIS, USSR National 
Affairs, 14 February 1963, p.cci. 
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Hence the frequent claims that 'the Soviet Union is a 
great maritime Power• and that 'the Soviet Navy now has 
everything necessary to beat back any aggression•. 1 
Gorshkov himself may have been influenced momentarily 
by the argument that the qualitative changes in the fleet 
had offset any quantitative disadvantage it may face 
vis-a-vis the most likely potential enemy. The Pravda 
article for the 1962 Navy Day celebrations stated, 
The might of the navy is now determined in the 
first place not by the number of pennants, but 
by the quality of vessels, by their being 
equipped with modern military technology and 
weapons. 
The Soviet Navy is at present more modern than 
the navy of any capitalist country.2 
In February 1963 Gorshkov significantly modified his 
previously expressed view in a more restricted outlet, 
the military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda 
It must be noted that today the might of the 
navy is determined not only by the number of 
vessels but also by the combat properties of 
the ships and aircraft and by their being 
equipped with perfect technology and weapons.3 
In February 1967 Gorshkov attempted to refute the 
claims of the neo young school or 'the naval radicals'. 
Firstly, he ridiculed the defensive orientation, the young 
school philosophies and the basic training of the Soviet 
1 From Gorshkov's Address on Navy Day 1965. BBC SWB 
SU/1920/C/14 and an interview with the Admiral of .the 
Fleet V. Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of 
the Soviet Navy, Tass in Russian for abroad 12.27 and 
in English 12.31 GMT 20 July 1965, BBC SWB SU/1916/B/l. 
2 Moscow domestic service in Russian 0100 GMT 29 July 
1962, FBIS U.S.S.R. National Affairs 30 July 1962, 
p.cc/22-23. 
3 Gorshkov, 'The great tasks of the Soviet Navy•, 
p.cc/2. 
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Navy ln the immediate post war 
attacked the present neo-young 
1 
era,and by implication 
school adherents who also 
advocated a defensive strategy carried out by a small 
number of units. Then he advanced the claim that: 
In the mid fifties, in connection with the 
revolution in military affairs, (which at 
this time had not advanced beyond the growing 
awareness that nuclear weapons had made nonsense 
of most of Stalinist military doctrine) the 
Central Committee of our Party defined the path 
of fleet development, as well as the fleet's 
role and place in the system of Armed Forces 
in the country. The course taken was one which 
required the construction of an ocean going 
fleet, capable of carrying out offensive 
strategic missions. Submarines and naval 
aviation, equipped with nuclear weapons, had 
a leading place in the program.2 
Now although the new course may have •required the 
construction of an ocean going fleet• there is no evidence 
that this requirement was 
the mid l950s 1 or arguably 
met in decisions originating ln 
at any stage since then. In 
1967 at least this was still an on-going requirement. Of 
course the Soviet fleet can and increasingly does go to 
sea in times of peace and even in times of international 
tension. Whether any but its SSBNs could remain there in 
times of conflict is however a different matter. Lacking 
sea based air cover it must be vulnerable to attack from 
1 
'As a result of the strengthening of defensive tendencies 
there was in the practice of combat training, a natural 
attempt to have own forces operate so as to cause enemy 
warships to enter the minefields, and to put them in an 
unfavourable position for carrying on the battle, and 
then to use torpedo boats, aviation, shipboard and shore 
artillery, to destroy these forces. Of course, operations 
such as these could take place ... But this undeviating 
attempt to conduct every engagement with surface ships 
by launching the main strike in our own coastal waters, 
and mandatorily by the various types of fleet forces in 
an area designated in advance, and often in the same 
identical area could not be justified.• 
Gorshkov, 'The development of Soviet naval science•, 
p.l4-l5. 
2 ibid., p.l9 emphasis added. 
the air and,with the exception of its SSBNs 1would be 
very hard pressed to carry out offensive strategic 
missions,except within the range of shore based air 
cover. 
Gorshkov 's navy circa 1967 failed to me.et his 
requirements. No amount of assertion could hide the 
fact that 'our ocean going fleet', that 'qualitatively 
new type of Armed Force' in which •submarine forces, 
aviation, surface warships and other types of forces 
developed harmoniously\ still remained an aspiration. 
What was important however was that this aspiration in 
itself was of a qualitatively different kind from the 
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views of the naval radicals. It involved the desire for 
'a balanced Navy, capable of successfully conducting 
combat operations under differing circumstances' as 
opposed to Kharlamov's navy comprising nuclear submarines, 
and naval aviation armed with nuclear rockets in which 
surface vessels play a 
capacity for offensive 
marginal role. It implied a 
strategic missions as opposed to 
Kharlamov's essentially submarine-oriented defensive 
requirements. Finally it implied a capability to sustain 
itself on the oceans; it was to be an •ocean-going 
fleet' rather than an updated version of the prewar 
mosquito fleet. 
And Gorshkov went further, for his well balanced 
fleet was to be one 
which, in composition and armament is capable 
of carrying out missions assigned it, not only 
in a nuclear war, but in a war in which nuclear 
weapons are not used, and is also able to 
support state interests at sea in peacetime.l 
the latter mission being almost impossible for a submarine-
aviation fleet, except in the context of strategic 
deterrence. 
1 
"b"d ~ l. • ' p.l9, f/n l. 
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Operational Tasks 1967 
The general war requirements of the Soviet Navy as 
noted by Soviet naval and military writers, and the 
Soviet Navy's ability to meet those requirements, have 
been fully covered by R.W. Herrick in his Soviet Naval 
Strategy1 for the period of the mid to late 1960s. 
The Role of Strategic Strike Force 
Herrick found the threat posed to the continental 
United States by the Soviet SLBM fleet to have been 
exaggerated,given the presence in the Soviet fleet of 
only nine SSBNs armed with three 650 mile missiles each. 
(The utility of the conventional FBMS, 7 Z conversions 
and 22 G class, must be open to considerable doubt as is 
evidence by the fact that the Z class submarines retained 
their complement of two SS-N-4 missiles, range 350 miles, 
and only half of the G class have been converted to take 
the 650 mile SS-N-5). 2 Moreover he concluded that these 
submarines were not intended for use in a first strike 
capacity,and demonstrated the low priority apparently 
afforded these vessels. (No new SSBNs entered service 
within the period 1962/3 - 1967). 3 Their technological 
inferiority, (to the U.S. Navy's Polaris boats), and the 
noise of their propulsion units together with the elaborate 
offshore and forward ASW systems of the United States 
suggested that the NATO forces could expect a relatively 
high degree of success in anti-submarine operations. 4 
1 Herrick, R.W., Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of 
Theory and Practice. United States Naval Institute, 
Annapolis, Maryland, 1968, especially Chapter 8, 'NATO 
versus Soviet Missions' and Chapter 9, 'Major Tasks and 
Capabilities'. Besides noting his conclusions it is not 
intended to duplicate his research, particularly as my 
own independent research in this regard produced almost 
identical conclusions. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, p.536. 
3 For construction details see Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, 
p.534-536. 
4 Herrick, op.cit., p.l23-131. 
These apposite observations should not however 
obscure the fact that the Navy aspired to upgrade the 
importance of its SLBM forces both numerically and in 
comparison with the ICBMs of the Strategic Rocket 
Troops, initially at least in the face of opposition 
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from the other services. Thus the authors of Military 
Strategy indicated that 'the need may arise for missions 
to deliver nuclear missile strikes on coastal targets' . 1 
This formulation remained unchanged in the subsequent 
editions of this important volume2 and remained the only 
mention of this topic under the general heading 'Military 
operations in naval theatres•. 
Admiral Alafuzov 1 s review of the first edition of 
Military Strategy observed, by way of an additional 
notation that the authors 'should have pointed to the 
advantages of nuclear missile firing submarines (in 
carrying out strikes against coastal targets)•. 3 He 
apparently found no quarrel with the view that in 
operations designed to 
1 
undermine the military capacity of the imperialist 
coalition by destroying its nuclear weapons, and 
to destroy its military and economic potential by 
destroying the economic war base and the govern-
mental and military system of control (the main 
weapons are) Strategic Missile Forces equipped 
with intercontinental and intermediate range 
missiles carrying powerful thermonuclear and 
atomic warheads, and also the Long Range Air 
Force armed with missile carrying nuclear 
warheads. 4 
Sokolovsky, V.D., ed., Military Strategy, first edition 
translated for RAND Corporation by Dinerstein, Gou.re & 
Wolfe. (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963) p.420. 
2 Military Strategy, Second and Third editions, translated 
for the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace by 
H.F. Scott, p.308. 
3 Alafuzov, 'On the appearance of the work Military 
Str a tegz', Mor skoy Sbornik, No. 1, 1963, translated by 
G. Jukes. 
4 Military Strategy, Rili~D translation p.408. 
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The second edition of Sokolovsky extended this list 
to include •rocket carrying submarines•. 1 However it 
i 
would appear that these had but a secondary role to play 
in the achievement of strategic goals. As a senior ai~ 
force officer put it 
Strategic Rocket Troops are the main branch of 
the Armed Forces insofar as their nuclear rocket 
power cannot be replaced by any of the other 
branches. In addition, rocket carrying submarines 
have their own advantages since nuclear strikes by 
them can be successfully employed in coordination 
with nuclear strikes by other branches.2 
The interesting feature of naval pronouncements on 
SLBM systems throughout the first half of 1960s was the 
growing assertiveness of claims made regarding their 
capabilities. 
Admiral Grishanov, Chief of Political Administration, 
claimed on Navy Day 1964 
Long range rockets of our submarine fleet can be 
launched underwater and with their nuclear 
warheads can hit not only the naval forces of 
the enemy, but also targets well inside the 
territory of the aggressor.3 
These claims were greatly exaggerated if taken as 
referring to then current capability. The SS-N-5 missile 
had a maximum range of 650 miles,which in comparison with 
the Polaris A-1, (range 1,200 miles) let alone the Polaris. 
A-3 (range 2,500 miles),hardly justified the description 
long range. The assertion that Soviet SLBMs possessed an 
underwater launch capability can be traced back to Soviet 
I 
1 Scott, H.F., translation, p.293 .. 
2 Sbytov, 'The character and concepts of a worlyt-wic;ie 
nuclear rocket war•, p.l3. 
3 Admiral ~3rishanov, Chief of Political Adrni:clistra,tion, 
Moscow hom•e service 7. 30 GMT 26 July 1964, BBC SwB 
USSR/1616/28 July 19.64, p.c/4. 
press reports of Khrushchev's visit to the Northern 
Fleet area in July 1962. 1 Despite the continued 
appearance of these assertions the retrofitting of the 
362 
H class SSBN with SS-N-5 missiles was not completed until 
1967. The claimed ability to hit targets •well inside the 
territory of the enemy• was a significant departure from 
the view expressed in Military Strategy that submarine 
missiles were for use only against coastal targets. 
The potential of the SLBM was attracting increasing 
attention not only within the Navy but among the political 
and military leadership. Gorshkov had claimed early in 
1963 that in the event of a future war 
We (the Navy) must be prepared to reply with 
crushing blows on naval and land targets over 
the entire area of the world's oceans.2 
Admiral Grishanov, Chief of Political Administration 
in the Navy, whose views were cited above, reflected the 
newly emerging party sanctioned line. Admiral Sergeyev 
noted that nuclear powered submarines could •strike vitally 
important land targets on enemy territory at great range• 3 
and in a Navy Day 1965 interview Kasatonov, Deputy 
Commander in Chief of the Navy, claimed the SLBM as the 
main striking force of the navy and suggested that this 
4 had increased the role of the navy in any future war. 
Premier Kosygin's observation that the striking power of 
the fleet had been greatly increased by rocket armaments 
suggested a governmental upgrading of the role of SLBMs 
11 The Navy's modern weapons were used in the manoeuvres. 
Shots were fired by missile armed surface vessels and by 
submarines armed with nuclear missiles, which launched 
their rockets from underwater positions•. Pravda and 
Izvestia, 22 July 1962, p.l trans £Q§P Vol. 14, No. 29, 
p.23. 
2 
'The great tasks of the Soviet Navy•, p.cc/2. Gorshkov, 
3 Sergeyev, 'The Navy of a great power•, p.6. 
4 Kasatonov, 'Soviet Naval Strength', Tass in Russian 
for abroad 12.27 in English 12.31 GMT 20 July 1965 BBC 
SWB SU/1916/B/l. 
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in any future conflict. 1 
The final seal of approval from the remainder of the 
Armed Forces was conferred on the SLBM system during the 
Marshal Malinovsky address to the 23rd Party Congress: 
Along with Strategic Rocket Forces, we have 
created during these years an underwater rocket 
armed fleet which is able to fulfill strategic 
missions destroying enemy objectives both on 
sea and land. It includes new atomic missile 
carrying submarines armed with ballistic rockets 
having underwater launch capability and great 
range.2 
The Navy appeared anxious not only to have the 
capabilities of the SLBM system recognised but to press 
for the recognition of its status as at least equivalent 
to the land-based ICBMs of the Strategic Rocket Forces, 
if not their superior. 
(A)t the present time missile submarines, 
achieving strategic results with their strikes, 
may exert a decisive effect on the course and 
outcome of a war ... (T)he resolution of a 
number of operational and strategic missions 
formerly delegated to bomber aviation, to 
carrier task forces and to ground missile units 
can now be assigned to nuclear missile armed 
submarines.3 
These views are attributed to the •military specialists 
of the large naval powers' and to 'American military 
figures' who •openly proclaimed submarines as the most 
important means of strategic attack• 4 but there can be 
little doubt that such claims were viewed favourably by 
Soviet naval leaders. 
1 
'One of the most powerful forms of armament are our 
rocket carrying submarines; the territory of any potential 
enemy of our country is within reach of their powerful 
rockets', Kosygin Navy Day Address at Baltiysk Moscow 
home service 17.30 GMT 24 July 1965 BBC SWB SU/1920/C/6. 
2 Malinovsky: Address to the XXIII Congress CPSU, in 
Kintner and Scott, op.cit., p.283. 
3 Nikolayev, P.V. Capt. lst Rank, 'Problems pertaining 
to the detection and destruction of missile armed nuclear 
submarines'. Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1965, JPRS SMT 
No. 184, p.21-2. 
4 
.b.d ~ ~ ., p.22. 
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Admiral Kharlamov claimed •the role of the navy is 
increasing among the other branches of the services• 1 and 
that the navies of the United States, Britain and France 
were shifting into •the first echelon of strategic assault 
forces. •2 He clearly implied that this pattern should be 
emulated in the USSR. 
After stating, 
submarines, the most important elements of the 
navy ... are competing for the role of the most 3 important carriers of strategic nuclear weapons. 
Kharlamov cited the then United States Secretary of Defense, 
Mr. McNamara, as advocating 
that missile armed submarines, because of their 
mobility and concealment, are virtually impossible 
to intercept, and are therefore more reliable than 
batteries of intercontinental misslles (lncluding 
missiles in underground silos).4 
By 1967, the year the first Y class SSBN became 
operational, Gorshkov claimed: 
With the Strategic Missile Forces the Navy had 
become the most important weapon the Supreme 
Command had, one which could exert a decisive 
influence on the course of an armed struggle ln 
theatres of military operations of vast extent.5 
Gorshkov, phrasing his claims in the past tense, was 
clearly being misleading. Nonetheless he undoubtedly 
knew of the forthcoming Y class boats,with their 16 
SS-N-6 1,350 mile range missiles,and must have been aware 
of the planning that was to result in the D class. His 
claim foreshadowed a situation which although yet to 
emerge was clearly in sight. The institutional confirmation 
of the Navy's upgraded role was not to emerge until 1973 
1 Kharlamov, op.cit., p.7. 
2 ibid.' p.7. 
3 ibid. ' p.9. 
4 ibid. ' p.9, emphasis added. 
5 Gorshkov, 'The Development of Soviet Naval Science•, 
p.l9, emphasis added. 
with the appointment of Admiral S.M. Lobov to the post 
of Assistant Chief of the General Staff. 1 
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In the task of achieving an upgraded status for the 
SLBM Gorshkov shared common ground with the naval radicals. 
Not only did they have a common appreciation of the 
importance of the SLBM but they also showed an aspiration 
for equality, to say no more, with the Strategic Rocket 
Troops. 
The Suppression of NATO ASW 
Where there must have been ground for conflict was 
over the problem of ensuring that the SSBNs should be able 
to bring their missi~ to bear. The United States' 
abilities in the field of underwater surveillance were 
well known among Soviet Navy circles, as was the fact 
that ASW zones were maintained across the relatively 
narrow channels which Soviet submarines had to transit 
to gain access to the high seas. 2 
In the Atlantic the following anti-submarine zones 
were identified: 
1 
'Soviet Generals Show New Style', New York Times, 23 
April 1973, p.l. Lobov had been the Commander of the 
Northern Fleet since 1964 and is acknowledged as an expert 
on nuclear submarines - a specialisation which accounts 
for his inclusion in this former preserve of the Ground 
Force Officers. 
2 
. l "t f t f See N1ko ayev, op.c1 ., or a contemporary accoun o 
the USN's ASW technology, particularly as it relates to 
detection systems. 
Gavrilov, F. Captain 3rd Rank, 'Fearing Retribution', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 January 1966 JPRS SMT No. 228, p. l-4 
details NATO ASW zones. - 'anti-submarine vessels, 
submarines and aircraft are constantly to patrol the 
zones which are to be equipped with stationary hydro-
acoustic detection systems. 
Gavrilov, op.cit., p.l. 'Carrier-borne search and attack 
groups (CSAG) are assigned a conspicuous role in the 
execution of these missions ... (T)he CSAG consists of 
several squadrons of destroyers and destroyer escorts, 
and an anti-submarine aircraft carrier with aircraft and 
helicopters aboard. 
Spitzbergen - Northern Norway; Greenland -
Southwestern Norway; Newfoundland -
Gibraltar as well as alo~g the US Atlantic 
coast. 1 
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In the Pacific region zones between 'The Aleutian and 
Hawaiian Islands and along the Pacific Coast of the 
United States' were identified, while the exits from the 
Sea of Japan were recognised as potential choke points. 2 
The description of NATO ASW exercises along these 
barriers suggested a lively awareness of the difficulties 
facing nuclear powered submarines in achieving undetected 
access to waters close enough to the United States to 
bring the SLBMs to bear against land targets. The problem 
was posed all the more starkly by the continued Soviet 
practice of deploying very few SSBNs on sustained peace-
time patrol. The position of the conventionally powered 
vessels must have been widely recognised as untenable in 
such an environment. 
The destruction of the vessels and aircraft patrolling 
these zones demanded the attention of Soviet naval planners 
charged with allocating forces to carry out wartime 
missions. To achieve this goal against the forces 
maintaining the patrols, let alone any reinforcements they 
might receive, would, of necessity, involve a force 
capable of attacking a well prepared and powerful enemy 
group equipped with strong ASW forces, carrier based 
aircraft suitable for surveillance and combat roles, and 
surface ships. 
Such an offensive mission would require Gorshkov•s 
'ocean going fleet' consisting of 'submarine forces, 
aviation (and) surface warships'. That ~sa fleet force 
capable of denying these zones to enemy ASW forces and 
maintaining a secure control over the zones until the 
l .. d 2 ~b~ ., p .• 
and 'Artemis' 
2 
.b.d 3 ~ ~ . ' p. . 
Particular mention is made of the 'Caesar' 
detection systems. 
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completio~ of hostilities. As Herrick has pointed out, 
the ability to maintain reliable control in areas over 
150 miles from Soviet occupied territory was beyond the 
capability of the Soviet Navy. Outside that range the 
requisite protective air cover could not be guaranteed. 
Countering Sea Based Nuclear Weapons Systems 
The task of countering sea based nuclear weapons 
systems has been acknowledged by both military and naval 
spokesmen as the primary task of the Navy in any future 
general war situation. Herrick's assessment that the 
Soviet Navy had little possibility of success, particularly 
against the SLBM systems, despite the bland assertions to 
l 
the contrary, was well based. 
If we discount assertions of SSBNs vulnerability, 
and leave in abeyance the claims that attacks by the 
Strategic Rocket Forces on navigation and communication 
stations, together with saturation strikes in areas of 
probable deployment, could cripple the Polaris system, 
there were two alternative Soviet naval strategies for 
countering the SLBM. 
Both start with the premise: 
The main actions of the enemy navies in a 
contemporary global war will be conducted 
not in the internal seas, but in the ocean 
theatres. 2 
One view asserted the necessity for control of the sea 
while the other devised a solution based on submarine 
battles. 
l 
Herrick, op.cit., p.94-8 and 109-22. 
2 
Lomov, N.: •Fundamental Tenets of Soviet Military 
Doctrine: the Revolution in Military Affairs, its 
significance and consequences'. Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 
January 1964, cited R.W. Herrick, op.cit., p.llO. 
See also Military Strateg)!:, RAND p.420. 'The World's 
Oceans may prove to be military theatres'; and 
Alafuzov•s review, op.cit., 'The World's Oceans will 
prove to be military theatres'. 
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Captain P.V. Nikolayev examined •the problem of 
destroying the main striking force at sea - which lS 
the nuclear missile armed submarine' on the basis of 
the views of foreign military specialists and concluded: 
operations aimed at the detection and 
destruction of nuclear powered submarines 
(before they can launch their missiles) 
presupposes control over all the routes 
they follow: from the bases to possible 
missile launch areas. Because of the fact 
that submarine search areas at sea are vast, 
the speed of underwater missile carriers is 
great, while the range of the anti-submarine 
tracking devices is comparatively limited, 
large forces and considerable means will be 
required for the successful detection of 
targets.l 
The proposed •control over all the routes they follow' was 
an inconceivable task for the Soviet Navy, particularly as 
the SSBNs of the NATO navies do not have to pass through 
narrow seas to reach launch areas from which the Soviet 
Union can be brought under attack. Nikolayev's 'solution' 
implied the ability to maintain, in the face of heavy 
opposition, control over almost the entire North Atlantic 
and North Pacific Oceans, the Mediterranean and perhaps 
the North-West Indian Ocean as well. 
that, 
The assertion of the authors of Milita.ry Strategy 
Homing missiles launched by submarines and 
surface ships are an effective weapon against 
missile carrying nuclear submarines. 2 
1 Nikolayev, P.V. Capt. lst Rank: 'Problems pertaining to 
the Detection and Destruction of Missile Armed Nuclear 
Submarines'. Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2 1965, JPRS SMT 
No. 184, p.26, and later; '(T)he struggle against nuclear 
missile-armed submarines under present conditions becomes 
one of the most important tasks confronting the navies, a 
task that will have to be resolved by the warring sides 
on the broad expanses of the ocean'. 
2 Military Strategx, RAND, p.409. 
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not only indicates that: 'the indisputable fact that 
nuclear submarines will operate only when submerged was 
not taken into consideration•, 1 as Alafuzov pointed out, 
but it assumed that the surface ships and missile 
launching submarines would be capable of operating freely 
in waters 
1,100 miles from the coast, especially in 
the Arctic Ocean, the Northern Seas, the 
north eastern.Atlantic and the western 
Pacific.2 
Military Strategy also noted 
The nuclear submarine is a formidable underwater 
vessel. Consequently, armed combat in the naval 
theatres may take the form of underwater 
operations.3 
The role of nuclear powered submarines which 
'successfully combine such features as stealthy approach, 
mobility, unlimited cruising range and tremendous striking 
power' in coping 'in full measure with battle missions 
against the surface and underwater striking forces' of the 
4 
enemy was frequently noted. However, here was another 
clear case of naval aspiration outrunning naval capability. 
The thirteen N class submarines, if used as hunter killer 
submarines, could not guarantee the destruction of the US' 
Polaris fleet. Not only were there too few of them, but 
the vessels, because of the great number of free flood 
holes in their hull casings and problems with the first 
l f . Ala uzov, op.clt., p.94. 
2 Military Strategy, RAND, p.422. The authors of Military 
Strategy were aware of the development of the longer range 
Polaris A-2 and A-3 missiles, which they cite as having 
ranges of 1,500 miles and 2,500 miles respectively. They 
note that this increase in range 'considerably increases 
the combat potential of these submarines and makes them 
less vulnerable to shore-based anti-submarine weapons•. 
ibid.' p.l74. 
3 ibid., p.422. 
4 Gorshkov, S.G., 'Naval might of Soviet Power', p.4. and 6. 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'The 23rd Congress of the CPSU and the 
Tasks of Navymen', p.6. 
Sergeyev, 'The Navy of a Great Power•, p.6. 
370 
generation propulsion units, were very noisy. 1 
The N class was produced in the period 1958-63 and 
no equivalent submarine appeared until the V class first 
joined the fleet in 1967-8. (This class has since been 
building at the rate of two per year, suggesting that the 
Soviets have preferred to allocate most of the naval 
nuclear reactor systems to missile firing submarines: 
SSGN in 1963-1967 and SSBN subsequently). It clearly 
indicates that the Soviet Navy has not been able to 
convince the Ministry of Defence of the importance it 
appears to attach to nuclear submarines in the anti-
Polaris role. 
Soviet statements on the vulnerability of large 
surface ships, including aircraft carriers, are legion. 
The US Navy's attack carriers were alleged to belong to 
the 'yesterday of navies' and to have 'outlived their 
age'. 'It has become vulnerable: in a nuclear war it 
will no longer be able to play a decisive role ~n sea 
actions' . 2 Yet despite these assertions the task of 
eliminating the .attack aircraft carriers remained 'a .most 
important 
inflict. 
3 task' because 
The peacetime 
of the immense damage 
forward deployment of 
they could 
the Soviet 
Navy into areas where the aircraft carriers were not only 
present 1 but also within striking range of the Soviet Union, 
represented a post 1963-4 solution to the problem of 
countering the carriers in the early stages of general 
war. It is in this context that the admonitions to remain 
on constant alert are frequently pressed. If the surface 
missile ships and cruise missile submarines remain within 
1 . . . 1 Janes F~ght~ng Sh~ps 973-4, p.542. 
Siegfried Breyer: Guide to the Soviet Nav~, USNI 
Annapolis 1970, p.l58. It was art N class submarine 
which sank at the beginning of the Okean exercises in 
1970 suggesting that there may have been other problems 
with these vessels . 
2 Sokolovsky and 
3 ibid., p.l8. 
Cherednichenko, op.cit., p.l8. 
firing distance of the carriers during peacetime they 
have the possibility of launching a successful 'first 
salvo' against the carriers during the initial stages 
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of a general war. If the 'first salvo• could be launched 
prior to the aircraft take-off then the threat from the 
carriers can be eliminated. Yet until the aftermath of 
the June 1967 war, when facilities were made available 
in Egyptian ports, the Soviets could maintain only a 
relatively small force in the Mediterranean to carry out 
this task - a force in keeping with the expressed views 
of Admiral Kharlamov: 
In order to launch such a strike (the first 
strike), it is no longer necessary to re-deploy 
large forces from various directions and 
concentrate them in the combat area, creating 
powerful groupings with bulky combat formations 
which are difficult to control. It is possible 
to destroy any naval grouping at sea, within a 
very short time, by employing relatively small 
groups of vessels armed with long range nuclear 
missiles which can be deployed in advance in 
certain areas.l 
What Kharlamov did not examine were the requirements 
for a successful strike against a carrier task force 
moving into a launch area under 
nuclear war. Such a task force, 
conditions of general 
covered by protective 
ASW and anti-aircraft screens,as well as airborne early 
warning systems, can detect enemy vessels in the area so 
that active defence measures may be taken against them. 
The possibility of launching a surprise first strike from 
a surfaced submarine under these conditions must be rated 
low, particularly when the requirements for mid-flight 
guidance are taken into account. What is required is not 
'small groups of vessels ... deployed in advance in certain 
areas' but an offensive force capable of suppressing the 
enemy's defences. As Admiral Petrov pointed out: 
1 Kharlamov, op.cit., p.9. Emphasis added. 
Under modern conditions under-evaluation of 
the need to suppress the enemy's defences is 
dangerous as is under-evaluation of the 
capabilities of new means for attack. There 
exists the opinion that modern aircraft, atomic 
submarines, and surface ships which use long 
range rockets are capable of destroying main 
enemy targets without suppressing his defences 
beforehand. We think in some cases this might 
actually be so, but in other cases it is hardly 
possible. 
Modern anti-air defense of ships (convoys) (also 
task forces) at sea is effective at great ranges, 
and the means for effecting such defense make it 
possible to destroy aircraft and the rockets 
which they fire, as well as the rockets which 
are fired by other forces (surface ships or 
submarines). 
Modern anti-submarine defense of ships (convoys) 
at sea is also characterised by great range, and 
the forces used are characterised by great 
effectiveness.l 
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The Soviet Union possessed the capability of over-
coming these forces, of •attaining the strategic goals 
of the struggle at sea with a powerful enemy• 2 within a 
mere 150 miles or at the most 300 miles from its coast. 
Outside these limits torpedo and cruise missile armed 
submarines could attempt to launch strikes at carrier 
task forces,in conjunction with naval aviation, which 
had sufficient range to participate in a strike, but 
without the continuous air cover essential to protect 
the surface fleet or surfaced submarines. 
A Soviet naval writer credited the carrier based 
aircraft with a range of 1,625 miles (2,600 kilometres), 3 
an admission that the carriers need not approach the 
strongly defended coastal waters to launch an attack. 
1 Petrov, B.F., 'The Essence and Nature of Modern Naval 
Warfare•, p.29. 
2 Gorshkov, 'The Development of Soviet Naval Science', p.20. 
3 Mamayev, Ye, Capt. lst Rank, 'Studies on the Element of 
Surprise'. Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 August 1966. Translated as 
'Soviet Estimate of Western War Plans', JPRS SMT No. 318, 
p.46. 
Little wonder then that the 1966 Navy Day article in 
Morskoy Sbornik, after noting that the world oceans 
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were becoming 'a vast arena containing the launch points 
for highly mobile, secretive carriers of strategic 
missiles, and for mobile aircraft carrier forces', claimed 
that: 
... the struggle with the main forces of the 
enemy fleet is, for our Armed Forces, taking on 
immeasurably greater s1gn1f1cance than it had 
in any of the past wars. 
The main content, and the main purpose, of this 
struggle will be to destroy an aggressor's strike 
forces in the shortest space of time and to 
eliminate his ability to deliver his nuclear 
strikes from the sea. It is for this purpose 
that the Soviet Union, in addition to its other 
branches of the Armed Forces, must have a strong 
ocean-going fleet.l 
This amounts to an admission of the fact that 
countering sea-based nuclear weapons systems was not only, 
or perhaps even primarily, a task for the Navy. As in 
other broad strategic missions the Navy had a contribution 
to make to the accomplishment of the task, in this case to 
sink aircraft carriers on forward deployment and to do 
battle with carrier reinforcements before they reached 
launch zones. However, it was only a contributing role 
in a mission in which other services play important parts. 
It is noteworthy that the important mission against 
carrier reinforcements, one in which the Navy could expect 
to play a major role, was arguably beyond the capacity of 
the Navy as it existed in 1967. 
Briefly, the other branches of the armed forces 
concerned included the air defence force, the anti-aircraft 
and anti-missile forces and the Strategic Rocket Troops, 
the latter being called on to destroy submarines and 
. f . h . b 2 a1rcra t carr1ers at t e1r ases. 
1 
'The Soviet People's Naval Holiday', Morskoy Sbornik, 
Np. 7, 1966, US Navy trans. p.4. Emphasls added. 
2 See R.W. Herrick, 'The USSR's Blue Belt of Defense 
Concept: A Unified Military Plan for Defense against 
Seaborne Nuclear Attack by Strike Carriers and Polaris/ 
Poseidon SSBNs'. Professional Paper No. 111, May 1973. 
Center for Naval Analyses. 
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The Downgrading of the Anti Sloe Mission 
There appears to be a degree of unanimity, between 
the naval radicals and Gorshkov, that operations against 
enemy SLOC were not likely to be of great importance in 
a future war, whereas the authors of Military Strategy 
saw the anti-SLOC role as one of the main tasks of the 
Navy from the very beginning of a future war. 1 Filonov 
observed 
in the initial, and most intensive, period of 
the war there may develop an environment which 
will exclude the possibility of organising 
strategic military and commerical shipments by 
sea. 
The NATO powers were establishing 'the necessary armament 
and strategic raw material reserves right in the probable 
theatres of war for the entire initial period of the war•. 
Moreover, 'air transportation is planned for the transfer 
of military forces and units from the rear areas to the 
front'. Hence, 
the sea lanes will be of no real significance in 
the initial phase of a general thermonuclear war 
in the contemporary environment and consequently, 
combat operations to disrupt or to provide inter-
continental transportation may be only of an 
auxiliary nature within the framework of other 
missions executed by naval forces. 2 
Gorshkov noted that in the immediate post-war period when 
the 'imperialists' attempted to encircle the countries of 
the socialist camp, 'the disruption of the ocean lines of 
communication ... continued to be one of the most important 
of the fleet's missions• 3 but made no further reference to 
this mission when discussing the important missions of the 
fleet in contemporary circumstances. He continues to 
l RAND, p.420. 
2 Filonov, S.J., Capt. 1st Rank, 'Armed Conflict and 
Communications by Sea', p.32-3; see also Panteleyev, 
op.cit., p.24-6, and Kharlamov, op.cit., p.ll, for 
similar conclusions. 
3 Gorshkov, 'The development of Soviet naval science•, 
p.l6. Emphasis added. 
mention the disruption of enemy SLOC in subsequent 
articles but this is neither consistent nor,when 
mentioned,does it appear as a major task. 1 
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If the anti-SLOC mission had been demoted in 
importance in a nuclear missile war (and no other type of 
war involving the Soviet Union and the United States was 
envisaged), then the conditions which brought this about 
were held to give the coastal lines of communication (CLOC) 
'a completely unique significance in a nuclear missile 
war'. Nuclear strikes would disrupt land communications, 
leaving only coastal shipping utilising small harbours and 
coves to provide for the necessary movement of reinforce-
ments and material. 2 
The protection of own CLOC was therefor e given great 
.. ..~ 
importance. The Soviet Navy could expect to protect its 
coast-hugging maritime transports which would operate 
precisely within the zone where the full brunt of Soviet 
naval might could be brought to bear, under a continuous 
air cover, against enemy submarines, naval aviation and 
surface vessels. 
Granted that the •at sea' part of the anti-SLOC role 
was likely to be of secondary importance, opinions 
differed as to how it should be achieved. The authors of 
Military Strategy looked to 'the destruction of convoys 
and transports at sea by submarines and aircraft' and 
called for 'the flexible use of nuclear submarines' while 
observing 'diesel-electric submarines will obviously be 
used against lines of communication•. 3 
1 
e.g. 'It (the Navy) has to carry out a wide range of 
tasks. It strikes at ground targets on enemy territory 
and fights his naval forces at sea. It disrupts ocean 
and sea-going transport, defends our coastlines and so on'. 
Gorshkov, 'On the high seas and oceans', Pravda, 
14 February 1968. Translation in the files of IISS, 
London. 
2 Filonov, op.cit., p.33-4. 
3 Military Strategy, lst edition, RAND, p.423 and 2nd 
and 3rd editions H.S. Scott, p. 3•1 Apparently the 
same nuclear submarines that were to do battle with the 
enemy's SSBNs. 
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Admiral Alafuzov noted that, counter to the opinions 
of the contributors to Military Strategy, Germany, which 
had relied on submarines, had been unsuccessful in its 
efforts to completely sever enemy SLOC. 
position in both wars indicates: 
Indeed, the 
he who had the strongest surface fleet controlled 
the maritime communications and he who did not 
was deprived of his maritime communications from 
the very start.l 
For Alafuzov success ln anti-SLOC role (he does not 
declare himself on the issue of the importance to be 
attached to it), required a balance of surface vessels, 
submarines and naval aviation,capable of achieving that 
degree of supremacy at sea which the Germans were never 
able to assert,but which the Americans achieved in the 
Pacific during World War II. 
Filonov, an exponent of the view that anti-SLOC 
missions had lost their significance in determining the 
outcome of a future war, went on to imply that this 
reduced the importance of attempting to gain control of 
the sea. The principle of •superiority at sea•, according 
to Filonov, was originated and formulated during the 
course of wars which,in the past,had been fought for 'the 
right to unlimited control over the sea lanes•. 2 To gain 
this control it was necessary to create 'large naval 
forces in order to gain control of the lines of 
communication• . 3 Given that this control was no longer 
essential then that 'supremacy at sea' required to maintain 
control of the sea lanes had also lost its significance. 
What was required was a naval force capable of protecting 
the CLOC, the significance of which had greatly increased. 
1 Alafuzov, op.cit., p.95. Rear Admiral Petrov 
battle with a convoy there is no possibility of 
the transports without suppressing the defences 
convoy 1 • 
noted 'in 
destroying 
of the 
Petrov, B.F. 'The Essence and Nature of Modern Naval 
Warfare•, p.28. 
2 Filonov, op.cit., p.26. 
3 
"b"d 27 ll ., p .. 
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Whether, on the broader issues, Filonov would declare 
himself in favour of a defensive or offensive naval strategy 
is impossible to say from his contribution. However, 
Admirals Panteleyev and Kharlamov, who agree with his 
analysis of the role of anti-SLOC operations, have been 
identified as proponents of a small fleet, defensive navy, 
comprised basically of submarines and naval aviation. 
Undoubtedly the naval radicals used Filonov's analysis to 
bolster their case. 
Co-operation with Ground Forces 
The Soviet Navy was undoubtedly best equipped and 
most capable of fulfilling its historic mission, co-
operation with the ground force along the sea flanks of 
the operational zones. The fact that, in the coastal zone, 
it could expect to maintain control of the sea against the 
naval forces of the NATO alliance suggests that the Navy 
could counter strategic or tactical landing forces, defend 
the ground forces from sea-based attack, (although purely 
naval success in this depended on whether aircraft carriers 
were involved) and carry out its own tactical landings in 
support of ground forces. 
The navy had to continue to fight for this role. 
Admiral Panteleyev had to argue that when the tempo (the 
decisive factor in the success of an operation) of an 
offensive by ground forces was reduced, 
there is probably only one way out: put ashore 
tactical land forces capable of changing the 
situation decisively in favour of attacking 
forces.l 
Even the role of fleet combat actions in support of 
the coastal flanks of the army may have been under attack. 
1 
From a purely theoretical approach it can be said 
that they (the army) are in a position to repulse an 
enemy landing and to cover their flank against action 
from the sea ... In this connection there are some 
specialists who feel it expedient to have fleet 
forces act against the enemy's forces at sea which 
are attacking along the army's flanks. 2 
Panteleyev, op.cit., p.2l. 
2 Ibid, p.24. 
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Conclusion 
The Soviet Navy was obviously affected by the 
introduction of new equipment which marked the revolution 
in military affairs. Issues which arose over tactical 
questions and likely missions ln a future war had 
implications for the size and shape of the Navy. In 
addition the importance of the Navy's contribution to 
joint operations such as strategic missile strikes, defence 
against sea-based nuclear weapons systems, attacks on sea 
communications and co-operation with the ground forces was 
reassessed. In all of this it must be remembered that there 
is no Soviet naval strategy as such but rather a naval 
contribution to over-all strategy within a unified military 
d . 1 octrlne. 
The Navy had, by 1967, won its case for a greater 
share in the offensive task of strategic missile attack. 
This was indicated by the subsequent priority afforded the 
new and more sophisticated SSBN, the Y class and its D 
class successor. In the role of defence against sea-based 
nuclear weapons systems the navy had been given the task 
of marking aircraft carriers on forward deployment with a 
view to destroying them in the 
war. It was also charged with 
initial stages of a future 
destroying other aircraft 
carriers, although its ability to have done so must be 
open to considerable doubt. A large part of the burden 
must be shared with the fighters and surface to air missiles 
of the air defence force,which are charged with countering 
airborne attacks, whether these originate from carriers or 
land bases. The destruction of the Polaris submarines, 
although enjoying the status of the Navy's primary task, 
would appear to be beyond the capabilities not, only of the 
Soviet fleet, but of the Armed Forces as a whole. The 
Strategic Rocket Troops and the SSBNs can launch missiles 
1 Colonel P. Sidorov: 'Foundations of Soviet Military 
Doctrine', Soviet Military Review, No. 9 1972, for a 
contemporary elaboration of this unified military 
doctrine. 
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against bases and hence eliminate those submarines, 
possibly a third of the total, berthed within them, but 
to date the Polaris/Poseidon submarines in transit or on 
station appear to be invulnerable. At least until 1967 
the Soviet fleet did not possess a hunter killer submarine 
capable of tracking enemy SSBNs without being detected, 
and the rate of production of the V class suggests that no 
great effort is being made in this field. Soviet agreement 
to limit the deployment of ABM systems suggests that at 
present ABM technology is not sufficiently developed to 
be capable of providing an effective defence. 
The Soviet Navy appears to have downgraded the anti-
SLOe role in the belief that the Strategic Rocket Troops 
strikes on ports, naval bases and important centres of 
transport will eliminate the need for such a mission. The 
Navy is obviously still best equipped for operations in 
the coastal zone yet even here,apparently,still has to 
justify its utility to the remainder of the armed forces. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
Although the arguments of the naval radicals undoubtedly 
appealed to the political leadership and members of other 
branches of the armed services because they implied that recent 
technological innovations had made possible an effective navy 
based on relatively limited numbers of submarines, aircraft and 
surface ships equipped with a variety of missiles it is 
pertinent that by 1967 the navy had not been supplied with 
sufficient numbers of nuclear powered missile firing submarines 
to fulfil the requirements of the strategically defensive 
radical strategy. The fact that even those arguing for a 
minimal posture were unable to secure the type of equipment 
needed in sufficient numbers is a clear indication of the low 
priority afforded the Navy. 
The assessment of the Soviet Navy's ability to perform 
allocated missions suggests that whereas the Navy had 
significant roles assigned to it these roles are shared by other 
branches of the armed services and that in many cases the naval 
contribution to the mission may not have been of major 
significance e.g. disruption of enemy sea lines of communication. 
In roles where its contribution is of greater significance e.g. 
the destruction of sea based strike forces, it appears most 
capable of combatting those attack carriers v1hich it marks in 
peace time, less capable of destroying replacement carriers and 
vin:ually incapable of eliminating enemy SSBNs on patrol. 
CHAPTER X 
INTRODUCTION 
We have already examined the initial Soviet naval 
d.eployments in the Hediterranean and Norwegian Seas. It vJas 
a,#-ued that these deployments and the associated exercises 
undertaken by the vessels 1ifhen on station, were designed to 
provide a presence capable of attacking the carrier task 
forces stationed in these seas. The Hediterranean deployment 
was abruptly halted in 1961 when the Soviet Union lost access 
to Albanian facilities - a political casualty of the Sine-Soviet 
dispute. 
Since 1964 the Soviet Navy has again undertaken regular 
deployments to the Mediterranean and for the duration of the 
facility agreement with Egypt was able to maintain a steady 
high level continuous presence in that sea. Soviet vessels 
have also deployed to the Caribbean, and the South Atlantic. 
These deployments are sketched but one example - that of the 
Indian Ocean - is described in greater detail. Soviet diplo-
matic, economic and strategic concerns in the Indian Ocean 
region are discussed, the patterns of naval deployment indicated, 
the impact of the Soviet presence on regional conflicts examined 
and the prospects for future increases in naval strength 
discussed. 
In particular attention is drawn to the difficulties under 
which the Soviet Navy operates in this region, difficulties to 
some extent ameliorated by the establishment of facilities at 
Berbera but which nonetheless indicate the problems facing the 
Soviet Navy when it seeks to operate at great distance from 
its bases. 
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Cl~PTER X 
Forward Deployment: The Indian Ocean Case 
Introduction: 
Prior to the 1960s the Soviet Navy had, in the main, 
confined its operations to the four fleet areas where its 
primary task had been one of coastal defence and support 
of the ground forces. The stationing of a modest force 
of submarines in the Mediterranean in 1958 constituted the 
major exception to this rule. 1 There had also been 
occasional Soviet exercises in waters off the Norwegian 
coast which had become potential launching areas for attack 
. . f 2 carr1er a1rcra t. 
A former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, reflecting 
on the pre-1960 situation,stated: 
The sight of Soviet ships on the high seas was 
exceedingly rare except for occasional transfers 
of units between the Baltic and Northern Fleets. 
These transfers were accomplished in haste and 
left the impression that the Soviets felt 
somewhat uncomfortable outside the waters of 
their own fleet areas.3 
The exercisesundertaken in the late 1950s by the 
Northern Fleet, to test the anti-carrier capabilities of 
coordinated submarine and aircraft attack, were enlarged 
in 1961 and 1962. In July of each year surface combatants 
and their associated support vessels, together with 
submarines and naval aircraft, undertook a major exercise 
in the Norwegian Sea. Whereas the 1961 exercise was held 
off the Norwegian coast that of 1962 was a larger, more 
complex, affair involving an estimated twenty submarines 
and extending from the North Cape to the Iceland-Faeroes-
Gap. During 1962 the first transfer of warships from the 
1 See p.211-219 above. 
2 See p.207-208 above. 
3 Holmes, E.P. Admiral USN, 'The Soviet Presence in the 
Atlantic', NATO Letter, September 1970, p.6. 
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Northern Fleet to the Black Sea occurred. 1 
The Cuban crisis in late October 1962 had exposed the 
limited capabilities of the submarines and crews which had 
been sent to escort the merchant ships carrying missiles to 
Cuba. The impact of this experience on the Soviet naval 
leadership was evident in Gorshkov•s Krasnaya Zvezda 
article,S February 1963, an exhortation to the fleet 
commanders and staffs to get their ship3to sea and train 
their crews in a realistic manner. Gorshkov demanded 
exercises involving 
The organisation of the mutual protection of 
submarines, surface ships, and the air force 
through which representatives of the diverse 
kinds of forces in accomplishing their 
individual tasks simultaneously create the 
tactical organisation for others and simulate 
the necessary counteraction from the enemy. 
Apart for the certainty that the combat training 
plan would be carried out, such a complex w~vld 
be a good screen against all kinds of simpli~ation1 
and indulgence which occasionally exists in 
training.2 
Moreover 
It must become a rule for the ships in the first 
line to carry out the major part of their tasks 
in winter, at night, and under bad weather 
conditions and restricted visibility. 3 
The stated objective of this training programme was to 
increase the vigilance and combat preparedness of the 
crews; to train them for a future conflict in which 
heterogeneous forces, a variety of weapons systems and 
4 
'technical means' were used. Such training wasnecessary 
to prepare the fleets for the major task of countering 
1 For details of Soviet major exercises involving the 
European fleet areas between 1960 and 1970 see Holmes, 
op.cit. 
2 
Gorshkov, S.G. 'Great tasks of the Soviet Navy•, p.cc4. 
3 
ibid. , p. cc4. 
4 
ibid., p.cc4. 
382 
the carrier strike forces and the SSBNs of the Atlantic 
powers 'over the entire area of the world's seas•. 1 
Gorshkov stated 
Today there are no invulnffiable objectives on 
the continent just as there are no areas in the 
seas of the world where in the course of combat 
operations, the enemy's ships would not be 
subject to the threat of destruction.2 
but this was mere rhetoric. Gorshkov could claim with 
some justice that •cruising in the Arctic by our surface 
ships and submarines has for a long time been a more or 
less routine matter• , 3 but early in 1963 that was the 
extent of the Soviet Navy's ability. 
Gorshkov's hectoring of the fleet was soon reflected 
in a change of exercise patterns. During 1963 a pattern 
of biannual exercises, occurring in March-April and in 
August, was established. 4 
Northern Fleet exercises reflected the changing Soviet 
assessment of where the primary confrontation between 
Soviet naval forces and Western units would occur. During 
the late 1950s and into the early 1960s exercises indicated 
that the Soviets expected the major confrontation to occur 
north of Norway,but since 1962 the area of operations has 
covered the whole of the Norwegian Sea, with particular 
attention being given to the Greenland-Iceland-United 
Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap. Occasion~ly 
involved incursions into the Central 
major exercises have 
Atlantic. This 
pattern suggests that the G-I-UK Gap is regarded by Soviet 
naval planners as their forward defence zone covering 
access to and from the Atlantic. 
1 ibid.' p.ccl-2. 
2 ibid.' p.cc2. 
3 ibid.' p.cc3. 
4 Holmes, op.cit., p.7. 
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In 1968, 1970 anc 1975 the Soviet Navy staged naval 
spectaculars - the Sever, Okean and Okean 75 exercises -
the last two being world wide in scope. Major fleet 
transfers occurred between the three European fleet areas, 
amphibious forces conducted a large scale landing in the 
Kola Peninsula area and surface ships, submarines and 
aircraft tested their anti-carrier, and ASW potential. 
Perhaps as important as the actual training experience 
for the crews and ships at sea was the opportunity these 
exercises afforded the naval staff to examine their command 
and control procedures. Certainly this was the aspect 
highlighted in the major Soviet accounts of the Okean 
1 
manoeuvres. 
Despite the occurrance of two major exercises per 
year in the Norwegian Sea, and the more frequent small 
scale training exercises conducted on a routine basis in 
the fleet areas, the Soviet Navy has not attempted to 
maintain surface warships by continuous presence in this 
region. The major biannual exercises are primarily to 
test their capacities of sea denial and enemy exclusion 
from the Norwegian Sea. By way of contrast ships have 
been maintained on forward deployment in the Mediterranean 
Sea, since 1964, and subsequently in the Indian Ocean. 
Several factors can be suggested as accounting for this 
difference. 
Firstly the US Navy does not maintain surface units 
on a continuous basis in the Norwegian Sea. (When a NATO 
naval exercise occurs Soviet vessels track the vessels 
1 Gorshkov's comment '(The OKEAN manoeuvres) provided 
excellent practice for ship and aircraft commanders and 
crews, and for group and detachment commanders and staffs 
in conducting operations in remote ocean areas. The 
manoeuvres enabled commanders and staffs to test their 
skills and abilities at organising and conducting modern 
naval operations and at directing heterogeneous naval 
forces and resources' is illustrative of the general 
overview comments on the value of OKEAN. 
See Shablikov, N.I., ed., OKEAN, Military Publishing 
House, 1970, JPRS Translation on USSR Military Affairs, 
p.9. 
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involved on a continuous basis. ) 1 Secondly, the home 
base of the Soviet Northern Fleet is sufficiently close 
to the Norwegian Sea to enable a rapid deployment should 
circumstances warrant it. Moreover, while the US Navy 
refrains from a major surface ship deployment in the 
area, apart from the forces engaged in ASW, the Soviet 
fleet is closer to the G-I-UK Gap than is the US fleet 
stationed at Norfolk, Virginia. In a crisis Soviet 
vessels from the Kola base could arrive on station in the 
Gap in lt to 2 days if they maintained a speed of 25-30 
knots. An American task force, moving from Norfolk, Va., 
would not be able to reinforce the ASW forces for 7 or 8 
days after it left base. In addition it is unlikely that 
the Soviet Northern Fleet can be as readily contained as 
the Black Sea Fleet, the Baltic Fleet or the Pacific Fleet 
all of which have to pass through narrow egress points, 
which in the case of the first two can be successfully 
blocked by quite modest naval forces. 
1 According to a retrospective briefing given by Strategic 
Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, Soviet reactions to 
Operation Strong Express held between 14-28 September 1972 
included: 
15 September - overflights by Soviet reconnaissance 
aircraft, the launching of Cosmos 518, a reconnaissance 
satellite, into an orbit designed to pass over the 
exercise area; 
16 September - 2 Soviet submarines and one destroyer in 
vicinity of USS Kennedy task force; continual 
surveillance of exercise by Soviet ships; launching 
of Cosmos 519 a manoeuvrable, high resolution 
reconnaissance satellite to orbit over the exercise 
area; 
19 September - over 24 Soviet surface ships including 
ELINT trawlers and submarines in the immediate 
exercise area, concentrating on HMS Ark Royal and 
USS Mount Whitney flagship of the amphibious forces; 
20 September - Soviet activity in area increases - 27 
Soviet naval vessels sighted around the 43 ship 
Atlantic Strike Fleet. soviet intelligence collection-
ships steam with and often inside formations of the 
amphibious task force and numerous reconnaissance 
aircraft make overflights. 
Soviet reactions to the NATO exercise were officially 
described as 'mild'. 'Exercise Strong Express in retrospect• 
International Defense Review, No. 6, 1972, p.661-664. 
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Thirdly the establishment of a major and continuous 
naval presence in the Norwegian Sea may have undesirable 
repercussions, from a Soviet perspective, on the defence 
policies of the Scandinavian countries. The threat of 
naval encirclement could force a reexamination of Norwegian 
policy on the question of foreign bases and nuclear weapons 
on Norwegian soil. 
Although Soviet operations in the Norwegian Sea appear 
to be based primarily on the anti-carrier mission it is 
undoubtedly the case that anti-SSBN operations are regarded 
as highly important. However such operations present 
intractable problems and it is likely that the Soviet Navy 
does little more than log the passage of SSBNs in and out 
of the Holy Loch base from its electronic intelligence 
vessels. 
In 1964 the Soviet Union began to maintain vessels in 
the Mediterranean on a continuous basis, the first such 
presence since the submarine base at Valona, established 
in 1958, had been denied the Soviets by the Albanian 
Government in May 1961. The original deployment can be 
explained as a reaction to the attack carrier threat from 
the Mediterranean 6th Fleet. In February 1957 the carrier 
Forrestal deployed to the Mediterranean carrying the A3D 
Skywarrior, a twin-jet bomber capable 
bombs to targets in the Soviet Union·~ 
of carrying nuclear 
By July 1964, the 
date at which the Soviet Navy established a fluctuating 
presence in the Mediterranean, the threat of sea based 
nuclear attack had been significantly increased by the 
deployment of three SSBNs in the Mediterranean. The SSBN 
f . 2 deployment was 1rst announced on 28th March 1963, and on 
l 
'If little wars come: U.S. Sixth Fleet - the punch behind 
the doctrine', Newsweek, ll February 1957, p.49. 
2 
The three SSBNs were stationed at Holy Loch Scotland. 
See Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems Project 
Office, 'Polaris and Poseidon Chronology', (Washington D.C., 
1970), p.S. 
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24 February 1964 the USS Proteus arrived at Rota, Spain, 
the advanced anchorage 
squadron of SSBNs. 1 
Soviet activities 
preoccuption with sea 
a former Commander of 
site and 'home' for the Mediterranean 
in the region reveal an understandable 
2 based nuclear weapons. Admiral Kidd, 
the US Sixth Fleet,stated,in 1972, 
that it was Soviet practice to maintain an intelligence 
ship off Rota to monitor SSBN movements and to watch traffic 
transitting to the Gilbraltar Straits. Further intelligence 
ships and a hydrographic vessel were stationed at the Strait 
of Sicily choke point. Soviet vessels also trailed high 
value warships and during exercises involving amphibious 
groups or carrier task forces intermingled with the ship 
formations. 
The details of Soviet naval deployments to the 
Mediterranean have been examined on a number of occasions. 3 
What stands out from these accounts is the sporadic nature 
of the initial Soviet deployments. Soviet ships returned 
to the fleet areas during the winter months because they 
lacked the facilities to maintain themselves on station for 
prolonged periods. Soviet naval activity grew steadily in 
the period 1964-1967. Deployments involving submarines, 
1 
'Polaris and Poseidon Chronology', p.8. On lst April 
1964 the USS Holland relieved the Proteus. 
2 Kidd, Isaac c. Admiral USN, •view from the bridge of the 
Sixth Fleet Flagship•, USNIP, January 1972, p.28. 
3 See for example, Weinland, R. •soviet transits of the 
Turkish Straits 1945-1970 1 for an exhaustive analysis of 
documents, Rapport Annuei sur le Mouvement des Navires a 
Travers les Detroits Tur~s lssued from 1946-1971 provldlng 
a reasonably rellable index of the growth of Soviet naval 
interest in the region. 
MccGwire, M., 'The Mediterranean and Soviet Naval 
Interest' which deals with the Soviet interests leading to 
forward deployment in this region. 
Dragnich, G.S. 'The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to 
naval facilities in Egypt prior to the June war of 1967 1 • 
A more detailed set of readings can be found in the 
bibliography but these articles are among the most useful. 
destroyers, gun cruisers and an occasional SSM armed 
surface unit occurred, but, without support facilities 
387 
in the region the Soviet Navy was unable to maintain a 
steady-state deployment. The lack of an effective support 
fleet, the inexperience of the crews in at sea replenish-
ment techniques and the absence of facilities, not only 
accounts for the relatively low level of operational 
activity of the Mediterranean contingent, it also accounts 
for the high level of activity undertaken to acquire 
facility rights in the region. Dragnich documents four 
visits by Admiral Gorshkov to Egypt between December 1961 
and January 1967, an increase in Soviet naval aid to Egypt 
during the l960s,and the firm rejection by the Egyptian 
government of Soviet requests for facilities until July 
1967. He concludes 
Had it not been for the cataclysmic effect of 
the June War on Soviet-Egyptian relations, it 
is doubtful that the U.S.S.R. would have ever 
obtained the regular use of Egyptian naval 
facilities which virtually fall into its lap 
after that event.l 
With the establishment of rights of access to Egyptian 
ports and facilities which followed the June war the Soviet 
Navy was able to embark on a programme of continuous year 
round deployments at sharply increased levels of activity. 
It was also possible for the Soviet Union to use aircraft, 
nominally the property of the Egyptian government but 
piloted by Soviet crews, to conduct maritime surveillance 
flights over NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. This 
capability was denied following Sadat's demand that Soviet 
advisers be withdrawn from Egypt in 1972 but reports do not 
suggest that there was any major downturn in Soviet naval 
access to port facilities. 2 
1 Dragnich, 'Quest for naval facilities', p.49. 
2 
•soviet Egyptian Withdrawal Impact Studies•, Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, 24 July 1972, p.l6 and 
'Washlngton Round Up', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
25 September 1972. 
Whatever the original Soviet intention in sending 
vessels to the Mediterranean once there these vessels 
have a potential capability for fulfilling a range of 
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other missions, including those which may be subsumed under 
the heading 'exploiting a naval presence for political 
purposes'. However Soviet naval activity has been 
generally restrainedin times of crisis. Thus in the June 
War of 1967 the Soviet Navy did shadow US carriers, but 
adopted an attitude of studious detachment from Egypt's 
fate. The Jordanian crisis of 1970 did not bring about a 
dramatic confrontation between the opposing naval forces. 
Indeed during the crises 
There was none of the nonsense of their ships 
running in and around our men of war at close 
range ... (The Soviets were) sensitive to the 
potential seriousness of the situationl 
although units of both fleets intermingled at times. The 
same judgement appears to be valid for the October War. 
The Soviet naval presence was dramatically increased during 
the course of the war, but significantly, more attention 
was paid to the possibility of a major Soviet air-borne 
intervention. 
It is not intended to deal in detail with Soviet naval 
deployment to Caribbean or West African waters. It need 
only be noted that Caribbean deployments are infrequent, 
low level and subject to continuous surveillance by the 
United States. 2 A Soviet base area in the Caribbean would 
offer advantages for Soviet Y class submarines which could 
target the US Navy's SSBN Atlantic home port of Charleston 
S.C. and the carrier base at Norfol~ Va. However the 
development of the D class submarine suggests that a 
Caribbean base for this purpose is not a vital objective 
1 Kidd, Isaac c., Admiral U.S.N., op.cit., p.27 (Admiral 
Kidd was Commander Sixth Fleet during the Jordanian crisis). 
2 MccGwire, M.K., 'Soviet Maritime Strategy; Capabilities 
and Intentions in the Caribbean• in Theberge James D., ed., 
Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean (Praeger, New York, 1972). 
and certainly not worth the risk of producing a major 
confrontation with the United States. What the 
occasional visits by submarines, sometimes nuclear 
powered, sometimes obsolescent SSBs, suggest is that 
the Soviet Union uses the caribbean from time to time 
to test United States resolve. As well as being a 
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useful test 1n itself it may also lead to further Soviet 
deployments of nuclear powered submarines to the region, 
should United States resolve be judged to be weakening, 
for the Soviet Union may see the benefits of increased 
missile accuracy and SSBN dispersal as sufficient to 
warrant the introduction of SSBN units on a permanent 
basis. 
The Soviet Navy has maintained a small presence off 
the West coast of Africa. It is of interest because this 
'Guinea patrol' has not the immediately apparent strategic 
relevance which we have noted for the Mediterranean and 
the Caribbean presence. Moreover the vessels involved 
have been engaged in activities suggestinf that commercial 
and political interests are being pursued ,although it is 
difficult to infer that the policies of the African states 
in the region have notably shifted in directions favourable 
to the Soviet Union,despite the naval presence and the 
large scale assistance to the central Government during 
the Nigerian Civil War. 
1 
Weinland, R.G. 'The Changing Mission Structure of the 
Soviet Navy' in MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments 
esp. p.269-27l for details of the release of Soviet 
fishing trawlers impounded by Ghana, Soviet establishment 
of a regular Guinea patrol to deter possible Portugese 
attack against Conakry, and for the timely naval visit 
indicating support for the Siaka Stevens regime in 
Sierra Leone. 
The Indian Ocean 
Soviet Diplomacy Toward the Indian Ocean 
Littoral States - A Broad Assessment 
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It was not until the mid 1950s that the Soviet Union 
began to develop relations with any of the Indian Ocean 
littoral states. During Stalin's post-war years of high 
cold war tension the newly independent nations had been 
assigned to the imperialist camp. It was probably the 
desire of the United States and its NATO allies to further 
contain an allegedly expansionist Soviet regime through 
the SEATO Treaty and the Baghdad Pact, which gave point to 
the Soviet Union's reappraisal of the 'third world'. 
The Soviet Union's objective, denying states along 
its southern borders to a United States-backed alliance 
system, led to a Soviet interest in maintaining the non-
aligned status of the Indian Ocean powers. This interest, 
intimately connected with Soviet security concerns, 
involved the littoral states and did not initially suggest 
a wider interest in the Ocean itself. There was no 
evidence of Soviet activity involving an armed presence, 
nor of the recipients of Soviet attention being drawn 
into a counter-alliance system. Indonesia, which until 
the fall of Sukarno had received large amounts of Soviet 
military aid for its navy and airforce, seemed more 
interested in forming a Jakarta-Phnom Phen-Peking axis 
than a Jakarta-Moscow ax1s. After Sukarno•s fall relations 
between the two powers cooled considerably, yet Moscow 
appears to be intent on doing nothing which could sway 
Indonesia from its non-aligned foreign policy. 
The Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Co-
operation of August 1971 marks a departure from this 
position, for its terms comply with the formal requirements 
for an alliance. It obviously had significance for India's 
decision to launch the Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971 
and would in all probability be invoked should the 
situation it was designed to ward off, a Chinese invasion 
of India, arise. Despite this, India still maintains, in 
her public pronouncements and ln her recent diplomatic 
rapprochement with the United States, that between the 
two super powers she is still effectively non-aligned 
and has continued to rebuff reported Soviet overtures 
for the establishment of naval facility rights in the 
. l 
reglon. 
The Soviet Union's attempts at crisis management 
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in the subcontinent appear in part to be directed against 
China. Baldly stated, if the tensions on the subcontinent 
could be eased then India could divert more of her 
attention to the Chinese border. Moreover the idea of an 
Asian collective security pact, launched by Brezhnev at an 
international gathering of communist parties in June 1969, 2 
has been denounced as an anti-Chinese move by Peking. 
Despite Moscow's protestations to the contrary3 it is 
difficult not to agree with the C.P.R.'s assessment. 4 
What initially began as an essentially defensive 
diplomatic move into the northern Indian Ocean littoral 
states, designed to disrupt the perceived threat of 
encirclement by American land bases, has, in the last 
decade, developed overtones of a positive policy designed 
to contain Chinese influence. The Soviet naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean is a contributing factor to the 
containment of Chinese influence in the region although 
this is not to suggest that Chinese containment is the 
sole motivating factor for that presence. The naval 
1 Indian Government sources •leaked• news of a formal 
Soviet request to India for standing facility rights 
prior to the Brezhnev-Ghandi talks in November-December 
1973. Australian 22 November 1973. The same source also 
suggested, prlor to the talks, that India would reject 
this overture. 
2 Moscow Home Service 1115 GMT, 7 June 1969, BBC SWB 
SU/3094/C/2-27. 
3 Moscow in standard Chinese 1230 GMT 21 December 1970, 
BBC SWB SU/3567/A3/l. 
4 Howard, P. 'A System of Collective Security', Mizan 
July/August 1969, p.l99-204, analysed the Soviet medla 
reaction to Brezhnev•s proposal and found a strong 
containment of China theme. 
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presence demonstrates that whereas Peking may be able to 
offer the intangible benefits of Mao's thought to regimes 
and movements in the region,Moscow is a major power 
capable of projecting its military capability. 
Non-Military Interests in the Indian Ocean 
The Soviet Union, besides being interested in the 
foreign policies of the littoral states, has had a gr?wing 
interest in the Indian Ocean as a region in its own right. 
Its fishing fleet is present for legitmate fishing 
purposes, its merchant marine crosses the ocean, some of 
its space experiments impact in the area, and it has a 
growing interest in the oil resources of the Persian Gulf 
states and the possibility of extracting mineral resources 
from the sea bed. These interests are likely to grow and 
in themselves may have been used as factors justifying 
the initial establishment of a protective naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean region. They also suggest that the 
Soviet Union would be best served by an absence of tensions 
and conflict within the region and by cordial relations 
with the littoral powers. 
Soviet interest in fishing lS well known. The fishing 
fleet ranges far and wide over the world's oceans on 
extended deployments. The Indian Ocean area as a whole 
provides less than 4 per cent of the world's total fishing 
catch and is not a major area of interest for the Soviet 
Union which has none the less fished there since 1964. 1 
In 1965 the total Soviet catch from the region was 36,100 
tons which by 1970 had increased to 47,000 tons representing 
0.7 per cent and 0.6 per cent of the Soviet total. 2 
1 Soviet Sea Power (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Georgetown, Washington D.C., June 1969), p.97. 
2 I should like to thank Mr. v.c. Ogareff of the Department 
of Political Sciences, Research School of Social Sciences 
for providing me with these figures based on Soviet sources. 
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Most Soviet fishing occurs in the grounds off both 
coasts of South Africa and undoubtedly vessels from the 
Southern Atlantic grounds use facilities available in 
the Southern Indian Ocean. In and around the Persian 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula area the Soviet Union has 
upgraded the local fishing industries by providing 
vessels and shore facilities for processing the catch. 1 
The Soviets appear to do little fishing of their own in 
this region. 2 
On this basis the fishing agreement with Mauritius, 
which provides up to 15 Soviet trawlers a year with docking 
rights and Aeroflot with landing rights, enabling crew 
transfers, appears consistent with Soviet reguirements. 3 
The fishing vessels which operate in the Indian Ocean are 
presently drawn from the Vladivostok fleet and the 
distances involved justify the use of local facilities 
for crew replacements and repairs. 
The Soviet maritime fleet has been steadily expanding 
since the mid 1950s4 and it has been carrying a greater 
percentage of the Soviet Union's increased sea borne trade. 
The Soviet merchant marine has more than quadrupled in 
size since 1955, totalling over 14 million gross 
1 
e.g. Tass in English 1725 GMT 26 July 1968 announcement 
of Soviet-Pakistani fishing agreement. These agreements 
are usually for a limited duration and provide for Soviet 
experts to train local specialists, explore the extent of 
resources, and carry out construction either of vessels 
or harbour facilities. 
2 There have been unconfirmed reports that Soviet fishing 
vessels have a fishing monopoly in certain areas off Aden. 
E.g. Edith Redan 'Red Sails in the Sunset•, Morning Post 
(Nigeria) 18 January 1972. 
Soviet fishing vessels have used the Aden facilities 
for trawler overhauls with ship repair workers being 
flown from Vladivostok to Aden. 'This procedure will be 
cheaper than bringing ships back to their port of registry• 
Vladivostok 1030 GMT 20 April 1971, BBC SWB SU/3641/A4/4. 
3 See Tass (Soviet News Agency) 15 July 1970. BBC SWB 
SU;3435/A5/2 for Soviet announcement of the treaty. 
4 See p.l93-4 above for the effect of this on naval 
construction. The Soviet Union still remains heavily 
dependent on foreign shipyards. 
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registered tons in 1970 and is expected to reach 
20 million gross tons by 1980. 1 In 1968 approximately 
51 per cent of Soviet import and export cargoes went by 
sea routes and of this some 52 per cent was carried in 
Soviet vessels in 1967. 2 
On 15 March 1967, a year before the first soviet 
naval deployment, the Soviet bloc had a total of 300 
vessels located at sea or in ports in the Indian Ocean 
region (on the same day there were 1,221 NATO bloc 
vessels and 433 flags of convenience in the Indian Ocean). 3 
The following table lS based on a recent United States 
estimate of Soviet Merchant Marine activity in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Number of Merchant Ships Transitting 
the Indian Ocean 
Soviet 
United States1 
1971 
817 
225 
1972 
829 
300 
1973 
850 
250 
Port Calls by Merchant Vessels 
Soviet 527 603 700 
United States No data available 
1 Estimates only. 
Source: Information supplied by Mr. S. Weiss, Director, 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department 
of State, to Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-
committee on Near East and South Asia. House of 
Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
Hearings Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military 
Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p.32. 
1 d" . l . f 
'Moscow's Expan lng Mercantlle Ro e•, Interpreter Brle, 
February 1972. 
2 Athay, Robert E. The Economics of Soviet Merchant 
Shipping Policy, (Chapel Hill, 1971), p.9. 
3 Figures taken from Table 3, World Distribution of 
Shipping, 1967, in Keith Trace's 'Internatlonal Trade and 
Commercial Relations' paper to Indian Ocean Conference, 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Georgetown University, Washington D.C., March 1971. 
I have no figures to suggest how much of the Soviet 
shipping was connected with through trade, to say North 
Vietnam or Vladivostok, from European U.S.S.R., as 
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opposed to trade directed to the Indian Ocean littoral 
states, although the above table indicates that port calls 
to the littoral states have been increasing in the period 
1971-1973. 
It can be expected that Soviet usage of the Indian 
Ocean as a transportation route will increase because of 
an increase in the already existing flow of trade. In 
addition Soviet vessels can be expected to carry some 
extra European U.S.S.R. - Pacific Coast U.S.S.R. cargoes, 
generated by the development of Siberia, although most of 
the extra traffic will travel on internal routes or via 
the Arctic Sea route. 
Soviet space related activities in the Indian Ocean 
stem from the fact that the western part of the Ocean, 
north of Malagasy, lies on the polar orbit which passes 
over the Soviet Union's space control centre at Plesetsk. 
Single space related vessels have been deployed in this 
area for some time but in 1967 a group of some 19 vessels 
appeared. This was followed by another large scale space 
related deployment in April 1968 which was undertaken in 
association with the Zond 5 and 6 space probes. The Zond 
5 capsule was retrieved on 21 September 1968 and taken to 
Bombay for airlifting to the U.S.S.R. 1 Since then space 
related vessels have used the Indian Ocean as the occasion 
requires. 
The question of Soviet interest in Middle Eastern oil 
is complex. Until recently the soviet Union had been 
reluctant to allow Eastern European countries to meet 
their oil needs by drawing on Middle Eastern sources. 
However, Soviet policy of selling oil to the West for 
convertible currency placed the Eastern European countries 
1 
'Indian Navy help transport Zond-5 to airport•. Indian 
~' 26 October 1966. 
in the position of signing direct contracts with oil 
producing countries because of the short term inability to 
increase Soviet recourses. Moreover, Soviet interests in 
Middle Eastern oil have recently increased. In late 1970 
a gas pipeline with a capacity of 1.6 billion cubic feet 
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per day wascompleted from Iran to the Soviet Union1 and the 
Soviet Union has concluded an agreement with Iraq to help 
develop the North Rumaylah oil fields in return for payments 
in oil. 2 
The relative proximity of Iraqi oil to the major 
processing and refining installations located at Baku makes 
further developments along these lines likely,for oil reserves 
in the Baku region are being slowly depleted. Even after the 
development of oil reserves in Siberia, in collaboration with 
Western and Japanese capital, there will probably be a 
substitution trade, exports from the Far East being balanced 
by imports from the Middle East. 
Soviet interest in the sea bed resources of the Indian 
Ocean is at this stage a futuristic concern. Admiral 
Gorshkov however devoted a considerable section of his 
concluding article in the series 'Navies in War and Peace' to 
a discussion of the riches of the sea bed and the dangers of 
'imperialists' using the sea bed for the emplacement of 
unspecified weapons systems. The discussion of ocean resources 
is conducted in terms of the dangers of 'imperialists• 
attempting to monopolise vase areas of sea bed for their own 
use - a monopoly which would be enforced by their navies. 
While Gorshkov 1 s discussion ~s, no doubt, yet another 
justification for a greater role for his own navy it is likely 
that Soviet interest in sea bed resources will increase. 3 
1 Economist, 31 October 1970. 
2 This agreement will enable Iraq to maintain production 
levels at a rate comparable to the pre-June 1972 figures. 
Following nationalisation of the IPC Company Iraq's oil 
production fell by approximately 17.5 million long tons to 
65 million long tons for 1972. Whitakers Almanac 1974, p.884. 
3 1 • ' Gorshkov, S.G. Nav~es ~n War and Peace' Part XI, Morskoy 
Sbornik, February 1973, p.S-15, JPRS Translation on U.S.S.R. 
Military Affairs No. 905. 
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It is unlikely that any of these factors, either 
alone or in toto, did in fact, lead the Soviet Union to 
deploy naval vessels to the Indian Ocean, despite Soviet 
suggestions to the contrary. 1 None of them appear 
sufficiently important or sufficiently endangered to 
suggest that the Navy should, at considerable financial 
cost, use their scarcest resource - surface vessels - to 
deploy to the Indian Ocean. Given an established naval 
presence, and particularly after facility arrangements 
have been made, these interests probably suffice to ensure 
a continual, if low level, naval interest in the region. 
The fishing and trade presence in the Indian Ocean has 
been credited with creating and expanding the Soviet Navy's 
support infrastructure within the region. 2 One version of 
the argument is as follows. 
Moscow clearly has a growing need for more ports-
of-call, preferably with repair facilities, as its 
naval and mercantile presence has been increased. 
In many cases a start has been made with visits by 
an occasional merchant or fishing vessel; once 
this practice is established and the Soviet ensign 
has become familiar, a warship visit is arranged. 
Finally, the visits become so commonplace that host 
countries would find it difficult to object, 
particularly if they are economically or militarily 
beholden to Moscow or its allies.3 
1 See for example the Soviet Union's letter of protest, 
dated 18 June 1974, addressed to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations concerning document A/AC.l59/l Report 
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the 
Military Presence of the Great Powers in the Indian Ocean. 
Besides routine training cruises the Soviet letter reports 
that its naval vessels are engaged in 'the search for and 
recovery of Soviet space craft that splash down in the 
Indian Ocean. It must also be borne in mind that transit 
routes from the European part of the U.S.S.R. to the Soviet 
Far East pass through the Indian Ocean'. In connection 
with its merchant marine activities the Soviet Union is 
'conducting scientific investigations in the region'. The 
Soviet letter is reprinted in Strategic Digest, August 
1974, p.l7. 
2 
. lER vi . Adm~ra .. Zumalt, USN, C.N.O. statement to Comm~ttee 
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South 
Asia, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
Hearings Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in 
the Indian Ocean. 
3 'Moscow's Expanding Mercantile Role', p.4. 
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While this version of events has some validity it is 
important to note: 
1. The fishing and merchant fleets make their calls 
for sound economic reasons. 
2. The step from fishing agreements to facility 
rights for warships is not automatic. Lee Kuan Yew 
stated in 1967 that he was prepared to offer 
Singapore's dockyard facilities to ships of all 
nations, but, was critical when a Soviet destroyer 
arrived unannounced in July 197L,and said that Soviet 
naval vessels would not be allowed to make use of the 
island's services. 1 Since then Mr. Lee has obviously 
toned down his previous tough stance. In the period 
August 1973 - 18 November 1974 the Soviet Navy made 
15 visits to Singapore~ presumably for minor repairs 
at that country's extensive dock facilities,which are 
readily available to vessels from all nations prepared 
to pay. Presumably the Soviets, since July 1971, have 
complied with the necessary formalities and announced 
their arrivals. 
3. Should the Soviet or any other Navy need to take 
on stores, water, fuel and perhaps relieve the ships' 
crews from the monotony of life at sea,it can do this 
at most ports in the world on a payment for service 
basis. 
4. While Soviet naval access to port facilities is 
undoubtedly important and suffices for normal peace-
time requirements such use may well be refused at 
the discretion of the country involved, and in 
particular, in times of crisis or conventional war, 
when they are most needed. 
5. The use of facilities is not to be equated with 
the automatic right of access to ports or with the 
establishment of a fully-fledged naval base which 
offers a legally guaranteed security of tenure. 
libid.,p.S. 
2 See Appendix IV. 
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Growing Soviet Concern over the Indian Ocean Area 
Soviet warnings that the US Navy intended to establish 
a major naval presence in the Indian Ocean predated the 
initial operational deployment of the Polaris A-3 missile. 1 
Charges that the United States planned to establish an 
Eighth Fleet for operations in the Indian Ocean following 
the Sino-India n border war appeared in the Soviet English 
language press. 2 
An article in International Affairs claimed 
According to Indian press reports (uncited) the 
U.S.A., and Britain, while making much of their 
military aid to India, tried to extract important 
concessions from her during the Indian-China 
conflict. Among them, permission for foreign 
air force units or aircraft carriers to base 
themselves on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
this being a condition for further supply of 
certain types of weapons to India. 3 
1 That these warnings did in fact correspond to the 
intentions of some sections within the US Navy has 
recently been confirmed. This is not to suggest that 
the Soviets knew of such plans in detail. Rear Admiral 
La Rocque, U.S.N. (retired), has recently testified that: 
'Plans for moving into the Indian Ocean date back to the 
early 1960s and even before•. 
During this period La Rocque was serving as Assistant 
Director, Strategic Plans Division in the Office of the 
Chief and Naval Operations, and would have known of such 
developments. 
In a printed statement submitted to the hearing at which 
La Rocque testified a former. •civilian assistant director 
of CNO's Long Range Objectives Group' Mr. S.B. Barber wrote: 
'I detected a vacuum of realistic planning to meet possible 
future national and navy needs in the Indian Ocean, and in 
1960 initiated through Admiral Burke the political efforts 
which kept Diego Garcia under British control (rather than 
automatically becoming a dependency of remote Mautitius) ... • 
See Hearings: Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military 
Facilities in the Indian Ocean, February-March 1974, p.90. 
2 
'A Dangerous Shield', New Times, No. 6, 1963, p.22. See 
also 'Sino-Indian Conflict Draws Navy Eye', Christian 
Science Monitor, 22 December 1962, for an Amerlcan report 
on US Navy thlnking about the need for 'a carrier 
amphibious force in the vast Indian Ocean'. 
3 Konovalov, Y., 'The Tentacles of Bases Strategy', 
International Affairs, (Moscow), July 1963, p.52-57. 
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New Times in mic 1963 and 1964 reported U.S. - U.K. 
negotiations in London on the establishment of naval and 
air bases in the Indian Ocean and cited the Seychelles, 
Maldives, Andaman and Nicobar Islands as potential sites. 1 
The Soviet media carried reports of the Concord 
Exercise in l964,involving five ships of the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet in the Indian Ocean. The exercise was linked with 
the alleged continued search for bases in the region and 
the 1963 Pentagon decision to convert the Indian Ocean 
into a sphere of regular operations for its Seventh Fleet. 
An appropriate quotation from the American (non-governmental) 
Navy League publication Navy Magazine, 'What is really, and 
obviously needed, of course is a permanent Indian Ocean 
Fleet including a combat-ready Navy-Marine amphibious 
element•, was also cited. 2 
The planned V.L.F. communications base at North West 
Cape in Western Australia, construction of which began in 
mid 1963, brought forward evidence of Soviet concern 
directly related to the long range Polaris A-3. 3 
The powerful radio transmitters installed there 
(North West Cape) will help U.S. submarines 
darting to and fro in the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans to train their lethal Polaris missiles 
on diverse targets.4 
The Soviet realisation of the potential use of the base for 
SSBN communications and control was accompanied by the 
almost ritual threat that such communications bases •turn 
the country into a target for nuclear retaliation•. 
1 
'International Notes•, New Times, No.2l, 1963, p.25. 
I. Andronov, •wanted: A Desert Island', New Times, No. 37, 
1964, p.ll. 
2 Alexeyev, E. 'USA Reaches for the Indian Ocean•, Pravda, 
September 1964, 'International Notes•, New Times, No. 17, 
1964, p.24. 'Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy', New Times, No.2, 
1964, p.2l. 
3 Shvedkov 'Bases in Pentagon's Strategy', International 
Affairs (Moscow) May 1964. 
4 
'International Notes', New Times, No. 20, 1963, p.23. 
Soviet commentators also noted 
The special US Navy radio station near Asmara, 
Ethiopia has recently been enlarged: it maintains 
communication with submarines and surface vessels 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red and Arabian 
Seas, the Persian Gulf and the Western part of the 
Indian Ocean.l 
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However Soviet commentators were, in the main, cautious 
in their Polaris related statements concerning the Indian 
Ocean. It was 'not excluded that nuclear submarines will 
appear in this area too• 2 but it was rarely firmly stated 
that they were stationed there, because 'the American Navy 
has no support points in the Indian Ocean area which could 
be used for basing missile equipped submarines•. However 
the Americans were expected to rectify this position, 
either in cooperation with the British, or, by an agreement 
with South Africa or some unspecified Persian Gulf State. 3 
The necessity for a support point within the Indian 
Ocean area itself,at which one of the US Navy's SSBN 
tenders could be based,is easily understood. The 
submarines need to restock stores, rotate crews and 
maintain and check equipment. Without a forward facility, 
Guam, 5,760 nautical miles from the middle of the Arabian 
Sea, the most 
support point 
likely patrol area for SSBNs, is the closest 
available. (This assumes that the submarines 
transit the shallow Malacca Strait which, despite its 
shallowness, is a major thoroughfare for heavily laden 
tankers and cargo vessels.) Estimating an underwater 
cruise speed of 20 knots made good it would take an SSBN 
12 days to make the journey. Allowing for the return 
journey this would mean an on station time of 36 days out 
4 
of a total 60-day deployment. An on station time for 
US Navy SSBNs in other areas is usually greater than 55 days 
1 Shvedkov, 'Bases in Pentagon's Strategy', International 
Affairs, May 1964. 
2 Yeremeyev, L., •u.s. Nuclear Submarine Fleet•, 
International Affairs, Moscow, April 1964. 
3 ibid. ' 
4 
•u.s. Navy "Polaris Missiles and Men"', p.l7. 
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per patrol. Should the route be south about around 
Australia the on station time is a mere 20 days, assuming 
a 60-day deployment. One authority has suggested that a 
15 knot transit speed is more likely for nuclear powered 
submarines. 1 On this basis the figures would be 28 days 
on-station via the Malacca Strait and 7 days on-station 
via the south about route. With the currently available 
facilities, an Indian Ocean patrol area would detract from 
the total retaliation capability at any given point in time. 
This is not to say that SSBNs have never been in the Indian 
Ocean but it strongly suggests that such deployments are 
2 
rare. 
Soviet naval planners would 
their duty had they not set this 
have been derelict in 
calculation 
the facts of a sporadic U.S. naval presence, 
alongside 
which 
appeared a prelude of things to come, U.S. - U.K. 
investigations of Indian Ocean islands for base facilities 
and, most important of all, the U.S. communications 
facilities being established in the area. 
Prior to the construction of the North West Cape 
facility the Americans had established V.L.F. stations at 
Jim Creek, Washington, Cutler, Maine and had updated 
existing V.L.F. stations at Balboa, Hawaii and Annapolis. 
1 MccGwire, Michael. 'The Economic Costs of Forward 
Development', Soviet Naval Developments, Centre for Foreign 
Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S. 1973. 
2 Admiral Zu~alt said that US Navy SSBNs 'won't' operate 
in the Indian Ocean area in the course of his testimony 
Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian 
Ocean, See p.l36 and 137. Later he states: 'There is no 
facility being put in which is called a submarine-support 
facility. A tender, a submarine tender, could go to that 
area but we have no current plan to do so•. p.lSO. 
See also testimony of J.O. Zurhellen, Deputy Director, 
U.S. Arms Control and Disaramament Agency, p.l6, ibid., 
for a denial of United States SSBN deployments to the region. 
But a chart prepared by the Navy and tendered in evidence 
at the same hearings contained a notation that SSBNs had 
been specifically excluded from the ship day calculations 
(p.30) and Rear Admiral La Rocque produced evidence to 
suggest that U.S. Navy SSBNs had used the Indian Ocean area 
on patrol, p.92. 
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These stations gave a coverage of all except the Western 
and Southern Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 
Early considerations for facilities to correct 
this deficiency were slanted towards a new V.L.F. 
site in the Marianas Island Group. This 
consideration even reached the point where the 
offices of the Secretary of Defense gave approval 
for such a project. Continued engineering 
analysis however, indica ted that sue h a facility 
in the Western Australia would have treat 
advantages over one in the Marianas. 
Although there is no clear statement that North West Cape 
was preferred to Marianas base because of the superior 
coverage of the Indian Ocean region it is a reasonable 
inference that this was the major conclusion of the 
'engineering analysis' . 2 
By late 1963 Soviet military planners and the top 
political leadership must have been aware of the possibility 
of future deployments of SSBNs carrying the Polaris A-3 in 
the Indian Ocean. The clue, which would indicate a firming 
of intention to deploy, would be the establishment of a 
base for a SSBN tender in the region. 
The Soviet Diplomatic Campaign 
To counter the possibility of the United States 
creating a Holy Loch type facility in the Indian Ocean 
the Soviet Union launched a diplomatic/propaganda campaign 
designed to support the aspirations of the littoral states 
for an end to colonialism and the elimination of foreign 
bases in the area. 
1 Welcome Aboard the U.S. Naval Communications Station 
Harold E. Holt. - a booklet for newly assigned personnel 
to the Harold E. Holt Communications Base, p.4. 
2 The inference that the V.L.F. stati~n at North West Cape 
is to communicate with SSBNs is supported by a recent joint 
statement issued by the Australian Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence and the United States Secretary of 
Defense on 10 January 1974 on the United States naval 
communications centre at North West Cape. It was noted: 
' ... that one important function of the station was to serve 
as a key element in a complex system of communications 
supporting the global balance. They noted the importance 
of effective and reliable deterrence for the promotion of 
stable relations among the powers.' 
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In July 1963 Khrushchev sent a message to the Heads 
of State and Government of African countries taking part 
in the Addis Ababa Conference of the O.A.U. In the 
message Khrushchev highlighted the common aspirations of 
the African states and the U.S.S.R.; the ending of the 
arms race, the policy of general and complete disarmament, 
economic cooperation, the liquidation of foreign military 
bases in Africa and opposition to colonialism and racial 
discrimination. The message also supported the concept 
of a nuclear free zone in Africa. 
The Soviet government believes in particular 
that if the African states, in developing 
certain U.N. resolutions on recognition of 
Africa as a nuclear free zone, conclude an 
agreement prohibiting the use of African 
territory, territorial waters and airspace 
for the storage, testing, shipment and launching 
of nuclear weapons and of African ports for the 
permanent or temporary stationing of ships 
bearing nuclear weapons then all nuclear powers 
will be obliged to respect such an agreement and 
assume definite pledges.l 
Such a proposal, if it attracted support, would have 
a potential asymetric impact on the super powers. The 
Soviet Union would gain little benefit, vis-a-vis the 
United States, from establishing its existing nuclear 
weapons,especially its ship and submarine based ones - in 
the Indian Ocean. The proposal encouraged African states 
' 
on the Mediterranean littoral to continue their campaign 
for opposition to SSBN deployment in that sea while 
initiating a similar campaign in the East African states 
to be directed towards the Indian Ocean. 
The introduction of U.S. Fleet units into the Indian 
Ocean was presented by the foreign language media as an 
attempt to force the non-aligned countries from their 
chosen political course. The •indignation• of the Indian, 
1 Khrushchev, N.S. 
the Support of the 
25 July 1963. 
'The Peoples of Africa Can Rely on 
Soviet Union', Pravda and Izvestia, 
Ceylonese, Burmese and Indonesian governments was 
favourably recorded. 1 
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In October 1964,at the Conference of the Heads of 
Non-Aligned States, Mrs. S. Bandaranaike, the Ceylonese 
Prime Minister, proposed a successful resolution calling 
for the denuclearisation of Africa, the Indian Ocean and 
the South Atlantic. The resolution declared, inter alia, 
that the establishment of new bases in the Indian Ocean 
would constitute a menace to the peace, security and 
independence of the littoral states. 2 
The Soviet Union presented a memorandum 'On Steps to 
Further Ease International Tension and to Limit the Arms 
Race' to the United Nations in December 1964. 3 Section 3 
of the memorandum 'The Liquidation of Military Bases on 
Foreign Bases on Foreign Soil' denounced 
The attempts of certain states, first and 
foremost the U.S.A. and Great Britain, to 
establish new military bases in the Indian 
Ocean despite the clearly expressed will of 
the peoples of the region. 
and Section 6 'The Establishment of Denuclearised Zones' 
specifically mentioned the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian 
Ocean as regions that could be established as nuclear free 
zones. This was in contrast to a similar memorandum of 
January 1964 submitted to the Committee of 18, in which 
only the Mediterranean Sea was specifically mentioned. 4 
in 
Geoffrey Jukes 
.15 some deta~ and 
ha~ discussed the December 1964 proposal 
it is not intended to repeat his 
1 
•u.s. Seventh Fleet' International Affairs (Moscow) 
July 1964. Primakov, Ye. 'The Indian Ocean and the 
Pentagon's Plans•, Pravda, 10 January 1964. 
2 Asian Recorder, 16-22 December 1964, p.6200. 'Commentary', 
The Times of India, 12 October 1964. 'End Colonialism Now, 
47 Nat~ons Demand', The Age, 12 October 1964. 
3 Pravda 9 December 1964 and Izvestia 9 December 1964. 
4 Pravda 29 January 1964, p.l. 
5 Jukes, G. 'The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy•, 
Adelphi Paper No. 87, May 1972, p.7-9. 
comments here. However it should be remembered that on 
l December 1964 the third SSBN advance anchorage site 
at Apra 
Proteus 
Harbour, Guam,became 
l 
as tender. 
operational with the USS 
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Of all the seas ln which Polaris submarines could be 
deployed the U.S.S.R. chose to mention only those in which 
Polaris submarines had most recently gained the capability 
to operate. Moreover these seas were abutted by a number 
of non-aligned nations which had accepted the Ceylonese 
proposal some two months earlier and which could therefore 
be expected to support the Soviet initiative. These seas 
were also ones which,while offering a range of Soviet 
targets to US SSBNs,did not offer the Soviet Union any 
comparable range of US targets. 
The issue appears to have hung fire from 1964 to 1968. 
The Soviets continued to offer general support for non-
alignment and the desires of Third World countries to 
remain free from external, i.e. United States pressure,in 
the form of a naval presence. Britain established the 
British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1965, by detaching 
the Chagos archipelago from Mau~itius and the islands of 
Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches from the Seychelles, as 
part of a move to substitute unpopulated island base areas 
for the uncertainty of its existing bases in the third world 
littorals. This policy was an early casualty of Britain's 
financial difficulties. 
In December 1966 under an Exchange of Notes the BIOT 
was made available for the defence purposes of the United 
States and United Kingdom Governments for an initial period 
of 50 years. The creation of the Territory attracted 
unfavourable attention from the littoral states notably 
India and Tanzania who regarded its creation as a tangible 
sign of increasing big-power presence in the Indian Ocean 
1 Polaris and Poseidon Chronology, p.9. 
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which could give rise to military confxontation. 1 
The period saw no major incursions into the region by 
United States Seventh Fleet units, due no doubt to the 
demands of the Vietnam Wax. The only U.S. presence was 
that of the Mid East Force, two destroyers and a tender 
in the Persian Gulf~and these had been there since the 
late 1940s. 
There were sound reasons why the soviets themselves 
did not venture into the Indian Ocean at this time, 
although a naval presence was established in the 
Mediterranean. 
Prior to December 1966 there was no concrete evidence, 
visible to both the U.S.S.R. and the littoral powers, 
suggesting that a move by the U.S. Navy into the Indian 
Ocean was imminent. The April 1967 announcement of the 
US-UK agreement on joint facilities in the BIOT meant 
that what had previously been a possibility, noted by the 
naval staff, was now a distinct probability, calling fox 
the attention of the Soviet political leaders. One Soviet 
commentator expressed the apparent fears of the Soviet 
defence community: 
A representative of the British Government 
announced that British and American bases would 
be built on these (BIOT) islands - they will be 
bases fox the B-52 bombers and atomic submarines 
and also the navy - but it seems that Britain is 
only a middleman in these negotiations fox the 
Pentagon ... it has been decided to build joint 
bases on the island.2 
The commentary pointed out that these bases should not 
only be considered in military strategy terms, they would 
also enable the Americans and British to 1 put political 
pressure on India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Tanzania and other 
1 Information Paper, Foreign and Commonwealth Office fox 
'The Indian Ocean in International Politics• Conference, 
Department of Extra-Mural Studies, University of South-
hampton, 17-19 May 1972. 
2 Radio Peace and Progress in English fox Asia 0930 GMT 
30 March 1967 BBC SWB SU/2430/A3/2. 
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Afro-Asian countries following an independent policy• 1 
thereby attempting to identify Soviet military-strategic 
concernswith the third world littoral powers concern to 
pursue non-aligned policies free of great power 
interference. 
The joint facilities agreement not only provided a 
compelling reason for the Soviet political leaders to 
consider deploying. their own naval vessels to the region, 
it also provided an opportunity to deploy at minimum 
political cost. The indications were that the US and UK 
intended to strengthen their position in the ocean, and 
these powers, despite the declared views of a majority of 
the littoral states, appeared to be completing the infra-
structure required to make possible future deployment of 
SSBN forces in the region. In these circumstances a 
modest Soviet countermove, in the form of a naval 
deployment, could be expected to be viewed by third 
parties with sympathetic understanding rather than outright 
hostility. It is possible that the Soviet Union planned 
its forward deployment move for 1967. However following 
the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 the bulk of 
naval vessels for an Indian Ocean deployment would have to 
come from the Pacific Fleet based some 7,330 miles from 
Aden. The distances involved, the necessity for afloat 
support, and the initial absence of facility arrangements 
made this an extremely difficult undertaking, not to be 
attempted without some effort to prepare the way for the 
initial deployment. Fortunately for the Soviets this 
preparation was relatively straightforward. Naval aid to 
India had, by the beginning of 1968, already delivered 
landing ships, torpedo boats and submarines2 creating an 
1 ibid. 
2 The actual figures are: 
2 'F' class submarines of a total 6 agreed to 
in August 1965 
6 Patrol craft 
2 Landing craft 
Janes Fighting Ships 1968-69, p.l29-136, and 
The Military Balance 1967 68, p.42. 
appropriate climate for A~uiral Gorshkov•s visit to 
India in February 1968. During his visit Gorshkov made 
an extensive tour of Indian ports examining facilities 
and India's naval requirements. In particular he 
examined the port of Visakhapatnam and reacted 
•sympathetically' to a request for assistance in its 
409 
1 development. The following month the first Soviet naval 
vessels entered the Indian Ocean. 
The Soviet Naval Presence 
The known movements of Soviet naval vessels in the 
Indian Ocean from March 1968 until January 1972 have been 
reliably documented in a number of publications. 2 
Unfortunately since that date there is little hard 
information relating to specific entrances, exits and 
port calls. However the monthly totals are known for 
the period through to November 1974. Appendix I indicates 
the pattern of deployments and port visits within the 
Indian Ocean area fr·om March 1968 until the end of 1971. 3 
Appendix II lists the major Soviet naval vessels deployed 
since 1971 by month of the year. Appendix III lists the 
ship days spent in the Indian Ocean by both the soviet 
and the United States navies. Appendix IV offers some 
information on the number of port calls made by soviet 
and United States vessels and Appendix V indicates the 
major Soviet naval combatants deployed to the Ocean during 
the Bangla Desh crisis. 
1 
'Soviet Naval Squadron to Visit India•, Daily Telegraph, 
15 March 1968. 
2 Jukes, G., 'The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy•, 
Adelphi Paper No. 87, May 1972. 
MccGwire, Michael, 'The Pattern of Soviet Naval 
Deployment in the Indian Ocean 1968-71 1 paper to 2nd 
Halifax Conference, October 1973. 
Re ort from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
the Indian Ocean Reg~on, Parliament of theCommonwea t 
of Austral~a, 1971, Paper No. 258. 
J. McConnell and A. Kelly, 'Super Power Naval Diplomacy 
in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis•, Center for Naval Analyses 
Professional Paper No. 108, February 1973. 
3 Table taken from M. MccGwire, 'Naval Deployment in the 
Indian Ocean', p.2. 
The deployments into the Indian Ocean area were, 
initially, concentrated in the north-west, or Arabian 
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Sea, area and a review of the post-1971 reports suggests 
that this is still substantially correct. An examination 
of port visits suggests that initial deployments were 
concerned to examine a wide range of facilities throughout 
the area. The subsequent concentration on Somalia 
(Berbera, Mogadishu), Sudan (Port Sudan) and South Yemen 
(Aden, Hodeida) in the period September 1969 to December 
1971 (21 visits as opposed to 4 visits from March 1968 to 
October 1969) suggests that the available facilities and 
the political climate in these countries were judged 
sufficiently reliable to contemplate the establishment of 
a point d 1 appui for sustained forward deployment in the 
1 
area. 
Subsequent developments indicate the correctness of 
this view. Alleged communist complicity in the attempted 
Sudanese coup of July 1971 and the Soviet Union's 
subsequent verbal protests about the Sudanese Communist 
Party, previously the strongest in the Arab world, denied 
them the opportunity to develop Port Sudan. 2 
The Soviet Union appears to have fatred better in 
Somalia. On 27 April 1970 Radio Mogadishu announced the 
unveiling of an 'imperialist-backed' plot against the 
recently installed military regime. 3 Ten days prior to 
this two Soviet vessels, including a Krupny SSM destroyer, 
arrived at Mogadishu for a five-day official visit. These 
vessels did not leave until the second week in May when 
the Said regime appeared well in control. 4 Subsequent to 
1 G . . Mcc w~re, M. op.c1t., p.7. 
2 For a discussion of the coup see African Recorder, 18-31 
August 1971, 2894-2899. 
3 African Recorder, 18 June - 1 July 1970, p.2554. 
4 McConnell, J., 'The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean•, 
Professional Paper No. 77, C.N.A. Washington, p.9. 
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this development Soviet usage of Somalian ports and the 
establishment of facilities dramatically increased to the 
extent that in 1973 97 visits to Somalia occurred. 
including visits made by oceanographic research and space 
related vessels. 1 
According to Admiral zu:alt: 
They have built a communications station near 
the Somalian port of Berbera to provide support 
for their fleet. At the same time they have 
increased their use of, and are expanding, naval 
facilities at Berbera, which currently include 
a restricted area under Soviet control, a 
combined barracks and repair ship and housing 
for Soviet military dependents. In addition, 
they engaged in building a new military airfield 
near Mogadishu, which could be used for a variety 
of missions.2 
This has led some observers to claim that the 
facilities in the Somali Republic warrant the description 
'base facilities• if not 'base•. 3 However the important 
questions of when, how, and under what conditions these 
facilities can be used remain. It is probably correct 
that the present facility arrangements meet present 
Soviet requirements but what of future needs? The Soviets 
continue to maintain that they have no bases in the area: 
Normal duty calls by naval ships at various 
ports for the purpose of replenishing their 
supplies are tendentiously depicted ... as the 
establishment of Soviet bases in the Indian 
Ocean region.4 
1 . From Append~x IV. 
2 Admiral E.R. zunfalt, U.S.N., C.N.O. Testimony 20 March 
1974 to Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in 
the Indian Ocean, p.l32. 
3 Soviet Naval Developments III Seminar, 8-11 September 
1974, Summary of Proceedings, Ken Booth rapporteur 
(Department of Political Science, Dalhous~e Un~versity 
(N.S.)), p.84. 
4 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. 
to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, 18 June 
1974, in Strategic Digest, August 1974, p.l7. 
and the Somali Re~ublic rejects as 'totally groundless 
and without foundation• the claims that it has offered 
a base to the Soviet Union. 
(T)here are no foreign military bases on the 
territory of the Somali Democratic Republic 
and ... the statements alleging the establishment 
of a foreign communications centre or naval and 
air base are totally unfounded. The port of 
Berbera, which is frequently quoted in the report 
has been recently rebuilt and modernised thanks 
to loans received from the Soviet Union ... 
Considering the increasing volume of traffic 
activities of the aforesaid port and in view 
of the fact that the Suez Canal is hoped to be 
reopened, my Government has recently decided to 
further amplify it, again with loans and 
technical know-how from the Soviet Union. The 
port, when completed, will offer refuelling and 
bunkering facilities to all ships which might 
wish to make use of its services. To suggest, 
therefore, that an area of our national 
territory is under the •restricted control• 
of a foreign power is not only contrary to our 
political philosophy but can be regarded as a 
conjectural exercise aimed at presenting an 
untrue portrait of the positive and neutral 
role that has been characteristic of my country's 
foreign policy.l 
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The Soviet practice of establishing a restricted area 
for its personnel while they are engaged in activities in 
foreign countries is not unique to Berbera. Soviet naval 
personnel engaged ~n the port clearance operations in 
Bangladesh were also housed in restricted quarters for the 
2 duration of their stay, a practice which is not unique to 
the Soviet Union. To date descriptions of the restricted 
areas and facilities of Berbera are sufficiently imprecise 
to leave in considerable doubt the claim that the Soviet 
navy has a base area here. Observers will have to content 
themselves with watching for the developments in this area 
to see whether the Somalian version cited above is proved 
correct. 
1 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to 
the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, 22 May 1974, 
in Strategic Digest, August 1974, p.l5-l6. 
2 Interview with His Excellency Mr. S.A.M. Kibria, 
Bangladesh High Commissioner to Australia, 17 July 1974, 
1030. 
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personnel engaged in the port clearance operations in 
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1 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to 
the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, 22 May 1974, 
in Strategic Digest, August 1974, p.lS-16. 
2 Interview with His Excellency Mr. S.A.M. Kibria, 
Bangladesh High Commissioner to Australia, 17 July 1974, 
1030. 
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Since the beginning of 1970 the Soviets maintained a 
steady state pattern of operations involving a Kotlin 
destroyer and, since October 1970, a T-58 minesweeper 
backed by an Alligator tank landing ship which 1 in the 
absence of other support vessels,is apparently used in 
this role. On at least two occasions the T-58 has 
entered and left the Ocean with a 'F' class submarine 
suggesting that in some instances it plays the role of a 
submarine support vessel. 
From January to August 1972 the Soviets maintained an 
average of two destroyers in the Ocean, a Kashin (SAM 
armed) and a Kotlin, but during the northern winter months 
this reverted to a single Kotlin destroyer. The Sverdlov 
and Kresta class cruiser which appeared in the aftermath 
of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 left the area in March 
and no cruiser returned until November 1972 when a single 
Sverdlov entered for a five to six month deployment. 
During 1973 the soviet Navy sent Petya class 
destroyer escorts into the region and from May until 
October of that year there were always two of these vessels 
plus one or two Kotlins present. Following the October war 
a cruiser entered the Ocean and,together with four 
destroyers and escorts, this remained the basis of the 
Soviet surface combatant presence until July 1974 when a 
helicopter cruiser entered the Ocean around the Cape of 
Good Hope. This vessel was to act as a command ship 
during Soviet mine clearing operations at the southern 
end of the Suez Canal. 
The Soviet submarine presence has been based on a 
single conventionally powered 'F' class submarine since 
May 1973. In times of regio51conflict the number of 
conventionally powered units has increased to three. 
During the Bangladesh war an SSM armed •J' class submarine 
appeared and remained in the Ocean until July 1972. A 
nuclear powered SSM armed 'E-II' class submarine was sent 
to the region at the end of 1971 but no other nuclear 
powered submarine appears to have entered the ocean until 
the aftermath of the October War. 
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It is noticable that whereas the older conventionally 
armed vessels tend to spend long periods in the Indian 
Ocean, between five and six months on average, the more 
sophisticated vessels visit less frequently and for shorter 
periods. The lengthy deployments of the Kotlins and 
associated vessels suggests that this is an enforced 
requirement given the shortage of Soviet surface units in 
relation to the requirement for distant operations. 
The relative absence of more modern units, except in 
times of regional tension when Soviet vessels and U.S. 
Navy carrier task forces enter the Pcean in some strength, 
suggests that the level of maintenance and support 
facilities in the area, both ashore and afloat, is not 
adequate to cope with the sophisticated electronics aboard 
the post-1960 generation vessels. In this respect it 
appears that the Navy was ill prepared for its venture 
into the Indian Ocean. 
The following comments by a Rear-Admiral suggest that 
vessels pressed into service, on this occasion for the 
visit to Ethiopian Navy Day in 1966, were ill equipped for 
tropical conditions: 
Departing Port Suez in the late evening, and 
entering the Gulf of Suez we immediately 
encountered steaming conditions which were, 
for us, unusual: high temperature, high 
humidity and the quite high salinity of the 
waters of the Red Sea. The production of the 
distilling plants fell off while black oil 
consumption jumped. The temperature in the 
engine and boiler rooms passed 60°C, radio 
antenna insulation dropped, and communications 
equipment operation deteriorated. 
The intensive rusting which occurred on the 
exposed metal parts of the ship, the weapons, 
and the upper deck was ... a cause of great deal 
of concern to personnel. 
One could only wish that our naval shipbuilders 
had given serious thought to the introduction of 
the latest achievements of science and engineering, 
not only in ships which are under construction 
(emphasis added), but even ~n those Which have 
been part of the fleet for a long time. How much 
work and materials would have been saved if the 
steel decks had been covered with non-skid 
coatings, if water and heat resistant paint had 
been used! And nothing need tasaid beyond 
mentioning the need for air conditioning 
systems for ships compartments. Air 
conditioning was needed everywhere.l 
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These comments raise serious questions about the fighting 
efficiency of the crew, and the accuracy of the electronic 
systems, after a six month deployment into the Indian 
Ocean. 
The apparent use of Alligator tank landtcraft and 
minesweepers as support vessels has already been commented 
on. While this may point to the ingenuity of the Soviet 
naval personnel it cannot obscure the fact that the Soviet 
Navy has given a low order of priority to its support 
fleet, suggesting that the need for such a fleet had not 
been recognised until events forced its belated 
consideration. As one author has observed 'The number of 
missions of the auxiliary fleet has sharply risen•, 2 and 
this 
has required the decisive reorganisation of the 
fleet's rear services and has significantly 
changed the functions, organisation, and nature 
of the activity of each of its detachments.3 
It appears to have been recognised that 
the violation of unity in the development of 
combat and support components of the fleet 
under modern conditions will inflict 
perceptible damage to the combat power of 
the fleet as a whole4 
1 Sysoyev, V.S., Rear Admiral 'Cruise to Ethiopia' Morskoy 
Sbornik, No. 7, 1966, p.lS-22, U.S. Navy trans. p.20-2l. 
2 Balyakin, L.N., Rear Admiral, 'The Auxiliary Fleet and 
the Rescue and Salvage Service of the Navy', Morskoy 
Sborrrik, No. 12, 1970, p.S. U.S. Navy trans. p.S. 
3 BessarQbov, V.N.,Captain lst Rank and Nikolayev, N.P., 
Captain lst Rank, 'Problems of the Rear Services and the 
Military Publishing House', Morskoy Sbornik, No.4, 1971, 
p.97-99, U.S. Navy trans. p.SO. 
4 Smukul, A.O. and Fedurin, A.S., Naval Support Vessels, 
Military Publishing House, Moscow 1969. Introduction and 
Conclusion translated as 'New Book on Naval Support Vessels•, 
JPRS. Translations on U.S.S.R. Military Affairs, No. 737, 
p.30. 
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and 'A great deal of attention is now being devoted to 
the building of not only warships but also auxiliary 
ships which are new in principle ... • 1 
While it is true, as Admiral Zumwalt has recently 
observed, that the Soviet Navy can use merchant ships for 
some logistic support functions 2 this does not mean that 
the Soviet Union does not require specialist vessels 
capable of not only supplying the fleet with 
all modern forms of material required for 
maintaining the prescribed combat readiness of 
the forces, but also of carrying out multi-
skilled technical maintenance of the complex 
weapon and equipment systems3 
if only so that the efficiency of its out-of-area operations 
can be increased. 
o.-rt 
If the data on ship days (Appendix III) ~examined 
the most striking feature is the high number of support 
vessel days in the yearly totals. If the amphibious 
vessels are included in the support role, which,as has 
already been indicated, seems justifiable, the proportion 
increases even further. It should also be borne in mind 
that in most cases minesweepers are included among the 
vessels counted under the title Warships or surface 
Combatants in testimony provided to Congressional Committees. 
In 1972 and 1973 figures have been inflated by the 
presence of vessels deployed to the Indian Ocean during 
the Indo-Pakistan War and in the aftermath of the October 
1973 war in the Middle East. While these increases show a 
Soviet capability to deploy additional warships for short 
times to the Ocean, when it is considered necessary, they 
should not be confused with the 'steady state' deployment. 
1 Balyakin, L.N., op.cit. (emphasis added). 
2 . ,,Jl d . f .. Admlral E.R. Zuma t, Propose Expanslon o· U.S. Mllltary 
Facilities in the Indian Ocean. 
3 Oleynik, G.G., Admiral, 'The Fleet Rear Services Today', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 12, 1970, p.3-8, U.S. Navy trans. p.2. 
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Ship days are an extremely crude unit of measurement. 
•Minesweepers are equated with aircraft carriers•. 1 The 
comparative figures of U.S. and U.S.S.R. ship days do not 
indicate that, with the exception of one Kresta II missile 
cruiser, the Soviet Union had kept its most modern and 
powerful vessels out of the Ocean whereas the United States 
has sent in aircraft carriers including the USS Enterprise, 
and the nuclear powered frigate USS Bainbridge. 
It appears impossible to locate any but total data on 
the number of port calls made by Soviet naval combatants, 
including support ships. However there are figures 
available (in Appendix IV) for port visits of all Soviet 
vessels, including oceanographic research and space event 
support ships. A comparison with the United States Navy 
in terms of naval combatants and their support vessels is 
most revealing. In the period 1968-1972 the Soviet Navy 
never made more than 35 port calls per year to the Indian 
Ocean littoral states. In the same period the smaller u.s. 
naval contingent never made less than 135. Despite the rise 
in Soviet naval port calls in 1973 to 100, of which those 
to Somalian ports, Iraq and Aden account for over a half, 
the U.S. Navy combatants almost doubled that figure. 
1 The Indian Ocean: A New Naval Arms Race? op.cit., p.5. 
See also La Rocques testimony to Hearings Proposed Expansion 
of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p.llO. 
•I claim to have ~nvented that term 'sh~p days' in the 
Mediterranean in order to make it very impressive to 
Members of Congress and to the press and to the people of 
the United States. 
Frankly, we sat around, the Commander of the Sixth Fleet 
and I, trying to figure out how do you demonstrate the 
fact that the Soviets are really a threat to us here (in 
the Mediterranean). There were just a lot of little ships, 
nothing bigger than a destroyer and an occasional cruiser, 
and it was not very impressive. We hit upon the happy idea 
to call them ship days, and when you did, it is very 
dramatic. 
Well, when you do it in the Indian Ocean, they start out 
with practically none prior to 1968, and then show an 
increase over the years. It looks impressive, but it is 
really not because the biggest ships that the Soviets have 
had in there have been an occasional visit of a very old 
cruiser. What they have there are simply destroyers -a 
few destroyers, a few destroyer escorts and minesweepers 
and these are not very effective•. 
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If port calls are a more accurate indication of impact 
and influence in the region than ship days, then the United 
States clearly makes more use of its naval resources in the 
region for this purpose. The Soviet Navy, perhaps as a 
part of its low visibility posture, spends much more time 
at its open sea anchorages located east of Durban in the 
Seychelles and Chagos archipelagos, or the more sheltered 
anchorages south of Socotra, near the Seychelles, 
Mauritius and the Maldive Islands. 1 While its vessels 
resupply in these regions they are very much out of sight, 
and, possibly, out of the minds of the littoral states. 
Soviet Naval Activities in the Indian Ocean 
All weapons systems can be used for purposes other than 
those for which they were originally procured and deployed. 
This is particularly true of naval vessels. Moreover a 
naval deployment can create, in the minds of friends, 
expectations, and ~n the mind of the initiators, a sense 
of obligation, if not necessity, to respond to those 
expectations. 
In the case of the Soviet naval deployment to the 
Indian Ocean it introduced an element of Soviet military 
power to the region thereby indicating that the Soviet 
Union,besides the United States and Britain,was also a 
naval power. The fact of naval presence has enabled the 
Soviet Union to indicate an interest in regional developments 
by undertaking timely regional deployments or, less 
dramatically, by arranging port visits, thereby demonstrat-
ing its presence and power ~n a friendly, but no~the-less, 
impressive manner. 
1 M . ccGw~re, M., 'The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment', 
op.cit., p.4. 
See also Admiral Zu~alt's testimony to Hearings: Proposed 
Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, 
p.l32, and Study prepared by the Congressional Research 
Service of the U.S. Library of Congress Means of Measuring 
Naval Power with Special Reference to U.S. and Sov~et 
Activ~ties in the Ind~an Ocean; Comm~ttee Pr~nt for 
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12 May 1974. 
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This naval power has been used on at least three 
occasions to indicate support of regimes friendly to the 
Soviet Union, during the Somali coup, the Bangladesh War 
and the October 1973 war. In addition specialist forces 
have been sent to the region to assist in mineclearing 
operations on at least two occasions, in the Bangladesh 
harbours of Chalna and Chittagong, and more recently at 
the southern end of the Suez Canal. More controversial 
is the influence of the Soviet naval visit which brought 
Admiral Gor shkov to the scene of the Iraq-Kuwait border 
dispute in May 1973. 
The events surrounding the Somali coup have already 
been mentioned. It should be noted that an interpretation 
of these events in terms of a deliberate use by the Soviet 
Union of its prearranged, but extended, presence in 
Mogadishu to support the Said regime overlooks the point 
that any action taken by the commander of the vessels could 
be construed as a form of naval diplomacy. Had the ships 
set sail on 22 April,as originally intended,would it not 
be reasonable to suggest that the Soviet Union was with-
drawing its support from th1Said regime? Was there a coup 
attempt or was Said merely eliminating domestic opposition? 
To establish this as a clear-cut case of naval support for 
a regime under pressure,it would be necessary to establish 
that the Soviet vessels entering Mogadishu harbour on 17 
April had been informed of the possibility of a coup,and 
that their visit was intended as an indicator of support 
for the regime. There lS also the problem of interpreting 
the results. How much of his success in unmasking and 
defeating the plot did Said attribute to the impact of a 
supportive Soviet naval presence,as against the alertness of 
his internal security forces? Perhaps all that can be said 
is that,by leaving the vessels in harbour until mid-May, 
Somali-Soviet ties were further cemented. 
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During the Bangladesh crisis of December 19711 the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet reinforced the already existing naval 
presence (Appendix II and V). The first •reinforcement', 
that of 5 December, consisting of an additional mLne-
sweeper and a destroyer, was fortuitous. These vessels 
were undoubtedly sent from Vladivostok, some time in 
mid-November, as routine replacements for the destroyer 
and minesweeper which had been in the Ocean since the end 
of June. On 18 December a second Pacific Fleet detachment 
entered the Indian Ocean. They must have left Vladivostok 
on or about 7 December as they were sighted transitting the 
Tsushima Straits on the 9 December. A third detachment 
left Vladivostok on 13 December. These last two detachments 
were similar in composition1 carrying a mix of SSM &~d SAM 
launchers; both included an SSG and an attack submarine. 
It is probable, as McConnell and Kelly have argued, 
that the second of the reinforcements were sent to match 
the already existing British presence in the region,and 
the third detachment to mark the U.S. Task Force,which was 
formed on 10 December. 2 
The Soviet Union's main concern seems to have been to 
prevent the crisis drawing in powers from outside the 
subcontinent. Clearly, from the first days of the war, 
India had demonstrated superiority on land, air and sea. 
Yet there was a concern that Pakistan's allies, initially 
Britain and subsequently the United States, might take 
steps 
which would in one way or another mean their 
involvement in the conflict and which would 
lead to a further aggravation of the situation 
in the Hindustan peninsula.3 
1 The facts of this event have already been analysed by 
McConnell and Kelly 'Super-Power Naval Diplomacy• on whose 
work I have drawn for this section. 
2 McConnell and Kelly, op.cit., p.l-3. 
3 Tass Statement Condemning Pakistan, Moscow Home Service, 
5 November 1971, 1100 GMT BBC SWB SU/3857/A3/l. 
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There is evidence, ln the Anderson Papers, to suggest that 
the Soviet Union did not expect the United States to 
directly intervene in the war. 1 If this is accepted then 
it seems clear that the Soviet detachments were sent simply 
to counter-demonstrate against the • imperialists •, to hedge 
against any unexpected intervention, and thereby to galn 
credit with the Indian government. However this is not to 
say that the super power naval demonstrations paralysed 
the supportive naval intervention of the other. The United 
States showed that it tilted towards Pakistan; the Soviet 
Union that it backed India7 although this support stopped 
short of direct intervention,and did nothing to alter the 
events unfolding on the subcontinent. 
In the third case, the naval deployments into the 
Indian Ocean following the October War, less information 
is available. None the less it would appear that the 
naval build-ups in the Indian Ocean occurred after the 
Middle East hostilities had concluded and were concerned 
with the Arab stated 'oil diplomacy' which followed the 
conflict. 
Prior to the October War it appears as though the 
Soviet Navy had 13 vessels in the Indian Ocean (see 
Appendix II), a destroyer, two escorts, an 'F' class 
submarine, two minesweepers, a landing ship and six 
auxiliaries. A further eight vessels were 
operation. On 
employed in 
31 October a the Bangladesh 
U.S. Navy task 
mineclearing 
force headed by the aircraft carrier 
USS Hancock entered the Ocean,accompanied by five or six 
destroyers and an oiler. 2 The official announcements of 
1 Anderson quotes a CIA report of a meeting held on 13 
December 1971 between •top Indian officials• and the 
Soviet Ambassador to India, Pegov. According to the 
report Pegov assured the Indians that the U.S. task force 
was 1 an effort to bully India to discourage it from 
striking against West Pakistan, and at the same time to 
boost the morale of the Pakistani forces•. Intent on 
doing some morale boosting of his own Pegov noted •the 
Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene•. 
Anderson, Jack and Clifford, The Anderson Papers, (Random 
House, New York, 1973), p.266. 
2 The Australian, 31 October 1973. 
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the U.S. government denied that the move was a response 
to the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean, which was 
placed at over 90 ships. 1 Rather it stressed the 
importance of asserting rights of transit through the 
Malacca Straits. There was no public mention of the 
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as a justification for 
2 the move. 
The Soviet media confined itself to reporting the 
condemnation this display of naval might had aroused in 
the countries of Africa and Asia. 3 
On 13 November a Soviet force entered the Indian 
Ocean. It consisted of a Sverdlov SAM cruiser and a 
guided missile destroyer accompanied by an oiler. 4 
Although it is likely that this was a normal rotation, 
for it is normal Soviet practice to send a Sverdlov to 
the Indian Ocean ~n November/December, it was noted that 
'the class of ships going in is superior to anything the 
Russians have there now•. 5 
Details of the subsequent Soviet deployments are 
scanty but we do know that during December additional 
submarines, two 'F' class and one 'E' class nuclear 
powered submarine armed with SSMs entered the Indian 
Ocean accompanied by two auxiliary vessels. The combatant 
force remained at this strength, one cruiser, two 
destroyers, two escorts, three 'F' class, and one 'E' 
class submarine, until March when one escort or destroyer, 
1 
. l h . . Adm~ra T.H. Moorer, USN, C a~rman J.C.S. Un~ted States, 
Military Posture for F/Y 1975. Section on the Middle East -
stated that the peak strength of the Soviet Naval force 
in the Mediterranean was 96 ships including 29 modern 
surface combatants and 23 submarines. 
2 The Australian, 31 October 1973. 
3 Radio Peace and Progress in English for Africa, 1430 
GMT, 3 November 1973, BBC SWB SU/4443/Al/4. 
4 The Age, 13 November 1973; The Australian, 14 November 
1973. 
5 The Australian, ibid. 
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an 'F' class and the 'E' class vessels left the area. 
During this period American carrier task forces remained 
in the Indian Ocean. The USS Hancock was replaced by the 
Oriskany1 ,and the Kitty Hawk2 arrived in March>about a 
month after the Oriskany had left the region. 3 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger,in a statement 
on 30 November 1973,announced that the presence of U.S. 
warships in the Indian Ocean was to be •more /eguent and 
4 
more regular than in the past•. The initial U.S. task 
forces appear to have spent most of their time in 
operations off the Oman and Saudi Arabian coasts. 5 As 
Saudi Arabia was at the time playing a leading role in 
the oil embargo on the United States,and the supporters 
of Israel,and threatening to cut back production rates 
at the oil head, the significance of this deployment needs 
little elaboration. Two destroyers from the task force 
visited the Ethiopian Red Sea port of Massawa. This 
involved transitting the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb,which the 
Egyptian Navy had blockaded during the second week of the 
6 
war. 
It ~s possible that the Soviet naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean region was deployed in support of this blockade. 
Although small in size and lacking air cover,the Soviet 
naval force may have been seen as a partial guarantee 
against American naval intervention in the area. It would 
have been reasonable for the Soviet units to move towards 
the area of conflict while keeping a discrett distance. 
1 The Australian, 5 December 1973. 
2 Pakistan Times, 13 March 1974. 
3 The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 1973. 
4 Reported Canberra Times, 3 December 1973. 
5 ibid. 
6 ibid. Although this was an undeclared blockade,it appears 
as though at least one American merchant ship seeking to 
sail through Bal-al-Mandeb was fired upon by an Egyptian 
destroyer. See Abir, Mordachi 1 Sharm al-Sheikh Bab al-
Mandeb: The Strategic Balance and Israel's Southern 
Approaches•, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 5, 
March 1974, p.5. 
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Interpretation of such a move would be subject to dispute 
but the consequences, for any subsequent Western involve-
ment, must have been to complicate any intended action 
and to close off a range of dramatic options for fear of 
risking an open naval encounter between the two super 
powers. 
The deployment of aircraft carriers off the Saudi 
Arabian-Oman coast was apparently related to the Arab 
nations 'oil diplomacy'. It gave some substance to 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's remarks, during an 
interview on 6 January 1974, that there was some risk of 
the use of American military power in response to a rising 
public demand for action against the Arab oil boycott. In 
a subsequent interview on 9 January 1974 Schlesinger 
commented 'I regard the likelihood of that as extremely 
low•. 1 The Arab states protested that the original 
statement was •reminiscent of gunboat diplomacy• and 
there were reports of ~udi Arabia taking 'security 
measures against possible foreign invasion of the sources 
of oil production' all of which was broadcast back to 
2 Arab states by the U.S.S.R. 
Although there is no detailed information available 
concerning Soviet naval activity, it can be stated with a 
reasonable degree of confidence that they kept close to 
the American task forces. 
oil boycott and urged its 
I 
fall-back due to occur on 
The Soviet Union supported the 
continuation after the Israeli 
3 21 February. Such statements 
probably required so~e continuing symbol of Soviet 
protection,as a reassurance to the Arab states,if they 
1 The Age, 12 Jan~ary 1974. 
2 See Editorial Report, BBC SWB SU/4496/A4/3, 10 January 
1974 for a coverage of Soviet broadcasts on the 8 January 
1974. 
3 
e.g. •continued Need for Oil Embargo after Disengagement•, 
Radio Peace and Progress in English 1430 GMT, 29 January 
1974, BBC SWB SU/4514/A4/l. 
were to be effective. Mbreover, Soviet vessels were seen 
to leave the Indian Ocean in the wake of the Oriskany 
task force in February 1974, suggesting that they had 
been marking this force during its tour. 1 
What can be made of this coming and going? It would 
seem as though, as in December 1971, the two super powers• 
naval forces observed each other closely during the period 
of 'oil diplomacy•,to ensure that neither intervened in a 
dramatic fashion. None-the-less the American task forces 
were not paralysed. The United States Navy tested the 
blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits, added some weight 
to Secretary Schlesinger's remarks, countered any comfort 
the Arab leaders may have gained from the Soviet presence, 
and provided an indication of United States concern about 
developments in the region. 
The only other naval activity ~n the region which has 
been described in terms of overt Soviet naval diplomacy 
occurred in April 1973. Admiral Gorshkov visited Iraq 
for the first anniversary celebrations of the Soviet-Iraq 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. While Gorshkov was 
in Iraq, and during the course of the celebrations, four 
naval vessels visited Iraq, from 5th - 12th April. In 
themselves these were not remarkable events, moreover 
Gorshkov 1 s visit must have been planned well in advance. 
The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy was an obvious 
choice for such a visit given the significant amount of 
aid the Soviet Union was making available for the 
development of harbour facilities at u~~ Qasr. The visit 
of the naval vessels was equally appropriate, symbolising 
the military strength of Iraq's treaty partner. 
However, a good deal of significance has been read 
into these events because during the previous month a 
long running border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait seemed 
about to ":t'r;;mpt into open conflict as a result of the Ir agi 
occupation of a border post. The facts of the dispute and 
1 The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 1974. 
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1 . . h 1 the nava Vlslts ave been documented elsewhere and four 
explanations of the visit offered; that the naval visit 
was merely routine, that it was intended to deter third 
party intervention, that it was an attempt to pressure 
Kuwait into accepting Iraqi claims and that it was a 
demonstration of solidarity with Iraq. However there is 
insufficient evidence to justify any of these claims and 
it would appear that a fifth hypothesis is just as 
reasonable: The Soviet naval visit and Gorshkov's talks 
with Iraqi leaders, while indicating general support for 
the regime, had the effect of restraining Iraq in what 
could have developed into a regional conflict involving 
Iran and Iraq. Moreover it is possible that the Iraqi 
leaders, having made the arrangements for the anniversary 
celebrations, attempted to take advantage of the situation 
by staging a small scale incursion into Kuwait territory, 
calculating that the subsequent visit would reinforce 
their position at the conference table and safeguard 
against any Iranian or other powers intervention. 
The Soviet Navy has also undertaken two minesweeping 
operations in the Indian Ocean area. The first of these 
involved clearing the Bangladesh port of Chittagong in the 
aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan War of December 1971. After 
the delays experienced in organising a United Nations 
supported clearance operation the Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh accepted a Soviet offer to undertake the task. 
A detailed account of Soviet operations and the magnitude 
of the task has been presented by Charles A.¢. Petersen 
of the Center for Naval Analyses and the £acts of the 
case as set out by him have been confirmed by the Bangladesh 
High Commission in Canberra. 2 Although the clearance and 
1 Kelly, Anne 'The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraq-
Kuwaiti Border Dispute, March-April 1973 1 • Professional 
Paper No. 122, Center £or Naval Analyses,Arlington,June 
1974. 
2 Petersen, Charles A., 'The Soviet Port-Clearing Operation 
In Bangladesh, March 1972- December 1973 1 , Professional 
Paper 123, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, 
June 1974. Interview with His Excellency the High 
Commissioner for the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 
S.A.M. Kibria, 17 July 1974. 
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salvage operation took much longer than anticipated the 
delays can be accounted for. Not only were the Soviet 
crews relatively unsophisticated in demolition techniques, 
compared with the Dutch who cleared Chalna, but they had 
to contend with high water temperatures and silting which 
not only reduced visibility during the monsoon months but 
also filled ships with silt. Moreover the Bangladesh 
Government was anxious to salvage as many of the wrecks 
as possible and requested the Soviet team to raise vessels 
rather than demolish them underwater. The Bangladesh 
authorities also admit to having added more vessels to the 
list after the original agreements had been made. 
Despite these delays, which gave rise to concern that 
the Soviet Navy was exploiting its presence to establish 
a naval base, the port clearance group began to leave ~n 
April 1974 and had withdrawn completely by July 1974. 
During the course of the operation there was no evidence 
of other Soviet vessels attempting to take advantage of 
the situation by paying frequent port calls; in fact only 
two such visits are recorded for the period August 1973 
to 18 November 1974. 1 
During August 1974 a second Soviet mineclearing 
operation was undertaken, at the southern end of the Suez 
Canal, as part of an effort, involving primarily the U.S. 
Navy and the Royal Navy, to prepare the canal for reopening. 
Seven minesweepers, five auxiliary vessels and two floating 
cranes were sent to the area where they were joined by the 
helicopter cruiser Leningrad which besides providing its 
helicopters also acted as a command centre for the 
operation. 2 The Leningrad left the Ocean during November 
although it appears that other vessels remained for a 
. d 3 longer per~o . 
1 Appendix IV. 
2 Canberra Times, 11 July 1974. 
3 d" See Appen ~X III. 
Besides undertaking the activities outlined above 
the Soviet naval presence has had an impact in other 
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more subtle ways. The number and distribution of Soviet 
port visits (Appendix IV) suggest a desire to remain 
relatively unobtrusive in the region as a whole,while 
concentrating on certain states, Somalia and Iraq, which 
are valued for their naval facilities, and in the case 
of Iraq, for its proximity to the Soviet Union and its 
oil. However the fact remains that whereas prior to 1968 
there was no permanent Soviet military presence in the 
region,post-1968 such a presence has been in evidence and 
is now permanent,if low level. This symbol of Soviet 
power and interest in the region has shown a limited 
ability to increase in numbers from time to time and 
Soviet prestige has undoubtedly benefited from the Chinese 
and American Governments' tendency to overreact to these 
increases. 
These aspects of the naval presence are essentially 
an adjunct to the economic and military aid programmes, 
and to the Soviet Union's diplomatic efforts in the region, 
which have enabled them to conclude Treaties of Friendship 
and Cooperation with Egypt (April 1971), India (August 
1971), Iraq (April 1972) and Somalia (October 1974). 1 
These treaties are the fruits of a policy designed to 
cultivate selected countries in a region of strategic 
significance to the Soviet Union,rather than an attempt to 
seek security and influence through more universalist 
collective security arrangements,such as the apparently 
abortive Asian collective security scheme of April 1972. 2 
1 Canberra Times, 1st November 1974 for report of Somalian 
ratification of the treaty signed on 11 July 1974. 
2 d 1 . . See Jukes, G., an C ark, I., 'The Sovlets and Aslan 
Collective Security, 1969-74', forthcoming in Kanet, 
Roger E., ed., The Soviet Union, the Soviet Development 
Model and the Developing Countries of Asla. 
An examination 
. f 1 . l ~n luence reg~ona 
of the use of the Soviet Navy to 
affairs should not obscure the fact 
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that the Soviet Union has been, and may still be, genuinely 
concerned about the possible establishment of a permanent 
U.S. SSBN presence in the Arabian Sea. Its naval vessels, 
oceanographic ships and fishing fleets are engaged, among 
other things, in gathering data on the topography of the 
ocean floor and the salinity, temperature variations and 
currents in the water. Soviet vessels not only keep track 
of other powers naval vessels in the ocean,but they also 
gather data on the quantity and characteristics of the 
electronic emissions from communications facilities and 
radars, both shore and ship based. Should it ever become 
necessary and feasible for the Soviets to conduct strategic 
ASW operations in the region they will have a reliable data 
pool at their disposal. 
The Soviets have raised the spectre of a naval arms 
race in the area but1 as has been pointed out,they have 
acted at a time and in a manner such that they have been 
largely absolved from blame for introducing this possibility. 
Soviet naval vessels first entered the Indian Ocean a full 
year after the US-UK agreement to establish joint facilities 
in the BIOT. Moreover, by presenting a low combat potential, 
and acting in a way designed not to rouse regional anxiety, 
1 I am aware that the discussion of influence in this 
context has been rather simplistic. However I have 
attempted to indicate some of the complexities and propound 
alternative hypotheses for some of the cases dealt with. 
It is possible to document the gross naval movements which 
occur during a particular incident and to note the outcome 
of such incidents 1 but it is impossible to demonstrate the 
connection between the one and the other, at least without 
a much fuller discussion of individual incidents, which 
would involve a great deal of attention being given to the 
actors allegedly influenced. 
Influence may be exerted in the sense that the presence of 
the Soviet Navy, where there was none before, has affected 
the behaviour of the littoral states simply by being there. 
However if the term influence is used in a more specific 
way suggesting that the process of influencing has been 
'successful' then we need to demonstrate that despite 
original intentions to the contrary an actor's behaviour 
does conform within reasonable limits to that desired by 
the influencing party. 
Soviet activity appears to have been accepted by the 
majority of littoral states as perhaps regrettable but 
certainly not threatening. By maintaining a low level 
1 presence the Soviet Union has helped create a climate 
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of opinion in the region which, while in favour of 
declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and a nuclear 
free zone, is not unduly hostile to Soviet activities. 
The Soviet Union in some respects appears to enjoy 
the best of all possible worlds in the reg~on. Its vessels 
come and go and can be used in support of Soviet commercial, 
scientific, military and diploma tic interests, while at the 
same time some of the activities of its rival, the United 
States, are subject to open questioning, suspicion and at 
times denunciation. In particular the American proposal 
to establish a naval base at Diego Garcia has been viewed 
with concern, not only in the region, but in some sections 
2 
of the American Administration and Congress. In addition 
the Soviets can take some comfort from the fact that to 
date no SSBN tender has been stationed in the Indian Ocean 
and therefore it ~s unlikely that the area has become 
a regular patrol ground for SSBNs. 
1 Mr. William Colby, Director of the CIA, has testified 
that the Soviet naval presence is still small and that a 
typical pattern of operations is for vessels to spend up 
to 80 percent of the time riding at anchor or in port. 
The Australian, 5 August 1974. 
2 Mr. Weiss supplied a table to the Hearings, Proposed 
Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, 
p.95, which indicated that of the 30 reg~onal powers 
surveyed only 6 were favourably disposed to the proposed 
upgrading of Diego Garcia. 
The U.S. Senate on 17 December 1974 passed a Military 
Construction Appropriations Bill 85 votes to nil but 
vetoed any money being spent on Diego Garcia subject to 
a Presidential declaration that the base is essential to 
the national interest. 
Canberra Times, 18 December 1974. Prior to this the 
House of Representatives had cut the Diego Garcia 
appropriation by half. A prominent member of the u.s. 
Administration, the Director of the CIA, Mr. William 
Colby, has also opposed the establishment of the base 
arguing that 'If we were to set up a permanent establish-
ment capable of supporting a regular force in that area, 
they would set up a countervailing force'. 
The Australian, 5 August 1974. 
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Soviet Expansion or Mutual Withdrawal 
It has been suggested, usually in the context of 
supporting the establishment of a United States naval 
facility in Diego Garcia, that the opening of the Suez 
Canal will see a dramatic rise in the number of Soviet 
vessels deployed on a steady state basis in the Indian 
Ocean, or alternatively that the Soviet Union will be 
able 
more 
to deploy a greater number of vessels to 
rapidly if and when the necessity should 
the region 
. 1 
ar ~se. 
Whatever the merits of this as an argument for the up-
grading of Diego Garcia2 the proposition itself bears 
examination. 
The distance from Vladivostok to Aden is 6,630 
nautical miles by the shortest route. A vessel travelling 
at a speed of 15 knots will spend some 18 days in making 
the journey. The voyage from Sevastopol using the Suez 
Canal will take 7 days. Thus the amount of time spent 
in transit by a vessel will be considerably reduced and 
hence its on-station availability will be increased. 
Assuming a 66 percent operational availability for surface 
ships at base,and a 150 day deployment, a vessel from 
Vladivostok making the journey to Aden would have an 
on-station availability of 50 percent. From Sevastopol 
the on-station availability rises to 60 percent. If the 
length of deployment is 60 days then vessels from 
Vladivostok have a 26 percent in 
from Sevastopol the figure is 46 
area availability while 
3 percent. Thus there is 
some advantage to the Soviet Navy if vessels use the Suez 
Canal route from the Black Sea,and this advantage becomes 
1 Admiral W.H. Bagley, C inC, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 
Interview U.S. News and World Report, 24 D.ecember 1973. 
2 See Jukes, G., 'Big Pond Needs Small Fish', 
The Australian, 26 February 1974 for the argument that 
it has little merit. 
3 Calculations of on-station availability =operational 
availability x deployment -(2 x transit) 
deployment. 
432 
more significant if shorter deployment times are used. 1 
Against this advantage must be set the fact that the 
Black Sea Fleet has primary responsibility for maintaining 
the Mediterranean presence. To assume the role of 
providing an increased presence in the Indian Ocean would 
stretch the resources of this fleet, particularly the 
auxiliary units, which despite the use of Berbera, would 
still be necessary. 
The naval strength of the Black Sea Fleet including 
auxiliaries is shown in the following table. From this 
table it can be seen that to deploy any major surface fleet 
vessel on a permanent basis to the Indian Ocean from the 
Black Sea Fleet would require ,,either a weakening of the 
Mediterranean presence,or a substantial increase Ln the 
size of the Black Sea Fleet at the expense of other fleet 
areas. 
Whereas some use of the Black Sea Fleet vessels is to 
be expected,it is unlikely that there will be any dramatic 
increase in the number of vessels in the Indian Ocean on a 
steady state deployment. This is primarily because the 
Soviets are unlikely to weaken their Mediterranean presence, 
where their vessels have a primary mission of countering 
the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers and conducting ASW 
exercises. Nor are the Soviets likely to draw large 
numbers of vessels from their other fleet areas where, one 
assumes, they have been assigned for a purpose. It is 
possible that the Pacific Fleet could be an exception to 
this proposition,for at present the Pacific Fleet is the 
home base of most of the ships deployed in the Indian 
Ocean. Therefore it is possible that these vessels could 
be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet. 
1 This would seem desirable if the more modern and 
sophisticated vessels of the Soviet Fleet were to be 
used in the region. There are also major advantages for 
auxiliary vessels which may be able to shuttle back and 
forth rather than accompany the combatants for the 
duration of their deployment. 
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Major Combatants and Auxiliaries available in the 
Black Sea Fleet 1st July 1973 {Estimate only) 
W cruise missile submarine 
B 
R 
w 
Q 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Kiev 
Kara 
air capability ship 
missile~firing cruisei 
Moskva ASW cruiser 
Sverdlov SAM cruiser 
Sverdlov 
Chapayev 
Ki:rov 
" 
" 
" 
Kresta I missile firing cruiser 
Kynda 
" " " 
Kashin Destroyer 
Kotlin SAM Destroyer 
Kildin 
Kotlin 
" 
Skory 
" 
Gl:isha 
all other light surface vessels 
omitted although present in Black 
Sea Fleet 
T-58, T-43 Minesweeper 
Alligator 
Polnocny 
Landing Ship 
Ugra 
Lama 
Dnepr, Oskol 
Fleet Oile%s 
Light Cat:go 
Int. Ships 
Hydrographic Research 
Fleet Tug 
Water Carrier 
Bexman1 
4 
1 
6 
14 
10 
1+1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
9 
3 
3 
4 
10 
5 
60 
3 
15 
55 
2 
2 
1 
B 
10 
15 
2 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
5 
3 
2 
3 
10 
4 
40 
3 
18 
45 
1 
1 
15 
not listed 
" 
" 
Berman in 
Mediterranean 
ftom B.S.F.4 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 Robert Berman, 'Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment as of lst July 1973', 
op.cit. 
2 Janes Fighting Ships 1973-4, p.530. 
3 To date the operational zone for classes building at Black Sea construction 
yards, the Kiev and the Kara, are not known with any certainty so they have 
been omitted from the following discussion. 
4 The submarine contingent of the Soviet Mediterranean presence is supplied 
by the Northern Fleet because of the limitations, under the Montreux 
Convention, of deployment from the Black Sea to the Me::E terranean. Don 
class submarine supply vessels also move down from the Northern Fleetii's do 
the ship repair vessels of the Dnepr and~ classes. 
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Any crisis which escalates to the stage of 
conventional war,or war at sea between the super powers, 
will in all probability see NATO attempts to blockade 
the Turkish Straits thereby denying the Black Sea Fleet 
transit. 
The above arguma<t, in terms of increased capabilities, 
or steps that would be required to increase capabilities, 
does not take into account Soviet intentions. If the 
argument that the Soviet Navy enjoys the best of all 
possible worlds in the Indian Ocean region is accepted 
then the possibility must be taken into account that the 
Soviet Union has no intention of dramatically increasing 
its steady state deployment in the region. Any such move 
may well jeopardise the present regional climate of opinion 
which works in favour of the Soviet Union. Many of the 
American domestic critics of the Diego Garcia proposal 
have based their opposition on the fact that the present 
Soviet deployment is small and relatively insignificant. 
However this opinion may well be changed by a dramatic 
and sustained increase in soviet activity. One critic of 
the current proposal to upgrade facilities at D~go Garcia 
has written: 
1 
(W)e should not as yet transform Diego Garcia 
from an important communications facility to an 
active naval base. Let the Russians bear the 
onus for precipitating a naval race in the Indian 
Ocean, which none of the littoral states desire. 
Their level of activity does not yet persuade the 
countries in the area that they are provoking such 
a race. If we proceed now ... wewould be held 
responsible. If, after Suez is reopened, they 
massively increase their naval presence, we should 
proceed as the President now suggests. It is 
important for our long run political, economic and 
defence relations in the area ..• that they are seen 
responsible for whatever competition may ensue.l 
Letter 14 February 1974 from W.H. Wriggins to Congressmen 
Morgan, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of 
Representatives, and published in Appendix III, Statements 
submitted for the record of the Hearings: ~roposed 
Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Ind~an Ocean, 
p.l73-4. 
435 
These arguments apply to the improbability of a major 
escalation of the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean presence on 
the opening of the Suez Canal but some elements also apply 
to task specific deployments. A major crisis involving 
NATO may see the closure of the Turkish Straits: in any 
case no Soviet naval planner could count on the ability to 
use the Straits unhindered in these conditions. In a 
future Middle East flareup there is no guarantee that the 
Suez Canal would be available for transits to the Indian 
Ocean, and in such a situation the Black Sea Fleet is likely 
to be fully occupied in the Mediterranean. 
In regional crises, such as occurred in December 1971, 
neither the Turkish Straits nor the Suez Canal are likely 
to be denied the Soviet Fleet,but then neither is the Suez 
Canal likely to be denied the United States. In a repeat 
round of Arab-Israeli hostilities it is quite possible 
that the Suez Canal will be closed or blocked to all vessels. 
Dr. Kissinger has recently noted 'The Soviet Union 
has not been pushing for a reopening of the Suez Canal•. 
(It is arguable that they refrained because others, most 
notably the United States, have been urging the opening 
of the Canal). Kissinger acknowledged that it would be 
easier for the Soviets to transit war ships from the 
Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean with the canal open, 
but this would not be a vast disadvantage to the United 
States which could also transit its ships in the same 
fashion. He questioned whether much political advantage 
would flow to the Soviets once its ships were able to 
transit the cana1. 1 
It is true that the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers will 
not be able to transit the Canal,and hence the United 
States naval presence would be denied one of its most 
versatile tools,but this denial does not confer impotence 
1 Transcript Report of Secretary of State Kissinger's 
News Conference, 6 June,l974, p.S; provided by U.S.I.S. 
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on such vessels as can make the transit. Should the 
situation be deemed sufficiently serious to warrant the 
presence of an aircraft carrier one could be sent from 
the Pacific Fleet and, given a transit speed of 25 knots, 
it could join an American force in the Arabian Sea within 
9 days. 
If there appears to be little danger of a sudden, 
unmatched, upsurge of Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean 
how likely is it that the Soviet Union and the United 
States will be able to reach some agreement on a mutual 
withdrawal or a limited presence in the Indian Ocean? 
On ll June 1971, Brezhnev gave some precision to the 
previously vague calls that the Indian Ocean be declared 
a zone of peace,or a nuclear-free zone, which as we have 
seen date from 1963-4. He said· 
We have never considered, and do not now consider 
it an ideal situation for the navies of the great 
powers to cruise for long periods, far from their 
own shores and we are prepared to solve this 
problem, but, as they say, on an equal footing. 
On the basis of such principles (equal footing) 1 the Soviet Union is ready to discuss any proposals. 
Brezhnev specifically mentioned the Mediterranean and the 
Indian Ocean as well as 'other seas' in this passage of 
his speech. He also critised the attitude of American 
politicians who, while complaining about the Soviet Navy, 
'consider it normal and natural' for the United States 
Navy to be constantly deployed far from its home bases. 
Following Mr. Brezhnev 1 s call for restraint ln naval 
deployments the United States sought some expansion and 
clarification of meaning. Mr. Alexis Johnson, Under-
Secretary of State, informed the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee of such an approach which had led to discussions 
2 following the 11 June speech. State Department spokesmen 
1 Brezhnev Election Speech, Moscow home service 14-55 
GMT 11 June 1971. BBC SWB SU/3708/C2/l-9, p.9. 
2 New York Times, 3 February 1972, p.lO. 
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however claimed that the discussions had not proceeded to 
1 
any great extent. 
In May 1972 Gorshkov and U.S. Secretary of the Navy, 
Warner, signed an agreement on the prevention of incidents 
at sea. This, however, only covered the behavior of 
vessels of the two navies 
nothing to regulate their 
when they met 
2 deployments. 
at sea but did 
There lS no 
public evidence that the issue of limiting deployments 
was raised at the time. 
In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on the Near East and South Asia, Mr. J.O. Zurkellen, Deputy 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated 
that to date the Soviet Union still had not clarified the 
issue. He claimed the United shates remained interested ln 
mutual restraint 'perhaps in the form of explicit under-
standings to avoid competition while safeguarding our 
respective interests in the Indian Ocean' 3 
At the United Nations the great powers and their major 
allies (excepting Australia and New Zealand in 1973), have 
abstained from voting on resolutions proposed by littoral 
states to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace,which 
have,none the less,been carried by increasing majorities 
on each occasion. One explanation for this apparent lack 
of enthusiasm on the part of the Soviet Union is that 
Brezhnev's proposal was mere propaganda. This is, of 
course, a possibility that cannot be rejected out of hand, 
but it is also likely to be an oversimplification. 
To dismiss the proposal in this way is to avoid 
examining some of the difficulties which face the Soviet 
Union in this matter. Insofar as the United Nations 
1 ibid. 
2 For the text of the agreement see 'President Nixon in 
Moscow: A Summary of Major Statements and Agreements during 
President Rlchard Nixon's Visit to the Soviet Union, May 
22-30, 1972', p.S-10; (provided by the U.S.I.S.). 
3 Hearings: Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities 
in the Indian Ocean, p.4 and 6. 
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resolutions are concerned they are declaratory, in 
principle, resolutions which do not relate to the concerns 
or interests of the great powers themselves, or provide any 
specific indication as to how the laudible goal of a zone 
of peace is to be achieved. This is in part because the 
supporters of the motion have no concensus views on what a 
zone of peace implies for them and the great powers, 1 but 
more importantly it stems from a realisation that any naval 
agreement which may eventually be arrived at will be struck 
by the great powers themselves,with full regard for their 
own interests. In this process the littoral powers will do 
no more than play 
eyes of the great 
a role in keeping the issue before the 
2 powers. 
A formal agreement between the super powers would 
have to permit transit of, and occasional deployments to, 
the Indian Ocean, and allow port calls to the littoral 
states, if the principle of freedom of the seas was to be 
maintained. There may be a restriction on permanent 
deployments, or perhaps on the number of ship days 
permissible in the ocean. Certaih types of vessel could 
be excluded completely, or allowed entrance on a relatively 
restricted basis. 
Although aspects of such a treaty, if and when it was 
negotiated, may contain provisions, such as the permanent 
exclusion of SSBN support facilities from the Indian Ocean, 
which would appear attractive to the Soviet Union such 
potential benefits are only available at a price. The 
treaty may impose some limitations on present Soviet naval 
activity or on Soviet ability to intervene in the region. 
1 A glance at the 'Excerpts from statements made in the 
general debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean' 
contained in United Nations General Assembly Report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1973. General 
Assembly Official Records 28th Session Supplement No. 29 
(A/9029) will be sufficient illustration of the point. 
2 See Bull, Hedley, 1 The Indian Ocean as a "Zone of Peace" 1 , 
paper presented for the National Seminar on the Indian 
Ocean, J. Nehru University, February 1974 for further 
elaboration. 
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This however is essentially a technical matter, capable 
of being avoided or skirted by a competent negotiator, 
and does not account for Soviet reluctance to enter into 
even preliminary discussions. Perhaps a more important 
concern is the fact that such negotiations would, as an 
end result, confer legitimacy on such U.S. naval presence 
as was agreed to under the treaty. Moreover an agreement 
arrived at by the Great Powers,and formally acknowledging 
Soviet-United States rights to a defined presence in the 
region would smack of that Great Power collusion and 
struggle for hegemony about which the Chinese have warned. 1 
If one considers the economic, diplomatic and 
strategic benefits and losses to each side occasioned by 
mutual restraint it appears that both may see they have 
common interests in a low level presence. The mutual 
understanding may result not in a treaty but rather in a 
continuation of the situation as it has evolved over the 
last six years. That is the super powers will continue 
to deploy to the Indian Ocean in small numbers under 
normal conditions,but retain the option to intervene in 
larger numbers should circumstances warrant it. 
1 e.g. Report of Hsin~Qarticle in The Australian, 
21 December 1974. 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
The brief survey of Soviet naval deployments indicates 
a generally defensive posture in that a major concern has been 
to gain operational experience in waters of potential 
significance in any future war between the super powers. The 
of 
timing of the initial establishment)deployments, their order, 
the type of combatants involved and the activities of Soviet 
vessels indicate that besides gaining broad area familiarization 
the Soviet Navy has kept the attack carrier task forces under 
close observation. 
The Indian Ocean case, which can be seen as part of this 
pattern, indicates some of the severe limitations under which 
Soviet naval forces operate on distant deployment. Such 
deployments v;ere undertaken prior to the provision of an 
adequa·te auxiliary fleet and necessitated an attempt to 
establish a reasonably secure naval facility in the region. 
The observed idleness of vessels on deployment is a further 
~~· indication of weakness in the Soviet Navy. Were the Soviet 
presence gt increase this could only be done by diverting 
vessels from other operations. Given the major problems of 
block obsolescence facing the Soviet Navy, the apparent short 
fall in almost all classes of vessels engaged in other operation~ 
and the fact that the naval presence as presently constituted 
appears to be fulfilling Soviet requirements and within Soviet 
means it seems reasonable te: suggest that any sustained dramatic 
build up in the Soviet presence will be a reaction to moves made 
by the United States. 
' 
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APP'SNDIX 1 
SOVIET NAVAL DBPLOYMB:NTS IN 1'HE INDIAN OCEAN 
MARCH 1968 ~ DBCEM3BR 1971 
SURFACE SHIPS 
_ Indivi~a_!.::-~~loyments 
- .. Port~ Vis~!_~-~---
·-ll~!· ! l (Bangladesh Crisis) I Kotlin Barbera, Bahrein, Aden 
~ Barbera, Aden 2!Eel Aden, Be:&:bera 
1-t :: ·+- 0 ~ '"' : ' I '~'-1~ j-~~··---~..::: +1- ~ 0 ~Aden, Massawa., Serbera Kis~~~ayu, Singapore • 
- T-58 Mogadishu, Port SUdan 
• ml"gator Aden, Berbe:ra 1 
Port Sudan 
• 
N 
" " ' I ~ • 
" " N 
" ~ Kotlin Aden, Berbera 
0 
' 
mrgi'tm: Por·t Sudan, Barbera 
" " -""'"' ~ 
00 • 00 
' 
0 0 0 
~ 
N 
0 I~ ~ Kotlin, Allisator Aden, Be:tbera ~ 
I 
0 Jknda Mauhn.us, Bombay 
N N ~ Mogadishu 
' • N N I 
I • • • • 
• ~ . Ma.w::iti1UI, Aden, Massawa, Hodeida N+-
• re ~. All~ator 
" 
N 
• 
V1s hnapatnam, 
c.:! 1-- ~I· Mogadishu ( + !!:!.!.:.!,) 
" 
Port Sudan 
I 
.':! K-Kisma.yu, A-Berbel'a 
0 • 
" I • ~ 
! • Krupnyi Singapore, Berbera 
--
Zam: ibar , Bandar Abbas , I> 
' 
t11m11. Qasl:' , Male -~ ·~ 
0 I 
' I 
.C" 
-. 
0 
I • Ma~itius {3-7), ChittagonQ (21-23) N 
' ""-- ~ N c-I
I • i N Banda!: Abbu(?-12}, Uflllll Qa.sr (15-18) I 
I " ~ Aden(2-7) ,Hoc:teid&(9-12) .~ua.wa.(9-l3) 
" 
" 
Mombassa ( 25-2) 
" • • 
" 0 
" 
• 
• 
' • • 
Colombo (7-11) (Berenice) 
. ~ . Bandar Abbas (4-9),Aden {25-28) 
0-
---
U.. Qasr (11-19), KaXacbi (25-2) • 
" • -1--
• • 
Bollbay (2-6), Mogadishu (17-24) 
• N N N 
,_., (27-31) 
N N N 
N 
" 
Note: Where there is no encom-
" ~ passing bracket, the location o£ 0 the port name indicates the ~ 
' ~ 0 > ~ " month o£ the port visit, ... ~ ~ :;, ~ B dates (when known) being shown ~ > ' ' • in parenthesis. " ... t: ~ ·• • 
" 
~ ~ ·• • • ~ ~ ., " • • > ~ ~ a " ~ g 00 < 
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SUBMARINES AND 
TENDERS I 
-11 ~' 1: . 
110 i 
' ~ 
t2J r-., 
1-
s 
1-I 
' ~ 
I 31 
• l ~ i Berbera '1 11, ; Ullll!D. Qa.sr ! ·(With T-58) ~ 
' ~ " 
8 
-
• ~··' 7 gadishu -
'" 
F-Karachi t--!1 
"I 
Bandllr Abbas ,I 
EII-8~bera 
--
• ~ I • Mombassa 2&F 
• 
Berbera £!2!:! 1· 
1-
I lF&Don ~ tE h IJmfll. oasr Aden 10 Karachi tg I 
N tg 1-
7 
r-. 
Is 
N 4 
I 3 
I 2 
h 1 
Dar-es-Salaam r-!.? 
11 
~·~~ 
-
10 
- 9 
-- 8 
7 
6 
5 
---·- ~-
• 
3 
2 
--" 
!I m • • • " v .~ 
MccGwire, M.: The Pattern ot Soviet Naval Deploy~nt in the Indian Ocean, p.2. 
APPENDIX I I : SOVIET INDIAI'\i OCEAN PRESEN:E 
In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union has no naval bases; the ships 
in positions there a:re drawn from the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. 
Deployments from October 1971 to March 1973 were:-
31 May 1973 1971 1972 
Type/Class Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mai Apr May Jun Ju1 Aug Se?t 
Cruiser -
( i) Kynda 
-
1 1 1 
(ii) Sverdlov 
- - -(iii) Kresta 1 1 1 
Destroyer -
( i) Kotlin 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 
(ii) Kashin 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
-(iii) Petya 
- - - - - - - - -
-
Submarine -
(i) Juliett 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(ii) Echo-II 
- -
1 1 1 
- - -(iii) Foxtrot 
- -
3 3 3 1 1 1 
Minesweeper -
(i) T-43 
- - - -
- - - - - - -
-
(ii) T-58 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Landing Ship -
Alligator 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 
- - - -
Oiler 1 l 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Repair Ship 
- - -
1 1 1 1 1 
Oceanographic l 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 
Space Support 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 
Stores Ship 1 
- - - - -
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Submarine Tender 1 1 1 
TOTAL 10 7 14 20 19 14 14 13 11 10 13 11 
Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Replies to 
q·~estions on notice, 31 May (p.3036-37), 22 October 1973 (p.2472), 1973; 
and 5 December 1974 (p.4727-28). 
Oct Nov Dec 
1 1 
1 1 1 
-
- -
- -
2 
1 1 
- -
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
4 4 3 
4 4 3 
2 1 1 
14 14 14 
1973 
Jan Feb 
1 1 
1 1 
- -
2 2 
1 2 
1 1 
3 3 
1 2 
10 12 
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Mai 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
10 
-F" 
~ 
APPENDIX II (Continued) 
Maximum number of ships present at any 
one time in the month of:-
1973 
Type/Class April May June July 
cruiser 
-
Sverdlov 1 
Destroyer 
-(i) Kotlin l 2 2 1 
(ii) Petya l 2 2 2 
Subma.r ine - l l 1 
Minesweeper 
-(i) T-43 2 1 l 
{ii} T-58 2 2 2 
Landing Ship 
-
Alligator 1 1 1 
Oiler 2 1 
Repair Ship 1 1 l 
Research l 1 1 
Space Support 3 1 2 2 
Stores 1 1 1 2 
TOTAL 12 14 14 12 
Mr. Barnard provided the following information on 31 May 1973: -
In addition, some five minesweepers, five salvage ships and 
one oiler have been engaged in port clearance operations in 
Bangladesh since April 1972. 
On 22 October 1973 he added the following:-
August 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
l 
2 
2 
13 
These numbers do not include the naval salvage and minesweeping 
force which, since April 1972 1 has worked in the port of Chittagong 
in Bangladesh. This force, which reached its peak in October 1972, 
at present comprises 1 oiler, 2 minesweepers and 5 salvage vessels. 
(2) 
(3) 
Soviet naval ships had access to commercial facilities in ports of 
a number of countries in and around the Indian Ocean. In recent 
years Soviet naval vessels have visited Bgypt (Red Sea ports), 
Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Malagasy, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Tan:~ania and the Yemeni Arab Republic. 
Up to the present time the Soviet Union has sought to develop 
relationships with those countries in and around the Indian Ocean 
which allow it, on request, to use their port and airfield 
facilities for the repair and resupply required to supplement its 
afloat support. There are reports of a Soviet communications 
station having been established in Somalia. 
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APPENDIX II (continued} ~OVIET INDIAN OCEAN PRESENCE 
Source~ Hansard, Australian {Federal) Pa:r li.ament, 5 December 
1973 
----
Ship Type Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mat Apt May 
.. 
C:t:uisex 1 1 1 l 1 l l 
Destroyer 3 3 3 4 4 4 
·' 
3 3 5 
Submarine -
Diesel powered 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 3 
Nuclear Powered 1 l .l 
Mines'i!ieepex 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
Landing Ship 1 1 l l l l 1 l 1 1 
Auxiliaries 6 5 6 6 8 7 ~ 5 6 5 
Miscellaneous Vessels 
employed in 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 minesweeping 
ope:rations 
(2) The total number o£ ship &!..ys spent by Soviet .na.va1 vessels in 
the Indian Ocean throu9hout the period was: 
Surface combatants 
Submax:ines 
Landing Ships 
Auxilia;ries 
Mineswmep:i.ng gr:oup, Bangladesh and Red Sea 
TOTAL 
1,067 
836 
388 
2,896 
3,588 
10,775 
1974 
June Jul Aug 
l 2 2 
3 4 4 
1 1 1 
9 2 2 
8 8 9 
5 10 12 
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Sept. Oct. 
2 2 
4 4 
1 1 
2 2 
1 1 
10 10 
10 10 
till 
Nov 
3 
1 
2 
1 
7 
10 
8 
.;;c 
.r;: 
v' 
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APPENDIX II (Continued) 
The total figures for Soviet Naval Ships visiting the 
Indian Ocean since 1968 are as follows:-
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
16 21 21 18 16 
From 1 August 1973 until 18 December 1974 the 
Soviet naval ships visited the Indian Ocean. 
figures represent totals only. 
Cruisers (including 1 helicopter 
cruiser) 
Destroyers 
Submarines -
Diesel powered 
Nuclear powered 
Minesweepers 
Landing Ships 
Auxiliaries 
Miscellaneous vessels employed in 
minesweeping operations in 
Bangladesh and the Red Sea 
1973 
(to 31 Aug) 
15 
following 
The 
4 
8 
4 
3 
4 
2 
29 
20 
MONTHLY TOTAL OF SHIP DAYS FOR SOVIET VESSELS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
1973 1974 
Ship Type Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug 
Surface 
Combatants 155 150 155 188 217 217 190 180 161 250 210 360 155 
Submarines 31 30 31 30 124 124 91 76 60 68 30 31 31 
Landing Ships 31 30 31 30 31 31 28 31 30 25 
- -
11 
Auxiliaries 113 129 159 182 230 168 149 140 136 152 221 236 185 
Minesweeping 
group, 
Bangladesh 248 240 248 240 232 248 224 236 180 154 108 
-
310 
and Red Sea 
TOTAL 578 579 624 670 834 788 682 663 567 649 569 627 692 
Source: ~. House of Representatives, 5 December 1974, p.4728. 
Sep Oct 
188 201 
30 31 
30 31 
250 346 
399 341 
897 950 
till 18 
Nov 
90 
18 
18 
100 
180 
406 
.. 
.... 
"' 
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APPENDIX II I 
. 
1 • h d" Sh~p Days ~n t e In ~an Ocean: Soviet Navy 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
Warships l' 370 1,190 3,220 3,160 
Amphibious 300 290 270 320 
Support 3,260 2!490 52350 5!520 
TOTAL 4,930 3,970 8,840 9,000 
Warships excluding 
1,8252 Bangladesh minesweepers 1,460 
Notes: 
1· Ship Days: the sum of the number of days each ship 
spends in the Indian Ocean. 
2. Included in the category •warships' are minesweepers 
present in the Indian Ocean but not engaged in the 
Bangladesh operation. 
As a basis of comparison: 
* Ship Days in the Indian Ocean: us Navy 
1970 
782 
1971 1972 1973 
---
Warships 
Amphibious 
Support 
TOTAL 
675 967 1,392 
374 
1,246 
183 
479 
1,337 
23 18 
447 744 
1,437 2,154 
Sources: 
1. Unclassified US Department of Defense material, 
provided by USIS, April 1974. 
2. Weiss, S., Testimony to the Subcommittee on the Near 
East and South Asia of theCommittee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
* 
6 March 1974. Proposed Expansion of US Military 
Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p.32. 
'The Indian Ocean: A New Naval Arms Race?' 
The Defence Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 3, April 1974, p.5. 
Christian Science Monitor, 13 December 1973, estimated 
that there were 20 Soviet naval vessels in the Indian 
Ocean, of which half were auxiliaries. 
The US Navy does not send minesweepers to the Indian 
Ocean. 
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APPENDIX IV 
INDIAN OCEAN PORT CALLS: COMBATANTS AND AUXILIARIES ONLY 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
--
Soviet Navy 11 18 18 35 100 
US Navy 152 135 177 161 184 
Source: Unclassified US Department of Defense material 
provided by USIS, April 1974. 
During the period August 1973 to November 1974 Soviet 
naval vessels are known to have conducted port visits 
in Indian Ocean littoral countries as follows:-
Bombay (India) 1 (2 ships) 
Madras (India) 1 (3 ships) 
Chittagong (Bangladesh) 2 ( 1 ship) 
Colombo (Sri Lanka) 5 (6 ships) 
Massawa (Ethiopia) 1 (1 ship) 
Mombassa (Kenya) 1 (3 ships) 
Port Louis (Mauritius) 7 (12 ships) 
Singapore 15 (14 ships) 
Soviet naval vessels visited other ports in the north-
western Indian Ocean, including Iraq, Somalia, and the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yeman, and Egyptian Red 
Sea ports, but details of those visits are not available. 
Source: CPD, House of Representatives, 5 December 1974, 
p.4728. 
Host Country1 
Ethiopia 
India 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Malagsy Republic 
Maldives 
Mauritius 
Pakistan 
Seychelles Islands 
Somalia2 
South Yemen 
sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
UAR (Port Suez) 
Yemen 
TOTAL 
APPENDIX IV (Continued) 
FIGURE 2: UNI'IED STATES AND SOVIET PORT CALLS IN 'ffiE INDIAN OCEAN 
United 
States 
14 
9 
1 
0 
7 
0 
6 
0 
18 
6 
6 
1 
£ 
3 
0 
0 
9 
0 
71 
1968 
USSR 
0 
8 
3 
3 
5 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
3 
4 
4 
0 
4 
3 
0 
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United 
States 
13 
9 
2 
0 
9 
2 
5 
0 
10 
9 
6 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
71 
1969 
USSR 
1 
2 
7 
8 
0 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
0 
13 
13 
8 
2 
2 
1 
2 
68 
United 
States 
10 
8 
10 
0 
8 
1 
7 
1 
7 
7 
3 
0 
£ 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
65 
1970 
USSR 
1 
6 
0 
2 
3 
0 
0 
0 
17 
2 
0 
18 
7 
2 
2 
2 
0 
3 
65 
United 
States 
10 
11 
6 
0 
9 
3 
13 
1 
16 
11 
9 
2 
0 
• 
0 
2 
0 
0 
97 
1971 
USSR 
1 
1 
2 
11 
0 
0 
0 
l 
5 
0 
0 
ll 
13 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
47 
1 Bangladesh is omitted since activities at Chittagong are not considered normal port calls. 
United 
States 
8 
0 
8 
0 
12 
1 
11 
1 
7 
10 
6 
0 
£ 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
74 
1972 
2 The large increase in Soviet visits to Somalia in 1973-73 reflects the use of Ber~a for naval support. 
Note: Port calls by oceanographic research and space event support ships are included. This explains the 
discrepancies between these and other figures provided which only indicate combatants and their 
auxiliaries, 
USSR 
1 
4 
2 
14 
2 
0 
0 
0 
20 
0 
3 
38 
12 
14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
110 
448 
United 
States 
12 
0 
8 
0 
22 
2 
19 
0 
19 
11 
10 
0 
£ 
10 
1 
1 
0 
0 
115 
1973 
USSR 
1 
7 
0 
16 
4 
0 
0 
1 
11 
0 
0 
97 
7 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
153 
4:' 
~ 
t:.'(} 
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APPENDIX V 
McConnell and Kelly's study of naval diplomacy during the 
Indo-Pakistan War of December 1971 lists the following 
Soviet vessels as being deployed: 
MAJOR SOVIET COMBATANTS DEPWYED INDO-PAKISTAN WAR 
Deployment as of 
l December 1971 
(Prior to War) 
5 December 1971 
18 December 1971 
Late December -
early January 1972 
Vessel 
Kotlin destroyer 
T-58 minesweeper 
F class submarine 
Alligator tank 
landing ship 
Kotlin SAM destroyer 
T-58 minesweeper 
Kynda missile cruiser 
(8 SSM launchers, 
2 SAM launchers) 
Kashin destroyer 
(4 SAM launchers) 
J Class submarine 
(4 SSM launchers) 
Arrival in Ocean 
29 June 
30 June 
Late November 
mid November 
Kresta I missile cruiser 
(4 SSM launchers, 
4 SAM launchers) 
Kashin SAM destroyer 
F class submarine 
SSM submarine 
(If a J class, 
4 SSM launchers; 
if EI, 
6 SSM launchers; 
if EII, 
8 SSM launchers). 
J. McConnell and A. Kelly, op.cit., p.l-3. 
CHAPTER XI 
INTRODUCTION 
Gorshkov's series "Navies in War and Peace" is an un-
precedented event. Its authorship alone is sufficient to 
capture attention but it is, moreover, the first detailed 
Soviet analysis of the role of navies to have appeared in an 
open source. 
The following discussion asks a series of questions: Why 
and for whom was the series 1vri tten? What has Gorshkov to say 
on the importance of the Navy in relation to other branches of 
the armed services? What is the role of sea power in war and 
peace? How does Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 
view arms limitation? The answers to these questions, although 
interesting in their own right, provide useful information on 
Gorshkov' s attitude to those broader issues with which '\'le have 
been concerned in this present study: the implications for the 
Soviet Navy of the major changes in the naval environment since 
World War II, the significance afforded the navy in Soviet 
strategic doctrine, the navy's development and capabilities to 
meet the demands of the changed environment and the political 
leaderships responsiveness to the needs of the navy. 
Besides noting what Gorshkov has to say it is important 
to note the stylistic devices which he uses. It is shown that 
Gorshkov is arguing, educating, attempting to convince his 
readership of the soundness of his overall view that a super 
power must have a strong navy, that possession of a strong navy 
can confer great advantages to a state in war and peace and, 
most significantly,that a strong navy requires a firm and con-
tinuing policy commitment from the poli·tical leadership if it 
is to be created and maintained. Only if such a commitment is 
forthcoming will the navy be able to play its unique role in 
ensuring a continued super power status for the Soviet Union, 
and such a conuni·tment can only come from a deep seated 
appreciation of the role and importance of the navy as an arm 
of policy in war and peace. 
CHAPTER XI 
An Analysis of 'Navies in War and Peace' 
by Admiral S.G. Gorshkov 
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General Comments on the Series 
The series of articles 'Navies in •var and Peace' '1-Ihich 
appeared under the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Soviet Navy were published in the monthly naval journal 
Morskoy Sbornik from February 1972- February 1973. 1 By 
its very size and the attribution of its authorship, it is 
an unprecedented series. Its subject matter, in the main 
a selective historical account of the role of navies in war 
and peace, 2 marks a departure in Soviet naval writings for 
it is the first detailed soviet analysis of the role of navies 
in peacetime to have appeared in an open source. 
The unprecedented nature of the series poses the 
question: why was it written? Previous analysts of the 
1 
2 
The series has been translated in the u.s. Navy's 
Selected Translations from Norskoy Sbornik. I have used 
this translation for all articles except the last, i.e. 
that of February 1973. Here I have used the JPRS trans-
lation which appeared in the series Translations-of USSR 
Nilitarv Affairs No. 905. 
All citations of the series in the text will take the 
following form - M.S./month of Morskoy Sbornik in which 
the article first appeared/year/page number of translation. 
This will combine sufficient accuracy, for those wishing 
to follow up footnotes, with brevity. 
Further translations of the series as a whole can be 
found in USNIP from January 1974 - November 1974, and the 
United States Naval Institute has published the articles 
under the title Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis, 1974). 
Gorshkov's own statement of intent occurs early in the 
first article. 'We do not intend to cover the history 
of the naval art, much less define the prospects for the 
development of naval forces. We intend only to express 
a few thoughts about the role and place of navies in 
various historical eras and at different stages in the 
development of military equipment and of the military art, 
in order, on this basis, to determine the trends and 
principles of the change in the role and position of 
navies in wars, and also in t.heir employment in peacetime 
as an instrument of state policy'. H.S./2/1973/p.ll. 
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series have divided into those who claim that Gorshkov is 
announcing a series of new departures in Soviet military 
doctrine and naval missions and subsequently advocating an 
increase in resource allocation to the Navy1 and those who 
see Gorshkov as advocating not only an increase in resource 
allocation to the Navy, but also the elimination of 
constraints on its operations,by educating and persuading 
the relevant publics: the Navy, the remainder of the Armed 
Forces and the political leadership. 2 
Without becoming enmeshed in this debate it. can be 
pointed out that if Gorshkov is announcing, as opposed to 
advocating, then he hardly needs to do so by way of eleven 
articles covering events from 'ancient times' to the present. 
If he is announcing something, it is a wonder that this 
announcement is not clear for all to see. (If Western 
analysts cannot agree on whether he is announcing, how 
much more difficult the task of the serving officers of the 
Soviet Armed Forces, who not only have to pick that there 
is an announcement but then delve through the material to 
divine what in fact is being announced.) 
Following the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966, 
Gorshkov claimed: 
Unified views with respect to the tasks 
the fleet will have in modern war, as 
well as with respect to the methods for 
conducting naval operations, have been 
developed, and have been based on the 
general axiomatic ~rovisions of Sovie·t 
military doctrine. 
1 
2 
3 
McConnell, J.M., 'Admiral Gorshkov on the Soviet Navy in 
War and Peace', Center for Naval Analyses Working Paper 
866-73, 4 May 1973. 
MccGwire, M.K., 'The Gorshkov Series- "Navies in War and 
Peace" - 11. Summary Report' , Center for Naval Analyses, 
Working Paper 969-73, 8 May 1973. 
Herrick, R.W., 'The 1972-73 Gorshkov Series of Articles 
in Morskoy Sbornik- a Summary', Center for Naval Analyses 
Working Paper 824-73, 1 May 1973. 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'The 23rd Congress of the CPSU and the tasks 
of Navymen', Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, US Navy tra~~. p. 8. 
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As we have seen, Gorshkov indicated that the fleet was to 
be balanced, comprised of submarines, naval aviation and 
surface ships, capable of offensive operations in nuclear 
and non-nuclear war and of protecting the State interests 
of the Soviet Union in time of peace. 1 
Gorshkov's recent series begins with an editorial 
observation. 
In the opinion of the editorial board 
these articles will foster the develop-
ment in our officers of a unity of views 
on the role of navies under various 
historical conditions.2 
While not denying that despite the claims of May 1966 
Gorshkov may still need to foster a unity of views within 
his own service the current series makes it evident that 
he is setting himself a wider audience than his subordinate 
naval officers. 
After observing: 
the experience of history attests to the 
fact that each branch of the armed forces 
makes its own certain and always discernible 
contribution to victory. To achieve victory 
the presence of all branches of armed forces 
properly organised, equipped and trained is 
essential •.. 
Under today's conditions •.. it (victory) 
is a matter of harmonious combined develop-
ments and rational balancing of all branches 
of the armed forces, and it is precisely 
because of this that the principle of 
concerted action of all branches of the 
armed forces is the basis of the Soviet 
·military doctrine. Only by co-ordinating 
efforts can they achieve victory.3 
Gorshkov continues: 
1 
2 
An analysis of the employment of various 
branches of armed forces in time of war 
Gorshkov, S.G., 'The development of Soviet naval science', 
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1967, u.s. Navy trans. 
M.S./2/1972/p.7. 
ibid., p.l0-11. 
or in peacetime is of definite interest 
from the point of view of both the 
development of the military art and the 
knowledge by the command personnel of 
specific features with which each of the 
branches of the armed forces is imbued • 
••• such an understanding fosters the 
development of a unity of operational 
views in the command personnel of the 
armed forces and is the immediate and 
most important condition for skill in 
acting in concert.l 
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Clearly then he wants to be read by, and to persuade, the 
command personnel of the armed forces. Moreover, he wants 
to influence the leadership of the CPSU and in particular 
those concerned with foreign and defence policy. The history 
of the Russian and Soviet fleets ~ written in such a way as 
to stress the importance of relevant government policy 
decisions on the development of the Navy and the impact of 
these decisions,for good or ill 1 on the outcome of subsequent 
wars or foreign policy initiatives of the regime. 
Although entering the modest disclaimer 'the focus of 
attention on the Fleet does not in any way imply any sort 
of unique importance of naval forces in modern armed co~bat•. 2 
Gorshkov is at pains to point to the 
Navy as a branch of the Armed Forces. 
unique properties 
In time of war, 
The hallmark of naval forces is their 
high degree of manoeuvrability, and 
ability to concentrate secretly to form 
powerful groupings which are of surprise 
to the enemy. 
of the 
and in nuclear war, 'naval forces are more stable against the 
3 
effects of nuclear weaponry'. 
1 
2 
3 
Indeed, 
ibid. 1 
ibid. 1 
ibid., 
Missile-carrying submarines, owing to their 
great survivability in comparison with land 
based launch installations, are an even more 
p.ll. 
p.ll. 
p. 7. 
effective means of deterrence. They 
represent a constant threat t.o an 
aggressor who, by comprehending the 
inevitability of nuclear retaliation 
from the oceans, can be faced with the 
necessity of renouncing the unleashing 
of nuclear war.l 
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Hence the navies have been 'catapulted into the front ranks 
of the diverse modern means of armed cowbat•. 2 
In peacetime states continue to use the Armed Forces 
'as the instrument or weapon of their policies• 3 but here 
too the Navy possesses 'special features'. Not only can it 
'be used in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the 
economic and military might of states beyond their borders', 
but it remains 'the solitary form of armed forces capable 
of protecting the interests of a country overseas•. 4 
The development of the Navy as a branch of the Armed 
Forces depends on 'a nation's economic capabilities and 
political orientation' . 5 It is this political orientation 
and the need for policy decisions to be made which is of 
basic concern to Gorshkov, for only if the Navy is adequately 
funded can it realise its potential in war and peace. 
Gorshkov's writing of the series at this particular 
time was undoubtedly a response to a variety of factors. 
Two which will be commented on here, for they affect that 
which follows, are his concern about the relative strengths 
of the Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy in the foreseeable future, 
and his concern over detente and the budgetary implications 
of detente for Soviet naval construction. 
The Soviet Navy now faces a significant problem of 
block obsolescence. The naval units of the immediate post-
war construction programmes are nov; at least 20 years old 
1 
M.S./2/1973/p.20. 
2 
M.S./2/1972/p.?. 
3 
ibid. 1 p. 8. 
4 
ibid. 1 p.ll. 
5 
ibid. f p. 8. 
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and must be due for retirement soon. 1 
Moreover as we have seen t.he more recent Soviet naval 
vessels appear to suffer from a number of defects, which may 
prohibit them from operating effectively in a hostile 
environment. 2 Of equal concern is the fact that there appear 
to be considerable numerical short falls in certain types of 
units which must play a significant role in any future conflict 
with a major naval power. These include SSNs, ocean going 
surface units, support vessels and sea based aviation, while 
Soviet ground based naval aviation requires protection when 
operating at a great distance from base. 
At the same time Soviet writings on American naval 
programmes3 indicate an awareness that the United States 5.s 
undertaking a major naval construction programme which will 
see a significant increase in the size of the u.s. Navy 
relative to the Soviet Navy. It is also well known in Soviet 
circles that since FY.l971/2 the u.s. Navy has attracted the 
1 
2 
3 
See the concluding section of Chapter VIII above. 
Gorshkov, of course, is in no position to highlight these 
defects but there are a variety of statements throughout 
the series which suggest that he is dissatisfied with some 
major aspects of his fleet. We are told that a modern 
fleet must be based on -
a) scientific predictions of the development of science 
and technology. 
b) the probable conditions of combat employment of naval 
forces which must include the capabilities of the 
likely enemy forces, and 
c) the realisation that the construction of a ship takes 
years. 
See M.S./5/1972/16-17, M.S./8/1972/5, M.S./8/1972/8, and 
for Lenin's vievlS used to confirm these thoughts · 
M.S./6/1972/4-5. Moreover only the navy and its various 
experts can hope to be fully conversant with the vast array 
of data and analysis subsumed under points a) and b) • 
Gorshkov then is telling the political leadership that if 
they want a modern fleet they must acknowledge the areas 
of naval expertise and be prepared to build to naval 
recommendations rather than intervening and thereby 
disrupting the product of scientific and technical analysis. 
Teplinsky, B., 'America's naval programmes', U.S.A.-
Economics, Politics, Ideologv, No. 10, September 1972, 
translated in Survival, March/April 1973, p.75-80. 
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largest slice of the U.S. Defence Budget. 1 
Gorshkov's concern about detente is due to a number of 
factors. He may not have approved the welcome afforded 
President Nixon in Moscow in 1972, which occurred after the 
mining of the North Vietnamese ports, especially if his first 
reaction was to attempt to clear the mines. 2 Such bonhomie 
at the summit contrasts with Gorshkov's claim that 
Like a red thread the idea runs through 
all Lenin's directives, letters and orders 
concerning the need for firmness and 
purposefulness in carrying out intended 
plans, and the falseness of any kind of 
wavering and indecisiveness at the crucial 
moments of the struggle.3 
Moreover the only restraint on the U.S. imperialists in their 
bid for world supremacy is the growth in might of the U.S.S.R. 
which not only secures the socialist bloc but is also a force 
4 in favour of revolutionary progress and overall peace. This 
militarist conception of world politics, based solely on 
armed might, is reinforced by Gorshkov's view that foreign 
policy negotiations always result in an outcome favourable 
to the militarily most powerful of the negotiating sides. 
Gorshkov would obviously regard it as a disaster if 
the politician's pursuit of detente resulted in the rejection 
of future naval construction programmes or limitations on 
deployment which may be forced on the grounds that such cut 
backs were essential as a gesture in favour of detente or 
that detente made such cut backs possible. There is no 
indication in the series that Gorshkov agrees with Teplinsky's 
assessment that there can be, 1 a real escape 1 from the arms 
race 'by other, peaceful means, in accordance with the spirit 
of the Moscmv Agreements' or that 'universal peace and 
+ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
ibid. 1 P• 77 • 
Dornberg, J., Brezhnev, p. 265. 
M.S./6/1972/6. 
M.S./12/1972/3. 
457 
delivering mankind from the threat of a new world war' can be 
achieved by follmving Brezhnev' s call of June 1971 to seek a 
degree of restraint among the naval powers in their policy 
1 
of forward deployment of naval forces. 
A review of the series concentrating on those aspects 
of Soviet naval development which have been underlying 
themes in the preceding pages: the weight to be afforded the 
Armed Forces including the Navy in the distribution of scarce 
resources, the status of the Navy vis-a-vis other branches of 
the Armed Forces, the role of the Navy in war and peace and 
the question of size and composition of the fleet, establishes 
the preferred future of Soviet naval development as envisaged 
by Gorshkov in 1972-3. However, the argumentative style of 
the series suggests that much of Gorshkov's preferred future 
for the Navy is not shared by significant others. 
The Status of the Soviet Navy within the Armed Forces 
The Soviet Navy and its Russian predecessor has been, 
and still is, the junior service 'lvi thin the Soviet defence 
establishment. The Ministry of Defence is dominated by 
Army officers: the Navy has but one member on the Supreme 
Military 
place at 
Council: the Navy still occupies its traditional 
the end of the listings of services in all official 
publications. 2 Other indications of this junior speeches and 
service status are the titles in the 'Officers' Library' 
series announced in 1965, which contains not a single volume 
3 
on the Navy, and the fact that the Naval Academy is only one 
of 15 arms-of-service academies at the command and staff 
1 Teplinsky, op.cit., p.SO. 
2 See Jukes, G., '"Deterrence" and "Defence" intthe Soviet 
Context', unpublished paper September 1973, p.l. 
3 
For a recent example of a listing of armed forces see 
General Sokolov, statement on Armed Forces Day 1973, 
BBC, SWB, SU/4230/C/4, 26 February 1973. 
Kintner, N.R., and Scott, H., The Nuclear Revolution in 
Soviet Hilitary Affairs, (Norman, Oklahoma, 1968) p.406-8. 
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1 level. 
The fact that t.his junior service status has had 
implications for decisions on funding new vessels and has 
even resulted in scarce construction yards being diverted 
from military to mercantile use has been indicated previously. 
In post-1965 statements on the Armed Forces, the 
Navy's SLBMs have been listed after the missiles of the 
Strategic Rocket Troops as 'our primary means of deterring 
an aggressor and a reliable shield protecting the world 
2 
socialist system'. SLBMs are placed second to the land-
based ICBMs in all but naval >vri tings and quite pointedly 
the non-SLBM components of the Navy are listed after Ground 
Forces, Air Defence Forces, and Air Force. 3 The view of 
the military establishment is clearly indicated in all three 
editions of Military Strategy, which states that despite the 
fact that military operations in naval theatres will be 
conducted on a large scale 'these operations can hardly have 
a decisive effect on the outcome of the war•. 4 
Gorshkov's opening paragraphs are designed to shake 
these prevailing attitudes. Not only has the revolution 
in military affairs meant an 'incredible increase' in the 
capabilities for conducting naval combat operations 5 but 
navies have been 'catapulted ..• into the front ranks of the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Scott, H. F., soviet Military Doctrine: its formulaticm and 
dissemination, (Stanford Research Institute, June 1971) 
p.l20·-124. 
Grechko, A.A., ''I'he F'leet of our Homeland', Morskoy 
Sbornik No. 7, 1971, u.s. Navy trans. p.5. 
See also Malinovsky, R.Ya. (Minister of Defence USSR 
1957-1967) Address to the 23rd Congress CPSU, April 1966 
in Kintner and Scott, op.cit., p.283. 
Malinovsky lists the long range air force after SLBMs 
whereas Grechko omits the L.R.A.F. completely. 
Grechko, op.cit., U.S. Navy trans. p.S-6. 
Sokolovsky, Military Strat~ (Third Edition), translated 
by Scott, Harriet F. as ~lilitary Strategy (Third Edition: 
a translational analysis, and commentar and comparison 
Wlth E~ious editions Stanford Research Institute, 
January 1971), p.308 (hereafter H.F.S. trans.) 
5 M.S./2/1972/p.?. 
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diverse modern means of armed cornbat•. 1 The manoeuvrability 
and ability to concentrate secretly and surprise the enemy, 
'the hallmark of naval forces' not only has advantages of 
flexibility but it also renders them 'more stable against 
the effects of nuclear weaponry than land forces•. 2 
A variety of factors, technical discoveries, the 
prevailing social and political system of the state, the 
geographical position of the state and its adversaries have 
'a certain 
forces'. 3 
so that 'in 
forces have 
effect on the character and structure of the armed 
This character and structure are subject to change 
some stages of the history of states ground 
4 played the main role, and in others, the Navy'. 
It seems apparent that Gorshkov accepts the present 
era as one in which navies should be afforded greater 
importance. If his reasoning is accepted the 'technical 
transformations' (the introduction of SLBMs upon nuclear 
powered submarines, the introduction of missile armament, 
and the increased vulnerability of land-based ICBM systems) 
and 'the enemy being opposed' (the trans-oceanic United 
States of America) are factors \vhich, having changed in 
the recent past, require a change in the role and importance 
of the Navy. Moreover, if 
the results of the victory in a campaign 
or war can only be secured by ground 
forces capable of proving the reality of 
it by their actual presenceS 
then a Navy will be required sufficient to ensure the safe 
t·rar1sport of ground troops to a trans-oceanic land mass, such 
as America,in a situation where enemy submarines at least 
may still be operating. 
1 ibid. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. See also Sokolovsky, Military Strate'1Y_, H.F.S. 
trans. p.l7, for the requirement to 'occupy enemy 
territory'. 
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Gorshkov draws attention to the development of fleets 
through history from slave galleys to nuclear propulsion. 
He makes the claim: 
These stages of development of the fleet 
were not just stages in the technical 
improvement of warships: at the same 
time as the material technical base was 
changing, changes were also ·taking place 
in its place within the system of armed 
forces, in its basic mission, and in its 
role in the policy of the state in peace-
time and in military operations at sea.l 
The implication seems obvious: the latest, and perhaps rrtost 
significant, of these technological changes, the introduction 
of nuclear power to ballistic missile firing submarines and 
the arming of fleet units with missiles, ought to change the 
place and role of the Navy in the Soviet Armed Forces. 
In the opening pages of the second of the articles 
Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea Gorshkov attempts to 
explain the Navy's historic junior status. In part it was 
due to a lack of understanding fostered by a 'centuries-old 
propaganda conducted by states that were inimical to Russia": 
a propaganda campaign which 
often found supporters among influential 
Tsarist high officials who held the view 
that the country did not need a powerful 
fleet and that expenditures for its 
construction and for maintaining it at 
the required state of readiness should be 
cut in every possible way.2 
Gorshkov indicates that the centuries-old proraganda 
campaign is still being wages by imperialists who assert.: 
That which the Soviet Union needs in way 
of military preparations differs from 
what we need. The USSR is a land power 
h'hile vle are primarily a sea power 
and our needs are therefore different.3 
l M.S./2/1972/19. 
2 M.S. /3/1972/8. 
3 ibid., p.9. The quotation is from Nixon and the 
Washington Post, 5 August 1970 is cited. 
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Proponents of the view that at best Russia only needed 
a coastal fleet are described as Tsarist satraps characterised 
by 'narrowness of thinking' and 'intellectual limitations•. 1 
By implication present adherents to this view are to be 
tarred with the same brush. 
Although Gorshkov is at pains to stress the need for 
a broad re-thinking of the role and missions of the Navy 
within the Armed Services as a whole it is by no means an 
easy task to discern at whose expense this re-evaluation 
should be made. The cost to the other services at times 
appears to be one of relative status alone. Rather than 
implying that other expenditures should be cut to divert 
more resources to the Navy, Gorshkov appears to argue for 
an increase in total defence expenditure with the Navy 
attracting the lion's share of the additional funds. Gorshkov 
may therefore find himself in an uneasy alliance with other 
branches of the armed forces, especially the ground forces. 
Both may unite on the need for additional defence expenditure 
based on the possibility of a protracted or conventional 
war requiring the use of general purpose as opposed to 
strategic force. Thereafter interests will diverge as each 
seeks to promote their own claims for the additional funds. 
that 
Gorshkov does attempt to reassure his non-naval readers 
the focus of attention on the fleet does 
not in any way imply any sort of unique 
importance of naval forces in modern 
armed combat.2 
and his view that victory requires the presence of armed forces 
in occupation of enemy t.erri tory acknowledges the continued 
importance of the army in the nuclear age. Gorshkov, as we 
have seen, argues that the place and role of the branches 
of the 
claims 
armed forces do change through time. 
I: hot 
~history~ shows that 'each branch 
1 ibid., p.lO. 
2 M.S./2/1972/11. 
However, he also 
of the armed 
forces makes its own certain and ahvays discernible 
contribution to victory•. 1 Moreover, he never suggests 
.stotes. 
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that the Soviet Union should, as others,( had done in the past, 
formulate its military strategy primarily on the basis of 
2 
sea power. 
The Peacetime Tasks of the Soviet Navy 
Gorshkov demonstrates to his readers the importance of 
a strong navy, as a vital component of the Soviet deterrent 
forces, as a tool to be used in the pursuit of foreign policy 
objectives, and hence as a vitally necessary resource for 
any state which seeks the status of a great power. It is 
apparent that he is attempting to educate his readers -
showing them in particular the foreign policy benefits which 
can accrue to a great naval power - in an attempt to persuade 
the political leadership that additional expenditure on the 
navy is justified. Moreover he seems to be calling for a 
more aggressive use of the Soviet Navy in peacetime. He 
wants it used consciously as a deliberate tool of foreign 
policy. In addition he also sees a role for the Navy in 
commerce protection, and an emerging role in protecting 
Soviet sea bed interests as they develop in the future. 3 
Underlying Gorshkov's argument is the real-politik 
assertion that in the age of feudalism and capitalism 
1 
all problems of foreign policy were always 
solved on the basis of and taking into 
account the military might of the 'negotiating' 
sides, and that the potential military might 
of one state or a~other, built up in 
accordance with its economic capabilities 
and political orientation, permitted it to 
conduct a policy advantageous to itself to 
the detriment of other states not possessing 
a corresponding military power.4 
ibid. I p.lO. 
2 M.S./2/1972/13. Holland, Spain, England, France, Japan 
and the U.S.A. are all cited as states which at some time 
or another have based their strategy on sea power. 
3 M.S./2/1973/8-15. 
4 M.S./2/1972/p.S-9. 
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This point is used to justify his important addition 
to Lenin's dictum 
Policy is the reason, while war is only 
a weapon, and not the opposite. Con-
sequently it only remains to subordinate 
the military point of view to the political. 
(Lenin) 
Viz: The basic and solitary means of waging 
armed conflict between states has always 
been the Army and Navy, which in peacetime 
continue to serve as the instruments or 
weapons of their policies.l 
It is important to note that the determinants of the 
military might of a state are its economic capabilities and 
its political orientation. Given that Gorshkov is in no 
doubt as to the present economic capabilities of the Soviet 
Union to sustain a large navy it seems clear that the variable 
of most concern to him is the political orientation, and in 
particular the specific policies of the state. 2 
While Gorshkov's initial point, that the armed forces 
can serve as an instrument of foreign policy, is generally 
applicable to all branches of military service,he suggests 
that the Navy is unique in that it possesses 
special features .•• as a military force 
which can be used in peacetime for 
purposes of demonstrating the economic 
and military might of states beyond 
their borders 
and has been 
1 
over a period of many centuries the solitary 
M.S./2/1972/p.S. Gorshkov's additional point is relatively 
unique in Soviet military writings. The authoritative 
Military StrateS[Y H.F.S. trans. p.43 and ·the 1966 Frunze 
Prize winning, l1arxism-Leninism on VJar and the Army, 
Chapter 1, (English language vers1on, Moscow, 1972, 
subsequently published for the U.S. Air Force, Washington, 
1973), both cite Lenin extensively but do not make 
Gorshkov's subsequent point. 
See also Problems of War and Peace: A Critical Analysis 
of Bourgeois Theories (l>!oscow, 1972) trans. Bryan Bean, 
p. 77 85. 
2 This is a theme of the series. It is strongly stated in 
the conclusion of the series, M.S./2/1973/25. 
form of armed forces capable of protecting 
the interests of a country overseas.l 
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Moreover Gorshkov notes that whereas other branches of the 
armed forces can mount impressive displays of military might, 
(exercises, displays and weapons testing), which might 
intimidate others by suggesting a 'potential threat' 
warships of the imperialist powers which 
appear directly off of foreign shores 
represent. a real threat of immediate 
operations •.• The capability of navies 
to suddenly appear close to the shores of 
different countries and immediately proceed 
to carry out their assigned missions has 
been used for ages by various aggressive 
states as an important weapon of diplomacy 
and policy in peacetime, which in many cases 
has permitted the achievement of political 
goals without resorting to military 
operations by only threatening to initiate 
them.2 
He confesses that the intention of the series is in part 
to examine questions related to this specific 
feature of naval forces as a real component 3 part of the military organisation of a state. 
Clearly Gorshkov is going far beyond the previously 
current vague references to the role of the Soviet Navy in 
protecting 'state interests at sea'. Here he states an 
intention to link the role of the navy explicitly with the 
state's prosecution of foreign policy objectives, as part 
and parcel of the overall military organisation of the 
state. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: this role 
must be recognised and the navy's importance to the ;)Verall 
military organisation of the state should be acknowledged 
by additional funding and by the deliberate use of the navy 
to achieve foreign policy goals. 
Undoubtedly the most 
Soviet Navy is its role as 
l M.S./2/1972/11. 
2 M.S./12/1972/5-6. 
3 M.S./2/1972/11 emphasis 
important peacetime task of the 
'a formidable force for the 
added. 
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deterrence of aggression' which, if war should break out, is 
able to act as 
a powerful instrument of defence in the 
oceanic areas ••. constantly ready to 
deliver punishing retaliatory blows and 1 to disrupt the plans of the imperialists. 
J>.s we have seen the ability to defend the Soviet Union 
from sea based nuclear attack launched by either C.V.A. task 
forces or SSBNs is overrated. None the less, there is an 
element of truth in Gorshkov's assertion that those who 
counted on 
speeding up t.he development of their 0~>,'11 
naval forces and the creation of new problems 
which are difficult to resolve for the 
defence of the Soviet Union, have themselves 
been faced with even more complex problems 
with the strengthening of our Navy on the 
oceans. 2 
Yet it is difficult to credit Gorshkov's assertion that the 
problem of countering the Soviet Navy's SSBNs is 'even more 
complex' than that which faces t.he Soviet Union. 3 
In the Hedi terrcmean Sea the Soviet Navy is 'ensuring 
the security of .•• (our) own country• 4 and operating in such 
a way that it can 'nip aggression in the very bud'. 5 It 
also 'prevents the disturbance of the peaceful atmosphere in 
this region and plays a deterrent role'. 6 Specifically the 
Soviet naval presence is seen as countering the U.S. policy 
of 'supporting aggressors in their actions against freedom-
~ 
loving peoples' , 1 in >vhich the main tool of support has been 
1 H.S./12/1972/p.lS, see also H.S./2/1973/p.l6. 
2 H.S./12/1972/p.lS. 
3 This assertion is more sustainable given the introduction 
of the D class SSBN with its 4000+ nautical mile missiles. 
4 H.S./3/1972/p.21. 
5 ibid, 1 p.23. 
6 ibid, 1 p. 24. 
7 ibid. , p.24. 
the Sixth Fleet. 
And if our enemies more and more often look 
at the Soviet Union and see it as a hind¢r-
ance to their adventures, this means that 
it is carrying out the mission assigned to 
't l ~ . 
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The role of the present Soviet naval force in the 
Mediterranean as a 'decisive opposition to the threats to 
the security of peace loving peoples' is greatly exaggerated 
by Gorshkov. No doubt the presence of Soviet naval vessels 
in the Mediterranean prior to the October 1973 Middle East 
war, and their subsequent reinforcement during the hostilities, 
entered the calculations of U.S. decision makers and provided 
headaches for the Sixth Fleet Commander and his officers. 
None the less, it remains a fact that the United States Sixth 
Fleet was able to provide a vital command and control link 
for the airborne replenishment of Israel, that the carriers 
of the Fleet acted as supply platforms for the fighters 
ferried to the Middle East from the United States, that the 
carrier borne aircraft were able to provide air superiority, 
and that by stationing itself off Crete, the American naval 
force presented an unmatched capability to land and support 
ground forces. Moreover this group, once on alert, possessed 
the anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-surface ship 
capabilities to ward off any counter activity from the Soviet 
naval units in the vicinity. 
Compared to the American force, based around three 
attack carriers, the Independence, Roosevelt and Kennedy, 
the Soviet naval forces were overwhelmed. As one commentator 
has observed 
1 
With the ships and aircraft of the Sixth 
Fleet operating in Condition III readiness, 
the possibility of a successful surprise 
attack and quick victory had been so sub-
stantially reduced as to effectively blunt 
the presence of the Soviet ships.2 
ibid, 1 P• 23 • 
2 Miller, F.C. (Lt. u.s. Navy), 'Those storm-beaten ships upon 
which the Arab armies never looked', USNIP (March 1975) p.24. 
Much of the material for the preceding paragraphs was also 
taken from this article. 
467 
Gorshkov is concerned to stress the positive impact of 
sea power as well as its deterrent and protective functions. 
History shows that states which do not 
have naval forces at their disposal have 
not been able to hold the status of a 
great power for a long time.l 
Not only can a state use a strong navy to deter the 
outbreak of hostilities, to repel and defeat an aggressor 
should deterrence fail, but the possession of this capability 
strengthens the independence of a state during peacetime, 2 and 
enables it to conduct an independent global foreign policy 
and protect its interests beyond its borders. During periods 
of decline of the Tsarist Fleet, Gorshkov asserts that Russia 
lost the position of a great power following an independent 
and sovereign policy, and became instead a supplier of cannon 
fodder to imperialist plunderers who were fighting for 
interests alien to the Russian people. 3 Conversely, during 
the most powerful periods of naval strength 'the Fleet 
weapon of Russia's foreign policy•. 4 
was 
Gorshkov concludes his survey of naval events prior to 
World War I with the observation 
every time the ruling circles in Russia 
failed to properly emphasise development 
of the navy and its maintenance at a 
level necessitated by contemporary demands, 
the country either lost battles in wars, 
or its peacetime policy failed to achieve 
its designated objectives.S 
1 M.S./2/1972/p.l2. This point is reaffirmed (with specific 
reference to Tsarist Russia M.S./3/1972/p.B. In the 
concluding article of the series it is stated that Russia 
and now the Soviet Union as a 'great continental world 
power' needs a strong navy as an indispensable part of its 
armed forces. M.S./2/1973/p.l6 and 25. 
2 M.S./2/1972/p.l2. 
3 M.S./3/1972/p.ll. 
4 M.S./3/1972/p.20. Gorshkov claims that as a result of 
Russian Fleet activity in the Mediterranean Sea during the 
Napoleonic Wars, Italy, Sardinia and Tunisia were drawn 
into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
S M.S./4/1972/21. 
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The root cause of the demise in naval power was the 
inability of the ruling circles to understand the importance 
of the Navy in achieving its political objectives, 1 i.e. a 
failure to support the Navy with a policy based on an 
appreciation of its unique role in the armed forces as an 
instrument of foreign policy. 
Navies are also described as 'the most important 
element' in cementing an alliance system. 2 Although this 
point is made in a direct reference to the role of the 
u.s. Navy in the NATO alliance there are two important 
implications which Gorshkov may want his readers to draw. 
Firstly, the European NATO allies'perceptions of growing 
Soviet naval power may serve to weaken the alliance system 
if it is believed in Europe that the Soviet Navy can 
effectively counter the U.S. Fleet. Secondly, the socialist 
camp, which the Soviet Union claims to lead, is no longer 
confined to the Eurasian land mass. Cuba, North Vietnam 
and Chile were all in 1972 parts of a potential socialist 
cam~ necessitating a strong oceanic naval force to bind 
the elements into an effective alliance system. 
Closely related to the idea of a navy strengthening 
a country's foreign policy is the belief that navies are 
important as 'political instruments to create definite 
prestige in the international arena and in mutual relations 
with other states•. 3 
Not only 
'strengthening 
is a strong visible navy important 
the international authority of the 
in 
Soviet 
. ' 4 Un~on , 
economic 
it also acts as a floating exposition of a nation's 
development. 5 Unlike the other branches of the 
1 ibid. 
2 M.S./12/1972/13. 
3 M.S./5/1972/p.lS. See also M.S./2/1972/p.ll-12. 'It is 
4 
impossible not to note hovl man's ability to comprehend the 
ocean and to use it for his own needs directly affects the 
growth of the political prestige of the country ... ' 
M.S./12/1972/p.l?. 
5 M.S./12/l972/p.4. 'The navy is a graphic indicator of the 
level of development of a country's economy'. 
armed forces 
the Navy possesses the capability to vividly 
demonstrate the economic and military power , 
of a country beyond its borders in peacetime.~ 
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and port visits can demonstrate the culture, personal and 
economic development of Soviet citizens. 'It is impossible 
to overestimate the significance of this ideological 
influence•. 2 
Given the significance Gorshkov attributes to the role 
of navies in peacetime, it is not surprising that he regards 
the present international regime of the oceans with its 
stress on freedom of the seas as more or less satisfactory. 
In particular he asserts the 'viability of a 12-mile limit 
for the breadth of territorial waters•, 3 warns against the 
dangers of setting up supra-national consertia to control 
exploration and exploitation of the sea bed4 and advocates 
that in narrow straits the littoral p01vers should establish 
appropriate corridors for the transit of ships5 These are 
views broadly supported by other major naval powers concerned 
to uphold the right of untrammelled passage for their w2.rships 
and merchant fleets at least in part so that they can benefit 
from the political/diplomatic use of their fleet. 
Gorshkov may draw some comfort from the fact that 
Marshal Grechko has offered support for his general theme, 
i.e. that the armed forces are an important instrument in 
the implementation of foreign policy. 
1 
2 
The carrying out of the foreign policy 
programmes of the CPSU as formulated by 
the Congress will depend greatly on the 
defence capability of the Soviet state 
and the state of its Armed Forces.6 
ibid., p.S. 
ibid. 1 p.l6. 
3 M.S./2/1973/13. 
4 ibid., p.l3. 
5 ibid., p.l4. 
6 Grechko, Speech before the 24th CPSU Congress, 2 April 1971, 
cited in u.s. Senate C'"rnmittee Print, Committee on the 
Judiciary: Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws: 
Soviet Disarma~! Pro!;'ac;anda 2~d the Stranc;e Case of Marshal 
Grechko. (WashJ.ngton, .1.9/irf, p.:;, 7. 
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There is a vague reference to the Soviet Army and Navy as one 
of 'the most essential factors' for the 'liberation struggle 
of the peoples•, 1 but this is far short of the recognition of 
the unique features of the Navy as a tool of foreign policy 
which characterises the Gorshkov series. 
In a more recent article Grechko2 describes the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union as a policy opposed to the 
imperialists and the policies of counter-revolution and 
oppression 'in whatever distant region of our planet it may 
appear'. Grechko also supports 'wars of national liberation• 3 
but at the same time specifically rejects the 'export of 
revolution'. 4 Finally Grechko claims 'the external function 
of the Soviet state and its armed forces ••. have now been 
5 
enriched with new content'. 
Some observers 6 have construed this as an implicit 
endorsement of Gorshkov's position, yet the evidence for 
this is by no means convincing, at least at this stage. Both 
Gorshkov and Grechko imply that Soviet foreign policy interests 
are now global and both recognise a connection between armed 
might and foreign policy. None the less Gorshkov appears to 
be far more enthusiastic about this new role. He not only 
details the naval role in foreign policy at length but also 
points out 1vhy the Navy is superior to the other branches of 
armed service in supporting a global as distinct from 
continental foreign policy. On the other hand it is possible 
to read Grechko's article as a mere propaganda declaration 
in its foreign policy passages coupled with a desire to have 
1 ibid., p.57. 
2 Grechko, A.A., 'The leading role of the CPSU in building 
the army of a developed socialist society' , Questions of 
CPSU History, May 1974, translated in Strategic Review, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1975, p.88-93. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
ibid., p.90. 
ibid. f p. 91. 
ibid., p.90. 
e.g. Weinland, R.G., '"Navies in war and Peace", Content, 
Context and Significance' in Admiral Gorshkov on Navies in 
War and Peace, C.N.A., (C.R.C.257) September 1974, p.l7. 
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Government defence expenditure increased. 1 
1\ihatever comfort Gorshkov might gain from Grechko' s 
comments has to be set against other possible doubts which 
may have been raised inside the Soviet Union against any 
expansion in the use of naval power for foreign policy 
purposes. The recent record could be used to argue for a 
reduction in this use of the fleet on the grounds that it 
has not been of benefit to the Soviet Union,but rather has 
resulted in some humiliation or at least been counter 
productive. Again there inay be supporters of detente who 
would agree with Brezhnev's stated view that one means of 
curtailing an expensive naval arn,s race would be to reduce 
the distant deployment of naval forces. This argument 
could be supported by those who want defence expenditure 
directed to their own arm of service or who fear, not without 
reason, that in any naval race the United States could only 
emerge with an enhanced capability. 
The naval aspect of the 1973 October war, as it 
affected the two super powers, has already been broadly 
discussed. Certainly, there was little in this event which 
could enhance Gorshkov's claims for the Navy as a tool of 
Soviet foreign policy, nor that would support the view that 
the Soviet naval presence had restrained the United States 
once the latter had determined a course of action. In this 
respect, the October war provided another occasion for a 
series of rival naval deplo~uents in which the United States 
was able to use its naval forces to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives despite the presence of Soviet warships. Soviet 
vessels are essential as a counter to the C.V.A.s and possibly 
the SSBNs attached to the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet and are 
doubtless justified on this ground alone. They can and have 
been used to enhance Soviet foreign policy in the region in 
periods of sub-hostile tension. None the less during periods 
of regional conflict, the 1967 war, the Jordanian crisis, and 
October 1973, the overwhelming presence of the u.s. Sixth Fleet 
1 Grechko, 'The leading role of the CPSU ..• ', p.9~. 
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has been such as to clearly indicate the dominance of the 
u.s. naval presence. 
The general thrust of Gorshkov's argument 1 that naval 
visits indicate support for friendly regimes and add to the 
'international authority' of the Soviet Union,is undeniable. 
Yet to the extent that naval visits imply support and 
commitment to friendly regimes it may involve additional 
commitments, or provide the visited regime with opportunity 
to undertake actions, without consulting the USSR, fron1 which 
the Soviet government may find it difficult to dissociate 
itself. 1 Moreover, Soviet support for Egypt during the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, manifested most obviously in Soviet 
arms aid but underlined by naval visits and the frequent 
use of Egyptian port facilities by Soviet vessels, did not 
stop President Sadat from cooling his relations with the 
Soviet Union and ultimately expelling Soviet advisers, 
denying the use of aircraft facilities and running down the 
availability of port facilities to Soviet naval vessels. 
More generally critics could point to the fact that 
the increase in size and activity of the Soviet Navy has 
been used by the United States Navy to strengthen its case 
for additional expenditures which has resulted in the U.S. 
Navy commanding the largest service appropriation of the 
defence budget. 
Indian Ocean has 
The increased soviet naval activity in the 
been used to justify the establishment of 
a u.s. naval facility at Diego Garcia, capable of supporting 
a carrier task force in the region and possibly allowing for 
the future establishment of an SSBN tender in the Indian 
Ocean. 
The War Time Role of the Soviet Navy 
The military technical revolution is 
constantly introducing new things in 
all areas of military affairs, but the 
final goals of armed conflict at sea 
remain the same: the defeat of the 
enemy and the destruction of his vital 
1 As I have indicated in Chapter X, it is possible that 
events surrounding the Somali coup and the Kuwait-Iraqi 
border dispute may have been of this latter sort. 
forces and materiel (i.e. his ships vlith 
their crews and provisions, and weapons 
or shore objectives located within possible 
range~l 
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To achieve these goals, Gorshkov insists that it is 
necessary to employ naval forces offensively, 2 and when 
conditions are such as to warrant a defensive naval strategy, 
then the tactics pursued must be offensive. 3 Lenin is used 
to support this stress on the offense, surprise and maintaining 
the initiative achieved by launching the first salvo. 4 An 
essential prerequisite for the offensive is to achieve mass 
superiority of force. 5 
To operate offensively, naval forces must be capable of 
undertaking assignments 'beyond the limits of our own 
coastal waters•, 6 to which end it is essential to gain and 
hold 'control of the sea'. 
1 
i.e. to achieve superiority of forces over 
the enemy in the main sector and to pin 
him down in the secondary sectors at the 
time of the operation ..• i.e., to create 
such a situation that the enemy will be 
paralysed or constrained in his operations, 
or weakened and thereby hampered from 
interfering with our execution of a given 
operation or in our execution of our own 
operational mission.7 
M.S. /2/1972/8. 
2 M.S./4/1972/12, where the 'essence' of naval combat activity 
is held to be 'active operations at sea'. 
3 See Gorshkov's discussion of the Black Sea Fleet in the 
Crimean war, ibid., for the necessity to use the fleet 
defensively and M.S./8/1972/p.ll for a discussion of Soviet 
naval art in the pre-war years in which 'tactical plans 
were carried out strictly by offensive methods', despite 
the overall defensive strategy of the era. 
4 
5 
M.S./6/1972/p.4-7, esp. p.6. 
ibid., Gorshkov tells us that t.he Leninist strategy contains 
the following important principles in achieving victory 'be 
stronger than the enemy at the decisive moment, at the 
decisive point'. 
6 Not to do so would imply remaining in the fleet areas and 
conducting essentially defensive operations. 
7 M.S./8/1972/9. Although the discussion of control of the 
sea is in the context of the pre-ltMII debates on naval theory, 
Gorshkov nowhere indicates that this pre-l'i'\'lii conception 
has since been subject to significant change. 
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The operations to be carried out by the fleet naturally 
vary according to the type of war envisaged. Without 
stretching Gorshkov's series too far it is possible to suggest 
that he envisages three distinct types of conflict situation, 
in which navies have a vital role: local wars, conventional 
wars or a post nuclear exchange continuation of hostilities, 
and the initial stages of nuclear war. He also emphasises 
the importance of navies in the outcome of peace negotiations 
which conclude a war. 
a) Local Wars. 
Gorshkov's discussion of local wars is relatively brief 
and confined to the operations of the 'imperialist' fleets. 
However, these local v1ars are discussed in an extremely 
revealing context in the final article of the series. After 
reiterating the importance of the peacetime role of the Navy 
in defending 'the interests of the Soviet state and the 
countries of the socialist community' Gorshkov continues 
This latter point is particularly important 
because local wars, >~hich imperialism is 
constantly waging, remain within the orbit 
of the policy of imperialism. Today these 
wars can be regarded as a special form of 
the manifestation of the "flexible response" 
strategy. In seizing individual areas of 
the globe and in interfering in the internal 
affairs of countries, the imperialists are 
striving to gain new advantageous strategic 
positions in the world arena which they need 
for the struggle with socialism and in order 
to facilitate carrying out missions in the 
struggle yith the developing national freedom 
movement. 
Can a navy, whose task is to defend the security of the 
socialist bloc, stand aloof from these local wars by which 
imperialism attempts to gain new advantageous strategic 
positions for the struggle against socialism? Given Gorshkov's 
Real··l?>olitik cast of mind, his obvious approval of Lenin's 
injunction to avoid any kind of wavering and indecisiveness at 
l M.S./2/1973/20-21. 
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the crucial moments of the struggle1 and the context of this 
passage, it is obvious that he is dismayed by this 
manifestation of ·the 1 flexible response 1 strategy not 
primarily because of its impact on movements for national 
independence and progress but because of the strategic 
implications it has for the Soviet Union. This point is 
affirmed by his anxiety that despite the SALT talks, ne>v 
naval bases were being constructed in Greece and elsewhere 
in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. 2 
It would seem as though Gorshkov is anxious that the 
Navy be allowed to undertake more vigorous counter activity 
in these situations. He maintains that one role of the 
naval presence in the Mediterranean is to maintain a peaceful 
atmosphere in the region3 and that the Soviet Army and Navy 
are the instruments of a policy of peace 
and friendship of peoples, a deterrent 
to military adventurists and a decisive 
opposition to the threat to the security 
of peace loving peoples on the part of 
imperialist powers.4 
But, what to do if the deterrence effect of their presence 
should fail? As has been indicated earlier the Soviet 
Fleet has in the main restricted its activities to a close 
observation of the naval units of the intervening power. 
What it has not done is offer any direct opposition to the 
superior naval forces of its imperialist rivals. Gorshkov 
may well be advocating that this role be changed, an advocacy 
which would necessarily imply an increase in the size of the 
Soviet fleet so that its presence could match that of 
interventionist powers. 
Gorshkov could argue that the increase in Soviet naval 
units in a region of local war, to the extent necessary to 
offset the present superiority of naval rivals and any 
1 M.S./6/1972/6. 
2 M.S./2/1973/18-19. 
3 M.S./3/1972/24. 
4 M.S./12/1972/15. 
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reinforcements they send, would result in a more effective 
deterrent to imperialist intervention. He does warn 'under 
certain circun1stances, such actions (local wars) carry with 
them the threat of escalation into a world war•, 1 but does 
not state that this must necessarily be a nuclear war. 
Whether Gorshkov himself draws this distinction is difficult 
to say although at times he does use the phrase 'world-wide 
nuclear \¥ar'. 2 
Whatever conclusion one draws on this point, the 
fact none the less remains that the present, frequently 
demonstrated, inability of the Soviet Navy to effectively 
counter one of 'the more decisive operating methods' 3 of 
the imperialists, must be a sore point with Gorshkov and 
an additional factor in his desire for a larger navy, as 
well as an additional point in his argument that government 
policy ought to provide him with the means to achieve that 
goal. 
There is no direct evidence that Gorshkov is asking 
for a similar interventionist capability for his own fleet. 
In fact he specifically denies on numerous occasions that 
the Soviet Navy has been or would ever be used in such a 
way. 4 None the less we should probably disregard the 
blatantly propagandist nature of these denials, especially 
in the light of the detailed discussion which is given to 
imperialist interventions. 5 From this account it is clear 
that Gorshkov understands the basic requisites for inter-
vention include artillery and missile firing surface ships, 
an abilit¥ to project air power into the region, an amphibious 
assault capability and a sufficient number of escorts to 
protect these forces. Clearly if the Soviet political 
leadership wants a direct intervention capability it will 
l M.S./2/1973/21. 
2 ibid., p.20. 
3 ibid. 1 P• 21. 
4 
e.g. M.S./3/1972/24, M.S./12/1972/14-18, and perhaps a 
little more ambiguously l'1.S./2/l973/25. 
~ 
- M.S./12/1972/5-8 and 12. 
need to step up Soviet naval construction, particularly 
in surface ships. 
b) Conventional Wars or the Post-Nuclear Phase 
477 
It is not altogether clear whether Gorshkov envisages 
the possibility of a conventional war or a period following 
an initial nuclear exchange which involves the super powers' 
navies in a major struggle at sea. However, he does spend 
a considerable time discussing the first and second world 
wars, and in particular their naval aspects,(while maintaining 
that the main goals were achieved 'by armed combat on the 
ground fronts, 1) suggesting that the lessons of the world wars 
are not totally inappropriate for the present. Moreover, 
we have noted the distinction between 'world war' and 'world-
wide nuclear war' and as we shall see later there is a 
specific listing of missions for the navy in the event of 
•world-wide nuclear war', which is distinct from any other 
listing of war time tasks. 
In the First World War the British sought to blockade 
the German shores and maintain superiority at sea. Germany 
attempted to break the blockade, weaken the British navy in 
a war of attrition, and inflict a major defeat on the enemy, 
which would leave German forces free to operate on the high 
seas and eventually enforce a naval blockade on Britain. 2 
During the Second World War navies again sought to 
disrupt the enemy's sea and ocean comrnunications; to protect 
their own communications; to cooperate with the ground 
forces in defensive and offensive operations and to destroy 
groupings of hostile naval forces. 3 
Gorshkov's discussion of the anti-communications 
(anti-SLOC) struggle at sea makes it perfectly clear that 
whereas submarines are by far the most effective weapons in 
1 M.S./11/1972/1, see also p.l2. 
2 M.S./5/1972/4-5. 
3 M.S./11/1972/1. 
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this role, 1 they require continual support from surface ships, 
naval aviation2 and the independent operations of Long Range 
Air Force against ship building and port facilities 3 if the 
operation is to be carried out successfully. (By comparison, 
the operations of German cruise squadrons and individual 
raiders were less successful than had been anticipated in 
World War I 4 and surface ships were little used in the anti-
SLOe role in World War II. 5) Gorshkov does point out that at 
the beginning of both wars the submarine was underrated and 
that the vast majority of these vessels employed during the 
war were constructed in wartime. 6 Undoubtedly there is a 
lesson here for those responsible for determining naval 
appropriations in the Soviet Union. 
The submarine, although the most impressive naval weapon 
in the anti-SLOC role, was reduced in effectiveness because 
of the major ASW campaign undertaken by Britain and her 
allies. 7 Gorshkov drav;s two main lessons from the ASW 
campaign. An effective campaign, which involves convoy 
protection of merchant shipping by surface escorts, air 
support, and to a lesser extent air attacks against submarine 
bases and the patrolling of routes used by submarines~ can 
1 For World War I, M.S./5/1972/p.8 and 16. For World ~~ar II, 
M.S./11/1972/5, 6 and 8. 
2 For World War I, M.S./5/1972/8 and 13, and for World War II, 
M.S./11/1972/10, and see also M.S./2/1973/19, for a summary 
of German experience during the tv;o wars 'one of the 
reasons for the failure of the "unlimited submarine v;ar" 
waged by the Germans v;as the absence of .•• support' (from 
&viation and surface ships). 
3 World War II, M.S./11/1972/10. 
4 M.S./5/1972/6. 
5 M.S./11/1972/7. 
6 For World War I, see M.S./5/1972/2, the table on p.5, p.7-9 
and p.l3. For World War II M.S./11/1972/2, 6, and 10. 
7 By contrast the Japanese did not mount a defence for her 
shipping and American submarines increased the effectiveness 
of their campaign against the Japanese lines of conununication. 
M.S./11/1972/4 and 11. 
8 M.S./11/1972/5, 7 and 15. 
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succeed in reducing the effectiveness of submarines provided 
a massive effort1 is made to achieve this objective. In 
addition the task of ASW was made much easier because the 
submarines were not provided with sufficient protective 
support from surface ships and aircraft. 2 
Gorshkov makes two additional points which contain 
significant implications for possible Soviet submarine 
operations in a future conventional phase of war. Firstly, 
nuclear powered submarines have significantly increased the 
difficulties of mounting a successful ASW operation. 3 
Secondly, there was 'a great miscalculation of the German 
command' during World War I: 
it did not employ submarines to sever 
the military sea shipping which was 4 
widely used by the Entente countries. 
Gorshkov also points to the role of naval aviation in 
the batt.le of sea communications •. 5 Whereas naval aviation 
played a secondary role in the anti-SLOC mission, 'in the 
defence of~ own sea communications, it was nuriilier one'. 
In particular, aircraft carriers 'were first among the forces 
protecting ocean communications'. Gorshkov's general 
conclusion on aviation is important 
Aviation units which were included within 
the composition of the fleets operated 
significantly more effectively than those 
temporarily attached. 
There can be little doubt that Gorshkov is seeking to 
make a number of points of contemporary relevance. Firstly, 
the number of SSNs needs to be dramatically increased for 
these are likely to be far more effective anti-SLOC weapons 
1 M.S./11/1972/5. 
2 M.S./2/1973/19. 
3 M.S./11/1972/6 and 8. 
4 M.S./5/1972/9. In operations against the Japanese during 
the course of World War II, the Americans did not make this 
mistake. M.S./11/1972/17. 
5 M.S./11/1972/7. 
than conventionally 
effective anti-SLOC 
powered submarines. 
campaign can only be 
Secondly, an 
mounted if there 
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is a significant increase in surface ships to pr·cvide the 
requisite amount of combat stability to submarines. Thirdly, 
naval aviation has an important role in the battle of sea 
communications, which it can only perform if it is clearly 
subordinate to naval command. Finally, in a future war, 
military shipping ought to be a primary target for submarine 
operations. 
Third in Gorshkov's listings of the missions performed 
by navies during World War II, is the task of cooperating 
with the ground forces and in particular the carrying out of 
amphibious operations. He points out that strategic seaborne 
landings were often accompanied by major naval battles which 
sought to gain command of the sea1 and that such landings 
were only conducted in a favourable military-political 
situation. 2 Moreover, air superiority became an 'indispensable 
condition' for the success of these operations. 3 
On the other hand, Gorshkov points out that no sea 
borne landing was subjected to resistance based on a 
continuous series of powerful blows delivered at it from 
its concentration point to the moment it landed. 4 The reasons 
for this failure of the defence; insufficient warning and 
the lack of sufficient means to attacl' the landing forces; 5 
have been overcome by the reconnaissance satellite, the SSM, 
and the missile armed submarine, which may employ conventional 
or nuclear warheads. 6 
If Gorshkov is anxious to add to a major amphibious 
1 ibid. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. , p.l4. 
5 ibid. 
6 At least one aspect of the OKEAN exercise indicates that 
this is precisely the tactic employed against sea borne 
landings by the Soviet Union today. 
capability to his navy's role, as opposed to the small 
scale coastal landings of V>Jorld War II, in which merchant 
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1 
ships and non-specialist naval vessels were employed, then 
his list of material requisites is enormous. Obviously a 
vast array of purpose-built landing vessels and transport 
craft are required together with a surface fleet, including 
carriers, capable of establishing or maintaining control of 
the sea. In such an operation, submarines obviously have a 
restricted role and, the main burden must be borne by a 
surface fleet. On the other hand, the requirements for 
defence against a sea-borne landing are probably satisfied 
by the vast array of vessels operating under the cover of 
land-based aircraft and within range of the coastal missile 
defence units, which are at present available to the Soviet 
Navy in its major fleet areas. 
The destruction of attack groupings of the enemy's 
naval forces, the last of Gorshkov's points, was an important 
feature of naval campaigns, but for the most part this 
mission was an integral part of the battle over communications 
or a necessary prelude to an amphibious operation. 2 
Gorshkov stresses that World War II indicated a 
'clearly defined tendency in the 
destruction of ships in bases•. 3 
growing 
In the 
threat of the 
light of his 
repeated claim that the subsequent gro~t1th of navies must be 
based on an extrapolation of tendencies revealed in previous 
conflicts, and the subsequent technical and scientific 
innovations, 4 it is not unreasonable to suggest that he sees 
this trend as being of major significance in the future. 
Implicit in this is the recognition of the importance of 
targetting enemy naval bases by ICBHs, the Long Range Air 
Force or naval aviation. 
In addition, this tendency suggests 'the need to disperse 
l H.S./10/1972/9. 
2 H.S./11/1972/14. 
3 ibid., p.l5. 
I, 
'H.S./5/1972/17, and M.S./8/1972/5 and 8. 
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forces and means in basing areas' and to bring about 'changes 
I l in methods of supporting them, a call for increased 
expenditure on the support fleet. 
Given that one cannot conduct an offensive naval 
strategy inside coastal waters, especially if the coastal 
waters are confined,as is the case with the Soviet Union, 
then Gorshkov must face the problem of controlling the access 
points to the high seas during a future conflict. Geographic 
dispersal2 and the difficulties of intra-fleet manoeuvres, 3 
suggest that each fleet area, in cooperation with the ground 
forces, will have to deal with this problem on its own. 4 
Although Gorshkov does not specifically discuss this 
problem in a Soviet context, it is an underlying theme of 
much of his historical account of the Russian Navy. Moreover, 
in discussing the German Navy prior to the outbreak of 
World War I, he notes 
Germany ••• had a system of bases suitable 
for a defence against attacks from the sea, 
but they did not ensure direct access to 
the ocean ... The system of basing permitted 
a rapid concentration of forces in the 
Baltic or Black Seas (but the possibility of 
clashes with the superior British Fleet had 
to be considered when exiting beyond these 
limits).5 
The similarity between the present position of the 
Soviet fleet and the German fleet hardly needs further 
comment, particularly when Gorshkov notes that the widespread 
system of British bases and their relation to German bases 
'created £avourable conditions •.. for operations against its 
(Germany's) surface ships•. 6 
l M.S./ll/1972/15. 
2 M.S./3/1972/11. 
3 M.S./10/1972/2-3. The context is World War II and although 
the Northern Sea Route is now open for considerably longer 
than the two to three months that then prevailed, the 
point is still valid. 
4 M.S./3/1972/11. 
5 M.S./5/1972/4. 
6 ibid. 
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Gorshkov gives particular emphasis to the question of 
access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, which he 
notes has always been denied by the major naval powers. He 
ruefully notes that throughout the course of World War I 
the Black Sea Fleet actively prepared for 
the execution of one of the main missions 
in the South - the landing of a major 
landing force in order to capture the 
Bosporus. However, this operation was 
never carried out even though ships 
repeatedly approached the Bosporus and 
fired at objectives on its shores.l 
Indeed, I get the impression, particularly from the historical 
account of the Russian presence in the Mediterranean, 2 and 
the emphasis vlhich Gorshkov places on the Mediterranean 
today, 3 that he is advocating the capture of the Turkish 
Straits as a major strategic objective in the initial stages 
of a future war in Europe. Moreover, he appears to suggest 
that such an operation will require the coordinated efforts 
of all the general purpose forces, for too often in the past 
the lack of a coordinated attempt has resulted in the failure 
to capture the Straits, despite the obvious success of one 
or other of the branches of service in attaining its particular 
objective. 4 This coordinated effort implies that for at 
least some operations in a future war, the Army should be 
prepared to accept the role of assistant to the Navy, a 
major historical reversal for both branches of service. 
l M.S./5/1972/12. 
2 
3 
4 
M.S./3/1972/17-22. 
ibid., p.23-24. He refers to the Mediterranean as 'the 
foremost line of defence of the country when threats of 
aggression were arising from the South-West', ibid., p.2l. 
See for example, the discussion of the activities of the 
Mediterranean squadron from 1769-1774 and success of the 
Russian Army in the Russo-·Turkish War of 1877-1878, 
M.S./3/1972/p.l?-18 and 10-11 respectively. In both cases 
one or other branch of the armed forces posed a threat to 
Constantinople, but the absence of the other resulted in 
threat being \vi thdrawn. 
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c) Nuclear vlar 
The basic missions of the navies of the great powers 
in a 'world-wide nuclear war' are listed as 
in 
participating in attacks of the country's 
strategic nuclear forces, weakening of the 
nuclear attacks by the enemy from the 
direction of the oceans, and participating 
in the operations conducted by ground forces 
in the continental theatres of military 
operations. In the process, the navies ''1ill 
perform a large number of complex and major 
missions. 1 
The ability of the Soviet Navy to fulfil these missions 
. bu . .; . . 
the pen.od 1967/1968 ~ been dJ.scussed Hl a previous 
chapter and subsequent developments have been discussed in 
the context of recent Soviet ship construction. We have 
also noted Gorshkov's claims on the deterrent value of the 
SSBN and the advantages of SLBMs vis-a-vis ICBMS. 
Although Gorshkov is probably well satisfied with the 
size and characteristics of his SSBN fleet, particularly 
since the introduction of the D class submarine and the 
American agreement to Soviet numerical superiority in this 
field at the SALT I negotiations, the question of countering 
enemy sea based nuclear attacks is still a major problem. 
The facts of geography impose limitations on the Soviet Union's 
ability to mount large underwater submarine detection systems 
and they also suggest that American SSBNs do not necessarily 
have to traverse geographic choke points. 
Horeover, Gorshkov is well aware that the introduction 
of nuclear propulsion units has made the task of anti-
submarine warfare far more complex in the post war period 
than it had been during World War II. The fact that German 
submarines were not driven from the seas until the destruction 
of the Nazi regime, despite the vast resources that were 
thrown into the ASW campaign and the tactical and technological 
innovations of ASW, is noted, and Gorshkov reminds his readers 
l M.S./2/1973/20. 
1.;hat must this superiority be today to 
counter nuclear powered submarines, 'i'.'hose 
combat capabilities cannot be compared 
with the ca~abilities of World war II era 
submarines. 
485 
If Gorshkov's purpose is to do no more than to advance 
the claim that an increase in SSNs is necessary for the anti-
SLOe role, as is suggested by the context, it is difficult 
to credit that the implications for the Soviet Navy's anti-
SLBM role are not fully appreciated. In addition, German 
U-boats had to approach their targets to distances of 
hundreds of metres: the modern SLBH has literally thousands 
of square miles from which to launch an attack. Moreover, 
the damage which could be inflicted by an SLBM armed with 
sixteen Poseidon type missiles each carrying ten independently 
targetted warheads during the final minutes of a war is 
horrendous, and totally incapable of being compared with the 
damage which the German U-boats were capable of inflicting 
during World viar II. 
This is not ·to suggest that Gorshkov is advocating a 
withdrawal from strategic ASW on the grounds of its 
impossibility and suggesting instead that the deterrent 
power of his own SLBMs be relied on to counter the threat. 
Indeed as we have seen in an earlier chapter, the Soviet 
Navy has given considerable attention to a damage limiting 
approach which would not only destroy a number of enemy 
SLBMs in base, but by destroying the navigational aids and 
the command and control links render surviving SLBMs much 
less flexible. 
claims 
In the series of articles under review, he specifically 
Submarines are becoming valuable anti-
submarine combatants, capable of detect.ing 
and destroying the enemy's missile carrying 
submarines.2 
l M.S./11/1972/5-6. 
2 tl.S./2/1973/18. The context makes it quite clear that 
this is a reference to SSNs. 
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That is SSNs are a valuable component in damage linliting 
strategic ASW campaignsand although they cannot ensure 100% 
success, they are essential to the ca:upaign. 
Given the relatively slow building rate of SSNs in 
the Soviet Union, it is obvious that Gorshkov is advocating 
a larger SSN component in his fleet and that this component 
will have to be developed rapidly. Moreover, it should not 
be forgotten that SSNs in addition to this strategic task 
will also have to undertake anti-SLOC missions (although 
this may be only a secondary mission) and may be called upon 
to provide protection for the Soviet tTnion's own SSBN forces. 
Whether the release of SSBN construction facilities as the 
SALT I limitations on these vessels are reached will enable 
SSN construction to increase at the desired rate is a moot 
point, but given the present size of the SSN fleet and the 
tasks it may be required to perform in a future war, it would 
not seem unreasonable for Gorshkov to be asking for more. 
In so far as the anti-carrier role is concerned, there 
is nothing in the series to suggest a change from the basic 
requirements of the 1967/8 period. Nor is there anything 
available in the open literature to suggest that the problems 
associated with the cruise missile, its launcher platforms 
and mid-course guidance requirements, have been overcome. 
The introduction of horizon range missiles, capable of being 
fired from underwater, may have removed the need for mid-
course guidance but this has been achieved at the cost of 
placing the launcher platforms within range of the ASW defences, 
which include carrier based aircraft, protecting the carriers. 
Gorshkov does claim that cruise missiles1 permit 'powerful 
1 The discussion of long range cruise missiles and the state 
of the art in the underlying technology of large array micro-
circuitry which have made possible an entirely new set of 
mincro-miniaturised electronic devices and sensors in SIPRI 
Yearbook 1975, World Armament and Disarmament (London and 
Cambridge, !Vlass; 1975) Chapter II, together with the 
development of 'smart bombs', points to possible future 
developments. However, given the recent assessment of one 
competent observer that Soviet research and development in 
this field lags by about five to ten years, it is unlikely 
that this development represents any more than ~ future 
aspiration for the Soviet Navy. 
'Offensive Missiles', Stockholm Paper 5, (SIPRI) p.24-5, 
f. n. 4. 
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and accurate attacks from great distances• 1 but this has 
alv;ays been the Soviet claim since their introduction to 
the fleet. In addition, he notes that developments in 
electronics have 'increased ship and aircraft capabilities 
to destroy surface targets, 2 a claim which is so broad 
as to be virtually meaningless for any specific context. 
The series strongly emphasises the importance of the 
Mediterranean Sea in any future nuclear conflict, perhaps 
to strengthen the case for an increase in the Soviet presence 
in this region. Gorshkov reminds his readers that 
historically the Mediterranean has been 'the foremost line 
of defence of the country when threats of aggression were 
arising from the southwest•, 3 and that in this region only 
the Navy can play a significant role in determining 'the 
overall course and outcome of the armed defence of the 
' 4 H country • ence 
(Soviet) fleet to 
there is an 'age old need 
stay there•, 5 which is as 
for the Russian 
relevant today 
as ever,if not more so,given the presence of the carriers 
and SSBNs of the Sixth Fleet. 6 
d) Navies and Peace Negotiations 
Gorshkov makes two distinct points about the 
significance of naval forces in peace negotiations. The 
first concerns the impact of naval power on the actual outcome 
of the negotiations which have followed some wars, while the 
second concerns the impact of the negotiations on the s·tatus 
of the naval forces of the vanquished power, a point more 
suitably discussed later. 
In his concluding remarks on the Crimean War, Gorshkov 
writes 
1 M.S./2/1973/17. 
2 ibid. 1 p.18. 
3 M.S. /3/1972/21. 
4 ibid., p.22. 
5 ibid. , (my addition) • 
6 ibid. , p.23. 
The significance of the Fleet in this war 
was also determined by the extent to which 
its presence in a given theatre could be 
used by diplomats of the belligerent States 
to support their position at the peace 
tables.l 
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Russia, her Black Sea Fleet overwhelmed by techno-
logically superior British and French forces 'had to accede 
to the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty', one of which 
was the prohibition against a Russian Fleet in the Black 
Sea. On the other hand, Great Britain and France having 
administered a naval defeat on the Russians 
acquired new possibilities for exerting 
pressure on Russia with the threat of 
attacks against her from the southwest, 
consolidated their control over the 
straits zone, and increased their ~ 
influence in the Near and Hiddle East.~ 
In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Russia was 
unable to achieve 'one of the main goals of the war - free 
access to the Hediterranean Sea, 3 because of a display of 
British naval might in the Turkish Straits. 4 Not only did 
this display influence the subsequent course of events, by 
forcing the Tsar to withdraw forces from Constant.inople and 
hence to give up the objective of controlling the straits, 
but it also forced a revision of the San Stefano Treaty, 
which concluded the war, at the subsequent Congress at 
Berlin. 5 
Despi·te the victories of her Army, Gorshkov concludes 
'Russia did not win the war' and he attributes this failure 
to achieve the objective to the inferiority of the Russian 
Fleet, 'sufficient only for single combat 1ili th Turkey' , in 
the face of the British presence. 6 For the modest price of 
dispatching a show of force the British were able to achieve 
1 H.S./4/1972/6. 
2 ibid. 
3 H.S./3/1972/10. 
4 ibid. 
5 M.S./4/1972/7. 
6 H.S./4/1972/8. 
subsequent occupat.ion of Cyprus: 'the most important 
strategic point in the Mediterranean•. 1 
It is clear from the style of presentation that 
Gorshkov intends these historical examples to be pondered 
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by his political masters. The failure of Russia to achieve 
the goals for which so much sacrifice had been made during 
the 1877-1878 war is laid directly to 'errors by the •rsarist 
government with regard to questions of building up the Navy•, 2 
and to the fact that 'Tsarist officials continued for a long 
time to underestimate the importance of a fleet in inter-
national rel~tions and in warfare•. 3 
What is more difficult to determine is what Gorshkov 
would have his political masters do. It is possible that 
Gorshkov is concerned to see a large proportion of his SSBN 
fleet withheld from any initial nuclear exchange, so that 
it can be used as a factor in the post- exchange bargaining. 4 
More generally, it is apparent that his example of the 
British Fleet in Russo-Turkish War 5 is designed to impress 
on his political leaders the diplomatic advantages that can 
accrue to a third party, essentially uninvolved in the actual 
combat situation, provided it has a predominant concentration 
of naval force in the area of hostilities. lvhat is required, 
is a large ocean going fleet, capable of concentrating in 
regions of importance and maintaining its predominance, which 
can only be provided if govenment adopts the appropriate 
policies and recognises 'the importance of a fleet in 
international relations and in >•mrfare'. 
l M.S./3/1972/11. 
2 M.S./3/1972/10-11. 
3 
4 
M.S./4/1972/7. 
McConnell 'Admiral Gorshkov' passim. See also MccGwire, 
Michael, 'Critique of a paper by James M. McConnell 
entitled 'Admiral Gorshkov on the Soviet Navy in War and 
Peace', 1st July 1973, mimeo,for a spirited reply. 
5 See also his account of Japanese withdrawal from the 
Liaotung Peninsula following the Sino-Japanese War of 
1884-1895, M.S./4/1972/11. 
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Naval Arms Control 
Gorshkov' s vie>vs on arms control, as revealed in 
'Navies in War and Peace' are corrtplex. He is undoubtedly a 
cautious man who believes 
Only the creation and testing of nuclear 
weapons in our country ..• forced the 
latter-day pretenders to world supremacy 
to restrain their aggressive desires.l 
u. . As such he appears to be~tough-m1nded advocate of some ideal 
military posture and an opponent of detente and compromise: 
a position which he directly associates with Lenin. 2 Thus 
he compliments the Party and the Sovie·t Government for their 
realistic appraisal of the threat posed to the Soviet Union 
by sea based nuclear weapons systems. They have 
seen that the way out of the situation 
which has been created lies in opposing 
the forces of aggression in the World 
Ocean with strategic defensive counter 
forces whose foundation consists of the 
Strategic Missile Forces and an ocean 
going Navy. 3 
For Gorshkov, 'strategic counter forces' are the 'way 
out' from the dangers of a nuclear war, and as such he opposes 
those who see in detente a 'real escape' by 'other, peaceful 
means', which are designed to promote peace and remove the 
dangers of a future conflict. 4 
This is not to sugg·est that Gorshkov regards arms 
control in general, or naval arms control in particular, as 
a bad thing. That judgement obviously depends on the outcome 
of any particular agree1nent. What he does warn against is any 
1 M.S./12/1972/1 and 2. 
2 
3 
4 
M.S./6/1972/6. 
M.S./12/1972/15. 
The quotations are from a Soviet comrnent on Brezhnev • s call 
for a limitation on distant deployment by the major naval 
powers. 
· Teplinsky, B., 'America's Naval Programmes' u.s.A.-
Economies, Politics, Ideology, No. 10, September 1972, 
translated in Survival, March/April 1973, p.SO. 
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kind of euphoria to which detente may give rise, a euphoria 
which may give rise to that 'wavering and indecisiveness at 
the crucial moments of the struggle' 1 and an underestimation 
of the enemy. 2 
Thus the treaty prohibiting the placement of nuclear 
weapons or other forms of mass destruction on the sea bed 
is applauded. The Soviet Union is credited with its 
initiation and the treaty is described as 'the first, but 
important, step' in 'a struggle against a new arms race' 3 
However, Gorshkov warns that '.ILmerican imperialists' and 
'prominent figures in u.s. military circles' are still 
interested in carving out areas of the ocean for military 
4 purposes despite the treaty. 
It is quite conceivable that Gorshkov's endorsement 
of the sea bed treaty is based on a realistic appraisal 
of the Soviet Union's technical inferiority in this area, 
a factor which in addition to the geographical disadvantages 
inherent in the Soviet Union's limited access to open waters, 
suggests a position of inferiority in these systems in 
perpetuity. To the extent that the treaty is successful 
in restraining the United States from developing this field, 
its results can be seen as being advantageous. 
. 5 
The SALT I agTeements are also welcomed. Clearly the 
ABM agreement has put a stop to a potential growth area for 
the P.V.O., which could have taken a massive amount of the 
defence budget had development in this field been continued. 
Moreover, under the terms of the Interim Agreement, the 
Soviet Union has had a position of rough parity agreed to 
in the field of strategic missiles. So far as numbers of 
SSBNs are concerned, the Soviet Union is permitted more than 
the United States and as indicated earlier, this may have 
been gained without requiring any cut back to intended Soviet 
1 M.S./6/1972/6. 
2 ibid., p.4-5. 
3 M.S./2/1973/ll. 
4 ibid., p.l4-15. 
5 M.S./12/1972/9. 
programmes. None the less, Gorshkov warns that the SALT 
agreements. notwithstanding 
The process of the approach of u.s. bases 
towards the borders of the U.S.S.R. 
continues despite measures taken by the 
Soviet Government to ease international 
tensions.l 
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The new naval base in Greece, and the basing of SSBNs 
and carrier forces in Japan, in Italy (Maddaltl!na Island) 
and the Indian Ocean are components of a 
powerful and widely dispersed military 
orgcmisation . • • directed against the 
USSR and countries of the socialist 
community.2 
The Moscow Agreements of May 1972 included a Treaty 
to Limit Incidents at Sea, which Gorshkov refers to in 
passing in the course of this series. 3 Hov1ever, in a 
July 1972 interview, Gorshkov characterised the Treaty as 
a 'practical step' t.aken to fulfil the peace prograrm:nes 
of the 24th CPSU Congress and as an 'integral part' of the 
SAL 'I' package, which was of 'historic significance' . Although 
the naval treaty opened 'possibilities for eliminating the 
Cold War at sea', Gorshkov stresses that signing bits of 
paper does not 'preclude undesirable situations'. To 
implement the agreement 'effort is needed on both sides' and 
although Gorshkov indicates that for its part, the Soviet 
Navy will make that effort the general tone of this section 
of the interview suggests that he is not expecting too much 
f h 0 4 rom t e Amer2cans. 
Gorshkov's comments on the broader aspects of naval 
arms control are primarily historical. He notes that as 
a result of various peace treaties, marking the conclusion 
l M.S./2/1973/18. 
2 ibid., p.l9. 
3 M.S./12/1972/14. 
4 Gorshkov Interview OG~NEK, 31 July 1972, p.4-5, translation 
JPRS, Translations in :::3SR Hilitary Affairs, No. 842. 
493 
of wars, the vanquished power was deprived of elements or 
all of its fleet. 1 This is used to sustain his point that 
major sea powers have always recognised the importance of 
navies as tools of foreign policy and as instruments of 
2 
war. He also notes the fact tha.t until the present, there 
had been no major attempt to implement arms limitation 
agreements on any except naval forces. 3 
Gorshkov's preference for a 'strategic defensive 
counter force' indicates a desire to build the Soviet Navy 
into a truly ocean going fleet. However, his comments on 
the naval arms limitation treaties in the interwar years 
suggests that the American experience is not Hithout its 
interest to him. He asserts that America's primary pre-
occupation throughout the negotiations, 'the diplomats war 
4 for supremacy at sea' , was to weaken the pov1er of Britain, 
then the dominant sea power, and to achieve a position of 
recognised parity. 5 Moreover, as a result of the interwar 
agreements and the fact that the British economy was 
drastically weakened by the world wars 
her ally - the U.S.A. - has displaced 
England from the throne of 'Mistress 
of the Seas'. In this connection, the 
Americans have succeeded without a war 
••• in achieving what Germany could 
not accomplish in two world wars.6 
Undoubtedly, if he could get the sort of arms control 
agreement which would enable his Navy to achieve parity with 
the United States, he would welcome it. Moreover, control 
in some fields, e.g. SSBNs u.s under the SALT I agreements, 
1 For the Russian case in the aftermath of the Crimean War, 
see M.S./3/1972/10 and M.S./4/1972/6. 
For the German case at the end of World War I, 
M.S./5/1972/15. 
2 M.S./12/1972/8-10. 
3 ibid. f p. 9. 
4 M.S./8/1972/l. 
5 
'b'd 1 1 • 
6 M.S./12/1972/10. 
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may be welcomed provided that this control is accompanied 
by development and construction in fields not covered in 
the agreement and provided that technological innovation is 
permissable in those fields covered. 
In the series, there is nothing on the control of 
deployment patterns and Gorshkov does not mention zones of 
peace, nuclear free seas or Brezhnev's statement on the 
withdrawal of fleets from distant waters. The stress on 
the utility of naval vessels in peacetime diplomacy suggests 
that he is not willing to forego these opt.ions at this stage, 
whatever the inclinations of the political leaders may be. 
l-1oreover, he may wish to enlighten his political masters on 
these matters, so that they too will not pursue these 
matters beyond propagandist utterances. 
'l'he Central Importance of Policy Decisions to the Grovrth 
of the Navy 
Throughout the series, Gorshkov can be seen as 
advocating and educating. He is reinforcing lessons which, 
whatever we may think of his treatment of history, are not 
at variance with commonly accepted doctrines of naval power 
held in the West. 
He stresses that the role of the Navy has changed in 
a world in which nuclear war is a possibility and advocates 
that this change in role be recognised. He spends a great 
deal of time showing the importance of naval power to Russia 
and the Soviet Union in the past and its particular importance 
in a thermo-nuclear world Hhere SLBHs are held to be 'an 
even more effective means of deterrence' than land·- based 
ICBMs. 1 Should thermo-nuclear war come 'naval forces are 
more 
land 
stable against 
2 forces'. 
the effects of nuclear Heaponry than 
If there is no thermo-nuclear war, but armed hostilities 
l M.S./2/1973/20. 
2 M.S./2/1972/7. 
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continue to occur at lower levels of violence, Gorshkov 
stresses the importance of the navy in defending state 
interests on the seas and oceans and in the defence of the 
country from possible attacks from the direction of the seas 
1 
and oceans. He is also concerned to show his readers the 
importance of naval forces, widely deployed, in peacetime 
and the advantages which can accrue to a nation possessing 
such a force. While ~>Tarning of the dangers which may arise 
if detente leads to an ill founded euphoria, he is not 
opposed to armscontrol, but seeks to use naval arms control 
to improve the naval might of the Soviet Union vis a vis 
the United States. 
Having shown his readers what benefits naval power 
can confer on a country in its international relations and 
during war he indicates what is necessary if these benefits 
are to be realised. In its most general terms what is 
required is a 'balanced fleet', the actual structure of which 
is revealed by 
an objective analysis (which) permits the 
determination of the necessary and 
sufficient composition of forces in their 
most rational combination.2 
We have highlighted specific areas where Gorshkov's concern 
seems to be most apparent. He wants more of everything 
except SSBNs and undoubtedly there are technological 
innovations here, such as the MIRVING of the SLBMs, which 
he may want. 
This process of advocacy and education is desir;ned to 
persuade others of the importance of a strong and powerful 
fleet, so that the Navy can be saved from the fundamental 
weakness which beset the Tsarist Fleet: the fact that the 
political leaders 
often did.not understand the r.ole of the 
l M.S./2/1973/16. 
2 M.S./2/1973/20. 
Fleet wi t.hin the system of the country's 
armed forces and underestimated its 
capabilities .1 
What is required is a policy based firmly on a clear 
appreciation of the importance of sea power in war and 
peace which will result in Gorshkov's balanced fleet. It 
seems clear that the actual specific requirements will be 
provided by the naval experts who will calculate 
by methods of mathematical analysis, by 
solving a system of multi critical problems 
for various variants of the situation and 
different combinations of heterogeneous 
forces and means.2 
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the actual requirements of a balanced fleet. This analysis 
will take into account expected technological advances 3 and 
the capabilities of the opponents naval forces. 4 
However, all this analysis and calculation will be to 
no avail unless the political will is there to allocate the 
necessary resources for 
a policy taking into account the country's 
need for sea power is an important factor 
determining the nature of naval construction 
promoting the mobilisation of its 
capabilities for the indicated purpose, and 
is an indispensable condition for the 
development of sea power.5 
Despite the dubious claim that 
In contrast to the ruling circles of Tsarist 
Russia, who did not understand the role of 
the Navy in the military might of the 
country, the Communist Party and the Soviet 6 Governn1ent attached greatest importance to it. 
Gorshkov's dissatisfaction with the growth of the Navy is 
1 M.S./3/1972/8. 
2 M.S./2/1973/20. 
3 M.S./5/1972/16. 
4 M.S./6/1972/4-5. 
5 M.S./2/1973/25. 
6 M.S./6/1972/13. 
obvious. There is a note of criticism in the remark 
As is well known, through the •11ill of the 
CPSU Central Committee, a course has been 
charted in our country toward the construction 
of an ocean going navy whose base consists 
of nuclear powered submarines of various 
types ••. 
However, a modern fleet, designed to conduct 
combat operations against a strong enemy, 
cannot be only an underseas fleet.l 
Gorshkov is not unaware of the costs likely to be 
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imposed on the economy and 
his ambitious plans are 
that such costs must be 
to 
Soviet society 
be fulfilled. 
as a whole, if 
Hmvever, he argues 
faced squarely by the political 
leadership and invokes Lenin to support his claim: 'Every 
revolution can only stand if it is able to defend itself'. 2 
Moreover, if the political leadership is to convince 
the Soviet people that sacrifices to their immediate prospects 
of improved living conditions are worthwhile, then there needs 
to be a return to the view which recognises the importance 
of the support of the entire people for the outcome of the 
armed struggle and therefore, makes the importance of military 
affairs an inseparable part of the people's daily lives. 3 
Gorshkov cites two historical examples of the Russian people's 
allegedly making the necessary sacrifices in order to develop 
4 
a more powerful navy. 
Gorshkov would appear to 
In view of the sacrifices required, 
5 
oppose detente to the extent that 
that process either weakened the politicians resolve to 
demand the measures necessary to build the fleet, or led to 
a reluctance on the part of the people to accept the necessity 
of these measures. 
While he quotes with approval Brezhnev's statement to 
l M.S./2/1973/19. 
2 M.S./6/1972/3. 
3 M.S./6/1972/4. 
4 M.S./3/1972/11 and M.S./4/1972/20. 
5 As is seen most clearly in his warning on the falseness 
of wavering and indecisiveness. 
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the 24th Party Congress 'Everything that the people have 
created must be reliably protected', 1 the series as a whole 
suggests that he would like to see such declarations 
implemented in policy terms and that a major beneficiary 
of the resultant policy should be the Soviet Navy. 
l M.S./2/1973/25. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet 
Navy in the post·· war era can be adequately explained as a 
particular response to the changing strategic environment. 
The particulars of the response have been shaped by Soviet 
military doctrine, a doctrine which has drawn no clear cut 
distinction between the requirements for deterrence and actual 
war fighting, despite the attempted policy of strategic bluff 
engaged in by the political leadership in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. In addition naval growth has been affected by 
changing assumptions regarding the role of the navy in a 
future war, inter-and intra-service competition for shares of 
the defence budget, the industrial and technical capabilities 
of the Soviet Union, the impact of the political leadership 
and geographical factors. 
In the above analysis and description of Soviet naval 
growth major changes in ship construction programmes, armaments 
and deployment patterns have been shown to be specific responses 
to changes in the naval capabilities of the Soviet Union's major 
adversary, the United States. In the immediate post war period, 
at Stalin's insistence, the Soviet Navy built a force capable 
of controlling the coastal waters and in particular the Baltic. 
Such a force, operating under land based air cover, could repel 
a sea borne invasion and lend support to army units operating 
in the coastal zone. When a new threat emerged, in the form 
of carrier launched sea based strikes, the Soviet Union 
dramatically abandoned its previous programme of ship con-
struction and moved towards the development of an anti-carrier 
navy based on smaller, SSM armed, surface ships and submarines 
and ASM armed aircraft. The Northern Fleet was strengthened 
in recognition of the importance of the Barents Sea area. 
Initial units of the SSM armed navy were conversions from the 
previous programme and entered service in the late 1950s. 
Subsequent developments, the introduction of a number of SAM 
armed vessels and the rapid growth of the SSGN component of 
:;.-00 
the fleet were a response to the increased range of carrier 
borne aircraft necessitated by t.he fact that no reliable 
P(l!·v,deJ 
fighter protection could be ~0C~ beyond the reach of 
shore based aircraft. 
It is now apparent, since the function of the SS-N-10 
has been clarified, that a reassessment in the late 1950s 
resulted in a major shift toward developing an anti-submarine 
capability for t.he surface vessels scheduled to appear at the 
end of the 1960s and into the 1970s. At this stage it is 
still uncertain whether the ASW programme was designed to 
combat a submarine launched cruise missile threat or an SLBH 
threat. If the latter it suggests that Soviet assessments of 
the characteristics of the U.S. SSBN fleet and its future 
development were sadly astray. 
It would be a mistake however, to see the growth of the 
Soviet Navy solely in terms of a response to developments in 
the navies of the NATO allies and the U.S. Navy in particular. 
The Soviet Union had developed an SSB1 the z.v. class 1 by 
the mid-1950s and the launching of its first SSBN occurred in 
1958. This rapid development of an admittedly unsophisticated 
system was undertaken to provide the Soviet Union with a 
reasonably reliable means of delivering a direct strike on the 
continental United States. It is important to bear in mind 
that the SSE and SSBN programmes produced no new vessels in the 
period 1962/3-1967, although longer range missiles were fitted 
to existing units. In this period the anti-surface ship SSGN 
progrmnme delivered some 27 E-II units. Since 1967 when the 
first of .the Y class SSBNs entered service the Soviet Navy has 
strengthened its SSBN force which now stands at some 48 boats 
of Y and D classes. The Y class vessels, although able to 
transit and launch missiles without surfacing,do require pro-
tection. The United States has taken advantage of its free 
access to the high seas and its long coast lines to construct 
submarine detection systems and it has exploited the Soviet 
Union's need to transit its Y class submarines through confined 
waters before reaching the high seas by establishing ASW 
l-Jarriers at the choke points. Horeover the Soviet Union now 
has high value surface vessels of its own which require 
protection. 
SOl 
Soviet moves to fonvard deployment may also be accounted 
for primarily in terms of reaction to sea based threats. 
Initial deployments were made to the Mediterranean in the late 
1950s 1 following the introduction of nuclear weapons and longer-
ranged aircraft to u.s. attack carriers. These deployments, 
in which W class submarines were the main attack force, con-
tinued until the Soviet Navy lost the use of Albanian ports. 
Soviet vessels began exercising on a regular basis in the 
waters west of Norway in the early 1960s following initial 
anti~carrier exercises in the late 1950s and returned to the 
Mediterranean in 1963/4. Port agreements were reached with 
the Egyptians in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. The 
return to the Mediterranean followed U.S. deployment of the 
longer ranged Polaris SSBNs to the area and the arrival of the 
SSBN tender Proteus at Rota in Spain. Finally the low level, 
but highly visible, Indian Ocean presence was established after 
the possibility of an SSBN threat from this region had been 
established. 
Forward deployment was a novel experience for the Soviet 
Navy. It required vessels capable of operating at a distance 
from home base in a variety of weather conditions, crews trained 
in a variety of new operational areas, familiarization with 
01"iJ 
new areas,/.where possible a measure of air surveillance, access 
to foreign facilities,aarl in some cases the establishment of 
their own forward facility areas and an auxiliary fJ.eet capable 
of sustaining forward deployment. While area familiarization 
could only be gained once a specific deployment had been under-
taken the navy's unpreparedness for such operations, together 
with the activities of vessels on forward deployment, strengthen 
the contention that the Soviet Navy was responding to events. 
The move to fo~-waJ=d deployment has enabled the Soviet 
Union to take advantage of its increased naval presence for 
diplomatic purposes, some of v1hich have been related to the 
Soviets' needs for facilities in the areas to which deployments 
.:;'Ul 
have been made. In addition the availability of vessels in 
a variety of areas has enabled the USSR to probe U.S. resolve 
on a number of issues; the introduction of nuclear powered 
submarines to the Carribean,and u.s. support for a variety of 
regimes in areas where the Soviet Navy has established a 
presence. The Soviet Union has also been able to indicate, in 
a reasonably low level manner, military support for friendly 
regimes and interest and concern in a nwnber of regional 
disputes_.through a mixture of timely port visits, inter-
positioning elements of its own naval forces amidst elements 
of the u.s. fleet and supplying arms. However it would appear 
that these aspects of naval diplomacy are benefits accruing 
from a naval presence whose formal raison d'etre is ~tb 
i::o 
enhanc<inl!F ~ Soviet ASW capability or 1>00 attempt®<i! closure, 
by way of diplomatic pressure from littoral powers, of oceanic 
spaces to enemy SSBN deployments. 
* * * * * * 
The historical development of the Soviet Navy had been 
affected by the dominant role of other branches of the armed 
services in Soviet strategic planning, by the fact that 
historically the Soviet Union has fought primarily continental 
wars and by the fact that Soviet naval vessels have had limited 
access to the open seas. Are these factors still of 
significance or has the change in the strategic environment and 
the course of Soviet naval development been such as to overcome 
what previously had been regarded as a geographical handicap 
o I fens, ._ ... e_ 
anc~ t:o afford the Navy a major,<.role in Soviet strategy? 
The major fleet areas of the Soviet Navy are still in the 
North, the Pacific, the Black Sea and Baltic and hence the navy 
is still subject to the possibility of being confined within 
limited waters. Within these fleet areas the navy has become 
more secure from external attack as a result of the post World 
War II settlements and because of the dispersal of facilities 
within the fleet areas. Whereas this may enhance the security 
of vessels from attack it does little to solve the problems of 
access to the high seas except in the Pacific where major 
concentrations of submarines are to be found at Petropavlovsk, 
outside the Sea of Japan. Only in the event of the Soviet 
Union dominating the egress points could access to the high 
seas be secured for its surface vessels. Although its 
submarine forces would be affected to a lesser extent the fact 
that a series of ASW barrier systems have been erected at the 
egress points and at subsequent choke points poses some 
difficulties for Soviet naval planners in the event of future 
hostilities. This fact was no doubt one important consideration 
in the development of the long ranged SLBM fi·tted to the D class 
submarine which does not have to leavP the well protected fleet 
areas of the North or Pacific to strike important targets in 
the United States. 
Forward deployment has to some extent overcome the 
immediate problems of access to the high seas. In peace time 
the Soviet Union is free to send its vessels where it will 
subject to the constraints of the law of the sea. It may also 
use a variety of ports, on a commercial basis, for refueling 
and resupply and enter agreements with sovereign states to 
establish facilities capable of supporting vessels on forward 
deployment. Should hostilities break out however the ability 
of the Soviet Union to use these facilities may be curtailed. 
In addition the survival of the surface vessels could not be 
guaranteed for any length of time. 
This latter problem can be seen in the Mediterranean 
where the presence of u.s. sea based nuclear strike forces 
continues to pose a major threat to the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets have responded by establishing a major presence in the 
region drawing on units from the Black Sea, subject to the 
constraints of the Montreux Convention, the Baltic and the 
Northern fleets. If the Soviets, through sheer numbers and 
ability to "launch the first salvo", eliminate the attack 
carriers and destroy a number of SSBNs on patrol they 1vill have 
accomplished their mission. Should they fail in the initial 
exchange their chances of reinforcement or returning to base 
areas for repair and re-equipment must be rated as slight. The 
fact that many Soviet vessels appear to carry no reloads for 
their missile system underlies the importance of t.he first 
salvo. 
Soviet vessels have little ability to maintain combat 
stability while they are without reliable and continuous air 
cover available to the NATO allies through the U.S. attack 
carriers. 
With regard to the navy's role within Soviet military 
strategy two points need to be made: 
1. The Soviet Union has a military strategy to which 
the various branches of the armed forces make a 
contribution. 
2. The so called "Revolution in Military Affairs" has 
significantly altered the importance of the 
contribution which the navy can make to aspects of 
Soviet strategy. 
The Soviet Navy is no longer regarded solely as the loyal 
assistant to the ground forces but as late as 1968 the authors 
of Soviet Military Strategy, none of whom were naval officers, 
were still of the opinion that naval activities could hardly 
have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war. Important 
sections of Gorshkov's "Navies in War and Peace" indicate that 
the Wavy's Commander-in-Chief is concerned that military and 
political leaders still do not recognise the important con-
tribution which the navy can make in furthering Soviet 
objectives in war and peace and that the navy has not shaken 
off its status as the junior service. 
There has been a relatively recent degree of consensus 
that the Navy, together \vi th the Strategic Rocket Forces, will 
play a major role in launching strategic strikes in any future 
war fought between the major nuclear powers. Yet it should 
not be forgotten that institutional recognition of this fact, 
by way of appointing a senior naval officer, Labov, to the 
position of Assistant Chief of General Staff, was not afforded 
until 1973. Indeed the potential importance of the SLBM appears 
to have been underrated for a considerable period of time 
following its initial appearance in the mid 1950s when it was 
arguably the mos·t reliable means of launching a direct attack 
in the United States. In the period 1962/3 to 1967 no nel¥ 
SSBN was added to the Soviet fleet although longer ranged 
missiles with undenvater launch capability were retrofitted 
to existing units. Whether this hiatus was due to dissatis-
faction with the then existing SSBN propulsion units and 
missiles, a decision to wait for the new generation equipment 
incorporated into the Y class, the recognition of a more 
pressing need (SSGNs in an anti-carrier or anti-surface ship 
role) or because Khrushchev thought that deterrence could be 
adequately provided with a minimal number of land based ICBHs, 
is difficult to determine with precision. What is certain is 
that the essential parity of ICBHs and SLBMs as contributors 
to a nuclear attack was not recognised until 1964 when 
Malinovsky linked the two as the major components of the Soviet 
strategic strike force. Whether this status for the SLBM was 
generally agreed to is doubtful for in the third edition of 
~iet Military Strategy,published in 19681 the role of the 
SSBN was confined to strikes against coastal targets. Gorshkov 
himself appears not to be content with the apparent concensus 
on parity for in his "Navies in War and Peace" he argues that 
the secrecy and mobility of SSBNs makes them relatively 
invulnerable to attack, a decided advantage vis-a-vis land 
based missiles. 
The major offensive role of the SSBN branch of the Navy 
under conditions of nuclear war has been recognised but what 
is equally apparent is the fact that the rest of the ;"avy has 
not been afforded the same treatment,despite the efforts of 
naval spokesman to stress the need for balanced growth. At a 
superficial level this is apparent in the fact that in speeches 
given on official military occasions the Navy is always 
mentioned last. More significantly it is seen in the fact that 
naval ship building facilities given over to merchant 
construction in the late 1950s have not reverted to the navy. 
In addition the Soviet Navy has not developed an aircraft carrier 
fleet capable of establishing sea control enabling it to under-
take offensive war time op~rations. 
It does appear t.hat the Navy has been able to justify 
the construction of a variety of surface vessels with an ASW 
capabili·ty. It is difficult to determine whether or not these 
vessels, at least in their initial conception, were seen as 
being used for strategic ASW purposes. Outside the relatively 
confined v1aters of the Mediterranean and the Barents Sea the 
surface vessels, designated large anti-submarine ships,appear 
to have limited utility in this role, given the range of 
present and projected SLBMs and t.he nature of their launching 
platforms. Even within these >vaters it is by no means apparent 
that they could achieve a degree of success sufficient to 
warrant the emphasis which has been placed on this type of 
vessel since the mid 1960s and which continues to the present. 
It is therefore likely that a number of these vessels will be 
used to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union's own SSBNs 
and in particular the Y class boats which need to gain access 
to the high seas before they can target the United States. The 
ASW armed surface vessels are at least in part an attempt to 
overcome the hunter killer submarine component of the ASW 
activities of the Soviet Union's adversaries. 
The Soviet Union's primary defence against SLBMs still 
rests with the Strategic Rocket Forces and such of its own SLBM 
forces as are directed against enemy submarine bases, communi-
cations and navigation facilities. No doubt research aimed at 
achieving an ASl'l' breakthrough is under way and Soviet vessels 
are involved in gathering oceanographic data and conducting 
exercises designed to prepare them for an offensive ASW role, 
but as yet there appears no Soviet answer to the problems of 
combatting enemy SSBNs on patrol. 
is 
Reports that the Soviet Union~developing a short range 
ballistic missile for shipboard use have caused some concern 
for it is alleged by some commentators that such a development 
would give the Navy a greater role in operations against enemy 
SSBNs and concentrations of surface ships at sea. However I 
think that such a development is impossible. It suggests a 
greater degree of targetting flexibility for the missile than 
is possible. A ballistic missile is not a free fire system. 
It cannot, like a rifle, be aimed in any direction at >vill. 
Ballistic missiles follow a trajectory from one fixed point 
to another and the precise location of these fixed points and 
their distance must be known,in advance, for the missile to be 
prograrr®ed. Neither of these conditions would apply in the 
case of the alleged new shipboard ballistic missile. 
The subordinate position of the Navy, except for the 
SLBM branch, and its primarily defensive strategy is explicable. 
The Soviet Union is still in important respects a continental 
power. In any future war, be it a nuclear missile war or a 
conventional war, the U.S.S.R. will not be dependent on its 
overseas trade routes. It will, if necessary, seek to expel 
nAG/e.:;r 
hostileJ-forces from the Eurasian land mass as quickly as possible. 
In either case the ground forces will bear the major burden for 
the success of this task and the navy will be called on to 
effect a sea denial strategy limited to the coastal waters of 
the territory it coMnands and to assist the armed forces 
operating in the coastal zones by effecting amphibious landings. 
In the event of a missile war it will contribute to the 
strategic attack and seek to play its part in eliminating 
hostile sea based weapons systems. For its contribution to 
the strategic attack it will not require control of the sea 
except to the extent that such coritrol is essen~ial to suppress 
ASW barriers erected against its SSBNs. To eliminate sea based 
weapons systems it appears over reliant on the success of the 
1 first salvo 1 • If its initial strikes are unsuccessful it vlill 
be unable to effect a sea denial strategy at any distance from 
its shore for it lacks effective air support. That such support 
is essential for achieving objectives on the high seas has long 
been recognised by a faction of serving naval officers >vho have 
argued for a more offensive naval strategy. Such a capacity has 
been denied to the navy. It is unnecessary in a navy whose role, 
in many important respects ,is primarily defensive, and lvhich is 
expected to use the cloak of invulnerability conferred by peace 
to prepare for a successful 'first salvo' should war occur. 
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